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Abstract: During the last decades, States no longer tend to invoke the principle of non-interference when it comes to the scrutiny of their human rights record by peer review, reporting mechanisms or judicial procedures. Nevertheless, compliance with the recommendations or judgments of international human rights fora is a persistent concern in a number of States. Infringement proceedings was introduced in the Council of Europe only with Protocol 14 to the ECHR. While for quite a long time dormant, the procedure was invoked in December 2017 against Azerbaijan. This paper lays out the salient features of the procedure and explores whether non-execution could be effectively addressed by the judicialisation of the monitoring mechanism. Whereas the infringement procedure provides strong signals to other States with bad compliance record, it remains to be seen whether it will secure execution, due to the underlying political reasons of non-compliance.

Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, Committee of Ministers, compliance with judgments, execution of judgments, infringement proceedings, monitoring mechanism
Resumen: Durante las últimas décadas, los Estados no han en invocar el principio de no interferencia cuando han sido escrutados acerca de la aplicación de los derechos humanos por mecanismos de supervisión o procedimientos judiciales. No obstante, el cumplimiento con las recomendaciones o foros judiciales internacionales de derechos humanos es una preocupación en un buen número de estados. Los procedimientos de infracción fueron introducidos en el Consejo de Europa en el Protocolo 14 por el ECHR. Tras un tiempo de inaplicación, el procedimiento fue invocado en diciembre de 2017 contra Azerbaijan. Éste artículo da cuenta de las principales cuestiones de dicho procedimiento.

Palabras clave: Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Comité de Ministros, ejecución de las sentencias, procedimientos de infracción, mecanismo de supervisión

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To execute or not to execute: that is not the question.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

During the last decades, States no longer tend to invoke the principle of non-interference when it comes to the scrutiny of their human rights record by peer review, reporting mechanisms or judicial procedures.² Similar trends can be discerned in Europe as well, where the latest statistics on the execution of judgments of the European Convention on Human Rights³ demonstrate the positive reception of the Convention system in the member States.⁴ Nevertheless, compliance with the recommendations or judgments of international human rights fora is a persistent concern in a number of States. According to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, sustained efforts are needed to improve the national implementation machinery, particularly with regard to violations revealing major complex or structural problems.⁵ Admittedly, quantification of compliance is not an easy exercise since besides monetary compensation, compliance with individual or general measures, if indicated at all by the Court, is much more complex.

³ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No.005, Rome, 4 November 1950
Whereas certain aspects of compliance have been addressed by the author *inter alia* in this Anuario in 2016, this paper focuses on one particular method of ensuring compliance with judgments. Infringement proceedings, while a well-established procedure in the European Union, was introduced in the Council of Europe only with Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 2004, and entered into force in 2010. New paragraph 4 of Article 46 of the Convention, inserted by Protocol 14, stipulates that

> If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph 1.

Admittedly, the procedure should be brought only in exceptional circumstances, to provide an intermediate stage for the Committee of Ministers to convince the failing respondent State, before applying Article 8 of the Council of Europe’s Statute, i.e. suspension of voting rights in the Committee of Ministers, or expulsion from the Organisation. It is not intended to provide for payment of a financial penalty.

The objective of this paper is to lay out various issues surrounding the practical operation of the infringement proceedings. While for quite a long time dormant, the activation of the procedure in December 2017 against Azerbaijan gives a fresh impetus to the examination of this issue. Whereas triggering the so-called nuclear option is a welcome development in relation to recalcitrant States, and provides strong signals to other States with bad compliance record, it remains to be seen whether infringement proceedings will secure compliance, due to the underlying political reasons of non-compliance.

In what follows, Part Two provides a brief overview of the reasons behind non-compliance, which is followed by exploring whether non-execution could be effectively addressed by the judicialisation of the monitoring mechanism. Part Four examines the first application of Art. 46(4), against Azerbaijan, while Part Five concludes by discussing the limits of the infringement procedure in ensuring the effectiveness of the Convention system.

**II. THE REASONS BEHIND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION**

Compliance with international law is problematic since the international legal system lacks international police force and a mandatory judicial system. The limited means of enforcing international obligations are even more salient in international human rights law, which lacks the element of reciprocity typical in other fields of international law. Non-execution of

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international human rights obligations is due to various factors, including the specific nature of international human rights law, the quality of the judges and the judgments, and the problems related to giving effect to the judgments.

