Historic Urbanization Process in Spain (1746–2013): From the Fall of the American Empire to the Real Estate Bubble

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Abstract

The aim of the article is to examine the process of urbanization in Spain in the long term. Given the delay in the consolidation of Spanish urban history, the contribution of related disciplines, such as art history and urban planning, geography, and economics is also assessed. Careful attention is paid to the identification of continuities and breaks, as well as to the contextualization of the changes in the cities in relation to their role in the national and international context. The article is divided into four parts. First, an introduction to the evolution of urban history in Spain is provided. Subsequent sections analyze the urban process in three stages: the enlightenment reforms and the end of colonial empire (1746–1833), the end of the Ancient Regime and the new capitalist development (1833–1936), and the transition from dictatorship to the integration into the European Union.

Keywords

Spain, historiography, modern history, contemporary history, urbanization

Introduction

In 2003, John Walton noted the abundance and diversity of the Spanish bibliography that could be framed in urban history,[1] but also that this discipline was not academically institutionalized: there were no teachings, associations, or conferences in urban history, nor a specific journal or synthesis of publications at the state level. From this came limited presence in international synthesis,[2] journals, and conferences. This historiographical evolution has been the result of the relationship of the discipline with the academic world and the political situation, conditioning its consolidation possibilities, the interdisciplinary practice, and the choices regarding issues, periodization, territory, etc.[3]

After the 1960s, a diversity of disciplines had been studying Spanish cities from a historical perspective,[4] something that was not exclusive to Spain. According to Cannadine, in Europe

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those who had most contributed to studying the city from a historical perspective were the historians of architecture and urban planning, the historical geographers, and the social historians.[5] But, in Spain, Francoism hampered historiographical production. After the Civil War, the academic environment suffered impoverishment, conditioned by the exile of many of its leading figures, censorship of publications and teaching, and distrust of international academia, and there were difficulties in overcoming the division of labor generated by large temporal samples (medieval, early modern, and contemporary history). In History, reliance on the official epic of the old Spanish Empire pushed scholars to study medieval Christian kingdoms and the apogee of the Habsburg, losing interest from the crisis of the mid-seventeenth century.

Historiographical normalization began in the 1960s. Early modern historians benefited from the penetration of the Annales School, and by the stay of foreign researchers, who disseminated a study model on the cities in which they discussed topics such as population, taxation, or local government.[6] The economic expansion of the 1960s was accompanied by a strong urban growth, and cities were encouraged to address General Urban Plans. Economists, geographers, architects, and town planners were called to assist in the planning and evaluation of the impact of the transformations, starting to analyze the city from a historical perspective. Geographers, in particular, who were under the influence of the French geography of the interwar years, played a significant role, as they reconstructed the historical evolution of many urban centers.[7]

During the democratic transition, the devolution of power to municipalities, the interest in assessing the impact of Franco's policies and the need to restructure urban space consolidated this practical and historicist orientation. This was the origin of the interest shown by geographers and architects in comprehending the process of constructing the city: the planning of the "enlightened" city during the eighteenth century, the creation of land values in the nineteenth century, housing estates from the Franco period, etc. All this took place in an intellectual climate of openness to international academic circles where the influence of Marxist-structuralist geography and sociology was clear. Urban historical geography boomed, going back in its research until the late nineteenth century,[8] and a good example of this was the publication of various works on the main Spanish cities.[9] In architecture,[10] and under the influence of the Schools of Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid, two key initiatives were developing: the founding of the journal *Historia Urbana*,[11] and the Historical Atlas of cities,[12] particularly the *Atlas Histórico de Ciudades Europeas*, with two separate volumes devoted to the Iberian Peninsula (1994)[13] and France (1996).[14]

Urban history in Spain faced a problem. There was a prevailing historiographical notion in Spain, which stated it had been an agricultural and rural country until the 1960s, something that would have led to a collective failure and would be the reason for various historical problems. These were the backwardness of agriculture and its inability to launch an industrial revolution,[15] the incomplete development of a class society based on the conflictive coexistence of an agrarian bourgeoisie and rural proletariat, and finally the correlative delay of the political system and the failure of the bourgeois revolution.[16]

In the 1980s, Spanish urban history began to follow, with some delay, the usual way of institutionalization of the historiography of other countries. The Spanish university system underwent large expansion while funding flowed from universities and government to regional and local studies. Economic historians became interested in the city as a driving force of modernization. Contemporary historians traced research agendas on the city: demography, urban pathologies, socio-professional structure, living conditions, labor movements, etc. Between 1987 and 1991, the four major associations of History were formed: Early Modern, Contemporary, Agrarian, and Social History. While in the latter there was a strong collaboration with early modern and medieval historians, Agrarian History extended its links to economic historians. The first two conferences of the Association of Contemporary History were held in 1992 and 1994, dedicated to the city. In 1996, *Ayer*, that association's journal, dedicated an issue to urban history, coinciding with the take-off of the discipline that occurred in the first half of the 1990s. We find here a local

response to the stimulus offered by the creation in 1989 of the European Association of Urban Historians. But it also coincides with a turning point in the country, which fell under an atmosphere of optimism that was justified by the great celebrations of 1992 and the first real estate boom, explained later.

From 1996 onwards, the great stage of Spanish economy's specialization in real estate began. This second bubble, which lasted until 2008, did not generate massive attention by economists and sociologists, despite the great interest of the contributions of scholars such as José Manuel Naredo, Miren Etxezarreta, and Vicenç Navarro. More puzzling is the fact that around 1996, at the same time that the real estate boom was beginning in Spain, that process of institutionalization of a Spanish urban history was interrupted.[17] Among the complex factors behind this, a significant weight might correspond to academic reasons, in particular the fact that the different disciplines that share the study of the city have not managed to create a common space for interdisciplinary reflection. This is crucial if we consider that a recent effort to prepare an inventory of specialists who are interested in urban issues has led to the publication of a volume with fifty-seven contributions,[18] of which less than half are seen as belonging to the field of history: above all contemporary (twenty-one), although also modern (four) or economic history (three). The rest are in the fields of geography (fourteen), art history (eleven), and architecture and urbanism (four).

