

Mathematical Principles for a Theoretical Model of Electoral Behavior from an Expanded Theory of Practice

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Doctoral Thesis/ Year 2015

UNIVERSIDADE DA CORUÑA



Mathematical Principles for a Theoretical Model of Electoral Behavior from an Expanded Theory of Practice

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DECLARE

That this PhD thesis, entitled 'Mathematical Principles for a Theoretical Model of Electoral Behavior from an Expanded Theory of Practice', presented by Mr Arturo de Nieves Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, with National ID 47361839D, meets the necessary requirements for obtaining a PhD with International Mention.

In A Coruña, 1 July 2015,

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Às classes dominadas.

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the product of countless hours of a hectic combination of intellectual discussion and human worries. The person who shared these stressful years the most is undoubtedly my dear wife, Clara, whom should be granted some official recognition for her unwavering support. The burden was also substantially shared with the rest of my family, especially with my mother, Isabel, my brother, Jacobo, and my father, Arturo. Countless hours of talking about this work, now finally finished.

I have been lucky enough to maintain a constant intellectual dialogue during the last seven years with Dr Celso Alvarez Cáccamo, professor of General Linguistics at the Universidade da Coruña, with whom I have a huge intellectual debt. Without his sociolinguistic research I simply would not have been able to develop the work presented in this thesis, as it shows the material basis of human practice, a relationship that is at the core of this thesis. Besides, it was him that put me in contact with Dr Mario Herrero Valeiro, and Dr Ernesto Vázquez Souza, from whom I have learned so much during these years.

Scottish sociology was also decisive in my intellectual formation; the year I spent in Dundee, where I finished my undergraduate studies in 2006/07, opened up a new world of research on nationalism and national identity without which my current work would be unthinkable. I want to thank especially Dr Alex Law and Dr Wallace McNeish, from the University of Abertay Dundee, as they are to a high extent responsible for the initiation of this intellectual journey. The path that was once opened in Dundee finally led me to Edinburgh, where I spent three months in 2013 at the School of Social and Political Science of the University of Edinburgh,

writing the chapter on the relationship between national identity and electoral behavior. I want to thank Dr Ross Bond for his very useful advice and kind hospitality there. I also want to thank the Territorial Politics & Governing Divided Societies research group at the University of Edinburgh, for giving me the chance to present my work to such an amazing group of social scientists, and for their very useful comments on it; I want to thank in particular Dr Wilfried Swenden and PhD candidate Coree Brown for their hospitality and willingness to help.

Exactly one year after Edinburgh, I was a visiting scholar at the Universidade do Minho, in Braga. I want to thank Dr Álvaro Iriarte for his help there. Dr Ana Paula Pereira Marques, at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais was also of much help, and I want to thank her again for her kind invitation to present part of my research at the ICS. The exceptional hospitality of Professor Dr Manuel Carlos Silva must be also recognized here, as I am still in his intellectual debt for the many references on clientelism that he kindly gave me during my time in Braga. Finally, I would like to thank the exceptional professionalism and kindness of Ângela Matos, secretary of the Centro Interdisciplinar de Ciências Sociais.

Back in 2011 I had the opportunity to collaborate with the research group Galabra, at the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Thanks to that collaboration I have definitely improved my knowledge on the conduction of qualitative methodology, which in turn improved this work. For that, and for their warm welcome and nice companionship, I want to thank the whole group and, in particular, Dr Elias Torres Feijó, Dr Raquel Bello Vázquez, Dr Roberto López-Iglesias Samartim, and Dr Jennifer Sime.

During 2012 I was an intern at the Department of Research of the Spanish Center of Sociological Research, where I have learned so much about this profession. I want to thank especially Dr Ludgerio Espinosa for having shared with me part of his deep knowledge on data analysis, as well as Dr Araceli Mateos for her support. I also want to thank the President of the CIS, Dr Félix Requena, for his continued support and help since that year. 2012 was an exceptionally fruitful year for me, as I passed through the wonderful experience and privilege of writing a book with Dr Carlos Taibo, from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid; the many conversations that we had during that year have undoubtedly improved my research and the way I see society, as well as the task of its analysis that constitutes the basis of this work, that I love and hate in similar proportions. To conclude that professionally exceptional year, I participated on the Fifth Summer Seminar on Sociological and Political Research, at Harvard University, where I presented the research on pre-capitalist voting included in this thesis; I want to thank all the participants in that Seminar for their useful comments and support, as well as for giving me the opportunity to share such a great time with an exceptional group of brilliant social scientists. In particular I want to thank Dr Michèle Lamont, Dr Cristina Ares and Dr Ainhoa Montoya, for their helpful comments and support.

In my three years as a lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Political Science of the Universidade da Coruña, I was lucky enough to have met an amazing group of students, from whom I have learned so much. Particularly I want to thank Andrea Souto García, Coral Blanco Mato, and Debora Cruz Meneses for their bright insights and shared knowledge while discussing Galician politics and society.

In February 2015, while finishing this work, I started one of the more stimulating and rewarding professional experiences of my life, working for the Elections Team of the United Nations Development Programme, in New York. I have learned so much about the work that is needed to successfully conduct sustainable democratic elections and practices, and for that I want to thank specially Niall McCann, Aleida Ferreyra and Léa Zorić, who kindly guided me through this exciting new world outside the academia; their excellent professionalism is only matched by their human kindness, making me a lucky man for having arrived to this exceptionally good working environment. I also see myself as a privileged man for having had the opportunity to see how democracy works from the perspective of both worlds: academic and practical.

I want to give special thanks to Dr. Xosé Manuel Beiras, who so courteously shared with me his deep knowledge on political and electoral matters, essential for the writing of the chapter on pre-capitalist vote

I would also like to thank the director of this thesis, Dr Manuel García Docampo, for his advice, and all my colleagues at the research group of the Universidade da Coruña, 'Grupo de Estudios Territoriales', directed by Dr José María Cardesín Díaz. Last, but certainly not least, I specially want to thank my colleague Camilo Fernández González, from the social research company inzaRede, for his essential help with the organization of the focus groups, as well as for his wise comments on the research question that motivates the work presented in this thesis: why people vote the way they (we) do.

Abstract (English)

This PhD Thesis wants to contribute to our understanding of why people vote the way we do. Adhering the critique by John Goldthorpe (2000), advocating for the reintegration of research and theory in sociology, this work follows a methodology based on (1) the description of the studied phenomenon and the detection of empirical trends and, (2) the explanation of these trends through theory. Thus, the first part of the thesis describes spatial trends of electoral behavior taking into account data from the Spanish general elections (1977-2011); we have chosen Spain as a case study because there is no international comparative dataset and because Spain presents enough internal variation in order to detect empirical trends affecting relevant variables, like class and national identity. We develop methodological critiques regarding the measurement of the impact of these two relevant variables on electoral behavior. In the second part of the thesis we proceed to explain the detected trends. Thus, after a review of the currently dominant theoretical frameworks, we observe that their predictions do not always fit the described empirical trends, so we propose a new theoretical approach that fits the empirical trends detected in our data. Consequently, we have developed a new model of practice, departing from Bourdieu's initial schema (Bourdieu, 1987). This new model, we argue, can help to solve some of the problems posed by the schemes that today dominate the field of electoral behavior theory, i.e., the models of Columbia, Michigan, and Rochester.