International human rights treaties deal directly with the relations between public authorities and private actors within States. Compliance with treaty obligations is complicated by the fact that … not only the human rights treaties as such need to be integrated in the domestic legal orders, but in addition the case-law of the respective judicial bodies imposes specific obligations concerning compliance with the judgments issued and with the interpretation given to the conventions by the international bodies. The case law of those bodies has an impact on the international obligations assumed by the States, and on the contents and scope of the rights and freedoms incorporated in the conventions.\(^{13}\)

In addition, human rights treaties establish special monitoring mechanisms, providing for multilateralized countermeasures. Such institutionalized machinery has, nevertheless, its limits. Thus, in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court exercises … caution in interpreting the Convention. It does so by granting a margin of appreciation to States on those issues in which there is no broader consensus or which touch upon issues of culture or tradition that the member state government is best placed to evaluate. The optimal form of subsidiarity is when human rights issues are resolved at the national level in line with the case-law of the Court.\(^{14}\)

Effectiveness of the Convention also depends on the quality of judges and the judgments. This issue has been explored in a previous article written by the author. Suffice it here to say that the Contracting Parties should set up appropriate national selection procedures to ensure that the strict criteria for the position be met. To maintain efficiency and authority of the Court, judges must hold the qualifications for office and be of “high moral character”.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{17}\) Art. 21 ECHR. The criteria require judges to be of high moral character, possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence, sit in their individual capacity, and not to engage in any activity which is incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with
A recent negative example could be the homophobic statements made by Judge Dedov in his separate opinion to the Bayev case, which related to a complaint brought by three gay rights activists about legislation in Russia banning the promotion of homosexuality. The majority of the Court held that the so-called “gay propaganda law” violated Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in conjunction with Article 10. Although the laws in question aimed primarily at protecting minors, the limits of those laws had not been clearly defined and their application had been arbitrary. In fact, by adopting such laws the authorities had reinforced stigma and prejudice and encouraged homophobia, which was incompatible with the values of a democratic society. In his separate opinion, Judge Dedov argued that

… the forcible informing of children without their desire or consent, in any form, about sex in general should be prevented; as regards non-traditional sex, it is a much more complex issue on which children should be informed as late as possible when they become mentally mature. … The idea that same-sex sexual relations are normal indeed creates a situation where they are ready to engage in such relations, just because of the curiosity which is an integral part of a child’s mind. […] the purpose of the demonstration [was] to raise awareness of non-traditional sex, thus making children more vulnerable to sexual abuse.

Such a clear departure from the values of the Convention is unfortunately not restricted to this particular case or this particular judge. Obviously, the attitude of the members of the Court is influenced by numerous factors, such as the member’s nationality, place of residence, current and past employment, membership of or affiliation with an organization, or family and social relations. However, by making such outrageously homophobic statements unworthy of a judge at the European Court of Human Rights, the Russian judge has certainly crossed a line.

Besides the suitability of individuals to be elected as a judge, the quality, cogency and consistency of the judgments is also of paramount significance. Well-reasoned, clear judgments are generally easier to implement. To facilitate compliance, and supervision

the demands of a full-time office. See also See e.g. PACE Doc. 11767 of 1 December 2008, Nomination of candidates and election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights. Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights; Rapporteur: Christopher Chope, available at https://bit.ly/2QyB2X6

18 Bayev and Others v. Russia (Appl. nos. 67667/09, 44092/12 and 56717/12, judgment of 20 June 2017)


20 See the separate opinion of Judge Dedov in Trabajo Rueda v. Spain (Appl. no. 32600/12, judgment of 30 May 2017) and Z.A. and Others v. Russia (Appl. nos. 61411/15 and three others, Judgment of 28 March 2017).

21 See e.g. the separate opinion of Judge Loucaides in E.B. v France (Appl. No. 43546/02, Judgment of 22 January 2008): “Homosexuals … must, like any other persons with some peculiarity, accept that they may not qualify for certain activities which, by their nature and under certain circumstances, are incompatible with their lifestyle or peculiarity.” See also the separate opinion of Judge Pejchal and Judge Wojtyczek in Orlandi and Others v Italy (Appl. nos. 26431/12; 26742/12; 44057/12 and 60088/12, Judgment 14 December 2017), arguing that “[m]arriage in its initial meaning presupposes the community of lives between a man and a woman. … The complementariness of the biological sexes of the two spouses is a constitutive element of marriage. Moreover, marriage in this meaning is – by definition – a social institution open to procreation.”