Since the 1990s, degrees in Geography, History, and Art History, which shared a common phase of three years, became independent degrees in which common subjects were removed. Urban geography with historical orientation became a minority choice among geographers, who were attracted by new research niches, while new generations of historians paid limited attention to the traditional analytical tools of geographers. Furthermore, the estrangement between the research agendas of the early modern and contemporary historians was confirmed. Local studies decreased in importance in modern history,[19] as a time gap was opened with respect to contemporary historians, who were losing interest in the nineteenth century and gradually focused on the middle fifty years of the twentieth century: Second Republic, Civil War, Franco's dictatorship, and the democratic transition.[20]

In recent years, new conditions have arisen for an urban history that would be marked by interdisciplinary dialogue. Attention should also be drawn to the new body of regional studies that have been applied to the analysis of contemporary urban history.[21] These works have addressed classic topics (industrialization, urban fabric construction, infrastructure, and municipal policies) in relation to historical demographic issues (family, immigration, and labor markets) and have built a framework of sociability that extends its view to the evolution of the territories that made up the Hispanic monarchy in the Peninsula and America.[22]

The fragmentation of disciplines produces points of view that are difficult to reconcile but it also generates a plural vision, almost kaleidoscopic, on Spanish urban history. We believe this is a good time to make an overall assessment.

From the Age of Enlightenment Reforms to the Bankruptcy of the Absolute Monarchy (1746–1833)[23]

After the stagnation of the seventeenth century, the Iberian Peninsula and Europe experienced a demographic growth in the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1800, Spain had 11.1 percent of urban population, far from the three leading countries (England-Wales, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the latter holding the record of 29 percent). Even so, Spain had a higher percentage than the European average (10 percent) and somewhat lower than Portugal and northern Italy.[24]

Cities were trade nodes and grew on the basis of the development of colonial empires. While Mediterranean Europe was relegated by Atlantic Europe, in the Iberian Peninsula inland cities transferred their prominent role to the coastal ones, a process that in 1765-78 confirmed the loss

of the monopoly of American trade by Cadiz. By the end of the eighteenth century Madrid was still the most populous city in Spain, with 165,000 inhabitants. A number of cities had more than 50,000: Valencia (100,000), Barcelona (92,000), Seville (81,000), Cadiz (71,000), Granada and Malaga. The urban hierarchy was also driven by political and administrative criteria. The historical territories (the "Reinos") were grouped in two "Coronas" [Crowns], Castile and Aragon and were subdivided according to political-military criteria (the "Capitanías Generales"), as well as administrative and judicial criteria ("Audiencias"), benefiting their capitals: Barcelona, Zaragoza, Valencia, Granada, Seville, and Valladolid. If centralization implemented by the Bourbons deprived Barcelona of the advantages of being the capital de facto of the Crown of Aragon, its port benefited greatly from the involvement in trade with America.

Madrid was another example of the tendency to supremacy shown by European capitals, which barely exceeded one hundred thousand inhabitants (with the exceptions of Paris and London). Although Ringrose has nuanced his thesis about the parasitic nature of Madrid upon the Castilian economy,[25] the fact is that the city was the bureaucratic seat of a huge empire and required complex logistics to supply it with luxury and consumer goods, including those policies that reserved part of the cereal production around the capital and imposed fixed prices.[26] The reforms of the Age of Enlightenment sought to alleviate that problem by improving transport infrastructure: ports, waterways, and the radial network of royal roads.[27]

In Europe, life expectancy was lower in cities (especially in the large ones). Most of them suffered negative natural population growth, which was offset only by sustained immigration.[28] Consequently, municipal competencies in the Spanish monarchy focused on the population's material needs (particularly, food markets) and on public order disturbances, which were often associated to chronic shortages. In the reign of Carlos III (1759–1788) major reforms were implemented, which were closely related to those that were introduced in France under Turgot. In the food markets deregulatory policies were established, especially the free grains trade of 1765.[29] These reforms were a trigger for the public disorders related to Esquilache's Mutiny (1766). Soon after, the government reformed the public order: "Leyes de asonadas" [Riot Laws] were passed, the army in the cities received a more prominent role, and the cities themselves were reorganized into areas with neighborhood mayors that were invested with police and judicial functions. Municipal governments were also reformed, introducing the election of representatives of the "commons," who joined the inherited municipal oligarchies. The assistance policy remained in the hands of religious institutions and convents, a Spanish specificity[30] that is related to a feature of the real estate market. By 1750, in the province of Castile, the church owned more than 40 percent of urban properties and the feudal rent that was associated to them.

In the seventeenth century, while a breakthrough was taking place in Europe in disciplines that were crucial to the management of the city, Spain was plunged into a lethargy that was the result of scientific backwardness and fiscal stress.[31] Hence the impact of enlightened reforms,[32] which were systematized in Madrid during the reign of Carlos III,[33] was evident within a project of the new Bourbon dynasty to achieve a capital-scenario that would help its legitimization.[34] Major reforms of Naples (capital of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in which Carlos had been previously monarch and from where he brought a staff of technicians) could be the laboratory from where some lessons were learnt for the Spanish capital.[35] The urban police regulations had their greatest significance in Madrid. These involved hygiene measures (street drainage, waste disposal), ordinances on extramural cemeteries (which were reiterated but remained unfulfilled), lighting and public order.[36] Moreover, there were city beautification policies (urban design, regulation of the façades, alignments and tree-covered boulevards) following the model of Paris.

Some of these urban reforms were applied to a number of Spanish cities in the last third of the century,[37] and even more freely to new foundations: the villages of the inland colonization (Sierra Morena), or the naval base of Ferrol, an ex novo town of twenty-five thousand inhabitants, where something new as the social segregation by neighborhood was brutally beginning to take place.[38]

After the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the Spanish monarchy had lost its European territories in Flanders and Italy but retained its colonial possessions in America. The colonies were vital for trade and for fiscal balance. But the escalating conflict between the French and British empires, from the Seven Years War, absorbed the budget of the Spanish monarchy and slowed down or did not permit authorities to carry out large urban projects or simply limited them to wealthier neighborhoods. The Peninsular War (1808–1814) had a greater impact: the effects of Napoleon's continental blockade were added to shortages and famine, catastrophic mortality, the burdens of military occupation, etc., which left the country and some cities devastated, or significantly reduced its population (as was the case of Madrid or Zaragoza). Shortly after, the independence of most of the American colonies exacerbated the difficulties and led to fiscal bankruptcy.[39] While state revenues were reduced by half, an exponential increase in public debt was taking place.

