Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms
| UDC.coleccion | Investigación | |
| UDC.departamento | Economía | |
| UDC.grupoInv | Organizacións Sociais, Institucións e Mercados | |
| UDC.institutoCentro | ECOBAS - Centro de Investigación Interuniversitario en Economía e Empresa para a Sociedade | |
| UDC.journalTitle | Managerial and Decision Economics | |
| dc.contributor.author | Martín-Legendre, Juan-Ignacio | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sánchez-Gabarre, Mary Elena | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sánchez Santos, José Manuel | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-11-18T19:02:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-11-18T19:02:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2026 | |
| dc.description | Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG | |
| dc.description.abstract | [Abstract] This paper examines strategic responses to alternative enforcement designs in professional basketball. Using NBA player-level panel data, we study two anti-flopping reforms: ex post financial fines introduced in 2012–2013 and in-game technical fouls implemented in 2023–2024. We estimate before-and-after models with player fixed effects, allowing responses to vary with pre-reform foul-drawing intensity. Because flopping is not directly observed in public data, we use shooting fouls drawn per game as our main proxy. We find a clear compression of the right tail of the foul-drawing distribution after both reforms. Players with higher pre-reform shooting foul-drawing rates reduce them by 0.20 to 0.40 fouls per game relative to lower-exposure players, whereas league-wide averages remain largely unchanged. Event-study evidence suggests that the 2023 reform is followed by a sharp reversal of pre-existing trends, whereas the 2012 reform appears to reinforce an ongoing adjustment. Within a unified framework, we do not find statistically significant differences in deterrent effects between financial and in-game sanctions. Overall, the results highlight the importance of enforcement design when the regulated behaviour is imperfectly observed. | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Funding for open access charge: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Martín-Legendre, J.I., Sánchez-Gabarre, M.E. & Sánchez-Santos, J.M. (2026). Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms. Managerial and Decision Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70153. | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/mde.70153 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1099-1468 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2183/50301 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Wiley | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70153 | |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | en |
| dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Deterrence | |
| dc.subject | Enforcement design | |
| dc.subject | Imperfect monitoring | |
| dc.subject | NBA | |
| dc.subject | Sports regulation | |
| dc.subject | Strategic behaviour | |
| dc.title | Enforcement Design and Targeted Deterrence in Professional Sports: Evidence From NBA Anti-Flopping Reforms | |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dc.type.hasVersion | VoR | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 08528538-6576-498a-9cd0-cc2740e4c087 | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 8d6ae0ac-5678-4ac0-83a0-5bd8ce354a25 | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | 8d2c797e-99fe-44d2-b736-2f7b583b4b3b | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 08528538-6576-498a-9cd0-cc2740e4c087 |
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