

article

Making the most of super-diversity: notes on the potential of a new approach

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This article aims at exploring how 'super-diversity' can cover aspects of current debates that traditional ways of understanding identity and multiculturalism could not. I start by engaging with Gilles Deleuze's differential ontology, which conceptualises difference as an inherent feature of identity and not some 'issue' brought by migration flows. I then outline super-diversity's potential implications for diversity management, with particular attention to the case of Roma minorities in Europe. The main argument is that super-diversity can provide a promising framework to address some of multiculturalism's constraints, if we focus on the new kind, rather than the new level, of complexity.

key words super-diversity • difference • identity • multiculturalism

Introduction

Over the past two decades issues of diversity and of migration management have received unparalleled policy and scholarly attention in relation to a state of affairs of contemporary western societies in which they are increasingly presented as a normal feature of a globalising world (de Jong, 2014; Pécoud, 2009). A recent article by Sara de Jong makes a convincing case that the two fields (diversity management and migration management) have so far too often been studied in isolation from each other and that the policy studies literature could benefit by incorporating diversity management into the study of migration (de Jong, 2016).

In light of the ongoing so-called 'migration crisis' in Europe and the integration challenges it entails, this article aims at advancing the under-researched concept of 'super-diversity' as a possibly helpful bridge between the two disciplines of migration and diversity management. The term 'super-diversity' was first introduced by Steven Vertovec in 2005 (Vertovec, 2005) and articulated in an academic journal in 2007 as a 'term intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything previously experienced in a particular society' (Vertovec, 2007 1024).¹ The contribution of this article to the wider debate around the multilevel governance of super-diversity is to problematise the conceptualisation of identity in relation to difference, to explore how super-diversity might be employed in tackling the policy and governance implications of increasingly complex societies, and to assess its potential and limitations for integration/inclusion policies.

1 This means opening up questions of identity of the mainstream majority population,
2 and not only of the migrant minorities, and adopting an approach that does not
3 essentialise ethnicity but instead looks at a variety of intersecting identities and
4 needs. In order to do so, this article will first problematise the relationship between
5 identity and difference as a way to rethink the dimensions and fluidity that super-
6 diversity consists of; it will then provide a brief overview of the background, that
7 is, how we got to the present debate on the death (or serious illness, or rebranding)
8 of multiculturalism (Barber, 2015; Connolly, 2010; Kundnani, 2002). Following
9 this, the specificities of super-diversity will be located before, and finally, suggesting
10 the adoption of a super-diversity approach in the drafting of guidelines on diversity
11 management such as the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy
12 in the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2004) and the Action
13 Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals (European Commission, 2016).
14 The Roma minority(ies) in Europe will serve as a useful case study to exemplify
15 how super-diversity can help us depart from the dominance of ethnicity as the main
16 category for identity policy without negating its relevance, in order to encourage
17 the development of inclusive policies towards minority groups and neighborhoods
18 that take into account multiple variables.
19

20 **Difference and identity, which came first?**

21
22 The core questions that underlie the main categorisations used in multiculturalism,
23 intersectionality and/or super-diversity can roughly be synthesised as: how do we
24 construct our identity, and how do we conceptualise the identity of others? There is
25 certainly a component of agency in our defining who we are as individuals as opposed
26 to ‘others’, but how much of it is personal choice, how much of it is inherited, and
27 how much of it depends on how the rest of the world sees (and treats) us?² Stemming
28 from our sense of self and other, where does racism (ageism, sexism, and so on) come
29 from? And how does this translate into societies’ integration and social cohesion (or
30 lack thereof), particularly with respect to migration?

31 A variety of attributes can be used as the basis for the identification and categorisation
32 of minorities. These characteristics can range from language to religion, to professional
33 affiliation, political orientation, citizenship/nationality, gender, sexual orientation,
34 race/ethnicity, to territorial location, and so on. The importance attributed to any
35 given identity varies in time and space, and not all of them have the same degree of
36 intensity, social relevance, exclusivity, ‘changeability’/flexibility, nor do they entail
37 the same legal consequences. The attempt, here, is that of trying to understand
38 which of these attributes have been traditionally linked to diversity policies,³ how
39 these are gradually changing, and what role super-diversity plays or could play in
40 these developments.

41 In terms of group and class belonging/affiliation, we tend to think that poverty
42 and social exclusion ‘can be fixed’, while ethnicity and gender ‘cannot’ (European
43 Commission DG EMPL and COMM, 2007; European Commission DG JUST,
44 2012b; 2015; European Commission DG V (EMPL), 1994; Pakulski and Waters,
45 1996). This is obviously an oversimplification, but it serves the purpose of beginning
46 to unpack some of the building blocks of the increasingly complex identities we talk
47 about when we call into question a ‘European culture’ or ‘European values’. Even
48 though there is a well-established debate in social anthropology and gender studies