Abstract (Galician)

Esta Tese de Doutoramento quere contribuir para a nosa comprensión de por que a xente votamos da forma en que o facemos. Adherindo a crítica de John Goldthorpe (2000), que propón a reintegración de investigación e teoría na socioloxía, este traballo segue unha metodoloxía baseada en (1) a descrición do fenómeno estudado e a detección de regularidades empíricas e, (2) a explicación destas tendencias a través da teoría. Así, a primeira parte desta tese describe tendencias espaciais do comportamento electoral con datos das eleccións xerais españolas (1977-2011); escollemos España como estudo de caso porque non dispomos dun conxunto de datos comparativo internacional e porque España presenta suficiente variación interna para poder detectar tendencias empíricas que afectan variábeis de relevancia, como a clase e a identidade nacional. Desenvolvemos críticas metodolóxicas atinxentes á medición do impacto destas dúas variábeis sobre o comportamento electoral. Na segunda parte desta tese explicamos as tendencias detectadas. Así, após unha revisión dos actuais cadros teóricos dominantes, observamos que as súas predicións non sempre se axustan ás tendencias empíricas descritas, polo que propomos un novo enfoque teórico que si o faga. En consecuencia, desenvolvimos un novo modelo da práctica, partindo do esquema inicial de Bourdieu (1987). Dito modelo, argumentamos, pode axudar a solventar algúns dos problemas presentados polos esquemas, hoxe dominantes na teoría do comportamento electoral, de Columbia, Michigan e Rochester.

Abstract (Spanish)

Esta Tesis Doctoral quiere contribuir a nuestra comprensión de por qué la gente votamos de la forma en que lo hacemos. Abrazando la crítica de John Goldthorpe (2000), que propone la reintegración de investigación y teoría en sociología, este trabajo sigue una metodología basada en (1) la descripción del fenómeno estudiado y la detección de regularidades empíricas y, (2) la explicación de estas tendencias con la teoría. Así, la primera parte de esta tesis describe tendencias espaciales del comportamiento electoral con datos de las elecciones generales españolas (1977-2011); hemos escogido España como estudio de caso porque no disponemos de un conjunto de datos comparativo internacional y porque España presenta suficiente variación interna para poder detectar tendencias empíricas que afectan variables de relevancia, como la clase y la identidad nacional. Desarrollamos críticas metodológicas concernientes a la medición del impacto de estas dos variables sobre el comportamiento electoral. En la segunda parte de esta tesis explicamos las tendencias detectadas. Así, tras una revisión de los actuales cuadros teóricos dominantes, observamos que sus predicciones no siempre se ajustan a las tendencias empíricas descritas, por lo que proponemos un nuevo enfoque teórico que sí lo haga. En consecuencia, hemos desarrollado un nuevo modelo de la práctica, partiendo del esquema inicial de Bourdieu (1987). Dicho modelo, argumentamos, puede ayudar a solventar algunos de los problemas presentados por los esquemas, hoy dominantes en la teoría del comportamiento electoral, de Columbia, Michigan y Rochester.

Resumen extenso en español

(En cumplimiento del Art. 33 del REDUDC)

La investigación sociológica atraviesa una fase de crisis prolongada cuyas raíces se remontan, si no antes, a los años 60 del siglo XX. Por aquel entonces se abrió un debate entre la intelectualidad alemana que acabó por ser conocido como *Positivismusstreit*, la disputa sobre el positivismo (Adorno *et al.* 1976[1969]). En él participaron, por un lado, los partidarios del *Kritischer Rationalismus* liderados por Karl Popper y, por el otro, personalidades cercanas al círculo de la Escuela de Frankfurt, defensores de la *Kritischer Theorie*. Mientras que los seguidores de Popper (1959[1934]) argumentaban que la sociología podría mantener un modelo de investigación análogo al del resto de las ciencias, los partidarios del racionalismo crítico entendían que el estudio de la sociedad estaba intrínsecamente unido a cuestiones filosóficas profundas, que inhibían la posibilidad de emplear un esquema basado en (1) la observación y (2) la explicación. La crítica a una sociología científica no hizo sino acentuarse tras el impacto que supuso el postmodernismo en la escena intelectual mundial a partir de los años 70 del s. XX y hasta comienzos del nuevo siglo. Esto es así porque el influjo del postmodernismo no sólo negaba la posibilidad de una sociología científica, sino la idea misma de producir conocimiento científico sobre la realidad, no sólo social. Esta crítica general al conocimiento científico tomó tres formas distintas: relativismo cognitivo, relativismo perceptivo y relativismo epistémico. La primera de estas formas de relativismo se basa en la idea de que la ciencia es una empresa necesariamente dependiente del contexto histórico y social en que se

lleva a cabo; de este modo, cabría esperar que desarrollos científicos en contextos diferentes produjesen conclusiones divergentes. En segundo lugar, el relativismo perceptivo parte de una concepción contextual de la propia realidad; así pues, sus proponentes consideran que la realidad es un constructo social, producto de una particular red de relaciones y determinado, o muy influenciado al menos, por el lenguaje, recordando la vieja proposición de Wittgenstein: 'Los límites de mi lenguaje son los límites de mi mundo' (Wittgenstein, 2004[1921]). Finalmente, el relativismo epistemológico niega la existencia de una verdad objetiva, que pueda ser iluminada haciendo uso de la razón. Estas tres formas de relativismo, que cuestionan la validez del método científico, afectaron de forma muy acusada a las ciencias sociales y, en particular, a la sociología y antropología modernas. Sin embargo, la reacción a dichas críticas no se hizo esperar y, durante la década de los 90 del s. XX, tuvieron lugar las conocidas como 'guerras de la ciencia' (Parsons, 2003). Los contendientes fueron, por un lado, autores postmodernos y, por otro, científicos activos en disciplinas tan dispares como la física o la biología. Muchos autores señalan que la contra-crítica a favor de la ciencia superó con creces los argumentos esgrimidos por los postmodernos y, así, entramos en el siglo XXI con una fe renovada en la posibilidad de generar conocimiento científico sobre la realidad social. Tal vez la obra de John Goldthorpe, *On Sociology* (2000) se haya convertido en la defensa más emblemática de dicha renovación en aras de una sociología científica. Nuestro trabajo parte de la que quizás sea la proposición más representativa de la crítica elaborada por el sociólogo británico, la integración de investigación y teoría. Así pues, para Goldthorpe, el 'escándalo de la sociología', se refiere a la disociación entre teoría e investigación que afecta a la disciplina por partida doble. Por un lado, hay una tendencia hacia la reificación de la

metodología, que a veces parece olvidarse de su cometido práctico y su papel habilitador de construcción teórica. Por otro, si cabe más grave, es evidente que muchos sociólogos/as han optado por elaborar teoría sin atender a la investigación empírica, en un ejercicio que no va mucho más allá del diálogo erudito. Como consecuencia, Goldthorpe reclama que la sociología debe recuperar la integración de investigación y teoría para retomar plenamente su posición de igual entre el resto de las disciplinas científicas. Esta integración debe obedecer, de forma primaria y fundamental, a un esquema por el cual, primero, se realice un trabajo de investigación empírica capaz de identificar tendencias empíricas regulares en conjuntos de datos agregados, indicativas, pues, de la existencia de fenómenos sociales para, en segundo lugar, proporcionar una explicación adecuada de dichas tendencias a través de la teoría.

De este modo, tras asumir el enfoque propuesto por Goldthorpe, hemos procedido a organizar la investigación del siguiente modo. En primer lugar analizando datos agregados del comportamiento electoral para, en segundo lugar, poder explicar las tendencias empíricas detectadas a través de la teoría. Dado que no disponemos de una base de datos internacional con información del comportamiento electoral implementado por la ciudadanía con derecho a voto, optamos por tomar en consideración datos de dicho comportamiento para las elecciones generales de España (período 1977-2011). Nuestra elección de España como estudio de caso obedece a dos motivos que consideramos bien fundamentados a nivel científico. El primero de ellos tiene que ver con la labor que el Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas ha venido desarrollando desde su fundación en 1963, si bien inicialmente se conocía como Instituto de la Opinión Pública. Dicha labor ha proporcionado a la comunidad científica un gran conjunto de datos que permite

muchas veces la comparación de variables análogas a lo largo de los años. Esta información es, además, totalmente accesible y pública, permitiendo la contrastación de hipótesis empíricas. La investigación de variables sociopolíticas ha sido, por añadidura, prioritaria a lo largo de la historia del CIS, lo que resulta particularmente beneficioso para nuestro trabajo. En segundo lugar, siguiendo la propuesta desarrollada por Linz y Montero (2001), la realidad española invita a considerar la existencia de no uno, sino varios sistemas políticos en su interior. Esto es así debido a la impronta diferencial de dos variables cuya relevancia en la teoría del comportamiento electoral es muy elevada: la clase social y la identidad nacional. Además, el caso español permite la consideración de otras variables igualmente relevantes en el estudio del comportamiento electoral, como los liderazgos, la religión, la ideología, etc.