Anu Fac Der UDC, 2018, 22:138-156
thereof, in its judgments the Court should identify what it considers to be the underlying problem, and indicate more clearly which elements are actually problematic and can be regarded as the direct source of the violation.\(^{24}\) 

Finally, much depends on the attitude of States to comply. The United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, reflecting customary international law, provides in Art. 26 that once consent to be bound has been expressed and the treaty has entered into force, the treaty shall be kept by the parties in good faith. Art. 46(1) of the Convention stipulates that States shall abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. In practice, however, States frequently relativize their international obligations when important interests and values are at stake, even at the price of incurring international responsibility.

In its 10th annual report on the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights of 2016, the Council of Ministers explicitly refers to four major types of difficulty facing the execution of Court judgments. These are the following:

- Important and complex structural problems and the resource implications of the reforms;
- The absence of a common understanding as to the scope of the execution measures required;
- Slow or blocked execution as a result of disagreement between national institutions, or amongst political parties, as regards the substance of the reforms required;
- A refusal to adopt the individual measures required or to pay just satisfaction, situations which frequently hide more fundamental disagreements with the Court’s conclusions or the requirements of execution.\(^{25}\)

Londras and Dzehtsiarou argue that non-compliance is due to mainly two factors: the political sensitivity of the case and the dilatoriness of the States.\(^{26}\) These two broadly conceived categories roughly corresponds with the four categories employed by the Council of Ministers: the “important and complex structural problems” as well as “the absence of a common understanding as to the scope of the execution measures required” might be subsumed under the dilatoriness category, whereas “slow or blocked execution” and “refusal to adopt measures” indicated in the judgment are linked to the political sensitivity of the issue.

As far as principled non-execution is concerned, Russia provides a clear example of a deeply rooted conviction that international decisions should not prevail over positions arrived at national level through democratic process.\(^{27}\) Indeed, in its judgment of 14 July 2015, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation made clear that “the Russian Constitution had priority, with the consequence that a decision from the ECtHR that contradicted the Russian Constitution could not be executed in Russia.”\(^{28}\) The Russian Constitutional Court held that

the Russian Federation is … obliged to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation within the framework of its legal system, which forces it in the event of emerging of any collisions in this field … to give preference to the requirements of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and thereby not follow literally the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the event if its execution contradicts constitutional values.29

Apart from this justification, based on a hierarchical argument, Russia also challenged the authority of the European Court of Human Rights to interpret the Convention in a broad manner.30

In 2016, this decision was followed by an amendment to the 1994 Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, which vested the President and the Government with the power to petition the Constitutional Court to monitor the compatibility of the decision of interstate human rights protection institutions with the Russian Constitution. Should the Constitutional Court find a contradiction, the international decision cannot be enforced by the Russian authorities.31 In fact, the Russian Constitutional Court has already denied enforcement of the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Anchugov and Gladkov, concerning Russia’s blanket ban on convicted prisoners’ voting rights,32 and in Yukos, relating to the tax and enforcement proceedings brought against Yukos, which led to its liquidation.33

Currently the priority areas requiring attention relate to inadequate control of police actions, different issues related to the lawfulness of detention, poor detention conditions, inefficient judiciaries, ensuring compensation or restitution for properties nationalised under former communist regimes, excessive restrictions of freedom of assembly and association, the legal framework surrounding actions of security forces and the effectiveness of investigations into


alleged illegal or excessive use of force. While some of these issues emanate from principle, others are due to the financial implications of the case. Londras and Dzehtsiarou argue that dilatoriness on the part of States stem from problems of “corruption, autocracy, geopolitics, formal legality without commitment to the liberal construction of the Rule of Law, and systematic disregard for judicial authority and, in some cases, independence”. This can readily be seen in the case of Azerbaijan, which became the first State to be served a referral decision under Art. 46(4). Human rights are under serious challenge there, as evidenced by various reports. According to Amnesty International, in Azerbaijan

Authorities intensified the crackdown on the right to freedom of expression, particularly following revelations of large-scale political corruption. Independent news outlets were blocked and their owners arrested. Critics of the government continued to face politically motivated prosecution and imprisonment following unfair trials. LGBTI individuals were arbitrarily arrested and ill-treated. Suspicious deaths in custody were still not effectively investigated.