1 around the fact that ethnicity, race and gender are social constructs that are intrinsically
 2 linked to historical processes and power relations – thus culturally constructed and
 3 fluid (Barth, 1969; Gould, 2007; Hall and Gay, 1996) – diversity management policies
 4 are still fundamentally rooted, in Europe and elsewhere, on the assumption that
 5 we are born with a fairly fixed and stable race (‘visible minority’), ethnicity (used
 6 mostly nowadays to indicate the ‘country of origin’) and gender.⁴ Conversely, class
 7 belonging is seen as intrinsically changeable (the concept of ‘upward/downward
 8 mobility’), and culture, language and religion seem to lie somewhere in between
 9 the two: we inherit it – some aspects and traits of it, at least – but also cultivate it in
 10 a direction that is mostly of our choosing. Such choice (or series or combination of
 11 choices) is however determined by our life options, access to information, exposure to
 12 societal expectations, upbringing, and contact with different cultures (Abu-Lughod,
 13 2002). The fact that our personal, individual identities are complex, not simply the
 14 reproduction of some given ‘community’ value seems a fairly uncontroversial assertion
 15 to make. What is often overlooked when drafting integration policies, however, is
 16 that this same mixture of ‘nature and nurture’ also applies to society as a whole.
 17 Different expectations and degree of agency are projected from the dominant majority
 18 population onto different kinds of minorities, shaping policies, but also a sense of
 19 community (or of alienation, or of a community alternative to the ‘mainstream’ one),
 20 and potentially re-enforcing stereotypes and even stereotyped self-perception on behalf
 21 of certain minorities. The ways in which differences and identities are narrated, acted
 22 upon and legislated about are therefore of paramount importance. It is in this sense
 23 that it seems useful to bring Deleuze’s almost half-century old differential ontology
 24 into the picture. The way in which most current integration policies, discrimination
 25 surveys, and multicultural datasets are designed rely on the unspoken assumption that
 26 there are ‘identities’ out there that can be compared, and which differ one from the
 27 other, mostly based on ethnicity/nationality (Queen’s University Multiculturalism
 28 Policy Index, the Migrant Integration Policy Index, the Canadian Index for Measuring
 29 Integration, just to name a few). Instead, according to Gilles Deleuze’s theories, there
 30 are no identities prior to difference: all identities emerge from difference(s), since
 31 perception derives from contrast and confrontation. If there were no ‘them’, there
 32 could be no conceivable ‘us’ (Deleuze, 1968). By inverting the traditional relationship
 33 between identity and difference, he states:

34
 35 [t]he majority of philosophers...subordinated difference to identity or
 36 to the Same, to the Similar, to the Opposed or to the Analogous: they...
 37 introduced difference into the identity of the concept, they...put difference
 38 in the concept itself, thereby reaching a conceptual difference, but not a
 39 concept of difference. We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order
 40 to think it... We also have a tendency to subordinate it to resemblance...to
 41 opposition...and to analogy... In other words, we do not think of difference
 42 in itself.’ (Deleuze, 1968, p 12)

43
 44 While Deleuze’s argument that difference should fundamentally be the object of
 45 affirmation and not negation was not developed in relation to minorities, migration
 46 nor diversity management, his claim seems quite compelling if applied to this realm:
 47 in order to grasp beings exactly as they are, the concept of identity (categories,
 48 resemblances, unities of apperception, and so on) fails to attain difference in itself. The

1 'swarms of difference' are not something transcendent or outside of the world; they
2 are 'immanent expression' just as are the identities formed from them (Deleuze, 1968;
3 Deleuze and Parnet, 1987). '[A]nd they continue to exist even within the identities
4 they form, not as identities but as difference. From their place within identities, these
5 swarms of difference assure that the future will be open to novelty, to new identities
6 and new relationships among them' (May, 2005). Drawing upon Gilles Deleuze's
7 concept of identity in relation to difference, the propositions I would like to put
8 forward as a departing point is, therefore, that the problem of majority–minority
9 relations is often mis-(re)presented: it is not racism that produces racist behaviour;
10 rather, it is racist behaviour that produces racism. The matter is not irrelevant nor
11 tautological, in that it has very serious implications in how we can and should think
12 of antidiscrimination law, inclusion and integration policies, and so on. We tend
13 to think that character causes action, but more often than not when it comes to
14 socialisation, moral behaviour, and collective identity, the opposite is true. Otherwise
15 put, 'Here is a way of seeing the world: it is composed not of identities that form and
16 reform themselves, but of swarms of difference that actualise themselves into specific
17 forms of identity' (May, 2005). Since the categories that we use to identify ourselves
18 and others derive from differences in the first place, there can be no 'fixed' or stable
19 identities, if not in relation to the difference from everything it is not (its internal
20 difference). Difference has been treated as a secondary characteristic that only comes
21 out when one compares pre-existing things: these things can then be said to have
22 differences. But this network of direct relations between identities overshadows a
23 much more subtle and elaborate network of 'real' differences: gradients, intensities,
24 and so on. The result is that in modern democracies identity only becomes an issue
25 when it is in crisis, simply because we overlook the fact that the inner core of identity
26 is never autonomous and self-sufficient, but was formed in relation to 'significant
27 others' who, to put it with Hall, 'mediated to the subject the values, meanings and
28 symbols – the culture – of the worlds he/she inhabited' (Hall et al, 1995). Super-
29 diversity offers, in this respect, a useful crosscutting tool to multiculturalism's focus on
30 ethnicity (operationalised as country of origin) and to intersectionality's 'holy trinity'
31 of class, gender and race, and allows for inductive as well as for deductive coding in
32 analysing identities. This does not mean that all belongings 'weigh the same', nor
33 that by bringing in new categories we must compromise analysing and comparing
34 empirical data. Conversely, by allowing for categories that are not necessarily theory-
35 driven to emerge, policy-applied research may have much to gain by employing the
36 concept of super-diversity. (Boccagni, 2014; Padilla et al, 2014)