De este modo, hemos comenzado nuestra investigación con la realización de una serie de análisis de estadística espacial que permitiesen la identificación de tendencias empíricas reseñables en el comportamiento electoral de la población española con derecho a voto durante las elecciones generales para el período 1977-2011. Dichos análisis han desmentido intuitivas asociaciones simples concernientes a la relación entre tipo de hábitat y comportamiento electoral. Mientras que los análisis iniciales de las agrupaciones espaciales mostraban una tendencia consistente con la teoría generada por los estudios de voto de clase, en el sentido de una correlación positiva entre las clases sociales agrarias y el voto conservador (Nieuwbeerta y de Graaf, 1999), mayores esfuerzos descriptivos han demostrado que dicha asociación no se sostiene. Así pues, es precisamente en los hábitats rurales donde encontramos una mayor predisposición al voto de opciones situadas en la izquierda del arco político teniendo en cuenta aquellos municipios

incluidos en agrupaciones espaciales definidas por un voto elevado a opciones de izquierda. De modo análogo, y pese a que puede parecer paradójico, los hábitats rurales son también los más propicios a votar por opciones políticas conservadoras de entre los municipios incluidos en agrupaciones espaciales definidas por un voto elevado a la derecha. En consecuencia, una de las conclusiones de nuestro trabajo es que los hábitats rurales son siempre lugares con unos porcentajes elevados de voto hacia las opciones políticas hegemónicas en el ámbito territorial del que forman parte, dado que una tendencia idéntica ha sido también registrada en lo que atañe al apoyo de candidaturas nacionalistas periféricas; a tendencia, sin embargo, resulta menos clara para el caso más complejo de la abstención. En nuestra opinión, esta tendencia empírica registrada necesita de mayores esfuerzos de investigación para recibir una explicación satisfactoria, tarea que desarrollamos en los siguientes capítulos. Nuestros análisis de estadística espacial, además, ofrecen una contribución significativa al debate académico sobre la relación entre tipo de hábitat y comportamiento electoral. Así pues, en un estudio que tomaba en consideración datos propios de la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía (Ortega *et al.*, 2011), se demostraba la presencia de una relación causal significativa, por la cual los hábitats más pequeños resultarían generalmente más proclives a la participación electoral. Mientras que esta tendencia parece clara para el caso andaluz, nuestros análisis revelan que la asociación entre variables anunciada por dicho estudio no es generalizable, pues las desviaciones típicas de los hábitats rurales son mayores que las de los urbanos para cada uno de los casos tenidos en cuenta (agrupaciones espaciales con voto elevado a la derecha, a la izquierda, al nacionalismo periférico, y a la abstención). Este es un hallazgo significativo, pues aquella relación tan sólo se había

cuestionado parcialmente (Anckar, 1999). Podemos decir que nuestro análisis también cuestiona algunas ideas sobre el papel de la abstención; en este sentido, Justel (1995) había argumentado una relación entre actividad económica y los diferentes tipos de abstención: 'Hay un cierto indicio de que la actividad terciaria se asocia con niveles más altos de abstención' (Justel, 1995: 113). Esta afirmación no parece encontrar soporte empírico en nuestro análisis, ya que los hábitats más terciarizados, ciudades y periferias, se encuentran debajo de la media abstencionista, invirtiendo la tendencia calculada para porcentajes sobre el total español. Estos hallazgos muestran la importancia de establecer una segmentación de los análisis entre agrupaciones espaciales, pues a menudo invierten la información ofrecida para la tendencia nacional agregada. Finalmente, de nuestros análisis se desprende que no resulta adecuado desde un punto de vista sociológico hablar de *un* tipo de hábitats españoles, ya que los datos muestran una elevada variación intergrupal para cada uno de esos hábitats. Resulta, pues, hasta cierto punto fútil hablar de el rural o el urbano español, como si se tratase de hábitats homogéneos. De forma demasiado frecuente, los estudios sociológicos basados en datos agregados se critican aludiendo al problema postulado por la falacia ecológica –asociar de forma errónea la tendencia detectada para un grupo a cada uno de los miembros de dicho grupo– y no obstante, el análisis presentado en nuestra investigación muestra que si hacemos un uso apropiado de la estadística espacial es posible minimizar los riesgos de la falacia ecológica. Así pues, hemos visto que el cálculo agregado de las diferentes categorías de hábitat para el total español puede hacer caer en la paradoja de Simpson (Blyth, 1972), por la cual una tendencia bien definida para un grupo determinado tiende a desaparecer o,

incluso, a invertirse si agregamos tales grupos en una categoría superior que carezca de fundamentación empírica apropiada.

Una vez identificadas las regularidades empíricas que deberán ser explicadas por la teoría pasamos, al inicio de la segunda parte de la tesis, a exponer una revisión de la teoría del comportamiento electoral. La finalidad de esta revisión no es la disertación erudita, sino más bien comprobar si las tendencias detectadas durante la primera parte de nuestra investigación pueden ser explicadas por la teoría existente. Así pues, agrupamos la muy extensa teoría del comportamiento electoral en tres grupos o tipos, de acuerdo con las escuelas de las que surgieron dichos enfoques. Estos tres bloques teóricos pueden ser resumidos como:

- La escuela de Columbia, centrada en las bases sociales del voto.
- La escuela de Michigan, que parte de los procesos de socialización política, a menudo fundamentados en la psicología social.
- La escuela de Rochester, basada en la Teoría de la Elección Racional (TAR), que entiende el comportamiento electoral como el resultado de ecuaciones de maximización de la utilidad.

Partiendo de estos tres enfoques, hemos desarrollado una crítica metodológica en dos variables fundamentales para explicar el comportamiento electoral en España: la clase social y la identidad nacional (González, 2004: 119). En lo que concierne a la primera, partiendo del enfoque de Meillasoux (1972) hemos definido un sector de la población agraria como pre-capitalista, compuesta por trabajadores que no están integrados en las esferas de producción o consumo del mercado o, si lo están, es de forma marginal. Este fragmento del electorado tiene una presencia notable en la Comunidad Autónoma de Galicia, si bien su peso relativo se reduce con el

paso del tiempo. El análisis del comportamiento electoral de estas fracciones de clase demuestra que no presentan ningún tipo de comportamiento homologable a lo que puede ser el voto de la clase trabajadora, de acuerdo con lo postulado por el índice de Alford, sino que más bien se trata de un voto con tendencia conservadora. Una posible explicación de esta tendencia es que estos sectores precapitalistas son propietarios de tierras, si bien se encuentran lejos del mercado capitalista, pues esta propiedad no se articula como capital dentro del mercado. Una posibilidad sería que, de modo semejante a la vieja teorización de Wright sobre las nuevas clases medias como posiciones contradictorias (Wright, 1985), podríamos pensar que la propiedad de la tierra actúa como un elemento de capitalismo dentro de un esquema no capitalista. Esto produciría un efecto semejante al atribuido a las nuevas clases medias por Callinicos y Harman (1987), es decir, estas fracciones de clase estarían más próximas a los comportamientos de la clase trabajadora o de la burguesía de manera contextual al contexto electoral. Sin embargo, esta hipótesis no se acomoda a nuestros datos, que apuntan a una fuerte tendencia de continuidad conservadora muy estable en el tiempo. En consecuencia, esta regularidad pone en cuestión el alineamiento entre clase y voto postulado por el enfoque de Columbia. Alternativamente, planteamos una hipótesis de trabajo a partir de estos datos, que se resume como un alineamiento de clase con el partido político identificado con la élite económico-política local, sin importar su ubicación ideológica. Si esta hipótesis es correcta, debería haber importantes variaciones ecológicas tanto en los valores políticos como en el comportamiento electoral. Esta hipótesis está directamente relacionada con las dinámicas de clientelismo político, ampliamente descritas desde la etnografía –*vid.* Jablonski (2009) para el caso gallego y Silva (1998) para el noroeste portugués–.

