Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names
| UDC.coleccion | Investigación | |
| UDC.departamento | Matemáticas | |
| UDC.endPage | 825 | |
| UDC.grupoInv | Modelización, Optimización e Inferencia Estatística (MODES) | |
| UDC.journalTitle | Group Decision and Negotiation | |
| UDC.startPage | 805 | |
| UDC.volume | 28 | |
| dc.contributor.author | García-Jurado, Ignacio | |
| dc.contributor.author | Méndez-Naya, Luciano | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-10-24T08:54:52Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-10-24T08:54:52Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-06-10 | |
| dc.description | This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6 | |
| dc.description.abstract | [Abstract]: In this paper we revisit the rule of k names from a game theoretic perspective. This rule can be described as follows. Given a set of candidates for a position, a committee (formed by the proposers) selects k elements of that set using a screening rule; then a single individual from outside the committee (the chooser) chooses for the position one of the k selected candidates. In this context we first give conditions for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then we provide conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria when the screening rule is majoritarian. Finally, we show that when the chooser can strategically appoint a delegate to choose on behalf of him, the conditions for the existence of subgame perfect q-strong equilibria are weaker. | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This work has been supported by the ERDF, the MINECO/AEI grants MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P, MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P, and by the Xunta de Galicia (Grupo de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01). | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Xunta de Galicia; ED431C-2016-015 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | García-Jurado, I., Méndez-Naya, L. Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names. Group Decis Negot 28, 805–825 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1572-9907 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2183/46089 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Springer Nature | |
| dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P/ES/OPTIMIZACION Y REPARTO EN PROBLEMAS DE DECISION MULTI-AGENTE CON APLICACIONES EN PROBLEMAS DE RUTAS/ | |
| dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/MTM2017-87197-C3-1-P/ES/OPTIMIZACION Y COOPERACION CON APLICACIONES EN ECONOMIA, ENERGIA Y LOGISTICA/ | |
| dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/MTM2017-87197-C3-3-P/ES/OPTIMIZACION Y COOPERACION CON APLICACIONES EN ENERGIA/ | |
| dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-019-09625-6 | |
| dc.rights | © 2019, Springer Nature B.V. | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
| dc.subject | Rule of k names | |
| dc.subject | Screening rule | |
| dc.subject | Subgame perfect equilibrium | |
| dc.subject | Strong equilibrium | |
| dc.subject | Delegation | |
| dc.title | Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names | |
| dc.type | journal article | |
| dc.type.hasVersion | AM | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication | cb3b1824-aa6b-4d54-aa7a-780e0247594b | |
| relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | cb3b1824-aa6b-4d54-aa7a-780e0247594b |
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