37 A second premise, but not least important (and tied to the difference-identity
38 conundrum), is that in the policy and scholarly attitude towards minorities in general
39 – be them immigrant (such as the asylum seekers whose legitimate claim to article
40 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights triggered the so-called 'migration
41 crisis') or not (such as the Roma in most CEE countries or the First Nations in
42 Canada) – there is a need to refocus and re-centre our 'measure' of difference: as
43 trivial as it may sound, policies (even, and crucially, intercultural and multicultural
44 ones) too often overlook the fact that, while we cannot and should not 'equalise'
45 differences, and while not all differences carry the same consequences in terms of
46 integration, majorities and minorities are *equally different*, meaning that we live at
47 the same (cultural) distance. How we construct meaning, distance and difference,
48 is a matter of purposeful, intentional choice, and it typically reflects in policies. To

1 take a non-politically charged example (as long as one is not a Roma with a blue-
2 eyed child), blue eyes are as 'different' to brown eyes as brown eyes are to blue eyes.
3 A society composed solely of blue-eyed inhabitants will consider a brown-eyed
4 person 'different', and vice versa. In short, the fact of something (or someone) being
5 numerically inferior or a 'novelty' for the majority does make the minority more
6 'peculiar' than any given member of the dominant culture – it is simply the context that
7 makes it seem that way. While this point has been acknowledged in conceptualising
8 integration as a 'two avenue path' in theory (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008; Council
9 of the European Union, 2004; Gidley, 2014; Ruiz Vieyetz, 2014a; 2014b), most
10 integration policies are still in practice designed by utilising the dominant, majority
11 host society as a benchmark for integration with which minorities should aspire to
12 catch up.

14 **The debate on multiculturalism and its discontents**

16 While super-diversity is, as stated in the introduction, a fairly novel term, the issues
17 that it aims at addressing have been in the making now for quite some time. When,
18 in the 1970s, Keohane and Nye started using the term 'complex interdependence'
19 in reference to both international politics and international economy, as well as to
20 the interactions between these two arenas, realism was still the strongest framework
21 through which international politics was analysed and interpreted, and nation-states
22 were seen as the main actors in the political arena, while economics was largely
23 considered its own independent branch of study. As interdependence grew 'thicker
24 and quicker' (Nye, 2007, p 207) as a consequence of globalisation growing 'faster,
25 cheaper and deeper' (Friedman, 1999), with increasingly frequent interactions between
26 individuals and groups coming from different cultural, religious, linguistic and national
27 backgrounds, it has become obvious that issues concerning the politics of nation-
28 states, markets, but also, and crucially, group identities cannot be addressed separately.

29 In our progressively complex and diverse societies, in which peoples' identities tend
30 to be multilayered, and do not always necessarily overlap with one set of political
31 or cultural institutions, multiculturalism emerged as a field that acknowledged
32 minorities and ethno-cultural communities as well as their claims for recognition and
33 representation, particularly in North America and in Europe, to the point that as an
34 American sociologist argued 'we are all multiculturalists now' (Glazer, 1997). Since
35 the 1970s, the civil rights movement has been so successful in bringing attention
36 to the issues of racialisation and inter-group relations that we have seen a whole set
37 of law changes and of recognition policies. As Steven Vertovec put it during a talk
38 given at the Einstein Forum in Potsdam in 2009 'Even the French have set up a
39 National Commission on Diversity and Equal Opportunities. And when the French
40 are talking about diversity, you know there is a major paradigm shift going on. These
41 are amazing times we are living in!' (Vertovec, 2009).

42 While multiculturalism was strongly mobilised, particularly in the 1990s, in
43 measures aimed at recognising the pluralisation of societies, academic scholarship
44 around 'the M word' also rapidly grew into a research field in its own right – best
45 known of which is the work by Will Kymlicka (1995), Tariq Modood (1998),
46 Charles Taylor (1994) and Bhikhu Parekh (1997), among others – and attempts
47 were made at building indicators to measure it, with databases such as Queen's
48 University Multiculturalism Policy Index.⁵ Over the last decade, however, western

1 democracies have witnessed both a political and an academic drawing back on
2 multiculturalism discourse with criticism rising on different fronts: on the one hand
3 growing xenophobic and populist movements and political parties, coupled with
4 declining welfare states and with the (real or perceived) security and refugee crises,
5 have laid the ideological background of the condemnation of immigration from
6 mainstream *politics* – the so-called ‘anti-multiculturalism’ (Barry, 2000; Huntington,
7 2004; Kymlicka, 2015) – on the other hand there has been no shortage of failures
8 and pitfalls in the implementation of multicultural identity *policies*, which gave rise to
9 what has been dubbed as the ‘post-multiculturalist critique’ (Benhabib, 2002; Phillips,
10 2007, p 16; Vertovec, 2005a). In Anne Phillips’ words, despite its noble intentions,
11 multiculturalism became a ‘cultural straitjacket’ rather than a ‘cultural liberator’, and
12 Phillips has not been alone in claiming that it required a radical overhaul if it were
13 to serve its original emancipatory goals (Phillips, 2007). Consequently, if gradually
14 the word ‘multiculturalism’ started disappearing from policies and legislation: while
15 the policies themselves did not significantly change, the perception of a need for a
16 rebranding, for a new conceptual framework, or both, led multiculturalism to being
17 replaced ever more often by the concepts of ‘diversity’ and ‘integration’, which to
18 date remain the two most used expressions in policy documents regarding migrants
19 and citizens of immigrant background (Favell, 2013; Gidley, 2014; Matejskova and
20 Antonish, 2015; Medda-Windischer, 2014; Vertovec, 2009). This shift in vocabulary
21 can be seen not only at the national, but also at an international level: UNESCO,
22 following criticism about its conception of culture being stagnant, based on a
23 static idea of cultures as in need of being conserved and protected, issued a World
24 Report in 2009 that revolved not so much around the preservation of culture or the
25 promotion of multiculturalism, but rather around the concept of cultural diversity
26 (UNESCO, 2009). Such a stance takes into account the dynamic nature of identity,
27 and is associated with the permanence of cultural change (UNESCO, 2009, p 21).
28 Another clear example of the shift from multiculturalism to diversity is the 2008
29 Council of Europe’s White Paper on intercultural dialogue ‘Living together as equals in
30 dignity’, that was developed to contribute to ‘an international discussion gaining steady
31 momentum’ on the occasion of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (Council
32 of Europe, 2008, p 51). In the White Paper the word ‘diversity’ is used 78 times,
33 while the expression ‘multiculturalism’ can only be found nine times, and in most
34 cases not in flattering ways. At page 9, for instance, we learn that ‘The responses to
35 the questionnaires sent to member states revealed a belief that what had until recently
36 been a preferred policy approach, conveyed in shorthand as “multiculturalism”,
37 had been found inadequate’ (Council of Europe, 2008, p 9). A few pages later we
38 read ‘[W]hile this was ostensibly a radical departure from assimilationism, in fact
39 multiculturalism frequently shared the same, schematic conception of society set in
40 opposition of majority and minority, differing only in endorsing separation of the
41 minority from the majority rather than assimilation to it’ (Council of Europe, 2008,
42 p 18), and ‘[W]hilst driven by benign intentions, multiculturalism is now seen by
43 many as having fostered communal segregation and mutual incomprehension, as well
44 as having contributed to the undermining of the rights of individuals...’ (Council
45 of Europe, 2008, p 19).

