Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms

Bibliographic citation

Martín-Legendre, J.I., Sánchez-Gabarre, M.E. & Sánchez-Santos, J.M. (2026). Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms. Managerial and Decision Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70153.

Type of academic work

Academic degree

Abstract

[Abstract] This paper examines strategic responses to alternative enforcement designs in professional basketball. Using NBA player-level panel data, we study two anti-flopping reforms: ex post financial fines introduced in 2012–2013 and in-game technical fouls implemented in 2023–2024. We estimate before-and-after models with player fixed effects, allowing responses to vary with pre-reform foul-drawing intensity. Because flopping is not directly observed in public data, we use shooting fouls drawn per game as our main proxy. We find a clear compression of the right tail of the foul-drawing distribution after both reforms. Players with higher pre-reform shooting foul-drawing rates reduce them by 0.20 to 0.40 fouls per game relative to lower-exposure players, whereas league-wide averages remain largely unchanged. Event-study evidence suggests that the 2023 reform is followed by a sharp reversal of pre-existing trends, whereas the 2012 reform appears to reinforce an ongoing adjustment. Within a unified framework, we do not find statistically significant differences in deterrent effects between financial and in-game sanctions. Overall, the results highlight the importance of enforcement design when the regulated behaviour is imperfectly observed.

Description

Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG

Rights

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International