dc.contributor.author | Novo Peteiro, Jose Antonio | |
dc.contributor.author | Mendez Naya, Jose | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-02-07T17:25:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-02-07T17:25:03Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Méndez-Naya, J., & Novo-Peteiro,J. A. (2023). Partial privatization with endogenous choice ofstrategic variable.Managerial and Decision Economics,44(2),1215–1227.https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3743 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 0143-6570 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2183/35487 | |
dc.description.abstract | [Abstract] This paper analyzes the optimal privatization policy when firms endogenously choose their strategic variable. The level of privatization is shown to determine: (i) the choice of strategic variable, whereby an asymmetric equilibrium could emerge (either Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot); (ii) the stability of equilibrium when the partially privatized firm and the private firm choose quantity and price respectively as the strategic variable; and (iii) the level of welfare, whereby Cournot–Cournot and Bertrand–Cournot games could lead to a greater welfare than the Bertrand–Bertrand model | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Wiley | es_ES |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3743 | es_ES |
dc.rights | CC BY NC ND | es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.subject | Partial privatization | es_ES |
dc.subject | Strategic variable | es_ES |
dc.subject | Mixed oligopoly | es_ES |
dc.title | Partial Privatization with Endogenous Choice of Strategic Variable | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.rights.access | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
UDC.journalTitle | Managerial and Decision Economics | es_ES |
UDC.volume | 44 | es_ES |
UDC.issue | 2 | es_ES |
UDC.startPage | 1215 | es_ES |
UDC.endPage | 1227 | es_ES |