46 In short, the dissatisfaction with multiculturalism seems to come from the fact that
47 it is simultaneously both ‘not enough’ (it does not change the majority–minority
48 dichotomy and opposition) and ‘too much’ (it gives too much power and rights

1 to communities over individuals, creating concerns about issues of membership,
2 belonging and especially women's rights). It is noteworthy that while the protean
3 nature of culture might nowadays appear to be a banal platitude, this change in political
4 discourse did not happen smoothly nor did it take place overnight. An account of
5 the factors that triggered or favoured such change would deserve a separate article,
6 but the central fact remains that such change has occurred, and currently remains in
7 place. At the same time, there is a general scholarly as well as political agreement that
8 since the phenomenon of increasingly multicultural – or rather diverse – societies is
9 here to stay, research on the topic of integration and on the management of diversity
10 is much needed, and entails a re-visitation of legal standards, anti-discrimination law,
11 human rights and citizenship laws, as well as of policy measures on matters such as
12 minorities' access to, and enjoyment of, rights. In this respect, while perhaps not in
13 all these realms, super-diversity can be a particularly useful tool for reframing cultural
14 policies in ways that contribute to a 'transformative', and not only 'affirmative',
15 policy-making (Fraser, 1995).

16 In the following sections I will therefore reflect upon what have emerged as the
17 main aspects of super-diversity identified by Meissner and Vertovec (descriptive,
18 methodological and policy-oriented) to trace a phenomenon which, if not new in
19 itself, I believe offers innovative opportunities especially for policy research (Meissner
20 and Vertovec, 2015). I will do so by first illustrating the way in which the concept
21 has come to be understood as a framework that can coexist, and to some extent
22 complement, the more rehearsed ones of multiculturalism and diversity. I will then
23 look at the effects of super-diversity on cultural and social management policies with
24 regard to a highly politicised issue: Roma minority integration in the EU.

25 26 **Identity politics and super-diversity's positioning in the debate**

27
28 Multiculturalism might have fallen out of favour with public opinion and with
29 policy makers, but the simple rejection of the multiculturalist paradigm cannot will
30 away immigration flows, its increasing numbers, its growing diversity in destinations
31 and origins, nor can it ignore its demographic, social, economic and cultural
32 impact on receiving societies. As a matter of fact, most societies are currently no
33 longer solely 'sending' or 'receiving' migrants, but are both sending *and* receiving.
34 Moreover, countries that have historically been ones that people emigrated from
35 (such as Southern Europe) have, in the past decade, had to acknowledge immigration
36 communities coming to settle in their territory and that are neither temporary workers
37 nor limited to asylum seekers. To quote again the Council of Europe's White Paper:
38 'The cultural diversity of contemporary societies has to be acknowledged as an
39 empirical fact' (Council of Europe, 2008, p 19). While cultural diversity, compared
40 to multiculturalism, offers a tempting alternative to an approach that has worn itself
41 out of popularity, it maintains one of its main liabilities, namely that the unit of
42 analysis has not, in essence, changed.⁶ There is increasing support around the idea
43 that culture is not a 'fixed' category or practice and that it should not be essentialised,
44 but when talking about diversity, the Council of Europe (as well as most national
45 and local governments, media sources and academics) still has in mind mainly racial/
46 ethnic diversity. It might picture a wider variety of ethno-cultural communities –
47 particularly if compared to the classic migration patterns in which large numbers of
48 people would move from few places to few places – but the unit of analysis is still

1 ethnicity, despite there being ‘more’ of it, being more mixed, more diluted, or more
2 dispersed. When talking about Islam, for example, even though the more politically
3 correct policy makers might differentiate between Sunni Muslims, Shi’ites, Sufi
4 Muslim and so on, the policies and practices of diversity management still tend to
5 lump together the religious affiliation of Islam and Arab ethnicity, presenting it to
6 the European majority as a cultural trait. Policies of cultural (religious, in these case)
7 diversity thus become easily ethnicised because the assumptions that underlie this
8 representation of the ‘problem’ are still rooted in diversity as ethnicity. In this sense,
9 I believe the term ‘super-diversity’ represents a more radical break from diversity,
10 compared to the shift that diversity represented vis-à-vis multiculturalism.