Esta versión del voto de clase, sin embargo, no encaja con los presupuestos del modelo de Columbia, basado en alineamientos de clase entre las clases bajas y la izquierda política y las clases altas y la derecha. Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo encaja con los datos analizados durante la primera sección de la tesis, en la que postulábamos un alineamiento entre las clases más bajas y opciones políticas asociadas a las élites político-económicas locales. Esta versión del voto de clase explicaría, además, las diferencias entre los hábitats rurales gallegos y andaluces. Estas diferencias no se explican con la hipótesis, ya comentada, de las diferencias en la propiedad de la tierra, debido a que incluso dentro de Galicia encontramos un número significativo de municipios categorizados como rural desactivado que apoyan fuertemente opciones políticas de izquierdas. Este hecho empírico nos obliga a reconsiderar los postulados tradicionales del voto de clase, cosa que hacemos en la parte final de la tesis.

Además de esta crítica metodológica a la medición del voto de clase, hemos realizado, como apuntábamos anteriormente, una crítica a la medición de la relación entre identidad nacional y voto, sin duda el clivaje de mayor relevancia en la escena política española, junto con la clase. A través de técnicas cualitativas – análisis del contenido de la prensa– y cuantitativas –regresión logística– hemos concluido que la medida generalmente utilizada para dar cuenta de la identidad nacional a través de encuestas, la pregunta Moreno, debe ser puntualizada. Nuestro argumento principal es que la pregunta Moreno ofrece una medida que es dependiente del contexto. Tras clasificar las Comunidades Autónomas españolas en cuatro categorías de acuerdo con los sentimientos identitarios de sus habitantes, comprobamos que la pregunta Moreno refleja correctamente los sentimientos de identidad nacional tan sólo en uno de estos cuatro grupos, que es

el de aquellas Comunidades Autónomas en las que se da una competición entre dos proyectos nacionales altamente desarrollados, como es el caso de las Comunidades Autónomas de Cataluña o del País Vasco. Sin embargo, no es un indicador adecuado de la identidad nacional para aquellos otros casos en los que se trata de evaluar sociedades con un único proyecto nacional en marcha o en las que, habiendo más de un proyecto nacional, uno de ellos es claramente dominante. Hemos desarrollado una crítica a la teoría de la identidad dual, que constituye las bases epistemológicas de la pregunta Moreno. Nuestra crítica se basa en el hecho de que en aquellas sociedades en las que hay una clara primacía del proyecto nacional estatal, la identidad o identidades sub-estatales se encuentran total o parcialmente –si se diera el caso de contar con un proyecto nacional alternativo– subsumidas dentro del proyecto estatal dominante, en la forma de expresiones regionales de dicho proyecto. Esta dinámica produce lo que podríamos llamar una *dialectalización* de la identidad, a través de su regionalización. Este proceso de regionalización, basado en la creación de dependencias simbólicas que afectan los diacríticos étnicos (Barth, 1969) a través de los que las identidades sub-estatales nacionales o pre-nacionales son socialmente construidas, origina un proceso dialéctico. En tal proceso la regionalización sería la tesis, mientras que la antítesis toma cuerpo en los diversos movimientos sociales que pueden, hasta cierto punto, identificarse bajo la etiqueta de independentistas. De hecho podríamos citar muchos ejemplos de este tipo de movimientos en aquellos lugares en donde hay suficiente diversidad cultural como para generar una situación demasiado cargada de violencia simbólica como para que el antedicho proceso dialéctico no dé comienzo. Estos incluirían la defensa y promoción de la lengua no estatal, del patrimonio natural e histórico, de la música, de la literatura, etc. Si, como Billig

propone insistentemente, debemos tratar el nacionalismo como una ideología (Billig, 1993), entonces tal vez debiésemos comenzar a medirlo como tal, haciendo uso de una escala similar a la que habitualmente se emplea para medir la ideología izquierda-derecha, representando en uno de los extremos la completa identificación con el proyecto nacional estatal y en el otro la completa identificación con el proyecto nacional sub-estatal. De forma alternativa, los investigadores podríamos desarrollar indicadores que combinen al menos dos variables de cara a medir realmente la identidad nacional en aquellos contextos en los que la eficacia de la pregunta Moreno ha demostrado ser limitada.

Tras haber analizado los tres grandes grupos de teorías existentes sobre el comportamiento electoral y haber introducido mejoras en uno de ellos –la medición de la relación entre los dos grandes clivajes de España y el voto– llegamos a la conclusión de que mayores esfuerzos teóricos son necesarios. Esto es así debido a la no adecuación de las predicciones teóricas con las realidades empíricas demostradas. El enfoque de Columbia se demuestra demasiado rígido para explicar el cambio electoral, mientras que el de Michigan resulta demasiado flexible para explicar ciertas constantes sobradamente registradas en los datos. Finalmente, el enfoque de la elección racional ha encontrado en la explicación del comportamiento electoral uno de sus principales talones de Aquiles, al no hallar un modo convincente de explicar la participación electoral, dada la desdeñable probabilidad de que un único voto sea capaz de alterar los resultados electorales. Así pues, hemos concentrado nuestros esfuerzos en diseñar un nuevo enfoque teórico coherente con las regularidades empíricas detectadas y que, además, puede entenderse como una combinación de las fortalezas de los enfoques de Columbia y Michigan. Postulamos, por último, que una versión definitiva de las prácticas

humanas podría integrar cálculos de maximización de la utilidad para explicar la variación residual. Nuestro enfoque, pues, se basa en la superación teórica de la oposición falaz entre objetivismo (Columbia) y subjetivismo (Michigan). Sin duda, la teoría de la práctica de Pierre Bourdieu (1987) es la propuesta que hasta la fecha mejor ha sabido argumentar esta superación de estructuralismo y fenomenología. Se podría decir que el enfoque bourdieuano sitúa estructuralmente los enfoques centrados en la socialización a la vez que subjetiviza aquellos otros centrados en la posición estructural. Esto es posible a través de la idea de *habitus*, como estructura social interiorizada y encarnada que es capaz de orientar las prácticas, si bien no las determina. El *habitus* dispone a los individuos hacia un conjunto de prácticas determinado, si bien no compele a la realización de una de ellas. Se podría comparar a una baliza orientadora de la conducta humana. El papel de dicha baliza es, además, contextual a cada uno de los *campos* en los que se desarrolla la acción social, tomando como unidad base o de referencia la estructura y el volumen de capital disputado en cada uno de estos campos. Así pues, hemos ampliado el esquema inicial bourdieuano a través de la inclusión en la teoría de la idea de sub-campos, así como también hemos formalizado el esquema general. El marco teórico de la teoría de la práctica postula la existencia de campos sociales compuestos de objetos sociales que se atraen entre sí; en consecuencia, podemos formalizar el modelo de acuerdo con la teoría general de campos, basándonos en el teorema de Gauss y en la gravitación universal. El hecho de que el resultado de ambas teorizaciones sea idéntico para explicar las dinámicas de atracción entre cuerpos dentro de campos determinados, apunta al hecho de que en realidad son modelos matemáticos de la atracción entre objetos dentro de campos de fuerza determinados. Hemos argumentado que la teoría de la práctica se desarrolla

plenamente al colocarla bajo estos supuestos técnicos, lo que nos ha llevado a generar una ecuación elaborada a partir de las particularidades de los campos sociales, que es el resultado de dicha expansión:

$$A(AL) = \sum_i \frac{\sqrt{S_1^2 + S_2^2 + S_3^2}}{(\overline{AL})}$$

Donde A es la fuerza de atracción entre dos objetos sociales A y L y es igual a la raíz cuadrada de la suma de las tres formas genéricas adoptadas por el capital simbólico de A y L elevadas al cuadrado, dividida entre la distancia euclidiana entre A y L . De este modo, el comportamiento electoral sería la expresión de la atracción entre objetos sociales –en este caso entre agentes y opciones políticas– dentro de un determinado campo o sub-campo, gracias al poder del habitus como dispositivo orientador de la práctica.

