Investment preference for either technical or operational energy efciency measures to achieve sustainable maritime shipping

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- Investigación (FEE) [923]
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Investment preference for either technical or operational energy efciency measures to achieve sustainable maritime shippingData
2023Cita bibliográfica
Longarela-Ares, A., Calvo-Silvosa, A. & Pérez-López, J-B. (2023). Investment preference for either technical or operational energy efficiency measures to achieve sustainable maritime shipping. Environment, Development and Sustainability. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-023-03991-7
Resumo
[Abstract]: The reduction in energy consumption in shipping is a crucial issue to achieve a more sustainable sector. Nevertheless, investments in energy efciency are inhibited by barriers.
Consequently, under a Principal-Agent approach, this study aims to analyze the factors
afecting the investment preference for either technical or operational measures. To date,
the research problem has barely been addressed from a similar approach. This work further
integrates agency theory with the identifcation of barriers and drivers, as well as the cost–
beneft ratio from both an environmental and a fnancial perspective. This makes it possible
to consider shipping management from a more comprehensive perspective. The study sample is current and representative (658 individual bulk carriers). The research was carried
out utilizing two binominal logistic models that provide similar results when testing the
proposed hypotheses. The outcomes show that regulatory factors, such as the distance of a
vessel’s technical emissions from EEDI requirements (standardized coefcients: −2.8352
and −2.5069), and Principal-Agent problems, such as split incentives (standardized coefcients: −1.0059 and −0.9828), have the greatest infuence on investment preferences. As a
consequence of Principal-Agent problems, vessels operating under Time Charter contracts
are less likely to invest in technical measures than in operational ones. Verifed information
and activity promote technical measures. Maritime regulation promotes technical measures in younger vessels, especially those meeting only the minimum requirements. Better
knowledge can help achieve a more environmentally responsible shipping sector. The role
of shipowners and charterers should be highlighted, and transparency should be promoted
to enable well-informed decisions to be made.
Palabras chave
Agency theory
Barriers
Binomial logistic regression
Drivers
Investment decisions
Maritime transport
Barriers
Binomial logistic regression
Drivers
Investment decisions
Maritime transport
Versión do editor
Dereitos
Atribución 4.0 Internacional
ISSN
1387-585X