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-Solidary and Collective Practices of Resistance-
How civil society organizations challenge the migration system in the city of Iquique, Chile

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"Where there is power, there is resistance and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault, 1978: 95).
Acknowledgments

I have always been particularly attentive and engaged in multiple associations fighting for different causes, pushed by a desire for social justice. When, in September 2020, I started a Master in International Migration and Intercultural Relations at the University of Osnabrück, I did it mainly because of personal interests and, in the end, I enjoyed it. However, in addition to the theoretical knowledge that the master’s course provided me, I was missing a more social and practical engagement which was due to the covid-19 pandemic at the time not achievable. The opportunity to spend my second year at the University of A Coruña in the Master Políticas Sociales e Intervención Sociocomunitaria was therefore a good way for me to combine these interests. Besides, I also lived, worked, and studied in Chile before the pandemic and thus had a personal further interest in concepts and theories that try to go beyond a Eurocentric way of thinking. Therefore, the compulsory internship in the fourth semester then turned out to be another great opportunity for me to combine personal, professional, and academic interests and I had the opportunity to complete this at the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales -INTE- from the University Arturo Prat, in Iquique, Chile and to combine it thematically with my Master's thesis.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CSO – Civil Society Organization
INTE, *Instituto de Estudios Internacionales* – Institute for International Studies
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
PCI – Problem-Centered Interviews
PDI, *Policía de Investigación* – Investigation Police
RMRP – Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
SJM, *Servicio de Jesuita a Migrantes* – Jesuit Migrant Service
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Abstract

The city of Iquique is currently characterized by a new migration phenomenon due to migrants entering through unauthorized border crossings since the border closure legitimized by pandemic prevention. Considering that global migration regimes have similar dynamics in different geographic locations but encounter different local processes, this thesis aims to analyze the specific materialization of the migration system in this local context. Therefore, I explore how civil society organizations challenge the migration system at the local level and what practices of resistance can be identified. To this end, problem-centered interviews were conducted with civil society organizations engaged in migrant struggles in the city. It was found that the migration system is challenged at the local level through various practices of solidarity and collective resistance from below. However, it was also identified that the criminalization of solidarity as a tool of governmental migration control is a response to the local challenge of the migration system.

Keywords: civil society organization, migration regime, practices of resistance, criminalization of solidarity

Resumen

La ciudad de Iquique se caracteriza actualmente por un nuevo fenómeno migratorio debido al ingreso de migrantes por pasos fronterizos no autorizados desde el cierre de la frontera legitimado por la prevención de la pandemia. Considerando que los regímenes migratorios globales tienen dinámicas similares en diferentes lugares geográficos, pero encuentran procesos locales diferentes, esta tesis busca analizar la materialización específica del sistema migratorio en este contexto local. Por lo tanto, exploro cómo las organizaciones de la sociedad civil desafían el sistema migratorio a nivel local y qué prácticas de resistencia se pueden identificar. Para ello, se realizaron entrevistas centradas en el problema con organizaciones de la sociedad civil que participan en las luchas de los migrantes en la ciudad. Se constató que el sistema migratorio es desafiado a nivel local a través de diversas prácticas de resistencia solidaria y colectiva desde abajo. Sin embargo, también se identificó que la criminalización de la solidaridad como herramienta de control migratorio gubernamental es una respuesta al desafío del sistema migratorio a nivel local.

Palabras clave: organización de la sociedad civil, régimen migratorio, prácticas de resistencia, criminalización de la solidaridad
1. Introduction

The Global South is hosting large numbers of migrants and refugees, and yet migration research focuses intensively on the Global North (Schwenken, 2018). Mezzadra (2012) similarly criticizes the focus of debates in critical migration studies being mainly on the European context, or migration to former colonies, while South-South migration movements are hardly considered in critical analysis. Hence, with this master thesis, I aim to make a small contribution regarding this disproportionate focus and examine a migration phenomenon of the Global South, namely in the context of the city of Iquique in Chile.

In the last 25 years, there has been an increase in people migrating to Chile, especially from other Latin American countries. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE), the number of migrants in 2015 was estimated at 465,319 representing 2.7% of the total population of Chile (Canales, 2018), while in December 2019 this figure rose to 1,492,522. This corresponds to almost 7.8% of the total population (INE, 2020). For comparison, in the 1980s, the percentage of foreigners in the total population did not exceed 0.7% (INE, 1982). Besides, the number of ‘irregular’ migrants was estimated at 300,000 to 500,000 in 2018 and 2019 (Rivera, 2020). In terms of the different national groups, the highest absolute increase of 57.6%, from 166,554 to 455,494 people residing in Chile, was recorded between 2018 and 2019 for Venezuelans (INE, 2020). Moreover, the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) (2022) estimates the number of Venezuelans living outside of Venezuela for the year 2021 at just over six million, 85% of whom reside in a Latin American country, and 562,000 Venezuelans are officially registered in Chile. The most recent census of the INE (2021) regarding national groups also registered that 30.7% of the migrant population in Chile are Venezuelans, followed by Peruvians with 16.3% or 235,165 people and Haitians with 12.5% or 185,865 people, while Colombians represent 11.4% and Bolivians 8.5%. Thus, these five national groups represent 79.4% of the total number of migrants with residence in Chile. In addition, the increasing vulnerability of disadvantaged groups due to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic impact on many people's lives, leading to increased vulnerabilization of migrants, has been described as a new migration push factor for Venezuelans to Chile1 (Stefoni et al., 2022). Consequently, this context highlights the occurrence of a new migration phenomenon in Chile, which is unprecedented in the region and

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1 The push and pull model of Everett Lee (1966), to which Stefoni et al. (2022) refer here, has been criticized in critical migration studies, for its simplification and the omission of migration networks among other reasons (Schwenken, 2018). Accordingly, it should be critically assessed whether this model is suitable enough to describe the current Venezuelan diaspora.
establishes a new scientific focus (Tapia, 2022), such as media interest (DW(a), 2022). Besides, this new situation also represents a research gap in migration studies.

Yet, even before the pandemic, the continued increase in intraregional migration in South America, and in particular the recent emergence of the Venezuelan diaspora, has led countries in the region to tighten their border security measures and make regular entry and legalization procedures more difficult for certain groups of migrants, which is discussed under the term border securitization. Thereby, the criminalization of migration is one of the elements used to legitimize the securitization of the border. In this process, the migrant is constructed as a danger and a threat to national security (Stang, 2016). However, many migration scholars were able to show that restrictive migration regime measures are not able to stop the constant influx of migrants but promote the precarization of migration routes and their lives (Liberona, 2018). As a result, an increase in unauthorized border crossings, as well as cases of smuggling, and human trafficking have been registered in Chile, with the Tarapacá region as a cross-border area, representing a regional focus in the national context (Dufraix et al., 2021). Similarly, the regional capital, Iquique plays an important role. As a response to the visibility of migrants in public places due to the lack of (state-provided) accommodation facilities, it became the scene of hyper-xenophobic anti-migrant protests in September 2021 and January 2022 and the violent raid of a Venezuelan camp by the police on September 24th, 2021 (Oyarzo, 2021). Nonetheless, as a reaction to the criminalization of migration, the securitization of the border, and the anti-migrant sentiment in the city, numerous actions and initiatives have been launched in solidarity with those afflicted, which involve different actors and organizations of the local civil society (Oyarzo, 2021). Based on this background this thesis addresses the following research questions:

*How are civil society organizations challenging the global migration regime at the local level in the city of Iquique, and what practices of resistance can be identified in this context?*

The aim is to analyze the practices of resistance of pro-migrant organizations, in the light of border securitization and the criminalization of migration, as well as to identify and contextualize the practices of resistance in the negotiation processes of the migration system, taking into account the global migration regime. As part of this, I will also analyze how local pro-migrant civil society organizations (CSOs) position themselves and their resistance practices within migrant struggles. Consequently, this thesis addresses the topic of negotiation processes of the migration system through resistance practices of CSOs at the local level, which
so far, has been handled only marginally in the literature and in the Latin American context and thus aims to fill a research gap.

Following Lilja and Vinthagen (2018), I understand resistance as a broad and complex concept that needs to be elaborated, theorized and contextualized in its specific settings and with its specific goals, which will be done in the course of this work. Furthermore, the basic assumption is that focusing on the analysis of active subjects makes it possible to show how spaces are opened up, in which the migration system is challenged. The analysis of the specific case of Iquique is therefore relevant because it provides an understanding of how global regimes of migration management have similar dynamics in different geographical locations but encounter local processes, such as practices of resistance that define their specific materialization. To know and understand these specificities is important not only to comprehend how these regimes operate but also to formulate political strategies of resistance and change and thus be actively and consciously part of negotiation processes of the migration system (Stang & Stefoni, 2016). Although this step is not part of my thesis, this work is intended to serve as a basis for the elaboration of policy proposals by political stakeholders, such as local CSOs. Thus, I aim to contribute in this sense through a transfer of knowledge.

For a thematic approximation, I will first introduce the local scenario to which this thesis refers in chapter 2.1. Based on this setting of the scene I analyzed relevant policy documents such as the decree of the state of exception in northern Chile and the Colchane Plan, as well as statistical data regarding ‘irregular’ border crossings and trafficking cases, to demonstrate the migration model of the Chilean North in chapter 2.2. Thereby, the section focuses on the heterogenous function of the border by considering the global migration regime and highlighting the securitization of borders and the criminalization of migration, and its impact on the migrant population. Furthermore, in order to analyze the resistance practices of local CSOs, some theoretical considerations and approaches to resistance, the autonomy of migration, and the act of citizenship are presented in the subsequent chapter 2.3. To complement the selected literature and document analysis with current and missing scientific data, I conducted six problem-centered interviews (Witzel, 1985; 2000) with representatives of selected pro-migrant CSOs during my internship at INTE in the city of Iquique². The methodology of which is presented in chapter 3. Further, the conducted interviews are analyzed in chapter 4 concerning the theoretical framework of chapter 2, highlighting how the interviewed CSOs challenge the

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² I completed a mandatory internship as part of my master's degree in "Políticas Sociales e Intervención Sociocomunitaria" from the University of A Coruña at the INTE between March 16th, 2022 to May 6th, 2022.
migration system on the local level and what practices of resistance were identified. Finally, a conclusion is drawn, and the research questions are answered summarily.

2. Contextual and Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze the resistance practices of pro-migrant CSOs in the city of Iquique, this chapter provides first a contextual and theoretical framework. For this purpose, I will begin by outlining the local context in which the resistance practices are embedded. Based on this, the Chilean migration system and its impact on the migrant population will be analyzed considering some theoretical considerations regarding the global migration regime. Finally, different critical micro- and macro-level approaches will be presented to serve as a basic methodological tool for the following analysis and to further investigate how the migration system is challenged at the local level.

2.1 Setting the Scene

As already mentioned, Chile has been experiencing an increase in immigration in recent years, especially from other Latin American countries and, particularly, from Venezuela due to the country's multi-faceted crisis. The main reasons why Venezuelans leave their country are lack of food and jobs, limited access to health care, and human rights violations, which have worsened since the pandemic (Dinamarca & Tapia, 2021). Given the economic crisis related to the pandemic, Venezuelan migrants came directly from their country but also from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (Tapia et al., 2022). Among the reasons that make Chile attractive as an immigration country are its political stability, high level of public security, financial stability, and its prosperity compared to other South American countries (Agar & Esponda, 2015). In addition, factors related to the geographical proximity to Chile and the tightening of migration policies in the Northern Hemisphere are relevant (Liberona, 2018). However, there are differences in terms of the circumstances of entry. In this regard, it is particularly important to highlight the Tarapacá region in northern Chile, which González (2009) considers a gateway to the national territory due to its strategic geographic location.
2.1.1 The Tarapacá Region

The Tarapacá region is located in the north of Chile and has a border with Bolivia, the Colchane-Pisiga border, as shown in Figure 2.1.

![Map of the Tarapacá border area](image)

**Fig. 2.1: Map of the Tarapacá border area [Ramos & Tapia, 2019].**

Until 2007, before the creation of the region called Arica and Parinacota, the Tarapacá region was a tri-border area and had a common border with Peru, in addition to the border with Bolivia (Ramos & Tapia, 2019). Today the region is composed of the provinces of El Tamarugal and Iquique, whereby the regional capital is also called Iquique. The number of migrants residing in the city of Iquique was reported to be 13.8% of the total population in 2018, thus higher than the national average, which, was estimated at 4% for the same year (INE, 2018).