El resultado de la tesis es una nueva teoría para comprender el comportamiento electoral que se adecúa a las regularidades empíricas registradas. Las líneas de investigación abiertas son fundamentalmente tres: en primer lugar se abre la posibilidad de comprender la parte subjetiva del habitus. Nuestro trabajo abre la caja negra de la parte objetiva o estructural del habitus; sin embargo, la explicación de la parte subjetiva, es decir, de cómo el habitus se integra en las redes neuronales de los agentes, es tarea pendiente. Investigaciones recientes en neurociencia invitan a pensar que el camino está abierto para estos desarrollos en un futuro próximo y hemos planteado algunas bases a partir de las cuales dicho trabajo se podría realizar. En segundo lugar se postula una teoría integrada de la acción social, que sería el producto de la integración de la ecuación general de la

atracción entre cuerpos sociales con las ecuaciones de maximización de la utilidad propias de la teoría de la elección racional. Esta integración solucionaría lo que se ha dado en llamar la paradoja de la abstención (Feddersen, 2004), al subordinar la maximización de la utilidad al poder orientador general del habitus, a través de lo que se podría denominar *racionalidad situada*.

'Socrates: All in all, I responded, those who were chained would consider nothing besides the shadows of the artifacts as the unhidden.'

(Plato, 2012[4th c. BC]: VII, 514)

'The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects.'

(Bourdieu, 1986: 241)

I. Establishing the phenomenon

1 Theory and research in Sociology

It has been argued (Leyte, 2014) that in *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (Camus, 1942), Albert Camus wanted to state that it is impossible for human beings to produce any knowledge of the world, since what we usually understand as the world around us is nothing but human *conscience* and, given that we cannot escape from that very consciousness that makes up our world, it is then not possible to objectivize it, enabling its study and, therefore, making it impossible to produce any genuine knowledge of reality. Thus, opposing Spinoza's famous quotation *Deus, sive natura*¹ (Spinoza, 2005[1677], part IV: 115), by which the Dutch philosopher equated God with nature, Camus built up an opposition between God and nature, equating the latter with the existence and, hence, embracing phenomenology to some extent. The result was the establishment of a limit when it comes to build up knowledge on the human nature. This knowledge would be defined as only able to provide mere descriptions of subjective facts and, thus, we should abandon any pretension of a real understanding of the social world. This is an example of one of the many arguments against the possibility of truly producing scientific knowledge of the social world, which would eventually lead us to the discovery of *truth*. If the scientific task, in the abstract, has been harshly criticized, then the epistemological foundations of the so-called social sciences have been submitted to an even harder criticism, as we will show in this chapter. Shall we abandon, hence, any positive expectation regarding the scientific advancement of the study of human behavior? This thesis is, above all, an attempt to demonstrate that the answer to this question

¹ "God, that is, nature". Translated by the author. Henceforth all translations will be done by the author, unless the contrary is indicated.

is no. We think that this task is not only possible, but also desirable; to build up scientific knowledge on how and why human beings behave the way we do is the only way to achieve higher levels of freedom. However, this scientific advancement must proceed with the greatest caution, for it is well known that it does not produce by itself higher levels of well being (Beck, 1992). The sociologist, Weber explained, is in charge of producing scientific knowledge on how society works, while it is the task of the politician to provide a framework that allows people to benefit from this knowledge (Weber, 2012[1918]).

1.1 Some difficulties affecting sociological research

Robert K. Merton, in a famous article published in 1987 explained that “establishing the phenomenon” should be the first step to be taken before starting out any further scientific endeavor, as it “involves the doctrine (universally accepted in the abstract) that phenomena should of course be shown to exist or to occur before one explains why they exist or how they come to be” (Merton, 1987: 1). This seemingly obvious remark was highlighted by Merton in order to prevent sociologists from committing that classical error in logics that drove Seneca to develop an explanation on why there are waters so dense that made it impossible for any object to sink in them, independently of their weight². This kind of mistake,

²“(…) erat in Sicilia, est adhuc in Syria stagnum in quo natant lateres et mergi proiecta non possunt, licet grauia sint. Huius rei palam causa est. Quamcumque uis rem expende et contra aquam statue, dummodo utriusque par sit modus; si aqua grauior est, leuiorem rem quam ipsa est fert et tanto supra se extollet quanto erit leuior; grauiora descendunt.” (Seneca, 1979 [63], p. 142).

“(…) There was in Sicily –there is still in Syria- a pond in which bricks float and there is no possibility of sinking the objects which are thrown into it, no matter how heavy they are. The reason is evident: check the weight of whatever object and compare it with that of the water, ensuring that the measurement is equal to one another. When the water is heavier,

known as the problem of pseudo-facts, has been appropriately dealt with in many scientific fields. Taking medicine as an example, we see that in 1865 Claude Bernard, a well-known 19th century French physiologist, published a celebrated treatise on experimental medicine (Bernard, 1966[1865]), in which he stressed out the importance of gathering detailed observations before starting out any attempt oriented towards the establishment of a scientific explanation for a given observed phenomenon; thus, Bernard wrote:

« L'art de l'investigation scientifique est la pierre angulaire de toutes les sciences expérimentales. Si les faits qui servent de base au raisonnement sont mal établis ou erronés, tout s'écroulera ou tout deviendra faux ; et c'est ainsi que, le plus souvent, les erreurs dans les théories scientifiques ont pour origine des erreurs de faits »³ (Bernard, 1966[1865]: 21).

In a similar way, the problem of pseudo-facts has famously affected physics. During millennia, people believed Aristotle's theory that bodies in the space have a natural state of immovability (Aristotle, 1999[4th c. BC]). The bigger the mass of an object, thus, the higher its acceleration in free fall, since its trend towards the natural motionless state would include more matter. However, Galileo proved that objects do indeed fall at exactly the same acceleration rate, independently of their mass (Settle, 1983). If it takes more time for a feather to fall down than an hammer, this

the lighter object stays afloat, raised by the water to its surface, as more as lighter the object is; the heavier ones will sink”.

³ “The art of scientific research is the cornerstone of all experimental sciences. If the facts used as a basis for reasoning are poorly established or are erroneous, everything will collapse or become false; thus, in most cases, errors in scientific theories originate in errors of fact”.

is just because of air resistance –in fact, the astronaut David Ross made this experiment on the moon, where there is no air, and indeed the feather touched the ground at exactly the same time than the hammer (NASA, 1971)–. Without that fundamental observation by Galileo it would be impossible for Newton to develop his laws of motion, stating that a body will either remain at rest or in continuous movement unless some force acts upon it (Newton, 1999[1687]).