End of the Ancient Regime, State Articulation, and Capitalist Development (1833–1936)

During the first third of the nineteenth century, the factors shaping the next half century of economic take-off and the process of urbanization in the country were starting to work. Spain began to take part in the race for industrialization, albeit with difficulties. The process required institutional reforms. In the context of the crisis of the ancient regime, the state and the administration model was transformed and a new territorial organization was built. The development of the liberal municipalities, beyond the differences between Moderates and Progressives, was linked to the building of a centralized state, following the Napoleonic model in its doctrine: wide competencies to councils, concentration of executive power in the mayor.[40] The liberal territorial organization was consolidated in 1833, after the death of Fernando VII, with the new provincial division of Javier de Burgos, which eliminated the old territorial divisions and established a network of fifty-two provinces (Figure 1).

Specifically in the case of Madrid, the process of centralization that accompanied the liberal revolution emphasized its role as a central node of the new railway system, and in general of the transportation network as a whole. Furthermore, all kinds of facilities—educational, sanitary, military, and administrative—came to be built in the capital city. Those changes were reproduced at a smaller scale in the fifty-two new provincial capitals, as many of them now assumed for the first time a significant administrative role. On the other side, the ancient capitals of the "capitanías generals" were deprived of their role. Being episcopals, these definitely lost most of their value.

According to Oyón, during the reign of Isabel II (1833–1868), the most outstanding events were the disentailments.[41] The process had received a push during the Liberal Triennial (1820–1823), above all attacking the religious properties. The main beneficiaries were the nobility and the emerging urban bourgeoisie.[42] However, the most transcendent disentailment in urban space was that of Mendizabal (1836) and, to a lesser extent, Madoz (1855),[43] as they helped to undertake important internal reforms,[44] released urban land, and disbursed capital for industrial initiatives.[45] Some properties were used to fill the urban fabric (opening public squares), or for collective facilities (areas/quarters, prisons, hospitals, charity centers, etc.). Except for Madrid and Barcelona, this provision of space enhanced growth through implosion. Monclús states that the sale of disentailed goods allowed people to absorb a part of the housing needs and public facilities during the middle decades of the century and led to a certain redistribution of ownership structure and strengthening the real-estate presence of the upper classes in the city centers.[46]

As for the legal forms of ownership, in the cradle of liberalism, urban take-off coexisted with generalized forms of overlapping domains (free holding and lease holding for ninety-nine years

Figure 1. Map of Spain including the main cities in 1833.

in England, or perpetual feud-duty in Scotland).[47] But in Spain, where overlapping domains on the land were widely spread, an idea took root, namely, that it was indispensable to establish full ownership to enable its massive entry into the market. The Bourgeoisie obtained substantial surpluses by investing in real estate values to the detriment of other productive investments.[48]

By mid-century, the country was on the verge of starting on the path of modernization. But several obstacles remained: agricultural immobility, failure of fiscal reforms, inadequacy of infrastructure, and chronic lack of resources of municipal bodies.[49] The productive structure of the country (which was hardly industrialized) and the absence of a modern financial sector lessened the gross fixed capital formation, burdening the creation of infrastructure: railways and other transportation and urban facilities. This hindered the formation of the national market and factor mobility. Although it has been argued that railways did not meet the expectations, Herranz has shown that they benefited (maybe slightly) the country.[50] Likewise, the first urban facilities (pavements, water, waste, lighting, etc.) began to be implemented as part of the second technological revolution in infrastructure.

On the other hand, Spain experienced a slow population growth, but without a real demographic transition. Mortality,[51] particularly infant mortality, was higher than in the European context: epidemics (cholera), "social" diseases (smallpox, measles, tuberculosis, etc.), and underconsumption crises (famines) that were characteristic of traditional agrarian economies, etc. The birth rate was low: there was a high level of celibacy and a very advanced marriage age. Migratory movements were not massive, being essentially intraregional (except Madrid), and did not cause significant changes in the territorial distribution of the population.

Urban planning took its first steps in 1840–1870, in an effort to approximate European urbanism. For the first time, a morphological reorganization of the inherited space was needed in a unit

vision of the city.[52] Here, a leading figure emerges, Ildefons Cerdà, who was recognized as one of the founders of the new science of urban reform and development.[53] Since Barcelona was a pioneer in Spanish industrialization, it was the first city that had to deal with the many problems posed by the new production model,[54] for which Cerdà proposed a plan of reform and extension of the city, commonly known as Plan Cerdà (1860),[55] which had a strong influence on future extension plans of Spanish cities.[56]

The state concern for housing as a public priority also emerged (Urban Extensions Act 1864 and Housing Act 1861–1864). But legal means were insufficient, and local authorities were unable to place the general interests ahead of the interest of the elites. The absence of a legal framework to manage urban growth made the implementation of global policies more difficult, with uncoordinated sector-based policies. Early efforts to overcome this framework arose with the approval of the first two Municipal Laws (1840 and 1845). The latter forced people to draft municipals ordinances. These, along with city police regulations and the new figure of the municipal architect, became the most valuable tool for urban planning.[57]

The positive impact of economic progress on the legal system is visible during the Restoration (1874–1923). The philosophy behind this is summarized by Anguita as "aligning, demolishing and rebuilding."[58] Since then, the regulation of municipal life was inspired in centralizations criteria. Successive laws and ordinances that were passed between 1846 and 1896 forced authorities to draw geometric expansion plans of the cities. The new approaches allowed the creation of spaces to which the previous planning had barely paid attention: streets and squares were designed and built following modern standards, suburbs emerged, suburban residential areas for the upper classes "bourgeoisie neighborhoods" and second residences (in the urban periphery) were outlined; spaces of sociability and leisure were opened (green areas, promenades), as well as healthcare or repressive spaces. A social horizontal segmentation began with gentrification of neighborhoods affected by interior reform and expansion projects and proletarianization of peripheries that grew based on the self-construction and degradation of historical centers. According to de Terán, by the 1880s, European avant-garde imbibed urban planning, leading to a cultural technical and legal mainstream that paid increasing attention to health.[59]

The period from 1890 to 1935 was characterized by a convergence to the patterns of European development. Historiography traditionally emphasized the idea of failure: of the liberal revolution, industrialization, etc. Recent literature has allowed us to revise these theses[60] and confirm a more solid modernization process than in the previous phase.[61] The second technological revolution began to impact on the industry, particularly the second energy transition, which enabled sector diversification. Electricity was responsible for major advances in infrastructure (transport and communication). Economic growth was slow until the World War I but it accelerated during the conflict and, in general, in the first third of the century but within a framework of social instability that was paralleled with the birth of the labor movement.[62]