As several authors point out, apart from the constant increase of migrants in the region, international migration is not a new phenomenon for Chile and especially not for the Tarapacá region (Joiko & Cortés, 2022). On the contrary, it has grown historically (Tapia, 2012). In this context, Marteles (2009) describes the triple Andean border between Bolivia, Peru, and Chile, demonstrating territorial, discursive, and cultural interconnectedness due to migration, cross-cultural family networks as well as cross-border religious festivals. Likewise, the region is characterized by the presence of indigenous peoples, particularly Aymara, Atacameño, and Quechua (Salgado, 2013). Moreover, the free trade zone *Zofri*, which opened in 1975 under dictator Augusto Pinochet, to promote transnational circuits, plays a decisive role in the internationalization of the region. The attraction of foreign investment under the prevailing neoliberalism fostered an economy linked to border communities and whose (commodity) flows across borders (Ovando & Ramos, 2016). Consequently, the region is classified as
multinational and cosmopolitan due to transnational and internal migration as well as the presence of indigenous peoples (González, 2007).

However, despite the historical component of migration phenomena, two contradictions can be observed between intercultural coexistence and nationalistic aspects. On the one hand, according to Marteles (2009), the collective historical memory in the city of Iquique shows a certain antagonism towards Peru and Bolivia, which the author attributes to the Pacific War, showing how historical discourses are connected to nationalistic ones. Other nationalist aspects can currently be observed in relation to local resistance to recent migration flows into the region (Joiko & Cortés, 2022). For instance, on September 24th, 2021, Plaza Brasil in Iquique, where many migrants were staying due to lack of shelter and difficulties in continuing their journey, was violently raided by the police. The following day, an anti-migrant demonstration took place in the city, with 3,000 people participating and hate speech being broadcast in the media and on the streets (Oyarzo, 2021). Furthermore, on January 30th, 2022, about 4,000 people protested against ‘criminals’ and ‘illegal migration’ and attacked the property of migrants and a Venezuelan man who had to be protected by the national police (DW(a), 2022). In this regard, in addition to racist and xenophobic narratives, the failure to control migration at the Colchane-Pisiga border crossing with Bolivia was particularly protested. Thus, to better understand this border crossing, the next section outlines the specifics of the Colchane border.

2.1.2 The Colchane-Pisiga Border

The so-called Paso-Colchane is located 262 kilometers from the City of Iquique and at 3,695 meters altitude in the Altiplano and is characterized by harsh climatic conditions such as very high levels of aridity, and temperatures that oscillate between 0°C and 18°C, as well as by the low oxygen air due to the altitude. Additionally, there are heavy rains during the summer months. To avoid border control, people have to take a long detour. This route passes through a wetland area at an altitude of 3,200 to 5,000 meters above sea level, consisting of a hard cushion of vegetation under which there is often frozen water. Thus, when crossing this route, the breaking of the crust represents a risk. In addition, at this altitude, inadequate clothing and poor physical condition increase the risk of hypothermia, falls, heart attacks, and increased blood pressure (Stefoni et al., 2022).

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3Appendix 7.3 contains some photos I took during a field visit on March 19th, 2022.
Considering that the border between Colchane and Pisiga has been associated in the media with the attributes of smuggling and drug trafficking since the mid-2000s (Ramos & Ovando, 2016), with the outbreak of the pandemic in 2020 it has again been in the headlines denouncing it as the ‘irregular’ entry route for Venezuelan migrants to Chile (Dinamarca & Tapia, 2021). The closure of the land border from March 18th, 2020, until May 1st, 2022, legitimized by the need for pandemic prevention4, reinforces a series of measures and policies already implemented before the pandemic, making regular entry of certain groups of people enormously difficult (Stefoni et al., 2022). In this regard, in 2021, 21 migrants died while crossing the Atacama Desert (Ebert, 2022). Additionally, in a study conducted before the pandemic, Liberona (2015) identified other risks of crossing the border as exploitation by smugglers, robberies, arrests, violence and sexual abuse, as well as abandonment in the desert by coyotes. Hence, it can be concluded that the conditions of entry via unauthorized border crossings, highlighted by Varela (2016) for the Mexican context, are extremely precarious and take place in distant locations, exacerbating the violation of human rights, which similarly can also be observed in Chile.

Even though entry into Chile through unauthorized border crossings is not a new phenomenon (Liberona et al., 2021), the Servicio de Jesuita a Migrantes (SJM) (2021) describes that the scale has risen since 2020, mainly at the Colchane border crossing. The Chilean Criminal Investigation Department (PDI) substantiates the information of this increase. As can be observed in Graph 2.2, while in 2019, 8,048 people entered the country through unauthorized paths, by 2020 the number doubled to 16,848, and from January 2021 until September 2021 there were 33,503 people counted (Leal, 2021)5.

4 In this regard, it should not remain unmentioned that the Colchane border crossing (among others to Peru and Bolivia) was not reopened until May 1st, 2022, while the international airport in Chile’s capital Santiago and the Mendoza border crossing to Argentina opened several months earlier (DW(b), 2022).

5 In comparison, it should be noted that an increase of 12.4% in the foreign resident population was recorded for 2019 and an increase of 0.8% in 2020. Thus, the increase in unauthorized border crossings is not proportional to the number of foreign residents in Chile. Thereby, the INE defines a foreign resident as a foreign-born person or a person with foreign citizenship who is habitually resident in Chile or has applied for a residence permit in the country (INE, 2021).
Furthermore, apart from the increase of migrants entering the country through unauthorized border crossings, also smuggling as well as human trafficking have risen. In this regard, it can be observed that in 2019, a total of 45 cases of smuggling of migrants in which the Public Prosecutor's Office intervened were recorded, followed by 66 cases in 2020. Until October 31st, 2021, 157 cases were reported, of which 31 were registered in the Tarapacá region (Dufraix et al., 2021). However, as Stang and Stefoni (2016) were able to show, people who illegally smuggle migrants into Chile are not always large organized networks, but also "bus drivers [who] charge money to enter and leave the country so that they can pass through and pick them up on the other side" (Stang & Stefoni, 2016: 68). On top of that, the combination of increasingly stringent migration policies and criminal drug trafficking organizations are increasing the insecurity for people crossing the border (Dufraix et al., 2021). In this regard, Dufraix, Navarro, and Ramos (2021) further emphasize that this phenomenon only occurs because normative regulations determine the circumstances under which a person can make cross-border movements. For instance, if there were no such regulations, there would be no human smuggling (Dufraix et al., 2021). Thus, the scholars indicate that, in addition to the geographical characteristics of the border, political decisions about regulations also have an impact on the migration phenomenon.
To examine this point in more detail, taking into account both border securitization and the criminalization of migration, the migration model that influences the local context is presented in the next chapter. To this end, the Chilean migration system is contextualized within the global migration regime. This is further important to understand the context in which the resistance practices of CSOs take place in a broader sense.

2.2 The Chilean Migration System within the Global Migration Regime

Understanding how the migration system is challenged on the local level and thus comprehending practices of local materialization of migration regimes requires a global understanding of the migration regime.

2.2.1 Contextualizing the Global Migration Regime

The regime theory, as coined and used in political science, seeks to describe the emergence, dynamics, and processes of (international) institutions through which state and non-state actors cooperate and negotiate conflict issues that cannot be regulated by one or more states alone, such as global trade, or collective security. By applying the regime approach to the field of international migration, some authors have developed the idea of global governance of migration, focusing initially on the regulation of migration by state and non-state actors (Betts 2011). This global governance perspective is based on the fact, that regime-building factors cross borders when attempts are made to prevent migrants from doing so. Moreover, each specific migration flow impacts many states and societies simultaneously or sequentially, as even the most restrictive national attempts to control migration are not limited to the borders they seek to establish (Wolff, 2016).

The attempt to localize regimes, however, carries the analytical risk of understanding place as fixed rather than permeable, thereby disregarding the multilevel system through which migration movements are influenced. The analysis of migration regimes, therefore, derives its complexity from the local through the global and from the conceptual space for variations and influential adaptations, interactions, or interrelationships (scaling) that result not from political regulation but from actions and interconnected practices under particular circumstances. Therefore, a migration regime is viewed from an inherently transnational and translocal perspective that transcends national legislation, apparatuses, and policies, among others. Furthermore, various actors are involved in negotiating migration regimes, with the reference
points of the actors engaged ranging from global to regional, and national to local. Nevertheless, national factors are important because they reflect and modify these overarching regime factors (Rass & Wolff, 2018).

This approach thus allows for an analysis of a regime in its national or local materialization (and their necessary international interconnectedness) but does not include the idea of isolated, spatially definable regimes. It thus allows explaining the term regime as migratory interactions through the achievement of a minimum of strategic intelligibility, such as the emergence of shared norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that facilitate the convergence of expectations (Rass & Wolff, 2018). For instance, it can be noted that starting in the 2000s, especially after September 11th, a new notion of globalized securitization was developed in the context of managing international mobilities and translated into policy debates and practices across countries (Bigo, 2006).

Consequently, I will further focus on the local dimension of the materialization of the global migration regime, while acknowledging the ongoing dialogue with the intergovernmental and global framework in relation to policy on border and migration control. To this end, the next chapter will present both national and local aspects of the migration regime and their linkages to further analyze how this system is challenged at the local level by pro-migrant CSOs in the city of Iquique. Hence, this multi-scalar approach is important as it allows for at least a small contribution to be made from a holistic approach.

2.2.2 Securitization of Chilean National Borders

To understand the Chilean migration model, it is necessary to mention Decree-Law 1094 on Foreigners which was established in 1975 and drafted during Pinochet’s military dictatorship. This Decree-Law was based on the doctrine of ‘national security’, in which the foreigner is considered an external enemy (Tijoux, 2016). Even though after long debates and several postponements this law was changed in 2021 (Chile Atiende, 2022), the doctrine has been partially preserved and becomes apparent when examining the migration regime regarding the concepts of border securitization and criminalization of migration.

Although the processes of criminalizing migration and securing borders are not comparable, they are closely intertwined (Stang & Stefoni, 2016). While criminalization refers to the association of the migrant population with the commission of crimes —usually including the

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6 This law was called in Spanish Decreto Ley N° 1.094 – Establece normas sobre extranjeros en Chile.
crossing of the border itself as a crime—border securitization describes the tendency to perceive migration as a risk, threat, or infringement of the integrity and interests of the citizens to national security (Waever, 1995). This in turn legitimizes the establishment of restrictive migration management measures (Domenech, 2017). Within this understanding, borders play a key function as they are seen as a space for all kinds of illegal and dangerous activities (Balibar, 2005).

From this ‘security’ perspective, problems constructed and discursively legitimized in the context of human mobility are presented as existential threats, with the ‘unwanted’ migrant constructed as the ‘other’, and narratives of securitization based on the notion of the "enemy within" (Stang, 2016: 86). The construction of ‘otherness’ is, according to Ovando and Ramos (2016), particularly intense in the Tarapacá region, where human mobility is presented as a paradigm of danger and as an internal, cultural, and economic threat, omitting the historical components mentioned in section 2.1 (Quinteros et al., 2019). This can currently be observed in the example of Venezuelan migrants, who are deemed a ‘threat’ to national security and criminalized in this regard (e.g., Ebensperger, 2021). Thus, the increase in Venezuelan migration dominates discourses and practices of securitization at present (Tapia et al., 2022).

However, entry restrictions on foreigners under the securitization paradigm have already been introduced into the Chilean migration policies, prohibiting the entry of certain migrants and giving authorities wide discretionary powers, through measures aimed at protecting ‘national security’, in 2018. Some of these mechanisms regarding immigration and border control are (1) new procedures for regularization of ‘extraordinary’ migration, (2) restricting the entry of Venezuelans and Haitians through consular visas, which however are hardly granted7 (SJM, 2021), and (3) strengthening the expulsion mechanisms for foreigners8. Together with the announcement of this package of measures, former President Sebastián Piñera declared that "it is time to bring order to our common house" (Toro, 2018). Thus, in addition to reinforcing a nationalist discourse, the speech also highlights the security policy narrative the former President used, addressing the contradictory discourse of an open border policy for orderly and

7 As Bigo (2006) describes, the securitization of borders is characterized by practices of exceptionalism, in which states create different risk profiles and, in the case of international migration, a set of indispensable normative frameworks for mobility. This is illustrated by the legal enforcement of consular visas with respect to the national groups of Venezuela and Haiti.