11 As Vertovec argued in 2007, and as Meissner and Vertovec have reiterated and made
12 even clearer in their more recent ‘Comparing super-diversity’ article, the issue is not
13 (or is no longer) one of measuring, assessing or having to deal with a different ‘quantity’
14 of ethnic diversity (Meissner and Vertovec, 2015; Vertovec, 2007). The steps to be
15 taken in rethinking public policies (for both minorities and majorities) should first
16 acknowledge super-diversity as ‘the diversity of diversity’: namely by accepting that
17 a pluralisation of societies has taken place over the past decades not only with respect
18 of ethnicity or country of origin, but also in terms of legal statuses, gender, age, social
19 capital, resources, education, religion, language, sexual orientation, physical ability
20 and so on. In Western Europe we have often been told that there are only two ways
21 for people to integrate into a society: the ‘British’ model of cultural pluralism, and the
22 ‘French’ model, based on acceptance of Republican values and, above all, the concept
23 of equality (Favell, 2003; 2013). As both ‘variations’, in the last few years, have been
24 declared doomed, dying, or dead a number of times,⁷ it is worth taking a brief detour
25 to give an overview of how the key conceptual issues came about in immigrant and
26 integration incorporation discourse, and how we have arrived at super-diversity. As
27 previously mentioned, multiculturalism emerged as a response to twentieth-century
28 inter-group relations, addressing the challenge of racialisation, communitarism⁸ and
29 integration, and is fully ingrained in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and
30 1970s, as well as the New Civil Rights Movement of the twenty-first century. Its main
31 driver was the will to guarantee rights and recognition to underprivileged minorities,
32 and this led to research such as the Multicultural Policy Index. The MCP Index
33 monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies in a standardised format, and it
34 is noteworthy that it distinguishes between three types of minorities – immigrant
35 minorities (‘new minorities’), indigenous populations (such as the Ainu in Japan) and
36 national minorities (such as Quebec in Canada). Where does this leave us in terms
37 of better understanding diversity management? While such a project has the declared
38 aim of monitoring the evolution of multiculturalism policies and majority–minority
39 relations, what it really captures is the States’ (legal) stances on minority recognition.
40 Which can indeed be an important tool for integration, but also risks reinforcing
41 the ethnic paradigm as the most salient one in modern societies: pushing people to
42 choose between being, say, ‘more’ Inuit or ‘more’ Canadian.

43 Interculturalism, also stemming from the desire for integration, is an attempt to
44 create intercultural mediation based on a flexible idea of culture and seeking a new
45 idea of citizenship (Allemann-Ghionda, 2009; Gundara and Jacobs, 2000). It emerged
46 from the criticisms to multiculturalism and it ‘prescribes’ intensive contact, exchange,
47 coupled with the support for cross-cultural dialogue and challenging self-segregation
48 tendencies within cultures, while aiming at creating a shared identity of sorts. Both

1 multiculturalism and interculturalism pose the question of whether certain rules should
2 be re-thought in order to accommodate minorities, and the two terms are, beyond
3 this synthetic sketch, two umbrella terms subsuming a varied number of approaches
4 which are, in many regards, quite similar (Hill, 2007).

5 As for super-diversity, it was coined originally to describe a society ‘distinguished by
6 a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small, scattered,
7 multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economic differentiated and legally
8 stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade’ (Vertovec, 2006). Its
9 major contribution is therefore that of taking into account a whole range of factors
10 for identity, breaking the ‘ethnicity primacy’ rule.

11 That being said, multiculturalism, interculturalism, diversity and super-diversity
12 are by no means mutually exclusive frameworks: the fact that diversity has changed
13 in terms of *quality* does not mean it has not also changed in terms of *quantity*. Super-
14 diversity should thus rather be seen as the attempt to deepen, highlight, and make
15 better sense of a phenomenon that was brought to the forefront of academic scholarly
16 and political debate by the previous approaches (Berg and Sigona, 2013). Regarding
17 the potential ‘dangers’ of super-diversity, while the term has attracted some criticism
18 simply based on its ‘trendiness’⁹ (Ndhlovu, 2016), it has also been criticised on the basis
19 that it risks ‘flattening’ differences, overlooking power politics and social inequalities
20 (Modood, 2011; Humphris, 2015). Various types of diversity are associated with a
21 higher or a lower degree of sensitivity to policy intervention (with difference from
22 the mainstream usually translating into a disadvantage for the minority in terms of
23 services and rights). When addressing the issue of the protection and promotion of
24 minority rights, particularly in the area of equality and anti-discrimination, not all
25 differences are ‘equally different’. However, while agreeing that the risk is present,
26 levelling the field of differences is not something inherent in the concept of super-
27 diversity. Using super-diversity as a framework for a kind of critical policy analysis
28 that allows for inductive methodology might help overcome this difficulty, creating an
29 opening for super-diversity to address debates on power, politics and policy (Meissner
30 and Vertovec, 2015, pp 551–2).

31 32 **The Roma as a litmus test for super-diversity** 33

34 The expulsion of European citizens of Roma ethnicity from France and Italy in spite
35 of the 2004 Freedom of Movement EC Directive and the current ‘refugee crisis’ have
36 not only raised heated political debates in Brussels, but also marked a significant shift
37 in discourses in minority politics, widening the minority and immigration debate
38 from the classic issue of securing peace within national borders to perspectives of
39 general human rights and non-discrimination.