Spain's remarkable (with nuances, as was stated by Llopis and González)[63] level of urbanization with respect to Europe in the eighteenth century was held until 1860, returning to growth in all regions.[64] For Reher it subsequently accelerated,[65] especially between 1900 and 1930, with a greater share of cities with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants.[66] It is often argued that industrialization was the most important factor,[67] although recent research shows that it only consolidated previous trends of population concentration.[68] The demographic transition was not completed in the interwar period.[69] The decline of fertility and mortality accelerated.[70] However, while the cities were responsible for mortality decline until 1930,[71] regional studies reveal discouraging behaviors. Several cities experienced negative natural population growth: Bilbao until the late nineteenth century,[72] Madrid until the early twentieth century,[73] and Granada until the second decade of the twentieth century.[74] Only immigration allowed positive demographic balance. Biometric indicators prove the same fact in the industrialized cities in the second half of the nineteenth century.[75]

Some scholars have argued that railways, mining, and industry promoted mutations in the urban system.[76] For Lanaspa et al., the urbanization process was dual and hierarchical, increasing the differences in the size of cities, as a result of an unbalanced rural–urban migration flow.[77] The periods between 1860–1877 and 1910–1930 were the years of greater growth, but the increase was uneven: higher growth in the coast (Basque Country, Catalonia, Asturias), while traditionally most urbanized areas (Andalusia) stagnated. Large cities extended their lead, small towns grew slowly, and medium-sized cities resisted with their specialization based on the tertiary sector. The cities did not remain anchored in their preindustrial past. It was not only the triumph of the industry: the provincial capitals consolidated the roles they had assumed in 1833, becoming the headquarters of the new educational, health, welfare, and military facilities.[78] Finally, although at a lower level than leading European countries, economic historians have shown how welfare indicators (e.g., diet and quality of life index) experienced great advances in cities, faster than GDP per capita.[79]

From the mid-nineteenth century to 1900–1910, urban growth was absorbed smoothly, clogging the historical centers, building the first extensions (*Ensanches*),[80] and annexing municipalities. New economic spaces were generated as a result of the improved mobility that accompanied the construction of transport infrastructure. The increased availability of resources led to the consolidation of markets, and the financial system facilitated these changes, especially during the "silver age of Spanish municipalism".[81]

Literature on transport infrastructure reveals that they left a deep impact. On the one hand, railways had a clear influence on urban growth[82] (more than in other countries),[83] but also in the configuration of the space.[84] For geographers, they conditioned urban planning,[85] acted as a decisive factor of business location, and affected land values, among other factors. The impact of urban transport was similar, especially in terms of the location of the economic activity, mobility, and land surpluses. Trams (first horse-driven, later steam, and from the 1890s, electric),[86] were the dominant system until the advent of the subway in some cities (early twentieth century) and buses just before the Civil War.[87]

The rest of the facilities were installed with a more complex pattern, and their impact is more difficult to assess. For Arroyo, the nineteenth century was the century of gas,[88] although it was gradually replaced by electricity by the late nineteenth century.[89] The significance of water supply and sewerage (which experienced a smoother evolution)[90] has more to do with social factors. For Pinol and Walter, by 1920, there were three major areas of mortality in European cities.[91] Spain was part of the Mediterranean area, with a higher mortality that was linked to the late improvement of sewerage and water supply. This was because the reforms that were planned in the municipal laws of the 1870s were not applied with determination, because of a combination of several factors: opposition from local lobbyists, political "turnism," limitations of municipal finances, etc.[92]

Since the late nineteenth century, the uses of urban space underwent further transformations. Tertiary functions acquired a greater role, leaving their footprint on central spaces. In some regions, new specialized functions emerged that were later consolidated. Tourism is worth noting as it altered the economic base of many cities, giving rise to remarkable urban transformations[93] and its relative further specialized, resort tourism.[94]

Modern urban planning was rising, in view of the need to solve the problems that appeared after the second industrial revolution. During the first third of the twentieth century, the planning tools and objectives were more clearly defined, and the plans were used as a paradigm of action, but this did not mean the paralysis of the Ensanches or interior reforms.[95] Specific municipal regulations were created and the emerging national urban planning legislation was applied to local regulations. The new building regulations were linked to new concepts, which were already announced in the late nineteenth century: buildability and hygiene and not only ornate. Apart from initiatives like Arturo Soria's Ciudad Lineal[96] (whose influence in Madrid, for Mas, goes

beyond merely urban planning),[97] Cerdà's influence is clear. But it is also worth noting that the most widespread option was to use singular projects as references of the new modern urban planning. The most outstanding example was the *Gran Vía* in some Spanish cities, Madrid, Barcelona, and Granada being some of the most remarkable cases. Another of the most successful alternatives was the Garden City,[98] which was framed in the social reform approaches that sought to address the shortcomings of the model of industrial towns.[99] Likewise, in order to address the need for housing for poorer classes, during the turn of the century, the first social housing proposals emerged,[100] extending the timid attempts tested in some cities since the mid-nineteenth century.[101] The most remarkable was the *Ley de Casas Baratas* of 1911 [Cheap Homes Act], even though its experience was very limited until the 1950s. Its main achievements took place in large cities.

As a result of the confluence of the above-mentioned factors, residential construction experienced a significant boom. However, while from 1860 to 1930 there was still a correspondence between the rate of population and urban growth in relation to housing, in 1900–1930, despite the deployment that was made, the latter could not keep up with the intense urbanization.[102]

From the Civil War to the Real Estate Bubble[103]

The Spanish Civil War left a devastated country and more than eight hundred thousand dead. The long postwar reconstruction period (fifteen years, somewhere between three to five times more than the cost of reconstructing post–World War II France and Italy) was also attributable to the erroneous autarkic economic policy of the postwar years.[104] Until the late 1940s, famine and shortages, including that of building materials, ravaged cities. The State assumed the role of promoter through the National Institute of Industry. Under its purview, the future large business began and financial groups were formed,[105] but the rules of the game were marked by "clientelism" and corruption.