8 Thus, 2,052 persons were deported in 2018 and 2,232 in 2019, compared to 1,389 in 2017. While about 30% of the ordered administrative deportations were enforced by 2017, this figure was only 9.1% in 2018 and 8.6% in 2019, while the number of deportation orders reached almost 7,000 in 2019. In summary, Dufrax, Ramos, and Quinteros (2020) conclude that the goal of effective deportation practices has not been achieved and, given the low number of administrative deportations enforced with an equally high increase in ordered deportations, has rather contributed to reinforcing the ‘irregularity’ of migrants. Current figures likewise indicate that only 5% of ordered administrative deportations were enforced in 2020 and only 6.1% until June 2021, continuing the trend of constructing the condition of ‘deportability’.
regular migration and, on the other hand, closed borders for ‘irregular’ migration, human trafficking, and smuggling (Dufraix et al., 2020). Moreover, it becomes evident that securitization and the current process of criminalizing ‘irregular’ migrants have a practical as well as a narrative-discursive component (Jaramillo et al., 2020). However, as many scholars were able to demonstrate, biopolitical borders are not successful. "On the contrary, neither surveillance systems nor suspension of human rights can prevent migrant mobility. Despite the great risk, migrants continue crossing the borders and contesting the biopolitical regime" (Topak, 2014: 830).

More recently, and regarding the uncontrollability of migration, it is necessary to consider the closure of the border between Colchane and Pisiga from the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic until May 1st, 2022 (Tapia et al., 2022). Although the closure of the border did not impede migrants from entering Chile, it became a new obstacle to people's mobility, which in turn precarized the conditions for crossing the border. In fact, this situation led to a significant increase in migrants entering Chile through unauthorized border crossings (see section 2.1), which in turn prompted the Chilean government to declare a state of emergency in the Tarapacá province of El Tamarugal on February 14th, 2022 (BCN, 2022). The enforcement of this state of emergency enabled the militarization of the border (Arcos, 2022), which underscores practices of securitization.

Moreover, another state response to the ‘emergency’ of the border was the Colchane Plan, launched on February 9th and 10th, 2021, which included not only military support but also public health interventions to secure the border. The plan also incorporated the objective of the expulsion of persons who entered through ‘irregular’ border crossings (Reyes, 2021). This broadened the scope compared to previous governmental plans, by addressing not only border control issues, but also public order and health control aspects, making them interconnected (Dufraix et al., 2022). In this regard Dufraix, Ramos, and Quintero (2022) analyze how sanitation facilities for migrants in Iquique, officially established to contain the spread of the virus, actually served to register, locate, categorize, notify, and enforce multiple deportation orders, disregarding legal rights. For this purpose, they refer in their analysis to the concept of crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006), which emphasizes the development of the merging of the legal systems of immigration and criminal law, highlighting that different categories of laws become governmental instruments used to manage mobility through control. Yet, the rise of crimmigration as an expression of a culture of control and repression permeates not only the

9 This state of emergency was extended on February 24th, 2022, as well as under the new president Gabriel Boric on March 16th, 2022, and March 24th, 2022 (See: http://bcn.cl/31oax, http://bcn.cl/31oat, and http://bcn.cl/2zdq3).
legal systems but also politics, public discourses, and social practices (López-Sala & Barbero, 2021). Nonetheless, migration regime measures do not only aim to restrict the mobility of ‘unwanted’ foreigners but also have the ability to construct the condition of “illegality” (de Genova, 2004: 116) and thus further impact a migrant’s life, which is described in the next section.


Regarding the construction of ‘irregularity’, the relevance of the border becomes clear by delineating it as a space of "exemplary theater for the staging of the ‘illegal alien’ that the law produces" (de Genova, 2002: 436). In this regard, Dufraix, Ramos, and Quinteros (2020) note that already the migration and border control measures implemented before the pandemic have led to the construction of a system of ‘irregularity’ that particularly affects northern Chile. For instance, in a call to promote ‘orderly, safe and regular’ migration, an exceptional regulation procedure for ‘irregular’ migrants was implemented in 2018. Yet, various bureaucratic obstacles and delays in the processing of individual cases have increased the ‘irregularity’ among migrants (Briones, 2019). On top of that, the compulsory introduction of a self-declaration for migrants who entered through unauthorized border crossings at the PDI in order to use public transportation and receive basic health care also results in an administrative expulsion order (Llorente, 2021.). This requirement has further exacerbated the system of constructing ‘irregularity’. Consequently, this type of migration management is an example of what De Genova (2004) defines as the legal production of ‘illegality’ (de Genova, 2004; see for the Chilean context Stang & Stefoni, 2016). However, the condition of ‘irregularity’ leads not solely to actual deportation but to what de Genova (2004) describes as ‘deportability’, as the state’s targeted deportations exceed actual possibilities to enforce them, what Brandariz (2021) calls the deportation gap.

In order to understand the impact of these constructed conditions on the lives of those affected, the approach of differential inclusion (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013) discussed in critical migration research can be referred to. With this concept, the authors describe that migration management is not based on the complete exclusion of migrants. This is because even the status of ‘irregularity’ does not produce absolute exclusion from society, but rather a highly precarious

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10 While de Genova (2004) uses the term ‘illegality’, I decided to use the term ‘irregularity’ and put it in quotation marks to indicate that it is a label that nation-states apply to certain migrant groups in order to criminalize and obscure the legal construction of this condition (Aquino, 2015). Thus, I aim to emphasize the process of ‘irregularization’ and the construction of irregularized migrants. This will be further clarified for the Chilean context in the next section.
status that is 'attractive' for the labor market as the conditions of ‘irregularity’ and ‘deportability’ turn migrants into highly exploitable labor, and thus constructs the condition of ‘exploitability’. In this sense, migration control policies do not aim at total closure, but rather at "filtering, selecting and channeling" (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013: 165) migratory movements and at gradual legal and social inclusion. To give a current example, a woman residing in the refugee camp Lobito which I was able to visit during my internship at INTE, reported that both she and her husband earn only half or even less of the usual hourly wage in the jobs they perform on an infrequent basis in the informal labor sector due to their ‘irregular’ status (Field note from 29.04.2022). The differential inclusion approach thus overcomes the binary notion of inclusion/exclusion. Consequently, ‘irregularity’ is not a homogeneous status. Rather, precarious legal statuses range from permanent provisionality to complete ‘irregularity’ and are not binary categories to citizenship (Thayer & Stang, 2017).

Furthermore, from an intersectional perspective (Crenshaw, 1989), the nexus of classicism, racism, and sexism becomes evident\(^1\), as, for example, ‘irregular’ migrant women are pushed into informal labor sectors such as sex work, which on the other hand is associated with the criminalization of migration (Liberona, 2015).\(^2\) In that way, "the spatialized condition of ‘illegality’ reproduces the physical borders of nation-states in the everyday life of innumerable places throughout the interiors of the migrant-receiving states" (de Genova, 2002: 439). Or, using the words of Aedo (2017), the Andean crosser is permeated by borders that are not only physical but also cultural.

Moreover, the experiences of racism, exclusion, and exploitation lead to subjectivity, patterned by emotions such as fear, insecurity, and vulnerability, which in turn negatively affect the daily life and health aspects of migrants, thus becoming a mode of being-in-the-world\(^3\) (Willen, 2007). For instance, Stefoni et al. (2022) were able to show in their study that 17.3% of surveyed Venezuelans felt discriminated against sometimes and 16.8% often. The numbers are high considering that the respondents of the study have only been in Chile for one month.

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\(^1\) The list of categories included in an intersectional analysis is not exhaustive. Currently, for instance, in academic discussions describing the racism experienced by Venezuelan migrants in Chile, the importance of a political stance attributed to Venezuelans is being discussed as another category for proposed explanations.

\(^2\) In addition to criminalizing migration laws, Aquino (2015) points out that there are numerous laws and administrative restrictions that limit the daily lives of ‘irregular’ migrants, forcing them to do things that are considered ‘illegal’ and criminalized. For example, driving without a license or carrying false identification. Moreover, de Genova (2004) describes that because of the condition of ‘illegality’, corruption and abuse of power by the police increase. Thus, ‘irregular’ migrants often have no way to avoid committing some form of crime.

\(^3\) Adapted from Martin Heidegger (1927), the term refers to a way of being that is peculiar to human beings and thus a personal experience. Thereby, being-in-the-world is a condition rather than an activity.
However, the globalized border securitization paradigm, clearly identified in the migration model of the Chilean north, as well as the criminalization of migration and its impact on migrant populations presented in this section, did not go unanswered. On the contrary, they led to various actions and practices from civil society in solidarity with those affected, resisting the migration system at the local level (e.g., Oyarzo, 2021). In order to identify and further analyze these resistance practices, the next chapter presents theoretical approaches as a basic methodological tool to be used in the analysis.

2.3 Changing the Focus - Conceptualization of Resistance

To analyze the practices of resistance of CSOs in the city of Iquique, to understand how these organizations have challenged the migration system at the local level and how they position their engagements in migrant struggles, I propose to utilize the concepts of autonomy of migration, the act of citizenship and concepts of resistance as a theoretical approach. The choice of these concepts, which offer tools to examine negotiation of the migration regime from a different analytical perspective, the micro, and macro level, can also be understood as an attempt to prevent contributing to a "border spectacle" (de Genova, 2013: 1181). In migration studies, there is a risk of focusing on unauthorized border crossings and on the spectacle of militarized border control "helping to generate a constellation of images and discursive formations that give migrant 'illegality' the appearance of an objective fact" (de Genova, 2013: 1830). In this respect, the focus on the local level offers the opportunity to show that ‘irregular’ migrants are active subjects who contest global dynamics from below, with civil society playing a key role (Fernández-Bessa, 2019).

2.3.1 Autonomy of Migration

The core assumption of the concept of autonomy of migration, which emerges from a constructivist perspective, is that there are "moments of autonomy" (Scheel, 2015: 7) that occur despite all attempts at control and regulation by the state and can be described as "moments of excess and uncontrollability vis-à-vis state practices of regulation and control" (Scheel, 2015: 2). These moments of autonomy are characterized by the fact that "there is an irreconcilable conflict between migration and attempts to control and regulate it through practices of appropriation of mobility and other resources by migrants" (Scheel, 2013a: 281). This basic assumption underscores the fact that migratory movements, borders themselves, and all
categories arising from the legal system do not exist as such. They are shaped by encounters between migrants and actors, resources and methods of mobility and border control, and are subject to constant processes of negotiation (Scheel, 2013b). In that way, migrants are involved in the transformation of border regimes, and on the other hand, border regimes shape migration (Papadopoulos et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that migrants are not understood as a sum of individuals, but as collective subjects (Schwenken, 2018). Additionally, the concept prevents falling into the trap of a control bias that perceives people on the move as passive targets of control and exclusion measures and practices, thereby overestimating the effectiveness of border controls because the entire system is seen as all-powerful (Scheel, 2013b). The concept further breaks away from the notion of formal citizenship and assumes that migrants act directly as citizens, regardless of their legal status (Mezzadra, 2012). Additionally, the approach describes that migration is an active force, which is to be understood as a form of everyday resistance (Hess, 2017), whereby Wonders and Jones (2021) understand migration through a global perspective as a massive social movement for justice, as migrants all over the world reject borders and conduct processes of ‘undoing’ borders from below. Nevertheless, it also needs to be critically recognized that migration plays a key role in the routines and reproduction of capitalism, primarily because capitalism is not possible without migration (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015).

