Novo Peteiro, JoséMéndez Naya, José2024-02-072024-02-072023Méndez-Naya, J., & Novo-Peteiro,J. A. (2023). Partial privatization with endogenous choice ofstrategic variable.Managerial and Decision Economics,44(2),1215–1227.https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.37430143-6570http://hdl.handle.net/2183/35487[Abstract] This paper analyzes the optimal privatization policy when firms endogenously choose their strategic variable. The level of privatization is shown to determine: (i) the choice of strategic variable, whereby an asymmetric equilibrium could emerge (either Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot); (ii) the stability of equilibrium when the partially privatized firm and the private firm choose quantity and price respectively as the strategic variable; and (iii) the level of welfare, whereby Cournot–Cournot and Bertrand–Cournot games could lead to a greater welfare than the Bertrand–Bertrand modelengCC BY NC NDhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Partial privatizationStrategic variableMixed oligopolyjournal articleopen access