Until 1975, an authoritarian political system governed Spain, which was one of three dictatorships near NATO that survived in Mediterranean Europe in the context of the Cold War. Repression (forty thousand murders in the first fifteen years of peace, hundreds of thousands of political prisoners and as many exiles) occurred with the deprivation of political rights, civil liberties, and trade unions. In this framework, it was impossible to outline a redistributive fiscal policy. Spain did not join the welfare state model that was being built in Western Europe. This explains the weak domestic market, even in the later years of prosperity. Wages could not be led to a generalized mass consumption.

The World Bank Report (1962) marked for Spain a subordinate joint path with the EEC that was based on migration and tourism.[106] These were the years of "desarrollismo" (policy of development at all costs), which were characterized by "Spain's economic miracle". The average annual growth rate in the 1960s reached 8 percent. Net immigration to Europe reached 1.2 million (4 percent of the Spanish population). In 1964, Spain became a world power in tourism. Tourism represented 9 percent of the GDP and 25 percent of revenues in a balance of payments that suffered a chronic deficit.[107]

According to Lars Nilsson,[108] in 1950–1980, Spain had (along with Italy) the highest rates of urban growth of the future European Union, reaching 3.23 percent per year in the 1960s. During that decade and the next, nine of the twelve European urban agglomerations that grew most were Spanish (Figure 2).[109] Behind this phenomenon was the baby boom of the 1960s and, above all, migration to the cities.[110]

In the 1960s, the government adopted an economic policy that was based on long-term indicative planning, a light version of the French model.[111] The choice of three main cities on the axis of development, Madrid, Bilbao and Barcelona, was completed with the establishment of secondary development poles in several parts of the country. The Mediterranean corridor and the



Figure 2. Demographic growth of Spain's top seven urban agglomerations (1950–1996), in percentages. Source: Data from José M. Serrano, "La red de aglomeraciones urbanas en España cuando finaliza el siglo XX," *Investigaciones Geográficas* 22 (1999): 41.

Balearic and Canary Islands benefited, in turn, from European mass tourism.[112] In order to facilitate this, transport infrastructures were developed: the airports network (completed in 1970), the national road network, and the first "Mediterranean highway".

Under these conditions, a serious housing problem originated, both for insufficiency and obsolescence.[113] In the absence of pool public housing, the rental market predominated: in 1950 only 46.7 percent of principal dwelling was under private ownership, a percentage that in big cities like Madrid and Barcelona fell to 6 percent. This situation changed dramatically during the "desarrollismo" years, when the government adopted policies to encourage private dwelling ownership, which was considered an element of social stability. The principal dwelling was 64 percent in 1970, but it increased to 73 percent in 1980.[114]

Cities grew compactly, with saturation of the centers and the closer peripheries.[115] The scarcity of vehicles and the shortcomings of the public transport network and of basic infrastructure such as water or sewerage conditioned urban peripheries in the 1950s that were characterized by shanty districts. Land and housing legislation encouraged the private appropriation of the added values generated from public action. The 1956 Land Act[116] introduced planning through legal tools such as the General Urban Development Plan. But only a minority of cities approved it and, even then, growth was conducted in a disorderly manner, often using land that was classified as rural. The Law of areas and tourist centers of 1963 introduced the possibility of considering the whole municipality as building land, without previously designing a plan, simply by passing a local ordinance. In the absence of democracy, collusion between city officials and promoters was widespread.[117]

In 1957, the Ministry of Housing was created, promoting hundreds of "Housing Estates" in the urban outskirts from 1961. These were large real estate operations that were based on the construction of poor-quality blocks of flats, often lacking educational, health, and cultural facilities and even infrastructure such as sewerage. These deficiencies led to the rise of the neighborhood association movement that has been studied by Manuel Castells,[118] which functioned as an assembly and helped to develop habits of solidarity and common management of the collective needs.

The Dictator's death facilitated the implementation of a democratic system in Spain, based on the alternation of two major parties: the Partido Popular (PP, conservative) and the Socialist Party (PSOE, social democrat). A process of political and administrative decentralization reorganized the country into seventeen Autonomous Communities. Hundreds of local movement leaders joined the new municipal governments and addressed the shortcomings of their neighborhoods and the problem of unemployment by resorting to the competences that the Constitution recognized in municipalities.[119] There was finally a first expansion of the welfare state, which was based on an attempt at tax reform. Public social spending (education, health, welfare, and pensions) grew by 11.4 points of GDP in Spain, from representing less than 14 percent in 1975 to more than 25 percent in 1993. Meanwhile, public expenditure on health between 1970 and 1990 increased from 2.4 to 5.4 percent of GDP.[120]

But since the mid-1970s, the international context had changed. The oil crisis and the abandonment of the dollar standard were the backdrop to the crisis of the Fordist model that affected the major industrial countries.[121] The impact on an economy as vulnerable as the Spanish was brutal, and unemployment climbed to 20 percent. The Moncloa Pacts, a very good deal between employers' associations, the main political parties, and the two big unions, introduced a new framework that was based on reducing inflation through wage control. Since then, governments have accepted high levels of tax evasion and underground economy and, since the late 1980s, they have frozen social spending growth.[122]

Friedman's neoliberalism of the Chicago School of Economics, implemented in the United Kingdom by Margaret Thatcher and by Ronald Reagan in the United States, spread into Western Europe, advocating supply theories: providing investment incentives (tax reductions) and job incentives (but with precarious employments). The liberalization of capital flow and banking deregulation favored a solution to the Fordism crisis through financialization, which spread to large multinationals and to national economies, particularly by reforming the mortgage markets. The social consequences of what Robert Brenner called "asset price Keynesianism" began to be perceived:[123] the increase in the value of housing as a driving force behind consumption of the lower and middle classes, during times of stagnant or falling wages.

The agreements for EEC membership of Spain in 1985 were conditioned by the reconstruction of our country as a territory that would be complementary to that. Industrial restructuring laws meant the liquidation of the Spanish industry that competed with the core countries of the EEC.[124] The opening up of the Spanish market led to an immediate deterioration of the trade balance and a massive capital inflow in the large national firms.[125] The corollary was the partial deindustrialization of major regions that had been the subject of Francoism's industrial development policies and, in a broader sense, of what had been the core of Spain's industrial strength since the early twentieth century: on the coast of Galicia, Asturias, the Basque Country, and Valencia and in the industrial belts of Madrid and Catalonia. Franco's housing estates underwent a widespread labor, social, and health crisis, which suffered its most serious symptom in widespread heroin abuse and an AIDS epidemic that mowed down a generation. The situation also generated a great cycle of labor and social unrest, and this was the last time that unions and neighborhood associations converged.

In 1992 the Socialist Party commemorated the tenth anniversary of its rise to the government implementing large-scale urban projects, which concentrated on the most significant cities of the

country: Barcelona Olympic Games, Seville World Exhibition, Madrid European Capital of Culture, and Frank Gehry's project of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. These celebrations were accompanied by urban renewal projects, communication infrastructure, and "iconic" facilities that aimed to put cities on the international media map.[126] The Olympic Games of Barcelona were the opportunity for the debut in society of one of Spain's cities with the strongest traditions in business, industry, and culture and the only one that had been able to compete with Madrid.[127] As the capital of the new autonomous region of Catalonia, at the head of a large urban area representing 40 percent of Catalonia's population, Barcelona seized the opportunity to redesign its transport network and redefine its seafront and historical center. The notion of a "Barcelona Model" was disseminated through literature related to urban planning, economy, and city branding, and mass media seemed to love the idea.[128]

Those celebrations were expected to be the expression of the government's move toward a service and new technologies economy, but they also represented the highest point of the first real estate bubble between 1985 and 1993.[129] This process was still limited geographically to the large cities that triumphed with reindustrialization (Madrid, Barcelona, and late in the 1990s, Bilbao) and with the tourist boom (Barcelona, Valencia, and Malaga). The "pomp of 1992" was a metaphor of the government projects that betted on a service and new technologies economy, in the framework of the European Union and globalization. In practice, a noncompetitive economic model was consolidated, which was based on low-level workforce, precariousness, inflation, and a high rate of unemployment which, larger than 8 percent in times of prosperity, climbed quickly to 25 percent in times of recession.[130] The latter occurred during the 1993–1996 recession.

It was that model which, taking advantage of the international move toward low interest rates, consolidated with the second real estate bubble between 1995 and 2008.[131] During the boom period, positive macroeconomic data apparently accumulated. GDP grew at 4 percent and national income increased 60 percent in that fourteen-year period.[132] Population underwent a natural growth of six million people, five of them attributable to immigration, mostly extra-EU. The working population increased to seven million laborers, half being immigrants.[133] And as the driving force of all these phenomena, four million households were built in Spain: eight hundred thousand units were built from 2005 to 2007, the same amount as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as a whole (which had five times the Spanish population) over the same period.

These data demand further interpretation. Given the ageing population, the rise in housing stock did not respond to domestic demand for new homes.[134] According to recent reports from the Bank of Spain, the real estate bubble actually hardly benefited 10 percent of families, those who were richer and enjoyed a significant initial capital. Meanwhile, real wages of 60 percent of the population remained stagnant in 1994–2006. While nominal wages and consumer prices rose steadily by a mere 30 percent, housing prices increased by 192 percent. In 1994, the purchase of a house of 90 m^2 represented five years of a laborer's average salary; in 2006, it required eleven years.[135]

The real estate bubble was not fed by a general increase in purchasing power but by the concerted action of a set of public policies that, as Isidro López and Emmanuel Rodríguez have analyzed, led to valuing almost all the entire national territory and allowed to join the growth of pool of housing and the increase of prices of those already existing.[136] There were five factors responsible. First was the banking and mortgage legislation deregulation, which facilitated access to credit to low- and middle-income households. Second, housing policies[137] abandoned public housing promotion and introduced tax relief for the purchase of housing at the expense of renting. Third, the 1998 Land Law declared the whole nation as potentially buildable and encouraged large-scale speculative processes. The fourth factor comprised the distortions of urban planning: regional and municipal administrations were to use their competences in urban planning and housing in order to promote a real estate growth that was the only means they had to substantially increase tax revenues, in a period when central state administration generously ceded them competences in health, education, and social services.[138]



Figure 3. Map of Spain with those municipalities with an annual population growth >1 percent, between 1996 and 2006.
Source: From Manuel García Docampo and Raimundo Otero, "Transición territorial: modelo teórico y contraste con el caso español," *REIS* 139 (2012): 147.

Finally, the role of transport infrastructure policies should be noted, toward which for twenty years half of the European funding from the structural and cohesion funds were headed (this was the counterpart of the conditions of industrial restructuring and opening domestic market). Spain became the country that enjoyed the largest network of motorways and high-speed railways in Europe,[139] providing access to large pools of land and homogenized market conditions across the whole country. And indeed, the real estate bubble eventually affected all of Spain, although urban growth and immigration have been concentrated in large metropolitan regions (Catalonia, Madrid, and the Basque Country) and in tourism-oriented regions (Mediterranean and archipelagos) (Figure 3).[140] Suburbanization processes became widespread, and the peripheries of the cities grew disorderly at a rate of 1 percent per year from 1996 to 2006, and nowadays they occupy an area that is equivalent to that of a compact city.[141]

Beginning in 2007, the crisis of subprime mortgages took place in the United States, and capital flow to the Spanish economy was reversed. The real estate bubble burst, creating a banking crisis and a credit rarefaction.[142] Immediately, destruction of the production network took place as well as an exponential increase in unemployment, which climbed from 8.5 percent in 2006 to 27 percent in early 2013. The recession highlighted the loss of competitiveness of the Mediterranean economies as compared to the Eastern European countries that were entering the EU, after suffering brutal restructuring processes that involved the sinking of their working and social conditions. The clauses of the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties and the incorporation to the Eurozone since 2003 made Spain lose its stabilizing mechanisms: trade barriers, possibility of devaluation, and public sector and central bank intervention.[143] The austerity policies imposed by

the EU were applied in a country that already focused taxation in VAT, forgot large taxpayers, and tolerated a tax evasion that was equivalent to 10 percent of the GDP, three-quarters being concentrated in large fortunes and large companies.[144] The dismantling of the welfare state is taking place in a country whose per capita income is 94 percent of the EU-15, while public social spending is 72 percent of the EU-15.[145]

Approximately 40 percent of households with mortgages risk an actual "epidemic of evictions":[146] fifty-two thousand families lost their main residence in 2012.[147] These are not good times for equality. Vicenç Navarro provides disturbing data on differential mortality by social class. There is a six-year difference in life expectancy between the richest 10 percent and skilled workers and ten years with respect to the long-term unemployed.[148] For the first time in over half a century, in 2011 and 2012 Spain's life expectancy has decreased—slightly, but still.