Furthermore, the autonomy of migration approach has been heavily criticized for romanticizing migration on the one hand and downplaying the extent of border controls on the other (Scheel 2013b). Moreover, Codero, Mezzadra, and Varela (2019) state that this concept has not been sufficiently developed for the Latin American context and requires "a good dose of conceptual creativity and empirical research” (Codero et al., 2019: 15), to develop a Latin American perspective that "contributes to the epistemological archipelago of the autonomy of migration, a situated knowledge that has the capacity to dialogue with other knowledges and other latitudes” (Codero et al., 2019: 11). Accordingly, I propose to link the concept to theoretical considerations regarding the acts of citizenship approach, to further emphasize the focus on migrants acting directly as citizens, regardless of their legal status and to contribute to this epistemological project.
2.3.2 Acts of Citizenship

By focusing on the practices of agency by ‘irregular’ migrants — actors traditionally considered apolitical subjects — the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens and the sovereignty of the state to distinguish between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are challenged. According to Isin and Nielsen (2008), these acts of ‘non-citizens’ are to be understood as acts of citizenship, rendering citizenship a practice that produces citizens – socially, politically, culturally, and symbolically – rather than merely as a legal status. In other words, acts of citizenship analyze how subjects constitute themselves as citizens, as those who are entitled to have rights, regardless of their legal status (Isin, 2008). Consequently, public protests but also ‘irregular’ border crossings can be understood as a prefigurative act of citizenship, while in that way international migration challenges the foundations of citizenship, sovereignty, and global political-economic dynamics (Nyers & Rygiel, 2012). From this point of view, citizenship appears as its social relation, which is as contingent as the categories of ‘migrant’, ‘the other’, or ‘illegality’ (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015). By treating citizenship as a procedure rather than a naturally given phenomenon, "the lens of subjectivity brings out the materiality of the processes" (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015: 84). This reveals how the labels of belonging and exclusion are defined, and also makes it apparent that this categorization is changeable and thus negotiable. Aside from this, ‘irregular’ migrants who publicly demand the rights to which they should be entitled by virtue of their human status, demonstrate the paradox of states committing to human rights while refusing to grant those human rights to some as externally constructed groups.

Yet, the focus on citizenship concerning migrant struggles may be too narrow, as not all struggles can be subsumed under the performativity of the appropriation of rights (Saunders & Al-Om, 2022). In this regard, Saunders and Al-Om (2022) criticize the concept for referring to practices that occur in the public sphere, thus overlooking the conditions under which acts of citizenship can (and cannot) occur and leaving out acts that are not public and act with overt political intent, such as migrant struggles where the primary concern is survival. Although many studies have been able to demonstrate the activism of refugees and migrants regarding the claiming of rights (e.g., Fernández-Bessa, 2019), it remains without a doubt that other people with, for example, precarized and vulnerabilized living conditions and uncertain residency status are unable or unwilling to engage in actions of performative rights claiming (Saunders & Al-Om, 2022). Accordingly, for a more holistic understanding, I include further concepts of resistance that aim to capture less public and also collective practices of allied resistance and those that go beyond the demand for rights.
2.3.3 Resistance

Resistance is a complex and broad concept that must be elaborated on and theorized in its specific contexts and aims. Resistance is usually associated with power, and the nature of power influences the nature of resistance as well as the effectiveness of resistance practices (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2018). In other words, the form of resistance depends on the form of power (Scott, 1989). Here, for example, distinctions can be drawn between violent or nonviolent, open or hidden, organized or individual, and conscious or unconscious resistance practices (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2018). Resistance is thus, according to the authors, "a response to power from below – a practice that might challenge, negotiate, and undermine power" (Lijia & Vinthagen, 2018: 215). Also, Foucault (1982) argues that resistance practices bring power relations to light, and serve to "locate positions and figure out its point of application and the methods used" (Foucault, 1982: 780).

To capture resistance practices that are not as dramatic and visible such as rebellions, demonstrations, revolutions, or other organized collective and confrontational forms of resistance, James Scott (1985) developed the concept of everyday resistance. This concept notes that resistance can as well be silent, disguised, or otherwise seemingly invisible. However, Lilja and Vinthagen (2018) criticize Scott's concept for not capturing all forms of individual and small-scale resistance, as practices of resistance can also be extraordinary and/or not always ‘everyday’. Therefore, they add the concept of dispersed resistance, overcoming the binary perception of everyday resistance and organized resistance/social movements that obscures a whole world of small-scale resistance practices that need to be recognized and explored more thoroughly. Furthermore, the authors emphasize that dispersed resistance can occur both uniquely, as well as inspire others to engage in similar resistance practices that, however, may differ in terms of space and/or time. Likewise, enduring and organized networks can develop, establishing collective practices up to social movements. Through this concept, dispersed practices of resistance can be understood as a cumulative and large-scale response to power that makes its political impact visible.

In this context, resistance can also be a practice that takes place on behalf of and/or in solidarity with a subaltern, which is described with the concept of proxy resistance (Saunders & Al-Om, 2022). This approach captures the resistance practices of civil society actors, from for instance pro-migrant organizations, who are not necessarily affected by a particular form of violence themselves, but who stand up as allies against forms of violence and the suppression of certain power constellations. However, it should be noted and critically evaluated that practices that
can be subsumed under the concept of proxy resistance can also be understood as paternalistic gestures that may (re)produce power relations (Saunders & Al-Om). Nonetheless, according to Schiffauer (2017), civil society projects stand for alternatives to panic reactions to immigration and as a counter-hegemony to policies of solution based on securitized border controls and deterrence-based policies. The proxy resistance approach thus highlights that civil society actors are involved in migrant struggles out of solidarity.

In this sense, in a joint paper by Casas-Cortes et al. (2015), de Genova, Mezzadra, and Pickles emphasize the diversity of migration struggles by stressing the heterogeneity of migration realities and the different ways in which migrants are affected by and have to deal with power relations. These struggles take place "at the border, but also before and beyond the borderline; struggles that are visible in the public arena or that remain relatively invisible" (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015: 80). They oppose dominant mobility policies, the labor regime, citizenship spaces, and also include everyday strategies, refusals, and resistances that can be political but do not have to be (Casas-Cortes et al.). In this regard, migrants' struggles are understood as practices and collective demands for equality and freedom that do not necessarily fall under the notion of formal citizenship and at the same time refuse to be codified in it (Domenech & Boito, 2019). Furthermore, Domenech and Boito, (2019) emphasize the relevance of civil society actors in migrant struggles and the local level as a space for political negotiation processes, and in which the migration system is challenged. However, according to Walters (2011) humanitarian assistance, does not always lead to a deconstruction of power relations and the challenging of systems. Rather, he outlines the supposed contradiction that by merging rescue with security, rejection, and control, in which civil society actors and organizations are involved, ‘humanitarian zones’ are created, in which humanitarian assistance reconstitutes conflict zones. The involved actors thus become part of a humanitarian government and the development of humanitarian borders. The result is a ‘compassionate’ border securitization that combines the humanitarian ethos with policing and militarization. Consequently, it is too simplistic to assume that CSOs will always resist existing structures, but can also be part of a consolidation of these power differentials and thus part of migration control.

Based on these theoretical considerations and the juncture of critical approaches, it is, therefore, feasible to ask how CSOs challenge the migration regime at the local level in the city of Iquique. Likewise, the questions arise as to what practices of resistance can be identified in this context, and in what ways the local CSOs position themselves within migrant struggles. To further explore these questions, which, as mentioned above, constitute a research gap in the Chilean
context, I conducted six interviews with actors from CSOs. The methodology I used for this research is explained in the next chapter.

3 Methodology

3.1 Sample Selection
In order to explore the practices of resistance, and to answer the research question, I conducted semi-structured, problem-centered interviews (PCI) according to Witzel (1985; 2000) with agents of CSOs in the City of Iquique. The target group consisted of individuals who are either voluntary or professionally involved in a CSO that supports migrants who have arrived in the city since 2020. To identify adequate and interested interview partners, a social space analysis was first carried out with the help of social media and through conversations with local key individuals. To organize this data, I created a detailed table of organizations, fields of activity, and contact details. To achieve the broadest possible coverage, six interviews were conducted with various organizations identified in the local area. This also allows me to be able to capture internal differentiation and a broad picture of the organizations involved, such as NGOs, feminist groups, and political groups. The interviewees were obtained through different approaches. Two of the organizations were contacted via social media and asked for an interview, while the others were reached through the professional contacts at INTE. The interviewees determined the choice of location for the meetings, which were held partly in public places, as well as on the premises of the organizations or those of INTE. Furthermore, preparing and conducting these interviews were part of the tasks carried out during my internship. The interviews were conducted in May 2022, both on-site and online, with a duration of 32 and 56 minutes.

3.2 Data Collecting Process
The semi-structured interview is subsumed under the open interview method in qualitative research (Kaiser, 2020). This research method is characterized by the fact that qualitative investigation is highly context-specific and dynamic, and therefore not standardizable. The

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14 Here I refer to people I met during my internship at the Institute of International Studies (INTE) at the University of Arturo Prat in Iquique.
15 The fieldwork of my thesis has been financed by a Fondecyt research project by Dr. Romina Ramos Rodríguez (responsible researcher): Proyecto Fondecyt de Iniciación N°11200244: “Abrir y cerrar fronteras: análisis de los procesos de securitización en la región de Tarapacá (2010-2020) y su impacto en la construcción de irregularidad migratoria”.
16 A list of socio-demographic data of the interviewees can be found in the appendix 7.1.
context-specificity results primarily from the research question. The notion of dynamics refers to the interview setting itself, as this situation is neither fully predictable in advance nor fully controllable during the interview, even if a guide is used to structure the interview situation. More specifically, for this thesis, the PCI method according to Witzel (1985) was selected, which is methodologically counted as a semi-structured interview approach. The PCI method aims to record "individual actions and subjective perceptions and ways of processing social reality" (Witzel, 2000: 1). Therefore, the research interest focuses on data concerning a specific problem (Flick, 2011) and is thus suitable for research on subjective perceptions regarding resistance practices in the local context. The PCI was developed by Witzel (1985) as a response to the criticism of prevailing research and measurement methods raised in the 1970s, as flexible and situation-appropriate methods were necessary for empirical social research. This criticism refers to a deductive approach, in which it is assumed that data can only be collected through fixed operationalization steps, and on the other hand, to an inductive concept, which is characterized by the principle of openness and thus by making theoretical knowledge recognizable. The PCI attempts to resolve the (presumed) opposition between openness and theory-led methods and is conceived as an inductive-deductive interplay (Witzel, 2000). Thus, the aim is to record subjective perceptions and ways of processing as unbiasedly and openly as possible (Witzel, 1985). To do justice to these principles, I elaborated a questionnaire guide with the help of a structuring matrix. According to Witzel (2000), the guideline serves as a memory aid and backdrop and does not have to be ‘worked through’ statically. Moreover, it ensures the comparability of the various interviews. For my thesis, I elaborated a guide that addressed the following main topics: (1) Possibilities and Actions, (2) Difficulties and Criminalization of Solidarity, (3) Autonomy of Migration, and (4) Migration Policy. The interview guide was also reviewed by the Ethics Committee of the University of Tarapacá and is attached in Appendix 7.2. The interviewees were informed about the research project both verbally and in writing. After consent was obtained, the interviews were audio recorded, and subsequently transcribed, to be analyzed in the next step.

3.3 Coding and Analysis

According to the principle of the object orientation of the PCI, the research and evaluation methods must be selected to fit the research interest (Witzel, 2000). For the analysis, the transcriptions of the entire interviews were required. In this respect, linguistic interpretations were not relevant for this project, so the transcription of non-verbal utterances, voice pitches,
and different intonations was largely dispensed with. Instead, what was said was written down to then examine different categories and codes and to cross-compare them (Kuckartz et al., 2008). Moreover, all names, locations, and other information that could contribute to the identification of the interviewees were anonymized. After the transcription, the evaluation of the data material was based on the qualitative content analysis according to Mayring (2015).

Mayring’s methodological approach deepens the basic idea that qualitative research does not mean that free interpretation takes place without systematic and comprehensible work steps. Nor does it mean that the results of the research are largely dependent on the researcher and can therefore hardly be comprehended by others. The basic components of analysis are therefore rules that systematize the analysis and make it intersubjectively verifiable, while at the same time proceeding in a theory-guided manner. With this method, Mayring (2010) creates a link between quantitative methods, which are characterized by systematics and intersubjectivity, and qualitative methods and their observations of individual cases. This is achieved by not standardizing the methodology for the individual analyses, but by tailoring and adapting it to the individual case. Based on this methodological approach, I analyzed the interviews and used MAXQDA to facilitate the process. Since the interviews were held in Spanish, I translated them only when used as direct quotes in chapter 417. The following chapter presents the results according to the three main topics identified beforehand: (1) Solidarity and proxy resistance, (2) Resistance practices, and (3) Criminalization of solidarity. Thereby, the abbreviation ‘CSO’ is used for civil society organizations, whereby the selected statements refer both to a specific organization and to statements that can be attributed to the interviewed member of the organization.