Before examining the background of the Committee of Ministers’ decision to launch infringement proceedings against Azerbaijan, the paper lays out the general scheme of Art. 46(4) of the Convention.

III. ARTICLE 46(4) OF THE ECHR: JUDICIALISATION OF NON-EXECUTION

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention control system, various measures have been introduced by Protocol 14, including the clarificatory interpretation of judgments in Art. 46(3), as well as the infringement proceedings in Art. 46 paras. (4) and (5).

The decision to refer the case to the Court, which should be made only in exceptional circumstances, shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Committee of Ministers. The State concerned will be formally notified and will be given another six months to implement the judgment. The referral decision shall be reasoned, and shall reflect the views of the respondent State as well.

This procedure does not foresee the imposition of financial penalty, because it was felt that the political pressure exerted by the infringement proceeding should secure compliance with Court’s initial judgment.

Until December 2017, the Committee of Ministers has refrained from invoking this procedure, even though in 2012 “a first major push has been made to induce the Committee of

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35 DE LONDRA and DZEHTSIAROU (2017), p. 479
37 The Committee of Ministers was vested with the power to ask the Court for an interpretation of a judgment, to assist the Committee of Ministers in determining what measures may be necessary to comply with a judgment.
39 ECHR Art. 31(b)
40 Explanatory Report, para. 99.
Ministers to start infringement procedures” 41 in Isayeva,42 relating to an aerial attack by the Russian military on a village in Chechnya in February 2000. The first referral decision was adopted in the Mammadov case.

It is clear that the infringement procedure was introduced to provide the Council of Ministers with a wider range of means of pressure to secure execution of judgments. Various points must be noted in order to explore whether this judicialisation could actually safeguard and/or enhance the effectiveness of execution.43

The first note to be made relates to the locus standi: neither the Parliamentary Assembly nor the applicants were endowed with the right to trigger the procedure. The idea was “to give a political (and not a victim) approach to such an appeal. It was admitted that only the CoM (composed of ambassadors representative of the States) would be wise enough not to abuse such a power.” 44

Second, while supervision of execution is admittedly a partly political exercise,45 Art. 46(4) does not specify what is required in order to activate the infringement proceedings: how much time should have passed, if it is sufficient that the respondent State has failed to comply with the judgment or there must be an explicit refusal to do so.46 The Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 stipulates that it is essential to strengthen the means given to the Committee of Ministers in its supervisory powers “whenever the Committee of Ministers considers that one of the High Contracting Parties refuses, expressly or through its conduct, to comply with the Court’s final judgment in a case”.47 Thus, probably the correct conclusion is that implied defiance might be sufficient.

Then, achieving two-thirds majority in the Committee of Ministers seems a remote possibility or, in retrospect, slightly probable, all the more so since there are quite a few States with a high number of non-implemented judgments, facing serious structural problems. These States are generally reluctant to vote for the launch of an infringement proceedings against their peer.48

Fourth, triggering the procedure implies a defeat on the part of the Committee of Ministers. Lambert-Abdelgawad argues that “… bringing a case to the Court on the ground of article 46(3) or (4) ECHR means that the CoM has failed in its function of supervising the implementation of the judgments; it will therefore probably be reluctant to display such a failure.” 49

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42 Isayeva v. Russian Federation (Appl. no. 57950/00; judgment of 24 February 2005)
43 The following section is largely based on the article of DE LONDRAS and DZEHTSIAROU (2017).
44 LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD, E, ‘The Court as a part of the Council of Europe: the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers’ in Follesdal, A, Peters, B and Ulfstein, G (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context, Cambridge University Press 2013, 263-300, at p. 280
47 Explanatory Report to Protocol 14, para. 98.
48 DE LONDRAS and DZEHTSIAROU (2017), pp. 482-483
Fifth, invoking Art. 46(4) may be counterproductive in the sense that the respondent State is unlikely to do anything to comply with the initial judgment during the infringement proceedings.\(^5\)

