Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms

UDC.coleccionInvestigación
UDC.departamentoEconomía
UDC.grupoInvOrganizacións Sociais, Institucións e Mercados
UDC.institutoCentroECOBAS - Centro de Investigación Interuniversitario en Economía e Empresa para a Sociedade
UDC.journalTitleManagerial and Decision Economics
dc.contributor.authorMartín-Legendre, Juan-Ignacio
dc.contributor.authorSánchez-Gabarre, Mary Elena
dc.contributor.authorSánchez Santos, José Manuel
dc.date.accessioned2026-11-18T19:02:52Z
dc.date.available2026-11-18T19:02:52Z
dc.date.issued2026
dc.descriptionFinanciado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG
dc.description.abstract[Abstract] This paper examines strategic responses to alternative enforcement designs in professional basketball. Using NBA player-level panel data, we study two anti-flopping reforms: ex post financial fines introduced in 2012–2013 and in-game technical fouls implemented in 2023–2024. We estimate before-and-after models with player fixed effects, allowing responses to vary with pre-reform foul-drawing intensity. Because flopping is not directly observed in public data, we use shooting fouls drawn per game as our main proxy. We find a clear compression of the right tail of the foul-drawing distribution after both reforms. Players with higher pre-reform shooting foul-drawing rates reduce them by 0.20 to 0.40 fouls per game relative to lower-exposure players, whereas league-wide averages remain largely unchanged. Event-study evidence suggests that the 2023 reform is followed by a sharp reversal of pre-existing trends, whereas the 2012 reform appears to reinforce an ongoing adjustment. Within a unified framework, we do not find statistically significant differences in deterrent effects between financial and in-game sanctions. Overall, the results highlight the importance of enforcement design when the regulated behaviour is imperfectly observed.
dc.description.sponsorshipFunding for open access charge: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG
dc.identifier.citationMartín-Legendre, J.I., Sánchez-Gabarre, M.E. & Sánchez-Santos, J.M. (2026). Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms. Managerial and Decision Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70153.
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/mde.70153
dc.identifier.issn1099-1468
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2183/50301
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70153
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectDeterrence
dc.subjectEnforcement design
dc.subjectImperfect monitoring
dc.subjectNBA
dc.subjectSports regulation
dc.subjectStrategic behaviour
dc.titleEnforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery08528538-6576-498a-9cd0-cc2740e4c087

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