4. Analysis

Keeping in mind the research questions of this thesis, I will present and analyze the collected data in the following chapter. In doing so, the data will be linked to relevant literature, especially from the conceptual and theoretical framework of chapter 2. First, I outline in what way solidarity is a condition for the CSOs to participate in migrant struggles, what is understood by the term solidarity, and how the interviewed CSOs position themselves and their practices in

17 I decided to conduct the analysis in the original language in order to work as closely as possible with the data material. However, with the aim of making this work linguistically accessible to a wide audience, the selected verbatim quotations have been translated into English. This decision is also justified by the fact that the translation of the entire work into Spanish is already planned for October 2022.
migrant struggles. On this basis, I subsequently present the identified resistance practices and contextualize these practices by examining how CSOs challenge the migration system at the local level. Moreover, during the development of this work, it also became clear that the migration system responds to these practices of resistance that operate from below. Thus, the criminalization of solidarity at the national and local levels is identified and presented in the final section of the analysis.

4.1 Solidarity and Proxy Resistance

Solidarity is the starting point for the resistance practices of the organizations interviewed. For instance, CSO3 describes the violent anti-migrant sentiment "provoked by the right wing of the previous government" and the resulting organizational response which was "first of all solidarity, [and] supportive networks". In this context, he understands solidarity "as a concept in which one does not expect anything in return as long as one helps in a humanitarian matter, which is not only a donation but also a solidarity of labor, of time, to be able to enforce certain demands" (CSO3).

CSO6 emphasizes that solidarity also includes the understanding that beneficiaries are subjects of rights regardless of their legal status. Furthermore, while Schiffauer (2017) categorizes civil society projects as an alternative response to panic reactions due to immigration such as the aforementioned anti-migrant protests in Iquique, and to state-authorized border securitization, CSO2 describes that solidarity and communality motivate her CSO to actions that are considered as counterhegemonic to the state and institutionalization. She emphasizes:

"Exactly, our purpose is for solidarity to be ours, our network of links with everyone, also setting an example of how we can live within a community collaboratively, also demonstrating that many things can be done outside the institution. So no, no, we are like, we are super and extremely self-managed, [...], where we do not have to depend so much on what the state does or does not do, but simply through an organization, will and perseverance to transform little by little the realities of the people" (CSO2).

In this context, CSO2 further includes the local level in her statement and describes a spatial connection of the organization to the city, and on the other hand, the precarization of the latter. It then becomes clear how a form of responsibility unfolds via the connection to place, in which the individual assumes more responsibility for themselves and others and understands this not as a burden, but as an opportunity (Schiffauer, 2017). For instance, instead of sitting back and calling on the state, civil society itself becomes active and takes on tasks that the state authorities are unable and/or unwilling to cope with, as will be shown in the course of this analysis.

Aside from this, Saunders and Al-Om (2022) describe the nexus of solidarity and resistance, by emphasizing the proxy resistance approach. The concept highlights that CSOs forge alliances
and/or resist power relations out of solidarity with those affected by some form of violence and/or injustices and inequalities. In this regard, CSO1 describes their engagement as directly targeting the violent criminalization of migration, while CSO2 and CSO3 describe their organizational goal more broadly and see their resistance practices as a response to hyper-anti-migrant sentiment in the city. Yet, one risk that is described in the literature regarding proxy resistance, is that the practices of resistance for ‘irregular’ migrants can lead to paternalistic (re)productions of power relations (Saunders & Al-Om, 2022). In this regard, CSO1 emphasizes that certain solidarity can avoid falling into paternalistic structures, while CSO3, on the other hand, describes difficulties in cooperating with migrant self-organizations. He states:

"Sometimes some leaders who, let's say, or pro-migrant and migrant organizations also see that one is having a leading role but a leading role well done, a leading role that one seeks to contribute and that let's say [...] that they see that they are not, they are not contributing or that they see that your figure is the one that is being put on the scene" (CSO3).

Furthermore, CSO2 and CSO5 also describe that their support was not accepted in the same way by all beneficiaries, and they also experienced violent confrontations, threats, and slander from the migrant population. It can therefore be assumed that the proposed assistance services did not meet all the migrants' expectations and/or needs, which however is not surprising given the diverse experiences migrants encounter.

In this context, it should be noted that in addition to the heterogeneous needs of people on the move, migration is always permeated by and involved in multiple and heterogeneous struggles (de Genova, 2010). Relatedly, the term migrant struggles encompass at least two different meanings and refer to a range of different experiences of migrants. On the one hand, more or less organized struggles in which the migration system is openly challenged, defeated, and escaped from, and on the other, everyday strategies of refusal and resistance (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015). Thus, in the nexus of proxy resistance and migrant struggles, the question arises of how CSOs situate themselves in the heterogeneity of migrant struggles.

CSO1 describes the role of pro-migrant CSOs as a certain mediation between the migrant population and state institutions. She sees a major problem in the fact that many institutionally funded projects merely assume what migrants' needs are, without engaging in dialogues. Thus, she describes the role of her organization to intervene in this regard with visualizations of this mismanagement and the feedback of weak points to the respective institution. She also emphasizes that her organization is closer to the migrant population than the institutions and therefore works in a more lifeworld-oriented way. CSO2 also positions herself in this regard, considering the way CSOs engage with the migrant population, as opposed to public policies that are often developed in haste. She sees a strength of the CSOs to identify the real needs of
migrants, because "of course, when we work with them, they are the ones who end up proposing what they need." In this context, she considers the involvement of CSOs in migrant struggles as an important factor for the "support to be able to live in dignity." In addition, CSO3 sees the possibility of certain empowerment to enable migrant organizations to gain a speaking position. By referring to postcolonial feminist theories that conceptualize the idea of ‘subalternity’, awareness can be drawn to the impossibility of speaking and being heard, as well as the absence of representation and lack of expression, or to put it in Spivak's rhetorical words "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1998). To be subaltern, then, is to be outside of decision-making, "and so their lives, voices, and resistances are constructed from the margins of societies" (Vazquez et al., 2015: 64). To leave this position is to amplify voice, to make it one's own, to speak and be heard, and to denounce power relations of oppression (Vasquez et al., 2015). This is where CSO3 comes in and sees the creation of spaces to speak out as a way to participate in migrant struggles.

"For example, we'll invite an academic and two immigrant leaders, one at the national level or someone from [city], from radio station [name], or someone further south, as well as a leader at the local level, and we'd just have them talk, talk, talk, talk, because we really believe that it's the empowerment that, obviously immigrant leaders themselves have because they have the knowledge and they're constantly implementing it in their community" (CSO3).

In addition, he sees further interference in migrant struggles in the joint development of proposals with migrant self-organizations to encourage them to submit proposals to authorities and thus describes a point of civil society possibilities, which Domenech and Boito (2019) also consider in the light of political negotiation processes of migrant concerns. Furthermore, CSO2 explains how the first Venezuelan families, that her organization supported, are now using the acquired knowledge to help other families, as "they have built their own solidarity networks."

In the process, she hopes that the Venezuelan community further strengthens and organizes itself. Hence, she also sees the work of CSOs within the migrant struggles as a kick-off point and bridging phase for the establishment of migrant self-organizations.

Now that it has been shown how CSOs legitimize their engagement in migrant struggles highlighting the ability of CSOs to mediate between the migrant population and state institutions, to identify the real needs of migrants, and empower migrants and migrant-self organizations to overcome positions of subordination the practical implementation of this proxy resistance can be examined in the local context of the city of Iquique.
4.2 Resistance Practices

Through the analysis of the interviews, I was able to identify different resistance practices of the CSOs in Iquique, which are analytically presented in this section. In doing so, the selection of these categories serves to simplify the presentation of my results, although the various practices of resistance, are not to be understood as separate and closed categories of analysis. Rather, the different types and forms of practices are intertwined and highlight the collective nature of CSOs resistance. Therefore, I will first present the Intervention in the Political Scene in the local context, and then, considering the concept of Dispersed Resistance, illustrate how a collective alliance of resistance was formed. Starting from this background, I will further explore the categories of Resisting Governmental Absence, Supporting Acts of Citizenship, Resisting ‘Irregularity’ and ‘Exploitability’, and Everyday Practices of Resistance, whereby individual aspects of these categories are also taken up elsewhere, highlighting the complexity of resistance practices.

4.2.1 Intervention in the Political Scene

Resistance as a political phenomenon, according to Butler, Mecheril, and Brenningmeyer (2017) follows the simple normative logic that whenever and wherever inequality is experienced and articulated as injustice, there is resistance. This normative stance is fundamentally based on the assumption that constellations and power relations are contingent and changeable, regardless of whether these relations are one's own experience or someone else's, and regardless of whether they are subjectively experienced as injustices. Resistance practices are involved in the processes of negotiating inequalities and injustices. Thus, they are also involved in the negotiation of the migration regimes, because, as discussed in chapter 2.2, migration regimes generate inequalities such as the conditions of ‘irregularity’, ‘deportability’, and ‘exploitability’. In this regard, CSO3 states that their activities and practices of resistance are always carried out from a "critical stance and through transformative proposals that help the country“ and with awareness of the inequalities created by the state. In particular, CSO3 is actively involved in local politics, demonstrating resistance against constructed inequalities and injustices by directly intervening in local political discourses and practices. Yet, the organization does not work alone, but in a collective network with various migrants and pro-migrant actors to provide policy proposals to authorities. In doing so, issues related to migration are "approached from a humanitarian point of view, always with technical arguments."
Foucault (1978) notes that where there is power there will also be resistance. In this regard, CSO3 describes "because politics is power, so I think [migrants and migrant organizations] have the legitimacy to distrust politics as well." Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, he sees the need for CSOs to "directly [participate in politics] and also, [...] that they do not participate for the sake of participating, but that they participate with their experience, with their proposals, and systematize them." In practice, resistance takes the form of running for candidatures to political posts, assuming leadership roles, engaging in politics, and submitting laws, proposals, and norms. Even though he emphasizes that these interventions are costly, he further concludes that interventions of CSOs "have contributed a lot to the discussions and polemics in the Tarapacá scene," highlighting that CSOs directly challenge and influence the migration system and the inequalities constructed by it at the local level and intervene in political discourses and practices. In this context, a collective character of resistance to the migration system can be revealed at the local level in the city of Iquique, which will be explained in the next section using the concept of dispersed resistance.

4.2.2 Dispersed Resistance

With the emergence of violent anti-migrant sentiment in the city, some organizations that previously did not work with or for the migrant population decided to change their work focus. The concept of dispersed resistance describes resistance practices between the poles of social movements and everyday practices, which do not necessarily have to be sustainable and organized but may inspire others to engage in similar resistance practices (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2018). Considering this approach, initial acts of resistance by individual CSOs were carried out close in time and space but were not collectively organized. CSO1 describes the situation:

"So we were working with other organizations that weren't dealing with the migration issue, but we were getting to know each other, [...] there were a lot of dormant organizations and we didn't know each other. We knew those who had come out through the social networks, but many did not exist... that is, that we never imagined existed because we wanted to keep a low profile, but we decided to join together and say, "No, we can't go on like this, we are going to join together and work" (CSO1).

All the other interviewed CSOs describe this way of joining together similarly. Besides, CSO4 states that these collaborations were not planned, but resulted from necessity, such as financial resource shortages. "To deal with this whole migration crisis and the health and humanitarian crisis that we are experiencing was that we come together, join forces and try to move forward with everything that we do, but collectively" (CSO2). Furthermore, she clarifies that common values and trust were necessary for networking and that the organizations divided their work according to their previous experiences and thematic focuses. Besides, CSO1 stresses the
importance of building alliances and joining forces to pool and strengthen knowledge and thus "to be able to live a better life in the region."

One analytical concept that Hill Collins (2019) describes regarding the black feminist movement in the US is that of flexible solidarity. The author highlights that in the fight for freedom, people must be willing to have conversations with each other in order to work for a common goal rather than for one’s own interests. Flexible solidarity is therefore an intersectional paradigm when actors enter into coalitions with others, who together aim to solve the problems that are concerning them. Taking this concept as a reference, it can be shown that the flexibilization of solidarity has led civil society actors in Iquique to enter new alliances in order to fight for a common goal, which included "often talking to the enemy and sitting down at the same table" (CSO1). Furthermore, when asked, CSO5 explains that the established networks and work structures still exist and are retrieved when a need arises. Besides, it becomes apparent that even when a common goal is worked out collectively, forms of resistance are characterized by complexity. For instance, CSO2 describes a physical level of resistance as "giving one’s body, giving one’s life, one’s security, one’s integrity, […] it makes a conviction" and continues describing that resistance does not have to be everyday (Scott, 1985) but some cooperators also engaged in confronting practices of resistance, as "[t]hey are like that, confrontative, they are very brave."