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Notes

1. John K. Walton, "Current Trends in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Spain Urban History," *Urban History* 30 (2003): 251–65.
2. Peter Clark, *European Cities and Towns, 400-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Andrew Lees and Lynn H. Lees, *Cities and the Making of Modern Europe, 1750-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jean-Luc Pinol et al., *Histoire de l'Europe urbaine* (Paris: Points, 2002), 6 vols.
3. Clark suggests similar conditions for the British urban history of the last century. Peter Clark, "La fabrication de la Cambridge Urban History of Britain," *Histoire Urbaine* 6 (2002): 161–74.
4. Fernando de Terán argued in 1996 that the difficulty of a unified vision of urban history in Spain came from the fact that each discipline had analyzed different problems and spatial and temporal scales. Geographers and economists focused on the evolution of the territory, population, and social structure; other geographers, architects, and art historians studied urban morphology; and law specialists analyzed the legal and regulatory regime of the cities.
5. David Cannadine, "Urban history in the United Kingdom: The 'Dyos Phenomenon' and After," in *Exploring the Urban Past: Essays in Urban History by H.J. Dyos*, ed. David Cannadine and David Reeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 203–21; José L. Oyón, "Spain," in *European Urban History: Prospect and Retrospect*, ed. Richard Rodger (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 37–59.
6. See José Fortea and Juan Gelabert, eds., *Ciudades en conflicto (siglos XV-XVIII)* (Valladolid: Marcial Pons, 2008).
7. See Rafael Mas, "Sobre la geografía urbana en España," in *Història urbana i intervenció en el centre històric. IIIa Setmana d'Estudis Urbans a Lleida* (Barcelona: Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya, 1989), 163–85.
8. Nevertheless it focused primarily on the Second Republic and, above all, on the Franco regime. These are the schools of Fernando de Terán in Madrid, Horacio Capel in Barcelona, and Francisco Quirós in Oviedo. See Sergio Tomé, "Los estudios de Geografía Urbana Histórica en España: Balance y estado de la cuestión," *Historia Contemporánea* 24 (2002): 83–99.
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10. Whereas art historians played a very important role, especially those that were linked to the Schools of Architecture and Urbanism. It was the time of the symposia on urbanism and urban history in the Hispanic world organized by Antonio Bonet Correa (1979–1982).
11. This was founded in 1992 in the School of Architecture in Valencia and came to a halt in 1997.
12. For instance, Virgilio Pinto and Santos Madrazo, dirs., *Madrid. Atlas Histórico de la ciudad, siglos IX-XIX* (Madrid: Lunwerg, 1995), and Virgilio Pinto, dir., *Madrid. Atlas Histórico de la ciudad, 1850-1939* (Madrid: Lunwerg, 2001).
13. Manuel Guàrdia, Francisco J. Monclús, and José L. Oyón, dirs., *Atlas Histórico de Ciudades Europeas, vol. I: Península Ibérica* (Barcelona: Salvat-Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona, 1994).
14. Jean-Luc Pinol, dir., *Atlas Histórico de Ciudades Europeas, vol. 2: Francia* (Barcelona: Salvat-Centre de Cultura Contemporània de Barcelona, 1996).
15. Josep Pujol et al., *El pozo de todos los males. Sobre el atraso en la agricultura española contemporánea* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001).
16. Juan S. Pérez, "La revolución burguesa en España: los inicios de un debate científico, 1966-1979," in *Historiografía española contemporánea*, ed. Manuel Tuñón de Lara et al (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1980): 91–138.
17. As noted by Walton (2003) and a monograph of the journal *Historia Contemporánea* (2002).
18. Delgado, Rueda, and Sazatornil, *Historiografía sobre tipos*.
19. However, progress was made in understanding the institutions of local government and their role as an intermediary between the central government and local elites.
20. In contrast, the repertoire of questions is focused on the political system, political culture, collective memory, etc.
21. The research team of the Universidad del País Vasco, coordinated by Manuel González Portilla, Pedro Novo and José M. Beascoechea, which has studied the urban network of the Bilbao River; the Universidad Complutense group, coordinated by Luis E. Otero, which has focused on the Ensanche of Madrid; the group led by David Martínez and Manuel Martínez, which studies Eastern Andalusia cities, and that of Julio Pérez, which focuses on Cádiz Bay; and the studies of José L. Oyón on Barcelona and its working class to name but a few.
22. Since 2002, the Universidad de País Vasco and the Universidad de Puebla have organized five Hispanic-Mexican Congresses of urban history (Puebla, Bilbao, and Granada).
23. By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the Spanish Monarchy had lost its European possessions. The territories in the Iberian Peninsula were reorganized through the political and administrative reforms that were implemented during the reign of Felipe V (1713–1746). On the other hand, economic and urban reforms did characterize the reign of Carlos III (1759–1788). Yet, as recent historiography has remarked, the germ of a number of those reforms began during the reign of Fernando VI (1746–1759). That is why 1746 has been taken as the starting point for this article. For more details, see below.
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26. Concepción de Castro, *El pan de Madrid. El abasto de las ciudades españolas del Antiguo Régimen* (Madrid: Alianza, 1987), 189–204.
27. Carlos Sambricio, *Territorio y ciudad en la España de la Ilustración* (Madrid: MOPU, 1991).
28. Confirmed for forty European cities by Roger Mols, *Introduction à la démographie historique des villes d'Europe du XIVe siècle au XVIIIe siècle* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1954).
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31. José M. López Piñero et al., *La Revolución científica* (Madrid: Historia, 1989), 16.
32. Sonia Lombardo, coord., *El impacto de las reformas borbónicas en la estructura de las ciudades. Un enfoque comparativo* (México: Consejo del Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México, 2000).
33. Pinto and Madrazo, *Madrid: Atlas Histórico de la ciudad*.
34. David Ringrose, "Madrid, capital imperial, 1556-1833," in *Madrid, historia de una capital*, ed. Santos Juliá, David Ringrose, and Cristina Segura (Madrid: Alianza, 1994), 121–252.
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41. José L. Oyón, "Crecimiento de las ciudades," in Francisco Bonamusa and Joan Serrallonga, eds., *La sociedad urbana en la España contemporánea* (Barcelona: AHC, 1994), 11–21. See also Isabel Rodríguez Chumillas, "Transformaciones urbanas y desamortización en las ciudades españolas," in *Continuidades y rupturas urbanas en los siglos XVIII y XIX*, ed. Dolores Morales and Rafael Mas (México: Consejo del Centro Histórico, 2000), 17–50.
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46. Francisco J. Monclús, "Las ciudades españolas en la Edad Contemporánea. Procesos de crecimiento y estrategias urbanas," in *Córdoba en la historia: la construcción de la urbe*, ed. Francisco García Verdugo and Francisco Acosta (Córdoba: Ayuntamiento de Córdoba, 1999), 357–72.
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89. Horacio Capel and Vicente Casals, eds., *Capitalismo e historia de la electrificación, 1890-1930* (Barcelona: Ediciones del Serbal, 2013).
90. Juan M. Matés Barco, “Le aziende di approvvigionamento d’acqua potabile nelle città e regioni spagnole, 1840-1970,” *Storia Urbana* 119 (2008): 49–74.
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93. See Luis Sazatornil, “Los orígenes del veraneo en España: playas urbanas, ciudades balneario y arquitectura elegante,” in *Playas Urbanas* (Santander: Ministerio de Fomento, 2007), 49–73.
94. See Carlos Larrinaga, “Termalismo y turismo en la España del siglo XIX,” in *La evolución de la industria turística en España e Italia*, ed. Carlos Barciela et al. (Palma: Institut Balear d’Economia, 2011), 569–608. It is important to clarify that urban tourism was an elitist activity that was fed by upper income classes, thermal spas simply being a minority segment of this sector.
95. José M. de Ureña, José M. Coronado, and Francisco J. Rodríguez, “De Cerdà a la ciudad descentralizada. Desarrollo, vigencia y futuro de los ensanches en España,” *Ingeniería y territorio* 88 (2009): 56–61.
96. Carlos Sambricio, “De la ciudad lineal a la ciudad jardín. Sobre la difusión en España de los supuestos urbanísticos a comienzos del Siglo,” *Ciudad y Territorio. Estudios Territoriales* 94 (1992): 147–59.
97. Rafael Mas, “La promoción inmobiliaria en los ensanches del siglo XIX,” *Ciudad y Territorio. Estudios Territoriales* 119–120 (1999): 55–73.
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99. José L. Ramos, “El descontento frente a la ciudad industrial: reformismo social y ‘ciudad jardín’ en España, 1900-1923,” *Revista de Historia Industrial* 37 (2008): 85–122.
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101. Mercedes Tatjer, “Entre la promoción pública y la promoción privada: la vivienda obrera en España (1853-1975),” *Scripta Nova* 194 (2005).
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103. José M. Cardesín, “Spain Is Different: Economy, Politics and Urban Growth (1940-2000),” in Lars Nilsson, ed., *The Coming of the Post-Industrial City. Challenges and Responses in Western European Urban Development since 1950* (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 2001), 101–33.