The problem of pseudo-facts has had, however, a persistent presence in modern sociology probably, following Merton’s argument, because of the political implications that inevitably complement any description of social reality. The argument was perhaps more deeply developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who explained that “the spontaneous theories imposed on traditional research (...) are the product of the social conditions with which the sociologist must do science, so that the obstacles to the adequate construction of the object are part of the object of adequate science” (Bourdieu, 1971: 8). This stance is at the core of Bourdieu’s indefatigable insistence on the necessity of always basing sociological research on empirical data (Bourdieu, 1980). It is also linked to the fact that social constructs, which are the object of study for sociology, have the capacity of shaping the form of reality –not only of *social* reality, as ANT shows⁴– under the eyes of social agents, including sociologists, who participate of social interactions. This makes Merton’s claim on the relevance of *establishing the phenomenon* a particularly important and complex task for a science of society, as

⁴“Actor Network Theory”, whose main representatives are Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, embedded by radical constructionist epistemology, establishes that reality is constructed within networks of interactions which are developed by human and non-human actors. *Vid.* for a good synthesis of the ANT approach, Callon (1986).

compared to other areas of scientific research. To cite a well-known example of the difficulties posed by the fact that the science of society inevitably remains immersed within society itself, we can mention the methodological tacit agreement that usually identifies societies with nations, which is of course a side effect of the *banal nationalism* that defines our modern world (Billig, 1995). As Ulrich Beck puts it:

“The nation-state society is the dominant societal paradigm. The mainstream considers that the concept of society is applicable only to the nation-state. Accordingly, the sociological perspective or gaze (the sociology of inequality, of the family, of politics and so on) is geared to and organized in terms of the nation-state. On the whole, sociology observes, measures and comments on its phenomena, for example, poverty and unemployment within a national context rather than in the context of world society.” (Beck, 2000: 80).

Consequently if reality and, especially, social reality is shaped by the social lens with which society is viewed by agents, and given that agents are clustered in different, often conflictive, groups, thus it follows that common-sense descriptions of facts are interest-loaded⁵, as they are designed to either perpetuate or subvert a

⁵ According to the school of the “interest approach”, firstly developed by a group of social scientists working at the ‘Science Studies Unit’ of the University of Edinburgh from the late 1970’s to the early 1990’s, knowledge is interest-driven not only in its naïve forms, but also in its sophisticated scientific versions (Barnes, 1977; Barnes & Bloor, 1982; Bloor, Henry, & Barnes, 1996; MacKenzie, 1981). This approach opposes the possibility of breaking through *reflexivity* those biases derived from the conflict of interests at the core of scientific production, as Bourdieu pointed out (Bourdieu, 1976). This PhD thesis adheres Bourdieu’s point of view, as it does not deny the social underpinnings affecting scientific development. However, Bourdieu’s approach starts from the assumption of that point to offer a solution for the overcoming of the negative effects that it produces.

given social order, depending on whether the position occupied in the social space by the group to which the agent belongs is either dominant or dominated⁶. It is necessary, then, for anyone who aims to build up social science, to distil descriptions through the sieve of the rigorousness provided by the scientific method, introducing thus the first step of a necessary “epistemic rupture” (Bourdieu, *et al.*, 1968) in which reflexivity plays a central role. We understand this reflexivity alongside Bourdieu, who pointed out that “the important is, therefore, to know how to objectivate the relation to the object so that the discourse over the object is not a simple projection of an unconscious relation towards the object” (Bourdieu, 2011 [1984]: 84).

We can conclude that, when talking about social facts, descriptions are always a matter of conflict between confronted groups of agents, that will try to establish their own version of reality “to capture what Heidegger (1927 [1962]) called the ‘public interpretation of reality’” (Merton, 1973: 110). This idea of confronted social groups fighting to establish the dominant, common sense, version of how social things are has a long tradition of research in the social sciences, being Gramsci’s

Therefore, we will try to make a scientific contribution that will unveil some portions of reality behind people’s electoral behavior, assuming Searle’s definition of reality as a correspondence with facts (Searle, 1993; 1995).

⁶ Bourdieu put this in terms of *strategies of the obvious* and *strategies of subversion* applied respectively by the dominant agents and by newcomers within a given social field in order to stay or to obtain the best position when it comes to pick up the benefits at stake on that given field: “against these strategies of subversion of the vanguard, those who hold the legitimacy, i.e., the occupants of the dominant position, will always hold the vague and pompous discourse of the ineffable ‘it is evident’” (Bourdieu, 1984: 118).

notion of *hegemony*⁷ particularly well-known and illustrative of this process (Gramsci, 1971 [1926-1937]; Hall, 1987). However, despite the fact that the problem is old and has been correctly diagnosed a significant time ago, we can still find it in modern social sciences, in which it is not as usual as it should to find detailed, well-informed, descriptions of the social facts to be explained preceding further theorizing on the subject matter. This detachment of theory and research has been defined by Goldthorpe as “the scandal of sociology” (Goldthorpe, 1997), meaning a “manifest lack of integration of research and theory” as a defining feature of the discipline in its current state (Goldthorpe, 1997). Several authors⁸ have exposed a

⁷ The notion of hegemony relates to the idea that unjust social relations need more than just coercion in order to be maintained. According to Crossley’s manual on critical social theory:

“What is needed, if a relationship of domination is to be rendered relatively secure, Gramsci argues, is intellectual and moral leadership. The bourgeoisie must win the hearts and minds of the people, persuading them (without even seeming to do so or to need to do so) that the status quo is natural and inevitable, beneficial for all, and inducing them to identify with it” (Crossley, 2005, p. 114).

⁸ Some authors have worked on the development of an explicit critique of ‘general theory’ –see, e.g., van den Berg (1998), Davis (1994), Voas (2003), for a general perspective; also van den Berg (1980) for the application of the same approach to general critical theory-. We could enumerate here, however, all those sociologists that are proponents of analytical sociology –see Hedström & Bearman (2009) for a synthesis- concerned with providing detailed theoretical explanations of social regularities, down to the detail of individual mechanisms that will eventually free theory from black boxes, such as undemonstrated attributed motivations or beliefs assumed to be held by individuals. This has led many of these theorists to embrace rational action theory (RAT), as a way to provide this high level of individual detail when explaining social phenomena. In any case, there are also theorists outside the world of RAT that have developed similar critical approaches in relation with the deattachment of research and theory that usually affects sociology –see Bourdieu *et al.* (1968) and, particularly, Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992)-.

similar view as they try to explain the detachment of theory and research, usually carrying most of responsibility upon the shoulders of the proponents of the so-called 'general theory', who would treat sociological theory as a sort of self-contained sub-discipline within sociology and not as a tool for explaining empirical regularities⁹. This critique is ironically synthesized by Hacking, who referred to this kind of theory as "not theory about something, just theory" (Hacking, 1999: 99). Moreover, it has been pointed out that the 'theoretical deviation' has a methodological counterpart, defined as "the propensity to separate the reflection on the methods from its actual use in the scientific work and to cultivate the method for its own sake" (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 28), forgetting, thus, Schutz's comments on methodology not as the tutor of the scientist but as "always its pupil" (Schutz, 1970: 315).

These two problems, the excessive independence of either theory or methodology, are still present in nowadays' sociology, as John Goldthorpe declares on the introduction to the second edition of his celebrated work, *On Sociology*; here, after summarizing the problem of the lack of integration between theory and research that affects the discipline, Goldthorpe wrote: "Writing now some six years later, I would see little reason for any major revision of this analysis of the condition of sociology" (Goldthorpe, 2006, p. 2).

Underlying these problems affecting sociological research, ultimately causing a lack of coordination between theory and research, is the shadow of relativism. It

⁹ Examples of these *general theorists* would be, according to Goldthorpe (2000a, p. 2), Alexander (1998) or Giddens (1984).

has been said that relativism can be divided into three kinds: *cognitive relativism*, *perceptual relativism*, and *epistemic relativism* (Goldthorpe, 2006: 1-27).

Cognitive relativism has been described as a consequence of the influence that postmodern philosophy has had on the social sciences during the last thirty years of the twentieth century (Outhwaite & Bottomore, 1993). It refers to the already commented notion of *scientific paradigm*, meaning a grid that establishes what can and what cannot be scientifically known in every epoch (Kuhn, 1962)¹⁰. According to this idea, science is a contextual enterprise unable to discover a pre-existent truth, as its social bonds will prevent it to do so¹¹. We find a similar conception,

¹⁰ It is worth saying that Kuhn has later distance himself from the strong assumptions of what he calls “the strong program”: “It is needed, that is, to defend notions like truth and knowledge from, for example, the excesses of post-modernist movements like the strong program” (Kuhn, 1990, p. 4). The critique to the so-called ‘strong program’ has been summarized by Hacking, who argued that substantive differences in the sciences should have been emerged, in the case of differences in the historical and social contexts in which these sciences emerged (Hacking, 1999).

