Fiestras Janeiro, María GloriaGarcía-Jurado, IgnacioMeca Martínez, AnaMosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo2024-08-022024-08-022020-05Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., García-Jurado, I., Meca, A. et al. On benefits of cooperation under strategic power. Ann Oper Res 288, 285–306 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-60254-5330http://hdl.handle.net/2183/38365This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6[Abstract]: We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.engCopyright © 2019, Springer Science Business Media, LLC, part of Springer NatureAirport gamesCooperative gamesGame theoryMaxmin procedureSimple gamesStrategiesjournal articleopen access10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6