• Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs 

      Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria; García-Jurado, Ignacio; Meca Martínez, Ana; Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo (Elsevier B.V., 2024-03)
      [Absctract]: In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the ...
    • On benefits of cooperation under strategic power 

      Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria; García-Jurado, Ignacio; Meca Martínez, Ana; Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo (Springer, 2020-05)
      [Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy ...