Null, Nullifying, and Necessary Agents: Parallel Characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley Values

UDC.coleccionInvestigación
UDC.departamentoMatemáticas
UDC.endPage1035
UDC.grupoInvModelización, Optimización e Inferencia Estatística (MODES)
UDC.journalTitleJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
UDC.startPage1027
UDC.volume180
dc.contributor.authorAlonso-Meijide, José Mª
dc.contributor.authorCosta, Julián
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Jurado, Ignacio
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-23T16:32:31Z
dc.date.available2025-10-23T16:32:31Z
dc.date.issued2018-09
dc.descriptionThis version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1403-5.
dc.description.abstract[Abstract]: In a cooperative game, we consider three special kinds of agents: null, nullifying, and necessary agents. A coalition with a null agent receives the same payoff if this agent leaves the coalition, a coalition with a nullifying agent receives nothing, and a coalition without a necessary agent also receives nothing. The null agent property proposes zero payoff to any null agent. We introduce new properties that propose payoffs for nullifying and necessary players. With these three properties and additivity, we obtain new characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work has been supported by the ERDF, the MINECO/AEI grants MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2017/38 and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01).
dc.description.sponsorshipXunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015
dc.description.sponsorshipXunta de Galicia; ED431C-2017/38
dc.description.sponsorshipXunta de Galicia; ED431G/01
dc.identifier.citationAlonso-Meijide, J.M., Costa, J. & García-Jurado, I. Null, Nullifying, and Necessary Agents: Parallel Characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley Values. J Optim Theory Appl 180, 1027–1035 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1403-5
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10957-018-1403-5
dc.identifier.issn0022-3239
dc.identifier.issn1573-2878
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2183/46083
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P/ES/OPTIMIZACION Y COOPERACION CON APLICACIONES EN ECONOMIA, ENERGIA Y LOGISTICA/
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1403-5
dc.rights© 2018, Springer Science Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature. Subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use (https://www.springernature.com/gp/open-research/policies/accepted-manuscript-terms)
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subjectBanzhaf value
dc.subjectShapley value
dc.subjectAxiomatic characterizations
dc.subjectNull agent
dc.subjectNullifying agent
dc.subjectNecessary agent
dc.titleNull, Nullifying, and Necessary Agents: Parallel Characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley Values
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionAO
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublicationcb3b1824-aa6b-4d54-aa7a-780e0247594b
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb4c2fa0c-48b8-4512-ad34-1ed4bb223b54

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