Thus, it can be concluded that through dispersed acts of resistance, which nevertheless had a common denominator thematically, temporally, and spatially, and through the flexibilization of solidarity a collective and systematizing alliance has been formed, which has led to collective resistance practices and is thus a cumulative and large-scale response to power. The collective alliance of CSOs also makes visible their political influence at the local level (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2018), which will become even more evident throughout the chapter by showing the different resistance practices through which the CSOs are engaged in migrant struggles.

4.2.3 Resisting Governmental Absence

In addition to the heterogeneity of resistance forms, the heterogeneity of resistance practices can also be distinct. For example, all interviewed CSOs are involved in satisfying basic needs and describe these activities as humanitarian aid, especially in the context of the antimigrant protests. CSO3 explains these practices as including the following: "From making breakfast to being able to place an appeal for protection." CSO1 complements, "always based on the basic baskets, tents, looking for help, a mobilization that is, we form a campaign […] and from those
we distribute food, lodging, medicine, tickets.” In this context, the situation in which the organizations involved themselves at the beginning is described as a "nightmare" (CSO4) and CSO1 further refers to physically distressing situations and the need for psychological support for those involved in assisting migrants. In this context, the CSOs further describe the absence of the state. CSO6 highlights:

“I think that unfortunately there is still a lack of support from the state, or I think that until today the state has not sufficiently perceived its role or the measures that it should take, I think that until today it does not take seriously what this particular migration flow means, which has never existed before” (CSO6).

CSO4 further explains: "At a certain point we didn't think about it, [...] and when we realized we had millions of pesos in our hands, that's when I got the courage and said we can't do this, the state has to do it, with its resources.” Thus, she highlights that the CSOs have taken on tasks that are actually governmental obligations. In this regard, it can be argued, that Chile has signed the United Nations General Assembly Convention on Human Rights which was ratified on February 10th, 1972. Article 25 states the right to a standard of life that ensures one and one’s family's health and well-being, including food, clothing, and housing. Furthermore, in Migration Law 21325, Title II "Of the Fundamental Principles of Protection" Article three states: "The State shall protect and respect the human rights of foreigners in Chile, regardless of their migratory status.” Hence, it can be concluded that the humanitarian aid provided by CSOs represents diverse practices of resistance to the absence and neglect of the state in dealing with the emerged and constructed situation. Thus, they resisted the denied access to social resources such as housing and food supply. Additionally, CSOs advocate for denied human and legal rights and support migrants in their acts of citizenship, which will further be elaborated on in the next section.

4.2.4 Supporting Acts of Citizenship

The CSOs are also involved in migrants’ rights struggles. CSO1 describes that these are macro goals. She states:

"They need to know their rights and obligations and how the institutional apparatus is managed in terms of aid. And it's a bit like [...] giving tips and avoiding certain things or getting the hang of [...] the education, health, and housing system” (CSO1).

She defines the importance of being conscious about what rights one has in rising from ignorance and becoming a "person with knowledge where the institution can't say, 'No, look, no’ because you gradually learn the laws and that's your way of defending yourself’” because “then the system suffers.” In doing so, she defines that it is about providing knowledge about rights and responsibilities, about
"the whole apparatus that also corresponds to us as citizens belonging to the national territory, be it regular and regularized migrants, migrants in an irregular situation through unauthorized border crossings, or migrants seeking refuge, or, depending on the situation, the LGBT community" (CSO1).

In addition to these issues regarding the knowledge of migrants about their rights, and regardless of their legal status, CSO2 adds that they, along with other organizations, provide free legal, psychological, and sexual reproduction consultations. CSO5 and CSO6 also offer case-by-case processing, while CSO3 describes other legal issues such as the question of legal representation that have been addressed by the organization to protect migrants. He further underscores the significance of networking and alliance-building, particularly with regard to practices of resistance to administrative deportations. "We defended there quite a lot and also with the help of networks to encourage migrants to denounce and know their rights." CSO5 further delineates that they took on judicial-administrative representation of some cases and created alliances with legal clinics. "We all organized ourselves to try to accommodate people [...] who had been administratively expelled without a trial, without a prior procedure." It can thus be argued that the activities and practices of the CSOs regarding legal issues support migrants in their acts of citizenship, in the performative claiming of rights regardless of their legal status. Consequently, they resist the construction of ‘irregularity’ and ‘deportability’.

Another working point of the CSOs is the provision of information regarding access to regularization, applying for a visa, and getting access to temporary health and education cards (CSO4; CSO5). In this regard, CSO3 further highlights the contradiction between universal human rights and the state's refusal to grant them to certain groups. He further emphasizes that his organization considers regularization as a human right, regardless of how one entered the country. Yet, he states that "currently the Venezuelan community [cannot] apply for a regular visa through the consular visa, and so far, there is no procedure because I believe there will be a regularization procedure, I am very confident." Here, a basic assumption of the act of citizenship approach is apparent, namely that legal status is claimable, which drives the organization to advocate for these legal concerns of migrants. In this context, CSO3 understands human rights as achievements of humanity that need to be preserved and demanded as a minimum, thus providing a first basis for claiming rights.
Furthermore, as described by Aedo (2017), the body of the migrant is not only permeated by borders that are physical but also cultural. In this regard, CSO3 conducts an intersectional analysis by describing the characteristics of those people deported with high media attention in 2021. He depicts:

"[It] has two elements; an indigenous or Afro-descendant element, you look at the evictions, you look at the faces, all brown, with broad noses or Afro, that was very obvious, and the other side is also the issue of cultural level, that is, the people who are migrating overland now are people with precarious resources, so they also come with a slightly lower cultural level" (CSO3).

He thus describes a group that was affected by actual deportation and not only by ‘deportability’, and how sorting those individuals ‘suitable’ for deportation was carried out. In addition to low cultural capital, the category of race also plays a role, exemplifying the racist structure of the migration system and the function of the border as a ‘sieve’ (Liberona, 2015). By confronting these administrative deportations and supporting acts of citizenship, CSOs rise above the state’s process of ‘othering’ (Stang, 2016) and thus challenge the system and the categories issued by it. Referring to the approach of autonomy of migration and its basic assumption that all categories are framed through encounters between migrants and actors, resources and methods of mobility, and border control (Scheel, 2013a), the influence of CSOs in the process of negotiating categories of inclusion and exclusion can be observed.

4.2.5 Resisting ‘Irregularity’ and ‘Exploitability’

Another identified resistance practice is the hiding of migrants. CSO4 explains that it was about saving migrants from racist and violent attacks, and unsafe situations. "At that time, we had to be outside, sitting in the car and walking around, like a police patrol, I don't know, but we were the ones who controlled that no such situation occurred, and if it did, intervened." CSO2 further describes the situation and again emphasizes the collective nature of the resistance practices:

"[Name] of [Organization] told us ‘Guys, on the beach there are migrants, a family, I need you to take them out and go hide them in the church’, because the anti-migrant people would come to beat them or burn their things, so we had to spread out, the sectors, especially the peripheries, to go and hide people" (CSO2).

As described in chapter 2.2, the construction of the condition of ‘irregularity’ has different effects on the lives of migrants, such as an increased ‘exploitability’, as a workforce and in daily life. For instance, more recently, sanitary measures were included in the migration management and again contributed to the precarization and ‘exploitability’ of people. Thus, a

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18 In 2021, more than 800 people were deported in seven flights. The deportations, however, were sharply criticized by various migrants and human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the United Nations, which warned of serious violations of fundamental rights (DW, 2021).
basic requirement to continue traveling by bus was a six-day quarantine and a negative PCR test. But many migrants were surprised by these measures and did not have sufficient financial resources to bridge these quarantine days without having to spend the money earmarked for bus tickets. Regarding this situation, CSO4 outlines how the constructed precarity of migrants "has formed a kind of mafia [...] that has come together to demand money and take people's money away." However, the interviewed CSOs resisted this situation and intervened in the planning and purchasing of tickets, for example through contacts with bus companies. Furthermore, CSO2 and CSO4 describe that they got people out of cars and vans who were sold an overpriced onward journey to Santiago. This transport, however, would have taken them only a few hundred kilometers further south, to then be abandoned at the internal border with the Antofagasta region. In this context, CSO4 describes how they have understood the system and networks of exploitation of migrants piecemeal through their active interventions. As a response, networking with some cooperation partners, such as hostels was terminated and alternative alliances were sought.

Consequently, it becomes apparent, that on the one hand the migration system is challenged through resistance practices of CSOs, and on the other that the system responds with "quick fixes for emergencies" (Sciortino, 2004: 32). Hence, a migration regime "is the result of continuous repair work through practices" (Sciortino, 2004: 32), which gets particularly evident when considering migration management measures under the pretext of pandemic containment. It also demonstrates the influence of CSOs on the local level and the ability to quickly respond to and resist political implementations of migration management, highlighting once again the collective character and mode of operation of the alliance. Besides, it becomes also observable how a global regime trend, namely to re-frame pandemic restriction measures as a legitimization for restrictive migration control, is materialized in the migration system at the local level and that resistance practices of CSOs impact this materialization from below.

4.2.6 Everyday Practices of Resistance

CSO2 addresses everyday practices of resistance, describing "basically [...] growing up and becoming a conscious adult is pure resistance, thinking that we are living day by day." Consequently, the forming of conscious people is seen as a resistance practice. She describes a key assumption of the autonomy of migration approach by emphasizing that migration is something that has always existed and will continue to exist despite all the securitization measures. Thereby the defense of this empirical information is a way of resisting the anti-
migrant sentiment in the city. Because "that it is something that happens, that it is natural, and that it is strange to receive a rejection for this." CSO1 also refers to everyday practices of resistance and describes migrant struggles as something that happens everywhere. "The migrant struggle is happening in migrant politics, the migrant struggle is being taught in communities, it is being taught in local neighborhood councils, it is being taught in our environment and also in ourselves." Likewise, Casas-Cortes et al. (2015) describe the heterogeneity of migrant struggles in terms of, type, location, and time, highlighting that migrant struggles are everyday strategies of refusal and resistance.

Furthermore, the educational workshops conducted by CSO2 to deal with racism in the local context can be categorized as another practice of everyday resistance. In this regard, CSO5 emphasizes the state's responsibility for constructing anti-migrant sentiment and criminalizing migration. She stresses that: "the state has not taken responsibility, it has built over time this sense of resentment, xenophobia, racism, and aporofobia." Consequently, education about the historical context of northern Chile as an area with a long migration history, as well as educating the ‘majority population’ about the situation of Venezuelans to create empathy, is an everyday resistance practice "for a social change we believe in" (CSO2). The meso goal here is regarding CSO2 to "fight on different fronts because we have to make a new socialization of what it means to be a migrant." Aumüller and Bretl (2008) argue that civil society engagement with migrants offers the opportunity to bridge differences between the migrant population and the ‘majority’ society. By passing on the experience of the living situations of migrants to the ‘majority’ population, the acceptance of migrants in the local and the whole society is positively influenced. To engage in these struggles, the interviewed CSOs are also educating each other on migrant issues to provide tools and knowledge to those who have not previously advocated for the migrant population. Consequently, these practices of resistance point to a symbolic shift in citizens’ conceptions, and the public and political discourses on immigration.

Furthermore, in addition to the heterogeneous as well as collective practices of resistance that emanate from solidarity, solidarity is also considered an everyday practice of resistance and thus a way of achieving transformative change. Hence, solidarity is a tool of resistance against precarization, as a rejection of a system from which one does not expect to be protected, and as a counter-reaction to fear and powerlessness. CSO2 states in this regard:

"Above all, we channeled this anger, this rebellion that we had against the system that abandoned us, differently, through solidarity, and we strongly believe that solidarity is our tool,  

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19 The concept **aporofobia** was coined by philosopher Adela Cortina (2000) and describes the hostility, rejection, and aversion to disadvantaged areas or neighborhoods and to poor people, who are destitute and have very few resources.
it is our soul, but not a solidarity help that can go with the wind, but something concrete that becomes a protective factor against the risks” (CSO2).