Sixth, while clearly an exceptional measure, this procedure nevertheless increases the workload of the Grand Chamber, whose competence also includes relinquishment of jurisdiction by the Chambers; referrals against the decision of the Chambers; it also has to hold meetings to examine requests by the parties for cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention; and it considers requests for advisory opinions.\(^5\) While it is impossible to indicate the length of the infringement proceedings before the Court, judicial procedures are always time-consuming. In its 2017 Annual Report, the Committee of Ministers indicated that a judgment in the infringement proceedings against Azerbaijan is expected in the course of 2018, thus probably within one year from the referral decision.\(^5\)

Another point to note is the impact of this second judgment on the delinquent State. Will it provide a real incentive for abiding with the initial judgment? Why should the respondent State, which has failed to comply despite the initial judgment and the repeated calls by the Committee of Ministers, abide with a new judgment restating that the problem giving rise to the original judgment still exists?\(^5\) The respondent State probably does not display an enhanced propensity, irrespective of whether its original reluctance stemmed from political considerations or the budgetary implications of the remedy. In fact, infringement proceedings might even prove to be counterproductive as it might fuel anti-Strasbourg sentiments, and fear about the loss of sovereignty and supremacy.

Finally, it must be recalled that there are no specific “sanctions” envisaged by Art. 46(4) of the Convention. Without providing for fines or penalties, any potential advantage of the procedure might prove to be illusory.\(^5\) If the Court finds that the respondent State has failed to comply with the initial judgment, it cannot do more than refer the case back to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken.

Against this background, it is of great interest to follow the fate of the infringement procedure used for first time over a judgment against Azerbaijan on the opposition politician Mammadov.

### IV. THE USE OF INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST AZERBAIJAN

\(^{50}\) DE LONDRA\$ and DZEHTSIAROU (2017), p. 484.


\(^{53}\) DE LONDRA\$ and DZEHTSIAROU (2017), p. 486.

\(^{54}\) LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD (2013) p. 280.

*Anu Fac Der UDC*, 2018, 22:138-156
This paper does not intend to provide a detailed description of the facts of the case. Suffice it here to say that the case concerned the detention of Ilgar Mammadov, a political opponent to punish him for his criticism of the government. In its judgment, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5(1) (right to liberty and security), Article 5(4) (right to judicial review of one’s detention), Article 6(2) (presumption of innocence), and Article 18 (limitation on use of restrictions on rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The judgment in the Mammadov case was adopted on 22 May 2014, and in the following three years the Committee of Ministers has repeatedly called on Azerbaijan that the applicant be released immediately and urged the authorities to guarantee his physical integrity in the meantime. It stressed that the applicant remained imprisoned on the basis of the flawed proceedings.

Admittedly, the Court’s judgments are “essentially declaratory”, thus States retain main responsibility for finding the most appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the Convention, having regard to the national circumstances. Nevertheless, the fact that the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan in 2016 decided to uphold the seven year-long prison sentence of Mammadov was in clear defiance of the Court’s finding that Mammadov’s deprivation of liberty was a punishment for having criticised the government. In its Interim Resolution of 2017, the Committee of Ministers noted that

the criminal proceedings against the applicant [was] concluded on 18 November 2016 before the Supreme Court without the consequences of the violations found by the European Court having been drawn;

and that

the respondent State [is obliged], under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention, to abide by all final judgments in cases to which it has been a party and that this obligation entails, in addition to the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the Court, the adoption by the authorities of the respondent State, where required, of individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum …

55 Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (Appl. no. 15172/13, Judgment of 22 May 2014)
56 The Court considered that Mr Mammadov, who had a history of criticising the Government, had been arrested and detained without any evidence to reasonably suspect him of having committed the offence with which he was charged, namely that of having organised actions leading to public disorder. The Court concluded that the actual purpose of his detention had been to silence or punish Mr Mammadov for criticising the Government and publishing information it was trying to hide. Press Release of the European Court of Human Rights, ECHR 144 (2014), 22.05.2014
58 See e.g. para. 58 of Marcks: “Admittedly, it is inevitable that the Court’s decision will have effects extending beyond the confines of this particular case, especially since the violations found stem directly from the contested provisions and not from individual measures of implementation, but the decision cannot of itself annul or repeal these provisions: the Court’s judgment is essentially declaratory and leaves to the State the choice of the means to be utilised in its domestic legal system for performance of its obligation under Article 53.” Marcks v. Belgium, Appl. no. 6833/74, judgment of 13 June 1979. The application related to certain rules of Belgian law relating to inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock.
59 See e.g. CDDH(2015)R44 Addendum I, para. 17.
60 I.e., in view of the fundamental flaws in the criminal proceedings, the immediate and unconditional release of the applicant.
61 Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)429, paras. e. and b.
In consideration of Azerbaijan’s failure to abide by the Court’s judgment as well as the Committee’s numerous subsequent decisions and interim resolutions stressing the fundamental flaws in the criminal proceedings, the Committee of Ministers decided to serve formal notice on the Republic of Azerbaijan of its intention to initiate the infringement proceedings, and invited Azerbaijan to submit its view on this question by 29 November 2017.62

In its views, Azerbaijan argued that as far as individual measures were concerned, it did pay the just satisfaction the Court had ordered, and with this it “remedied the deficiencies found in the proceedings leading to the applicant’s conviction”.63 It listed a few general measures, including a visit by a mission set up by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, a few changes to national laws, certain recommendations formulated by the President of Azerbaijan addressed to the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Justice in relation to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code. Most importantly, however, Azerbaijan stressed that “…having regard to absence of the Court’s any ruling to secure the applicant’s immediate release and the discretion of the High Contracting Party to choose the means necessary to comply with the Court’s judgment, the Government consider that they implement necessary measures to comply with the Court’s judgment in the present case.”64

Without going into the merits of the arguments, it must be noted first that, apart from just satisfaction, the Court rarely specifies the individual and general measures, thus respecting the principle of subsidiarity; and, second, that in its subsequent decisions and interim resolutions, the Committee of Ministers explicitly “expressed its very serious concern about the fact that the applicant is still detained”.65

Expecting the judgment to be adopted in the second half of 2018, the scope of examination is restricted to a few preliminary issues. In view of the fact that the Contracting Parties intended the infringement proceedings as a last resort instrument, and that there are other dilatory States, one cannot but wonder about the specific circumstances which triggered the activation of this “nuclear option”. Flagrant and/or systemic violations of human rights occur in other States as well, including Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Hungary,66 but no such steps were taken against these.

There are various factors which probably helped the Committee of Ministers overcome the obstacle of the two-thirds majority.67 First, the victim in this case, Ilgar Mammadov is a well-known, high profile political opponent.68 Support was expressed by the European Union,69 as

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64 Ibid., para. 23.
66 See e.g. PACE Resolution 2178 (2017) on The implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, noting in para. 6 that “Italy, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova and Poland have the highest number of non-implemented judgments and still face serious structural problems, some of which have not been resolved for over ten years.”
68 See his blog at https://ilgarmammadov.livejournal.com/
69 Statement by the spokespersons of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, on recent events in Azerbaijan: “The High Representative and the Commissioner are concerned that … Mr. Ilgar Mammedov, leader and Presidential candidate of the Republican Alternative party [was] arrested”. European Commission, Press Release, Brussels, 9
well as prestigious human rights NGO-s, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.\textsuperscript{70}

Second, the case involved a flagrant defiance of the obligations under the Convention. The applicant’s imprisonment was based on his political activities; his detention formed part of an attempt to intimidate the opposition, engendering a widespread sense of fear among opposition forces; and the actual purpose of his detention had been to silence or punish him for criticizing the government. Besides the violation of Arts. 5 and 6, the Court also found that Mammadov’s rights were restricted for purposes other than those prescribed in the Convention, and that the authorities had not acted in good faith.\textsuperscript{71}

Then, the measures required to comply with the judgment are relatively straightforward: release from prison. Measuring compliance in a situation stemming from structural problems would inevitably involve more complex issues, and would be less suitable to judicial scrutiny.

Finally, Azerbaijan is an easier target than other States, a few of them with a significantly higher number of non-implemented judgments. There are other, equally non-complying States, such as Russia or the UK, but these enjoy far more lobbying support among the other members of the Committee than Azerbaijan.

The judgment is eagerly awaited and further conclusions cannot be drawn beforehand. Nonetheless, a few points can be noted.

- It is already known that the judgment is expected in 2018, thus adopted within one year, which is relatively short as compared with other cases before the Court.