40 A particularly compelling case to analyse in Europe is the set of policies addressed to
41 the Roma people, a minority¹⁰ which falls outside of the typical category of migrant
42 communities with which diversity is usually associated, since Romani minorities have
43 been residing in Europe for centuries and are as indigenous to the European continent
44 as the descendants of the Founding Fathers are to the United States. Falling outside
45 the typical multicultural scheme and of the mainstream political agenda, minorities
46 such as the Roma find themselves in a particularly vulnerable situation, as they risk
47 not only not being included (socially nor politically) in the political community
48 that should represent them but not even having a recognised identity to oppose

1 to mainstream society, and which would entitle them to cultural rights and special
2 protections (European Commission DG JUST, 2012a). They are an acknowledged
3 minority, in some countries as a 'national' one, but the perception of an oppositional
4 identity and the practice of segregation is very acute and widespread, to the point
5 that national Roma communities are sometimes perceived as more 'foreign' in their
6 own country than non-Roma migrants in the same territory. Here we have the
7 case of a highly diverse minority, characterised by a range of legal statuses, linguistic
8 diversity, socio-economic diversity, religious diversity and so on, and yet the 'Roma
9 issue' is still regarded, thought of, and consequently dealt with (both at the European
10 and at national levels) in very essentialising ways, as if dealing with a generic and
11 all-comprehensive ethnic minority, while a range of other dimensions (such as
12 gender, socio-economic class, language, age, geographic location) remain largely
13 un-problematized (Tremlett, 2014). This translates into policies that are generally
14 addressed at the Roma community (since that is where the current narratives locate
15 the 'problem'), and not at the neighborhoods they inhabit, the society of which they
16 are a part, the schools they attend or the employers or institutions that discriminate
17 against them. In this sense, I suggest that super-diversity, for all its limitations (the
18 concept is still a 'work in progress', as stressed by Meissner and Vertovec, 2015) holds
19 important potential to shift the frame that informs these policies, by problematising
20 the terms in which specific policy problems are understood. While it is not new to
21 draw attention to the fact that all policies are problematising activities which contain
22 implicit problem representations, and thus 'how the "problem" is represented, or
23 constituted, matters' (Bacchi, 2009, p 1), this body of literature has scarcely been
24 applied to diversity management, and much less to Roma-targeted policies.

25 Monica Rossi has eloquently summed up what the fundamental issue with the
26 conceptual and methodological approach to Roma studies has been so far:

27
28 'Whether you believe them to be unassimilable or whether you want to
29 'preserve' their culture, the methodology to date has always been the same:
30 to adopt criteria which are presumed to be anthropologically correct, but are
31 instead an alibi for the inaction that freezes the Roma by either segregating
32 them, or offering them ineffective and inadequate integration practices.'
33 (Rossi, 2009, p 71)

34
35 An example of how this approach can be shifted by changing the conceptual
36 framework from a traditional ethnic one to a super-diversity one is the case of a
37 group of Romanian Roma who, having been evicted in 2009 from an informal
38 settlement, joined an occupied ex salami factory in Rome (Maestri, 2014; 2016). By
39 doing so, they successfully managed to change their 'category of identification' into
40 a new narrative: they were able to shift in the public (and administrative) eye from
41 being seen as 'Roma' (and thus, in the Italian policy framework, 'nomads') to being
42 perceived as part of the 'Metropolis squatters', thus no longer the target of specific
43 and ethnically-based 'Roma integration policies', which in turn translated into being
44 able to lobby their housing rights together with other (non-Roma) migrants. The
45 emergence of the 'squatters' identification in this specific case, even though 'squatters'
46 is not a category of any kind in current policies, allowed a group of people who
47 had been acknowledged solely on the basis of their ethnicity to be seen as people
48 experiencing severe housing deprivation, in a way that did not negate their ethnicity

1 but that did not make their ethnicity the only possible lens to construct narratives
 2 and policies about them: ‘They have been considered another thing’ (Maestri, 2016,
 3 p 6). The ‘squatters’ identification is one linked to marginality and is charged with
 4 its own set of stereotypes, of course, but I consider it important in the sense that it
 5 allowed the Roma who had been evicted and who became a part of the Metropoliz
 6 experience to escape the ‘ethnicity trap’ (Rossi, 2016). Allowing for new identities
 7 and categories to emerge, and for the possibility of people to move freely between
 8 them and identify with more than one at the same time is something that should not
 9 be underestimated: ‘since the way the group is defined in each system in academic and
 10 policy literature is related to policy justifications, these groups are usually attached to
 11 a conceptual category with general implications for the discourse of ethnic/national/
 12 anti-racist politics’ (Acton and Gheorghe, 2001, p 61).

13 The argument here is that the possibility of multiple identifications that super-
 14 diversity enables (that is, the recognition of the fact that everyone’s identities are
 15 complex and not simply the reproduction of some given ‘community’ value) can (and
 16 should) deeply affect our way of understanding knowledge production about and
 17 around minorities. For instance, more useful than analysing the Roma minorities,
 18 their culture or lifestyles or markers of ethnicity (as these are fluid, contextual and
 19 generally defined by non-Roma) what Mihai Surdu has called their various classifiers
 20 and modes of objectification become what to look at: ‘Roma identity as we know
 21 it today wouldn’t exist without the discourse created by numerous experts...The
 22 production of knowledge about Roma presents a curious consensus on who the
 23 Roma are and typically reinforces stereotypes. Consequently, Roma identity tends
 24 to be recognised by the strength of the stereotypes related to it’ (Surdu, 2014).