¹¹ There is a similarity with Bourdieu’s ideas on science, commented above, in that he recognizes the social underpinnings of science that cognitive relativism uses in order to define science as intrinsically contextual, what endangers the scientific promise of revealing the true nature of reality. There is, however, a substantial difference that keeps Bourdieu aside from cognitive relativists, as he thinks that social science is possible through a process of scientific reflexivity that will make sociologists aware of the influences derived from the social anchorage of the science that they produce, enabling them to neutralize the effects of this social bond (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992); this process of scientific reflexivity is possible thanks to the socio-analysis and self-analysis by which the sociologist becomes aware of the way in which his or her social positioning is affecting his or her scientific production (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1968; Bourdieu, 1991). Bourdieu developed systematically this sociological analysis of oneself, needed to neutralize bias in research (Bourdieu, 2004).

perhaps more radical, in the Foucauldian notion of *épistémè* (Foucault, 1966; 1969), which we will discuss in-depth later.

Perceptual relativism has been summarized by Edward Sapir as follows: ‘The fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group’ (Sapir, 1929: 209). This refers to the idea that reality is *constructed* socially (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) or performed through speech acts –involving that different languages provide different versions of reality (Whorf, 1956; Sapir, 1984)–, undermining the idea of reality as a pre-existing objective set of facts. As Alex Callinicos has pointed out, twentieth-century thought was characterized by a “revolution in language”, which largely transformed philosophy and sociological theory, both in its postmodern and modern branches (Callinicos, 1999, p. 282)¹²; this *linguistic turn*, as Richard Rorty (1967) called it, has eventually lead to the notion of philosophical *deconstruction*, introduced by Jacques Derrida (1967) and developed later by other authors –see Butler (1990) for an application of deconstruction to the social category of gender–.

Finally, epistemic relativism is presented as the most radical of the aforementioned forms adopted by relativism, going down to the point of

¹² The modern branch is usually identified with those thinkers who, after the crisis of structuralism, and in particular of Althusserian Marxism in the 1970s, decided not to embrace the list of postmodern thinkers and to carry on the modern tradition –mainly Jürgen Habermas and Pierre Bourdieu-. The postmodern branch alluded relates to the explosion of post-structuralism, represented by authors such as Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida, whose thought has usually been defined as an evolution of Nietzsche’s *gegenaufklärung* (see, e.g., Callinicos, 1999, pp. 258-295). The encounter of these two traditions has created one of the most passionate intellectual debates of the last fifty years (see, e.g., Habermas, 1981; 1985; Derrida, 2006; Thomassen, 2006).

contextualizing the criteria of truth and logic, questioning, hence, the possibility of knowledge acquisition through science, what originated the so-called 'science wars' during the 1990s (Parsons, 2003). The contenders in these science wars were, on the one hand, postmodern philosophers and, on the other, a group of scientists led by Alan Sokal, the former rejecting the possibility of discovering an objective reality through the use of reason¹³, the latter defending this task¹⁴.

¹³ This idea appears in key poststructuralist thinkers, as Foucault: "Couldn't it be concluded that the promise of *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment), of attaining freedom through the exercise of reason, has been overturned within the domain of Reason itself, that is taking more and more space away from freedom?" (Foucault, 1981: 117). Also Derrida, in his famous quote: "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte" (Derrida, 1967: 158-159) ("There is nothing outside the text"). These views of scientific knowledge as pure discourse is stressed by Rorty, as well, when he says:

"Truth cannot be out there –cannot exist independently of the human mind- because sentences cannot exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own – unaided by the describing activities of human beings- cannot. The suggestion that truth, as well as the world, is out there is a legacy of an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being who had a language of his own" (Rorty, 1989: 5).

It has been indicated that the postmodern abandonment of science has its roots on Nietzsche –what gave way to one of its many critics, as Nietzsche's thoughts are rooted in the very modern 19th century (Callinicos, 1991)-, as in Habermas:

"Nietzsche's critique of modernity has been continued along both paths. The skeptical scholar who wants to unmask the perversion of the will to power, the revolt of reactionary forces, and the emergence of a subject-centered reason by using anthropological, psychological, and historical methods has successors in Bataille, Lacan, and Foucault; the initiate-critic of metaphysics who pretends to a unique kind of knowledge and pursues the rise of the philosophy of the subject back to its pre-Socratic beginnings has successors in Heidegger and Derrida" (Habermas, 1987: 97).

¹⁴ The book of Gross & Levitt (1994) was probably the first attempt to discredit postmodernist relativization of scientific knowledge made by practicing scientists. Two years later, Alan Sokal's publication in *Social Text* –an academic journal of postmodernist

Epistemic relativism has been also criticized from philosophy. Thus, John Searle has defended the notion of truth as a correspondence with facts (Searle, 1995), whereas Nagel has worked on the rehabilitation of reason as a valid, positive, category for understanding the world (Nagel, 1997). This task was shared also with Habermas (1984), who developed a critique equally applicable to postmodernists and to the dead-end to which the Frankfurt School had arrived during its latter years. This dead-end is identified with its despair on the role of reason as the key category for human progress, epitomized in the *Dialektik der Aufklärung*: 'Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology' (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002 [1947]: xviii), while, at the same time, 'Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment of the world. It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge' (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002 [1947]: 1).

This PhD thesis is draw on the tradition of critique to these three commented forms of relativism, being focused thereby on the recovery of truth and reason as valid ways through which objective knowledge can be achieved. Thus, aiming to produce true knowledge of the social world through the use of social science, we have defined the research question guiding this work as *Why people vote the way they do*. As this is the question that we want to respond at the end of this work, it follows that the first reasonable step in order to provide a scientific answer to it is to describe how people is actually voting.

orientation- of an article arguing that quantum gravity is a mere social construct (Sokal, 1996), largely discredited postmodernists' attitude towards science, as the article was just a fake, only charged with postmodern jargon (see also (Sokal & Bricmont, 1997).

1.2 How to proceed?

This work wants to contribute to our general understanding of how people decide what to do when a democratic political election takes place. It has been said that the academic literature on the topic of electoral behavior holds the title of being the widest within the very extensive tradition of political science as a discipline (Lago, 2005: 1) and it is our belief that this proliferation of studies in our selected area of research is double-edged. On the one, positive, hand we can celebrate that, certainly, we are not starting from scratch; on the other hand, however, it seems difficult to be able to make an original or relevant contribution to what may seem an exhausted field. Regarding this latter stance, we may counter pose that science is a never-ending task, defined by a continuous forward movement in which new research strengthens, modifies or, sometimes, entirely contradicts old approaches¹⁵.