- Less clear is the scope of the judgment. Will the Court focus only on the Azerbaijani refusal to release Mammadov, and if yes, can it award just satisfaction; or will the Court also scrutinise the general measures taken by the State?\textsuperscript{72}

- Though an unlikely scenario in view of the circumstances of the case, but what will happen if Azerbaijan releases the applicant before the Court adopts its judgment?

These are just a few questions to which the answer is as yet unknown. In fact, infringement proceedings do not entail any kind of legal sanction. Art. 46(5) ECHR stipulates that if the Court finds that the respondent State has refused to abide by the judgment, “it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken.” If the Court finds no violation, “it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, which shall close its examination of the case.” Thus, should the Court find that Azerbaijan has failed to


\textsuperscript{72} The Court found that “the actual purpose of the impugned measures was to silence or punish the applicant for criticising the Government and attempting to disseminate what he believed was the true information that the Government were trying to hide. In the light of these considerations, the Court finds that the restriction of the applicant’s liberty was applied for purposes other than” those prescribed in the Convention. Para. 143.
execute the judgment, the only difference is that, besides the classification of the Committee of Ministers, now we have the Court’s statement on that as well.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The case against Azerbaijan is the first attempt to invoke the new procedure, thus it will be interesting to see how it works in practice. The major issue is whether it can provide a workable solution to the ineffective national implementation and inadequate execution of Court judgments, which are the main problems facing the Convention system.

Failing to implement judgments of the Court in a timely and effective manner undermines the rule of law, and poses significant challenges for the credibility and legitimacy of the Convention system. Unfortunately, the last decades saw the increasing number of States which challenge the authority of international institutions. These various developments, taken together, are cause for real concern. As the Commissioner for Human Rights noted,

Prolonged non-implementation is problematic, even if it is true that complex problems do take time to resolve. Reforms can legitimately take time to design and implement. Nevertheless, the rule of law requires that all judgments should be implemented promptly, fully and effectively. Prompt execution of domestic court decisions is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. The same should apply for execution of international judgments.73

Admittedly, Art. 46 leaves a very wide margin of appreciation to States in finding legislative and other solutions adapted to national circumstances. Yet, this discretion is not unlimited: the Committee of Ministers is vested with the power to scrutinize the execution of judgments. The reliability of this peer review is disputed. It is argued that either States lack incentives to monitor other States’ human rights compliance, or just the opposite, heightened interest in human rights in other States is frequently due to self-interest.74 Such criticism seems justified in the case of the Universal Periodic Review carried out by the Human Rights Council.75 however, an in-depth empirical analysis of the peer review mechanism in the Council of Europe carried out by Çali and Koch shows that there are adequate formal and informal

74 ÇALI and KOCH (2014), at p. 302.
institutional constraints in the Committee of Ministers to secure the reliability of the system.\textsuperscript{76} As the implementation process may be very technical, the Court is not always in the best position to address this task, particularly when the execution takes time or seems difficult.

Despite their flaws, hybrid models of compliance monitoring which combine political and judicial elements, may be effective in facilitating human rights compliance. Due to the “the rising cost of acquiring a reputation for being unreliable and untrustworthy”, States generally care about their reputation and endeavour to be seen as a respectable and law-abiding member of international society.\textsuperscript{77} It remains to be seen how the Court decides in the proceedings against Azerbaijan, and what might be achieved in case the Court agrees with the Committee of Ministers.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{76} ÇALI and KOCH (2014) at p. 311 argue that “peers do admit that they are politically motivated, build alliances, have enemies and friends and do not show equal interest in each and every human rights case. They are, however, constrained by the institutional setting in which they operate.”


\textsuperscript{78} Please note that according to Azeri Times, Baku “hinted at the release of Ilgar Mammadov in connection with serving two-thirds of the term of punishment. … In addition to releasing on parole, pardon may be announced. However, Ilgar Mammadov has repeatedly stated that he will not write a petition for pardon. But the law does not exclude pardon even without the request of the convict. … Finally, the Supreme Court may, in pursuance of the ECHR decision, release Mammadov on justifiable grounds. However, such a scenario looks unrealistic.” 8 December 2017, https://bit.ly/2y8sjo1. Is this an evidence for the impact of “naming and shaming”?
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