25 In short, super-diversity can help us move beyond a fixed and limiting notion of
 26 ‘ethnicity’ without losing sight of ethnicity, and it can be seen as ‘an emblematic
 27 departure’ from ‘the ideology of the “nation-state” which dominates both popular
 28 representations and academic objects of analysis’ (Tremlett, 2014, p 840). Partly
 29 because of its novelty and its appeal in policy terms (London successfully managed to
 30 brand itself as super-diverse as an asset for the Olympics) it offers a new avenue that
 31 might prove useful in what can be thought of as Nancy Fraser’s recognition policy
 32 via a ‘deconstruction of the mainstream’ (Fraser, 1995).

33 This, however, requires strong political will on behalf of academic scholars, policy-
 34 makers and the media alike, in widening the way that diversity is typically thought of
 35 and portrayed, namely as uniquely concerning the two classic areas of 1) collective
 36 security and 2) economic employment (Ruiz Vieyetz, 2014b, p 15). Politics will
 37 remain the underlying driving force in framing policy ‘problems’ in specific ways:
 38 the recent National Roma Integration Strategies would probably not have developed
 39 as they did, had France and Italy not started a campaign of evicting and repatriating
 40 Romanian Roma in 2010 as a response to populist concerns of a ‘Roma invasion’
 41 (Clough Marinaro and Sigona, 2011; Magazzini and Piemontese, 2015). However,
 42 super-diversity can serve as a tool to dispel the fiction that such ‘policy problems’
 43 are neutral, objective and not rooted in a specific (cultural) way of constructing it.
 44

45 **Bringing the structure back in**

46
 47 Historically, the likely by-product of conflating popular sovereignty and liberal
 48 representative democracy in nation states in areas of mixed populations has been

1 the proclivity to sacrifice cultural minorities on the High Altar of nation building:
2 'reducing the heterogeneity of the people is a symbolic policy which transforms the
3 people into a nation' (Mastropaolo, 2012). However, contemporary processes of social
4 and cultural interconnection, fuelled by increased global mobility, are challenging
5 and (re)-shaping institutional boundaries of identity and belonging. Faced with these
6 processes, while a populist discourse has slipped easily into a rhetoric of danger (of
7 invasion, poverty, unemployment and cultural disintegration), new policies are being
8 developed at the European, state, regional and local levels in order to catch up with
9 demographic changes, and to cope with new and 'different' immigrant minorities,
10 compared to traditional, national ones. What was in the 1970s a niche, cutting
11 edge research field, namely that revolving around the concept of multiculturalism
12 and diversity, has increasingly gained relevance and attention, and migration and
13 integration is now a recognised and bolstering branch of social science, both fostering
14 and drawing from public policy debates. Meanwhile, the object of study has remained
15 anything but still: discourse on multiculturalism, interculturalism, diversity, and more
16 recently super-diversity is the result of not only changes in demographics and in paths
17 of migration, but also in the ways we (societies at the 'receiving' end of the migration
18 fluxes) have chosen to frame the issue(s) of differences and identities. A growing
19 number of academics are critical of methodological nationalism, and migration
20 policies are increasingly seen to have more chance of succeeding if various levels
21 of governance, including local authorities and civil society, are actively engaged
22 in an integrated strategy (Amelina et al, 2012; Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero,
23 2014; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002).

24 The EU Framework for Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020 that was adopted
25 by the European Commission in 2011 is a case in point that while the nation-state
26 remains an inescapable framework for both political institutions and collective identity
27 formation, immigration, integration and diversity management policies must acquire a
28 broader (or at least different) framework than that of the nation-state and of ethnicity, if
29 we are to make any progress. For some time now, the EU has pointed at the local level
30 as a key actor in migrant integration policy-making.¹¹ A critique of unidirectional
31 approaches to migration governance leads not only to the identification of new actors
32 in the formulation and implementation of migration policy and its governance but
33 also to a new understanding of 'policy making' as a 'thick' assemblage of institutions,
34 narratives and the strategies and action of the different actors involved. Against this
35 backdrop, super-diversity can be used to challenge the dominant approaches that
36 understand migration policy as based mainly on action by states by revealing a much
37 richer, more complex picture made up of both top-down and bottom-up decisions.
38 The challenge is to identify the different threads that shape migration and integration
39 governance as a super-diverse and thick assemblage by unpacking multi-level and
40 multi-scale spaces for politics and policies, and identifying the changing narratives
41 in (but also outside of) institutional settings: in the case of the Roma minorities, as
42 Vermeersch writes: 'Depending on how political and social actors portrayed them
43 or on how activists represented them, the Roma could be conceived of in different
44 ways: as migrants/nomads, as a national minority, as an ethnic group or as a social
45 underclass' (Vermeersch, 2012, p 1203).

46 This article's suggestion for ways forward in operationalising the concept of super-
47 diversity is to shift the focus from minorities to majorities, and from general theories
48 to institutional local settings, in order to produce an alternative research framework to

1 traditional ethnic studies and methodological nationalism. Beyond the case of Roma
2 minorities in Europe, the use of a super-diversity lens to investigate migration and
3 integration issues could further our understanding of the institutional dimension as
4 well as of the social dimension of these issues. As any conceptual framework, super-
5 diversity has, of course, both assets and drawbacks.

