Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence
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Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidenceData
2012Cita bibliográfica
Helland, L., Hovi, J., & Monkerud, L. (2012). Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence. European Journal of Government and Economics, 1(2), 106-125. https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2012.1.2.4280
Resumo
[Abstract] Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects
Palabras chave
Overlapping generations
Last period effects
Legislatures
Last period effects
Legislatures
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Atribución 4.0 España
ISSN
2254-7088