To sum up, through the practices of resistance demonstrated here, it becomes evident that CSOs challenge the migration regime in various ways in the city of Iquique. At the political level, through interventions of regulations and rights, at the legal level in terms of protecting denied human and legal rights, regarding the accessibility of denied social resources such as accommodation and food supply, as well as on a symbolic level regarding a change in awareness of the local population and in political and public discourses. Nonetheless, these practices do not remain unanswered by the system which will be further analyzed in the next section.

4.3 Criminalization of Solidarity

What has already been shown in current critical migration studies for the European (e.g., ReSOMA, 2020) and U.S. context (e.g., Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2016) but is a new development for the South American region, is that not only migrants but also people who demonstrate and act in solidarity with migrants have become targets of migration containment policies.

According to ReSOMA (2020), the criminalization of solidarity refers to the increased prosecution by the police of people who support migrants. In this criminalization process, civil society actors, including volunteers, and non-governmental organizations, are portrayed as criminals and prosecuted as such. Martínez (2019) emphasizes that the criminalization of solidarity is another tool that states "use in their fight against irregular immigration" (Martínez, 2019: 8) and can therefore be identified as an element of the negotiation of migration systems. The author thus explains what the autonomy of migration approach depicts, namely that various actors, including migrants and CSOs, are involved in the negotiation processes of the migration system (Scheel, 2013a). Likewise, Foucault (1978) describes that resistance to power never functions outside of this power and that the resistance that opposes power also co-constructs it. Furthermore, resistance works as an attempt to tactically reverse the local balance of power (Sarasin, 2005). Alongside the practices of resistance, the criminalization of solidarity is thus a sign that CSOs are challenging the migration system and the power produced by it and have therefore themselves become targets of the authorities (Amnesty International, 2020).
Borderline-europe (2020) describes that this criminalization occurs through a corresponding public discourse in which priorities and focus on the work of police and law enforcement shift and/or new offenses are created that formally criminalize a particular act. Furthermore, the non-governmental organization identifies four main features of the criminalization of solidarity. These forms usually build on each other and are mutually dependent. They specify (1) discrediting and delegitimization in public discourse, (2) bureaucratic hurdles, (3) police harassment and repression, and (4) legal prosecution. Given the interconnectedness of the global migration regime with the trans-regional, national, and local levels, these four steps, originally identified for the European context, form the basis for the analysis of this section. Thus, the question of how these four aspects can be identified in the local context in Iquique will be explored, while also including the national level in the analysis.

4.3.1 Discrediting and Delegitimization

In the interviews, the discrediting and delegitimization of CSOs, and their activities and practices were related. For example, CSO1 describes how the tasks carried out by CSOs in the city are made invisible and how their competencies are delegitimized. She states:

"But this has also brought attrition of the organizations, a tremendous effort of the organizations that are not institutionally appreciated, so... just today we came from a meeting, [...] where we looked at a map that they had made of the networks, that the civil society organizations are not there, [...] where are they? And that's a big shortcoming, the way social organizations are looked down upon, the way they're understood, well, in an organizational sense, right? Organizationally, it is understood that they are people, that they are generally uneducated, that they are people who decide how to fight with violence" (CSO1).

CSO2 likewise describes the difficulty of being taken seriously by politicians as a CSO with its skills and experiences. As mentioned, the discursive level plays a crucial role in the criminalization of solidarity and provides a legitimizing foundation for further repressive steps (Borderline-europe, 2020). In this regard, CSO1 describes the criminalization of solidarity on a discursive level by the local press. "On the one hand, there is the community that you help, and on the other hand, there is the tabloid press that attacks you day and night, with, with, with darts."

CSO1 and CSO4 describe being criminalized as a CSO by media and on social networks, and facing accusations of terrorism, on the grounds that their activities in support of ‘irregular’ migrants increase the criminality in the region. Similarly, CSO5 and CSO6 describe their organizations as being accused of supporting criminals on social media. In this process, CSOs become scapegoats for crises and emergencies that are in fact due to failure and/or neglect by the state and are increasingly associated with criminality in the public discourse (Borderline-europe, 2020). In this regard, according to Aris (2020), media plays a fundamental role in the
construction of a ‘border spectacle’, as a form of producing signification and articulating the control of migration. The criminalization of solidarity as a controlling tool of migration (Martínez, 2019) thus becomes observable. Furthermore, the narratives about humanitarian aid as a scapegoat for ‘irregular’ migration highlight how the criminalization of solidarity is interlinked with the criminalization of migration. Consequently, concerned activists from Germany are calling for "not stopping at the demand to end the criminalization of solidarity" (ProAsyl, 2022).

Moreover, the role of political actors and their interventions in political and public discourses is decisive because "[I]inguistic criminalization thus often provides the legitimation basis for further repressive measures" (Borderline-europe, 2020: 24). These features, albeit in a modified way, were also mentioned in the interviews. For instance, CSO3 emphasizes that this criminalization also takes place at the political level since "suddenly doors are closed in politics" and that the CSO has also had experiences of exclusion by political actors. In this regard, he describes: "Marginalization also, let's say, from people in politics who see us as something like 'Hey, why are they defending migrants?' and say 'You know, this is very, very unpopular, don't talk about it.'" On top of that, he further describes experiences of criminalization, citing death threats and threats of being reported to the prosecutor's office. Even if the organization did not receive any report from the public prosecutor's office, a next step of the criminalization of solidarity described by Borderline-europe (2020) can be identified here –legal prosecution–. In addition, the criminalization of solidarity at the legal level was recently enshrined in Chile's migration law.

4.3.2 Criminalization of Solidarity at the Legal Level

As Borderline-europe (2020) highlights, the culmination of the criminalization of solidarity are politically motivated arrests and trials. For this purpose, new criminal offenses are created, already existing ones are misused, or people are confronted with disproportionately drastic charges. In doing so, laws that form the basis for the criminalization of solidarity are legitimized by aiming at combating smuggling and trafficking20.

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20 For instance, the EU’s so-called Facilitators Package officially targets combating the smuggling of migrants but requires member states to criminalize the facilitation of ‘irregular’ entry, even if it is not for profit (Martínez, 2019). It should be noted, however, that Article 1(1)(a) of the Facilitation Directive gives Member States the discretion to exempt from prosecution persons who assist in the entry or transit of migrants "where the aim of the conduct is to provide humanitarian assistance to the person concerned" (Article 1(2) of the EU Facilitation Directive). Nevertheless, most EU states have not included this exemption in their national laws, because legislation in 26 EU member states does not require that financial gain or profit be the objective of a crime (ReSOMA, 2020).
In Chile, a new law was passed in 2022, which criminalizes aiding or abetting entry and transit. In the Ley de Migraciones y Extranjería (Migration and Aliens Law) No. 21325, Article 112 states that "legal entities that facilitate or encourage the illegal entry or exit of a foreigner into the country shall be punished by a fine […]." Further, the same article states: "natural persons who are not public officials and who facilitate or encourage the illegal entry or exit of a foreigner into the country without the intention of making a profit shall be fined […]." Thus, it becomes evident that the profit motive is no longer necessary to justify an administrative sanction. This amendment to the law at the national level can be identified as a pivot into the criminalization of solidarity according to the 'European model', as it follows the logic of the EU Facilitators Package. Consequently, this development illustrates the interconnections and the influence of the different scales of the global migration regime.

However, since the law is still recent, the interviewed CSOs assume differently whether and in what way it will affect the criminalization of solidarity and thus their activities and practices at the local level. For instance, CSO1 did not know at the time of the interview, that the law had already gone into effect. CSO2, on the other hand, describes the criminalizing effect of the law and details that this very law has an impact on the question of institutionalization that was currently debated in the organization.

"So this very law, this fine print... it kind of gave us a break on whether or not we could continue to be part of the legal entity. And of course, I think it's extremely criminalizing, in other words, it's basically pointing a finger at you, putting you in jail, prosecuting you, punishing you for believing in and promoting natural and safe migration. Not providing a solution, only providing punishment" (CSO2).

In this context, she describes the dilemma of the need and dependence on the external financial support of the organization, for which, however, one must be a registered association, which is a legal entity, but which is criminalized by the law. In this regard, she continues by describing that the law "limits all the possibilities we have to help because our intention is not to promote illegal transit." She sees that the legal conditions created by the state are not solutions, because "the only solution we have seen lately has been repression, has been the denial that migration exists, the trivialization of all that we experience as human beings, that we are witnesses of the migration process." CSO3 becomes more explicit and states:

"But I believe that the objective of this law is not to punish legal persons, fictitious persons, in this case [...] but to punish humanitarian aid, that is the objective of this law, even if it is not

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21 For comparison, Law 20507 of the Criminal Code, enacted in 2011, entitled Describes the Offenses of Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons and Establishes Norms to Prevent it and to Make Criminal Proceedings More Efficient, states in Article 411 bis. that a person who, for profit, facilitates or promotes the illegal entry of a person who is not a national or resident shall be punished by imprisonment in the medium to the highest degree and a fine of fifty to one hundred monthly tax units.
said, but that is the objective. There is an intention that is under the table, it is to punish humanity" (CSO3).

Additionally, CSO4 refers to the novelty of the law and describes the complexity that results from the fact that many terms are not uniformly defined. "Where [for example] is the limit for promoting entry?" and is the legal advice provided by her CSO regarding regularization procedures for ‘irregular’ migrants considered promoting entry under this law? She details: "There are a lot of things in the new law that we're not clear on how they're generally applied, and I would say they're more complex because of that." However, she also doubts that the law will be implemented in practice "because it is very much up to the discretion of the person who detects this violation of the law and how it can be defended as well." Although the impact of the law on the activities of CSOs is not yet clear and requires a temporal dimension to further observe this development the criminalization of solidarity has affected the interviewed CSOs and their members, as will be explained in the last section.

4.3.3 Consequences of the Criminalization of Solidarity

The different levels of criminalization impact the personal and professional lives of the CSOs members (Borderline-europe, 2020). For example, it was described that people lost their jobs due to their activism or feared this loss and thus left the organization (CSO1; 3). Furthermore, members lost friends, family, and partners, preferring "not to meet with you for a while, not to share spaces with you because our values are not the same" (CSO6). CSO2 concretely describes the criminalization of solidarity by the local population and physical attacks that members experienced during actions. She adds: "In this region, we live in danger, either by the repression of public institutions or the police, the federal police, or by the people themselves, who do not believe in what we do and, on the contrary, criminalize us." As it became clear in the further course of the interview, attacks were not just isolated situations. Rather, she details that although at the beginning it was only "shouting without words", people's hatred of migrant supporters became systematized. For example, they were able to identify the addresses and workplaces of members. This experience has led to an invisibilization of individuals with "those who are now older, [feeling] like they were living in the dictatorship again, that is, hiding, not saying what they were studying or not saying that they were part of a volunteer group."

In addition to the impact on the personal lives of the active individuals, consequences of CSOs having to establish protection measures were also mentioned. For instance, CSO5 describes that in-person service was discontinued for a time and counseling sessions were handled online or by phone calls only. Furthermore, CSO1 describes that they had to move their donation
warehouse several times because it was threatened to be set on fire. She likewise describes that the CSO, as well as its members as individuals, have "lowered the profile a little bit, meaning we've been hiding a little bit to survive." CSO5 further describes being especially cautious when giving interviews for television or radio, "but you can feel the danger." Also, CSO4 explains some precautions she took, such as not driving her car to activities, after having an experience of aggression at the bus terminal in Iquique. She details these aggressions of drivers who, as described above, wanted to take advantage of the vulneralized situation of some migrants.

“They told me, 'Why didn't I want to cook, why didn't I want to wash, look at this crazy woman, listen, you and that thing, you ruined our business.' They hit me with their cabs, very threatening, in the end, I left” (CSO4).

Another mentioned consequence is an incredible decrease in donations. In this regard, CSO2 also details the dilemmas of having an anti-institutional stance, on the one hand, and being dependent on public funds to finance resistance practices, on the other.

“We don't think [the state] can take care of us and we don't think it can take care of the citizens [...] but unfortunately it also requires us to be part of the system if we want to have more resources and be able to help more people” (CSO2).

