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https://hdl.handle.net/2183/49221

Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/2183/49221
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16

Publication date

2017-09-22

Authors

Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro
Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria

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Bibliographic citation

Saavedra-Nieves, A., García-Jurado, I., Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. (2018). Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed. In: Mueller, D., Trost, R. (eds) Game Theory in Management Accounting. Contributions to Management Science. Springer, Cham.

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Abstract

[Abstract]: In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs.

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This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16

Keywords

Airport game Core allocation Cost game Inventory problem Order coalition

Editor version

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16

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© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG. (https://www.springernature.com/gp/open-science/policies/accepted-manuscript-terms).

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