Autonomy, Monomania and Free Development of Personality in the Clinical Relationship. to what Extent can the Autonomous Person be Protected?

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Vergara, Oscar. «Autonomy, monomania and free development of personality in the clinical relationship. To what extent can the autonomous person be protected?». Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics, 2022, Vol. 1, Núm. 13, https://doi.org/10.34810/rljaev1n13id398678.

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[Abstract]: All competent moral agents have a prima facie right to make their own health decisions. When this competence is lacking, they cease to be autonomous and someone else may justifiably make decisions for them in an act of soft paternalism that is generally admitted. The problem arises when autonomous subjects need to be protected (from themselves). This type of protection only tends to be admitted in very exceptional cases, such as suicide attempts, as a form of hard paternalism. So the question arises as to whether and to what extent this protection can be extended to certain cases in which the autonomous and competent moral agent acts according to an uncommonly singular life plan. To answer this question, we deemed it important to distinguish between freedom and autonomy, for which purpose we have adopted a eudaimonic approach.

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Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual (by-nc-sa)
Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual (by-nc-sa)

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual (by-nc-sa)