This example illustrates what Foucault (1982) describes as resistance to power within the framework of this power. However, it remains an open question to what extent there is a direct criminalization of solidarity through financial state cuts for CSOs in Chile, as it is reported for instance in the German context (ReSOMA, 2020).

Furthermore, as described by ReSOMA (2020), the criminalization of solidarity and humanitarian assistance has a far-reaching deterrent effect, and as a consequence, more people refrain from assisting migrants. In this regard, Aris (2020) highlights that the stigma of criminalization has led activists to question and interrupt their work. CSO1 however emphasizes that "it was also a matter of defending one's convictions when one was attacked in one's environment." Likewise, CSO4 describes that while the experience of the criminalization of solidarity did not lead to doubting one's conviction, the fear that members of the organization would be physically attacked was constantly present. "Because we had never experienced anything like this, we had never witnessed violence against human rights defenders so close up." In this regard, Borderline-europe (2020) emphasizes that harassment and intimidation by the police and security authorities are intended to intimidate and deter CSOs and their members.

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22 In 2020, the German Ministry of the Interior introduced new requirements for the funding of integration and refugee projects from the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which is an essential economic source for organizations working in this area. Only organizations that undertake not to interfere with, disrupt, or prevent governmental measures in connection with the implementation of an existing obligation to leave the country will be eligible to apply for funding. Consequently, civil society actors who hold opinions on deportations that differ from those of the government fear that they will be silenced or brought into line (Borderline-europe, 2020).
and to prevent or at least make their work more difficult. Although the interviewees did not report specific situations of harassment by state institutions, a general danger and a systematization of the criminalization of solidarity were nevertheless reported. Yet, despite the experienced criminalization of solidarity, the interviewed CSOs continue to be involved in migrant struggles. "We continue to work, we are in politics, in the social field and also in science. In other words: We do not exclude any space for struggles" (CSO3).

To summarize, the CSOs challenge the migration regime on the local level in various ways and have thus themselves become targeted of measures to control migration. Regarding the four criminalization of solidarity aspects outlined by Borderline-europe (2020) for the European context, discrediting and delegitimization in public discourse and legal prosecution have been most apparent in the city of Iquique and impact the work of the CSOs and the life of their members, even though this development is still recent. However, given the linkage with the global migration regime, it can be surmised that the criminalization of solidarity, already a common practice in Europe and the United States, will continue to evolve while becoming part of the specific materialization of the migration system at a local level. Consequently, ReSOMA's (2020) demand that "criminalization should only occur when there is ‘unjust enrichment’ such as in cases of human trafficking," in order to counteract the criminalization of solidarity, thus becomes relevant in the Chilean context as well. Moreover, the CSOs also emphasize that their response to the increasing criminalization of solidarity and humanitarian aid is solidarity among themselves. In this regard, CSO3 and CSO4 describe solidarity within the organization, while CSO2 refers to solidarity alliances among the affected organizations, which has led to intensive networking. Solidarity is thus not only a tool of resistance but also a response to the criminalization of humanitarian aid.

5. Conclusion

Observing and analyzing how local pro-migrant CSOs challenge the migration regime at the local level led me to identify several collective practices of resistance from below that are carried out in solidarity with the migrants affected in the region. These identified practices of resistance are: Intervention in the Political Scene, Resisting Governmental Absence, Supporting Acts of Citizenship, Resisting ‘irregularity’ and ‘exploitability’, and Everyday Practices of Resistance. Initially, these resistance practices of the individual CSOs were widely dispersed, but similar in terms of time, place, and objective, leading to the formation of an intensive solidarity network and to collective resistance practices.
Beyond the identification of these practices of resistance, my research shows that the types of resistance have different transformative effects: (1) at the political level by intervening in regulations and rights, (2) at the legal level in terms of protecting denied human and legal rights, (3) in terms of access to denied social resources such as housing and food supplies, and (4) at the symbolic level through a change of consciousness in the local population and in political and public discourses. Thus, all types of resistance have the potential to impact migration policies in terms of the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion and the resulting conditions for migrants, highlighting that CSOs play a key role in challenging the migration regime at the local level. However, by focusing on the capacity of CSOs to challenge the migration regime, it became clear that the criminalization of solidarity, which is already common practice in Europe and the United States, for example in the Mediterranean region and the Arizona desert, can also be observed as a new development in Chile and represents a new tool for governmental migration control. Yet, this criminalization of solidarity and humanitarian aid makes clear that CSOs are part of the negotiation of the migration system and its power, and thus become targets of migration control themselves. In this regard, I found it particularly surprising and impressive how much willpower and political awareness the local and small-scale CSOs demonstrated in order to achieve sustainable changes for the migrant population, and how intensive collective networks emerged from this common goal. And this is despite the fact that they experienced not only little support, but also repression against their work.

Furthermore, it was mentioned that global regimes of migration management have similar dynamics in different geographical locations but encounter local processes that define their specific materialization. The unit of analysis of the city of Iquique represents thereby a privileged focus of this scale-interrelated research since it has become the scene of a new migration phenomenon, composed on the one hand by the current Venezuelan diaspora, the pre-pandemic border securitization measures under the global paradigm of migration control, as well as the closing of border crossings legitimized by the Covid-19 pandemic, which in its entirety led to an unprecedented scenario. The geographic particularities of the border, the historical components of the city as a region of immigration, the hyper xenophobic protests in the city, and the existing and involved small-scale CSOs thereby constitute local specifics that are involved in materializing the global migration regime at the local level. To capture how CSOs intervene in the negotiation of the migration system through resistance practices thus represents a highly topical relevance in the Chilean and local context.

This work can thus serve as a contribution to the elaboration of policy demands and improvements, raising awareness that CSOs are capable of challenging the migration system...
and encouraging them to be an active and conscious part of the negotiation processes. Furthermore, the development of the categorization of resistance practices can be a useful conceptual tool for understanding how CSOs challenge the global migration regime at the local level and can be used and further developed for future case studies. Thus, the involvement of CSOs in the negotiation process of the migration system in different cities and contexts can be systematically analyzed and compared.

However, even though my research showed that CSOs have the transformative potential of changing migration systems from below, it will require many different types of activism and resistance, at different scales, to effectively challenge the unequal dynamics of today's migration regime processes locally, supra-regionally, or globally. This is also because the multi-scalar functioning of the migration regime implies that certain aspects such as ‘deportability’ and immigration policies, can hardly be deconstructed at the local level and are therefore largely beyond the reach of local CSOs. Consequently, the focus on the local level also poses an analytical limitation of losing sight of the big picture and leaving out important connections.

Thus, based on what has become apparent in this thesis, a further question arises as to how CSOs in the local context are or become part of a humanitarian border (Walters, 2011). In other words, how CSOs not only challenge the migration system but are also part of migration control, and how this dynamic of control assistance could be strengthened by involving more networks and alliances with local, national, and international organizations. Furthermore, from a temporal perspective, it is interesting to analyze the expansion of the dynamics of law enforcement practices that legally legitimize the basis for the criminalization of solidarity, as well as the ways in which the legal and administrative structure and police control have become instruments of the state to control and repress activists who advocate for migrants’ rights, in the context of the development of what Stumpf (2006) describes as crimmigration. Consequently, it may thus reveal the impact of the growing trend of criminalization of solidarity as part of the attempt to control migration. Based on this, it can be analyzed further how CSOs at the local and also global level are resisting this criminalization and the extent to which the formation of broad-based, cross-cutting alliances plays a role in resisting this global dynamic of border control from below.
6. References


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### 7 Appendix

#### 7.1 Data regarding interviewees and civil society organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO</th>
<th>Main Activities</th>
<th>Formalization</th>
<th>Human Resources</th>
<th>Financial Basis</th>
<th>Gender of the Interviewees</th>
<th>The profession of the Interviewees</th>
<th>Role in the Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CSO</td>
<td>Counseling Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Only by donations – no funding from state/city</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Spokesperson Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CSO</td>
<td>Activities to achieve a life in dignity for the person/family. (Very extensive and adapted to the case)</td>
<td>Low (Self-Organization), participative in a non-hierarchical way</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Only by donations – no funding from state/city</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>Educational Assistant Student</td>
<td>General coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CSO</td>
<td>Activities at the political level</td>
<td>Low (Self-Organization) participative in a non-hierarchical way</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Only by donations – no funding from state/city</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Jurist</td>
<td>Secretary of the Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CSO</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Low (Self-Organization) participative in a non-hierarchical way</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Only by donations – no funding from state/city</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>Artist</td>
<td>Member and founder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CSO</td>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Support by public institutions, donations, stable financial base</td>
<td>Feminine</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>Regional Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 CSO</td>
<td>Counseling</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Support by public institutions, donations, stable financial base</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FONDECYT N°11200244 “Abrir y cerrar fronteras: análisis de la securitización en la región de Tarapacá (2010-2020) y su impacto en la construcción de la irregularidad migratoria”

(Primera versión)

1. Posibilidades y Acciones

1.1 ¿Cuáles son los objetivos y las actividades que su organización desarrolla actualmente en el trabajo con la comunidad migrante?

1.2 ¿Qué redes y cooperaciones mantiene su organización con respecto al trabajo con migrantes? (local, nacional, internacional, ...)?

1.3 ¿A qué valores adhiere su organización en el trabajo con las personas migrantes?

1.3.1. Si se mencionan los derechos humanos/resistencia/desobediencia civil/autonomía/: ¿Qué entiende usted por derechos humanos/ desobediencia civil/resistencia/ autonomía?

2. Dificultades y criminalización de la solidaridad

2.1 Con respecto a la situación actual en materia migratoria, y los últimos acontecimientos acaecidos en la región de Tarapacá, ¿A qué dificultades se ha enfrentado la organización cuando participa en la atención a las personas migrantes?

2.2 ¿Ud., o algún integrante de la organización, se han sentido amenazados, discriminados o excluidos por otorgar apoyo a las personas migrantes? Por ejemplo, a través de las redes sociales, en espacios comunitarios, etc.

2.3 En caso de haberse visto amenazado/a o discriminada/o ¿ha sentido miedo u otra emoción frente a esta situación?
3. Autonomía de las migraciones

3.1 ¿Cuál es la opinión que tiene su organización respecto al derecho a migrar?
3.2 ¿Cuáles han sido las acciones (jurídicas, políticas, sociales, etc.) que su organización ha implementado para la defensa de los derechos de las personas migrantes? El Politólogo argentino Eduardo Domenech destaca la importancia de la participación de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil en las luchas de los migrantes. ¿Qué entiende usted por el término lucha migratoria? Si no lo ha escuchado antes, ¿a qué lo asocia dentro de la acción de su organización o de su trabajo?
3.3 ¿Cuáles serían decisiones políticas deseables en materia de asilo, refugio y migración?

4. Política migratoria

4.1 ¿Qué opina Ud. de las personas que cobran dinero por trasladar a migrantes que ingresan por pasos no habilitados?
4.2 ¿Qué opina de personas que han ayudado a ingresar a otras por pasos no habilitados con fines humanitarios, altruistas o familiares?
4.3 En el marco de la nueva ley de migraciones y extranjería N° 21325, en su artículo N°12 señala que: “Las personas jurídicas que faciliten o promuevan el ingreso o egreso ilegal de un extranjero al país serán sancionadas con multa de cincuenta a cien unidades tributarias mensuales”. En este sentido, ¿Qué opina que las organizaciones con personalidad jurídica puedan ser sancionadas por facilitar el ingreso al país?
4.4 En el mismo artículo N°12, además se indica que: “Sin perjuicio de las penas que le correspondan conforme a la legislación penal vigente, las personas naturales que no sean funcionarios públicos, que, sin ánimo de lucro, faciliten o promuevan el ingreso o egreso ilegal de un extranjero al país, serán sancionadas con multa de cincuenta a cien unidades tributarias mensuales”. En ese ámbito, se observa que el ánimo de lucro deja de ser necesario para establecer una sanción administrativa ¿Qué le parece esta incorporación en la nueva ley de migraciones?
Field Trip to Colchane on March 19th, 2022

1. Colchane main square, in front of the border crossing

2. Weekly market where goods from ZOFRI on Cilean ground are sold

3. Unofficial way to the informal border crossing point

4. Line of people at the unofficial border crossing to Bolivia, Military control

5. Water ditch as border protection

6. Market visitor pass the water ditch
7. Reception camp for Venezuelan migrants; Place of self-disclosure

8. Landscape in which the border is located
7.4 Transcripts of the Interviews