6 In order to confront the criticism that it ignores issues of inequalities and power,
7 super-diversity needs to be adopted in public policies by putting the emphasis not
8 so much on the level (in demographic, quantitative terms) but rather on the kind of
9 diversity to be acknowledged, accommodated and cherished, thus deconstructing
10 the mainstream. The implication of deconstructing the mainstream through
11 super-diversity would, in my opinion, on the one hand contribute to rendering a
12 more accurate picture of our similarities and fundamental equality amid the many,
13 multilayered identities built out of difference that each of us consists of. On the other
14 hand, it would challenge the unspoken implication of the traditional framework that
15 'white men are individuals – human beings in their own right, with personalities and
16 quirks and rich, rounded lives – while other people are still defined as members of
17 homogenous 'othered' groups' (Bates, 2016). In short, super-diversity can actively
18 help bring the debate on privilege and power relations into policy discourse. The
19 main danger of super-diversity might therefore not be that of creating an 'equivalence
20 of differences', but rather that of being the product of the society that it attempts to
21 question: since super-diversity tends to be more individualistic than multiculturalism,
22 it is more difficult to make claims around this concept. But at the same time, as
23 differentiation is socially and politically constructed, it also opens up the discussion
24 on the responsibilities of mainstream institutions (Faist, 2009).¹²

25 As UNESCO's universal declaration on cultural diversity and Action Plan¹³ point
26 out, the challenge is precisely that of taking advantage of the richness that diversities,
27 as *diversities*, have to offer to the European project. The insight that super-diversity
28 has to offer to this project is a subtle, but at the same time radical one. It allows not
29 only for change, but also for contradiction, variation and opposition not only in
30 majority–minority relations, but also within the majority itself, and within Europe's
31 decision-making institutions.

32 As stated by the first article of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural
33 Diversity¹⁴ 'Cultural diversity, as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, is
34 as necessary to mankind as biologic diversity is for living creatures. In this sense, it
35 represents the common heritage of humanity, and should be recognised and affirmed
36 as such for the benefit of present and future generations.' If culture is the sum total
37 of not just ethnicity but also of beliefs, assumptions, language(s), customs, legends,
38 songs, age, sexual orientation, (hi)stories, politics, attitudes, tastes, human capital,
39 profession and more, then super-diversity can thus be a useful concept not only as
40 a terminological marker of growing complexity, but it could be used as the tool of
41 choice to design cultural policies that are not only affirmative in nature, but also
42 that tackle the root causes of inequality by deconstructing the mainstream, in what
43 Nancy Fraser has called politics of transformation. The major shift here, it seems,
44 is that of moving the focus from entities to relations, allowing an exploration of
45 diversity(ies) within the majority population and its decision making bodies as well.
46 In this sense, this could indeed be the 'radical overhaul' of multiculturalism for which
47 some scholars have been calling.

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Notes

¹ In this article I adopt the spelling with hyphen, as Vertovec tends to do, but this bears no meaning with respect to the debate around this punctuation mark and should by no means be interpreted as a choice to stress the 'super-' part of the term or promote a limited understanding of it as just 'more' ethnic diversity (Meissner and Vertovec, 2015, 545).

² Even if we chose to take country of origin as the only meaningful category, we would have to account for the shifts in borders and citizenship laws, as an anecdote in Agnew's *Making political geography* illustrates: an old man says that he was born in the Austro-Hungarian empire, he went to school in Czechoslovakia, he got married in Hungary, he worked most of his life in the USSR and now lives in Ukraine. When his interlocutor comments that he must have travelled a great deal, he replies 'Not at all! I have never left Mukacheve' (Agnew, 2002).

³ For a definition of diversity related to this debate, see (Vertovec, 2012; Wessendorf, 2013). Diversity policies typically entail recognition and appreciation of cultural diversity, support for immigrant associations, promotion of interfaith dialogue and more generally policies aimed at fostering immigrant integration (Ambrosini, 2016).

⁴ Transgender and transsexual studies and identity are out of the scope of the analysis of this article, which does not mean that they should be overlooked in formulating equality policies (for a problematisation of gender and identity, see Butler, 1990).

⁵ This is not to obliterate the differences that exist among the authors mentioned. For an overview of the heterogeneity and dissonances between multicultural schools of thought and interpretations, see (Uberoi and Modood, 2015).

⁶ For an account of the shift from multiculturalism to diversity, see (Boccagni, 2014).

⁷ Angela Merkel: 'multiculturalism has utterly failed', October 2010; David Cameron: 'muscular liberalism against passive tolerance', February 2011; Manuel Valls: 'Roma lifestyles as "clearly in confrontation" with French ways of life', September 2013.

⁸ French scholar Jean-Paul Fitoussi described communitarianism in a 2008 article as follows: 'The temptation of communitarianism, which the French have debated for at least a decade, comes from the wish to turn the failure of "genuine" equality into something positive. It offers integration by default within the differentiated space of various communities – a sort of imprisonment by civilization' (Fitoussi, 2008).

⁹ Vertovec's 2007 *Super-diversity and its implications* is currently the most cited article in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*' history.

¹⁰ On the debate on the construction of a political identity of the Roma, and whether we should think in terms of one or multiple minorities, see Magazzini, 2016; Surdu, 2015.

¹¹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 13.5.2015. COM(2015) 240 final. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region, *Migration management at the local level*, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2015, and the Committee of the Regions, Report on the role of local and regional

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 3 [2014-en.pdf](http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/Documents/rapport-ecoter-migration-2014-en.pdf)

4 ¹² In whatever way one understands liberal democratic national-popular sovereignty, the
 5 demos is always defined by mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, mechanisms that by
 6 virtue of their inescapable national dimension, are always cultural.

7 ¹³ See Main Lines of an Action Plan for the Implementation of the UNESCO
 8 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
 9 images/0015/001560/156046e.pdf#page=50](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001560/156046e.pdf#page=50)

10 ¹⁴ Accepted unanimously by the 185 countries represented at the 31st session of the
 11 General Conference, in 2001.

12
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