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105. Jesús M. Valdaliso, "Grupos empresariales y relaciones banca-industria en España durante el franquismo," *Información Comercial Española* 812 (2004): 163–78.
106. Juan Velarde, "La nueva política económica española y el informe del Banco Mundial," *Cuadernos de Información Económica* 90 (1994): 209–224.
107. Isidro López and Emmanuel Rodríguez, *Fin de ciclo. Financiarización, territorio y sociedad de propietarios en la onda larga del capitalismo hispano (1959-2010)* (Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2010), 142–45.
108. Lars Nilsson, "North and South in Western European Urban Development, 1950-2000," in Nilsson, *The Coming of the Post-Industrial City*, 13–40.
109. By 1996, four of these cities exceeded one million inhabitants: Madrid (4.7), Barcelona (3.7), Valencia (1.5), and Sevilla (1.1). The other three were Bilbao (nearly 1 million), Malaga (850,000 inhabitants) and Zaragoza (600,000). Anyway, we have presented their growth in percentages in Figure 2, in order to show how the largest cities grew in a similar way through the whole period, but their size was not the most determining factor.
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111. Joseba de la Torre and Mario García-Zúñiga, eds., *Entre el Mercado y el Estado. Los planes de desarrollo durante el franquismo* (Pamplona: Universidad Pública de Navarra, 2009).
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113. Ramón Díaz and Juan M. Parreño, "La política económica, la construcción de vivienda y la producción de la ciudad en España (1939-75)," *Scripta Nova* 218 (2006).
114. José M.Naredo, "Perspectivas de la vivienda," *Información Comercial Española* 815 (2004): 143–54.
115. Manuel García Docampo and Raimundo Otero, "Transición territorial: modelo teórico y contraste con el caso español," *REIS* 139 (2012): 133–62.
116. Martín Bassols, "Ante el cincuentenario de la ley del suelo y ordenación urbana de 1956," *Revista de derecho urbanístico y medio ambiente* 40 (2006): 45–90.
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118. Manuel Castells, "The Making of an Urban Social Movement: the Citizen Movement in Madrid towards the End of the Franquist Era," in *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 213–75.
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121. Robert Brenner, *The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945-2005* (New York: Verso, 2006).
122. Navarro and Torres, "La hipoteca del déficit social."
123. Brenner, *The Economics of Global Turbulence*.
124. José M. Marín, "La fase dura de la reconversión industrial: 1983-1986," *Historia del Presente* 8 (2006): 61–101.
125. Miren Etxezarreta, coord., *La reestructuración del capitalismo en España 1970-1990* (Madrid: Icaria, 1991).
126. Carmelo Adagio, "Il PSOE e la gestione dei grandi eventi del 1992," *Spagna Contemporanea* 25 (2004): 69–99.
127. Nilsson and Bellander have compared the national urban systems of the EU-15 in the second half of the twentieth century. According to rank-size distributions, they concluded that most of them have

been clearly dominated by its most important city. Spain (with its bipolarity Madrid–Barcelona), Italy and Portugal were the only clear exceptions. See Lars Nilsson and Linus Bellander, "Western European Urban Systems, 1950-2000," in Nilsson, *The Coming of the Post-Industrial City*: 41-64.

128. Jordi Borja, *Luces y sombras del urbanismo de Barcelona* (Barcelona: UOC, 2010). See also Horacio Capel, *El Modelo Barcelona. Un examen crítico* (Barcelona: Ediciones El Serbal, 2005).
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133. Antonio Izquierdo, dir., *Demografía de los extranjeros. Incidencia en el crecimiento de la población* (Madrid: Fundación BBVA, 2006).
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