The study of voting behavior has deep roots in Sociology (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944), Social Psychology (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) and Behavioral Economics (Downs, 1957). It has called the attention of social thinkers, however, since the time when the discipline was being founded –*vid. e.g.*, Siegfried, 2010[1913]–, and it has clear precedents in the Marxist theory of ideology and alienation (Marx and Engels, 1998[1846]; Marx, 1974[1844]). However these developments within Marxism were prematurely stopped probably, as happened

¹⁵ We are aware that this statement contradicts the Foucauldian notion of *épistémè* as the underlying concept that defines changes in scientific discourse. Meaning that every historical period is characterised by its own epistemological realm, which acts as a grill that defines what can be and what cannot be scientifically known, Foucault contradicts any possible evolutionist idea of science (Foucault, 1969; 1966). We are, however, pretty sure that our research will not initiate a new epistemological era in science and, thus, that we are operating under contemporary paradigms within the social sciences.

with the Marxist theorization on the national question, as a consequence of the events taking place at USSR after Stalin took power in 1922 (Haupt, Löwy and Weill, 1974). In a broader sense we can affirm, moreover, that the voting behavior research question, i.e., *why people vote the way they do*, has been occupying the research agenda of every generation of social thinkers since we have records. Thus, this question was at the core of the famous dispute between Socrates and Protagoras, narrated by Plato in his *Protagoras* dialogue (Plato, 2008[5th c. BC]); discussing if virtue can or cannot be taught, the dialogue goes on showing the difficulties to provide a clear definition of what virtue really is, and it eventually concludes that these matters are too complex to arrive to a final, definite, solution¹⁶. So, in a sense, Plato was anticipating the debates taking place in late 20th century, known as the ‘science wars’, validating Alfred Whitehead’s famous quotation: ‘The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’ (Whitehead, 1978: 39). We can affirm, hence, that there has always been an interest in providing a correct understanding of why people behave politically as they (we) do¹⁷.

¹⁶ Underlying the dialogue we can see the tension between the Sophists, who made a fortune teaching rhetoric to wealthy citizens and Plato’s critique of democracy. Plato’s critique of democracy is based on the idea that those wealthy citizens who can afford for the Sophists’ lessons have more chances to win a political election. Consequently democracy, for Plato, does not provide an adequate framework for the government of the experts, which would lead to common good (Plato, 2012[4th c. BC]: Book VI).

¹⁷ See Del Águila and Vallespín (1998) for a review of the classical tradition on the theory and critique of democracy, initiated in the Classical Greece. We can even trace back this line of thinking to classical Chinese philosophy, 6th century BCE, in Confucius’ political philosophy (Shihlien, 2005[1932]) or in the proto-libertarian ideas of Lao Tse (Kaltenmark, 1969).

We are basing our research on the tradition of scientific sociology, in which the role of theory is just to provide an explanation of the observed facts (Boudon, 2002). This is the role attributed to theory by the logic of scientific knowledge, typically since the times of rationalist philosophy, epitomized in Descartes' philosophy of the *cogito* (Descartes, 2000 [1637]) and in Galileo uses of reason and logic to study physical phenomena –*vid.* Hawking (1988; 2009) for a consideration on Galileo's role as the father of modern science–. This epistemology has, however, clear precedents in the philosophy of the so-called Muslim Golden Age (10th century AD), and particularly in the huge work of polymath Ibn al-Haytham, who often takes over Galileo's condition of 'father of science' –*vid.* Steffens (2006)–. Some recent intellectual fashions, namely postmodernism and the so-called 'general theory' (Goldthorpe, 2000: 2), affecting the social sciences in general and sociology in particular, have put into question this role of theory, due to different reasons (*vid. supra*). We are adhering the methodological critique to these currents (Goldthorpe, 2000; Noguera, 2006; Boudon, 2004) and, thus, bringing back theory to its traditional scientific role. As we have discussed these ideas above with greater detail, we only want now to restate our position, with just one aggregate. Sometimes this traditional role of theory is identified with the so-called "Weberian temptation" by some social scientists, particularly sympathizing with the Marxist tradition in the social sciences (Wright, 1989a, pp. 313-323). Thus Wright commented: "(...) Weberians have an easier time than Marxists in forming a concept of the middle class because in the Weberian tradition the concept of class structure is relieved of three theoretical burdens which must be contended with in one way or another within a Marxist framework (...)" (Wright, 1989a: 315). This has been an issue on the well-known debate on classes (Wright, 1989; 2005), in

which neo-Marxists counterpose their schema –we are referring to the last versions of the Wright schema, *vid.* Wright (1997), not to the initial ones in Wright (1978), later abandoned by Wright himself– to the neo-Weberian approach – Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) approach (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1979; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992)–. In this sense, neo-Marxists usually argue that one of the advantages of their schema, when compared to the neo-Weberian one, is that they depart from theory to create a coherent class schema, whereas neo-Weberians produce a more explanatory schema without starting from, or attaching to, any broader theoretical tradition. We argue that this dispute has more to be with the symbolic appropriation of an extremely politicized concept, such as social class by rival political ideologies –socialism, associated with Marxism, and liberalism, associated with the Weberian tradition–. What is probably happening here is that neo-Marxist social classes are designed not only to explain social mobility –as the EGP class schema does– but also to complete a general framework of capitalist functioning, from a critical point of view. Significantly enough, the main proponent of neo-Marxist class analysis, Erik Olin Wright, called in a recent article for an integration of both traditions, arguing that the main difference between both is Weberians’ denial to integrate the notions of exploitation and domination within their class schema (Wright, 2009). We can conclude, hence, that neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians are just talking about the same reality from different perspectives, the former going further than the latter as a consequence of embracing a far-reaching *normative* program. This is also suggested by the fact that in their later versions, Wright’s and Goldthorpe’s schemas are in fact very similar¹⁸.

¹⁸ I want to thank Dr García Docampo and Dr Pau Mari-Klose for having called my

Since the role of theory in science is just to provide an explanation of the trends observed and described through the rigorosity of the scientific methodology, and not an end in itself, we are going to proceed as follows. Firstly we will present some observations on how people are actually behaving when democratic elections are held. We have to state now the most important of our methodological limitations: there is no single exhaustive international database registering people's electoral behavior. As a consequence we have two possibilities. The first one would be to try to combine different election polls in order to build up an international comparative framework on electoral behavior. The problem with this option is that methodologies diverge from country to country and although there are some ongoing international attempts to build such a comprehensive database¹⁹, we are not yet on a stage that enables complex international hypothesis testing. Consequently we have chosen to develop comparative electoral

attention on this point.

¹⁹ It is particularly remarkable, in this regard, the leading role of the *ACE Project*, Electoral Knowledge Network (ACE, 2014). The ACE Project is a combined effort between different international organizations, including the following partners:

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)
- Elections Canada
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
- Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE-Mexico)
- United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC)
- The Carter Center

Although a great effort with many different results on the field of democracy promotion and electoral assistance, the ACE database does not yet include enough variables to test complex hypothesis on electoral behavior theory.

research within a highly reliable statistical framework. The case of Spain suits this condition, for two reasons:

1. The Spanish Center for Sociological Research (CIS) has been developing electoral research since its foundation in 1963. One of the leading areas of research at the CIS is, undoubtedly, elections. Particularly, the Spanish general elections.
2. According to Linz and Montero the multinational reality of Spain makes it a unique case in Western Europe, provided that we should speak of Spanish party systems, in plural (Linz & Montero, 2001: 152). We will argue that the Spanish case enables comparative research in terms of economic, cultural and political diversity.

In the end, if we believe in the possibility of developing social science, we should be able to unveil the laws determining people's electoral behavior with comparative data from a diverse country such as Spain. We may say that Newton did not need to see pears and oranges falling down, apart from apples, in order to build up his powerful theoretical framework²⁰.

Secondly, once we have observed the empirical trends defining people's electoral behavior, we will try to develop an explanation of these. For this task we will summarize the state of the art on the social sciences regarding electoral behavior. Our intention is to see if the existing theoretical knowledge can or cannot explain

²⁰ The anecdote of the apple hitting Newton's head, although widespread, seems to be apocryphal. As Hawking put it: "The story that Newton was inspired by an apple hitting his head is almost certainly apocryphal. All Newton himself ever said was that the idea of gravity came to him as he sat "in a contemplative mood" and "was occasioned by the fall of an apple" (Hawking, 1988: 5).

the patterns and regularities detected in people's electoral choices. We will summarize the achievements of theory in this regard and we will point out some of its weaknesses, too. Thus, we will see if the explanations provided are completely satisfactory or if, otherwise, they provide only partial explanations of the described voting patterns. If this were to be the case, we will hypothesize new theoretical developments in order to go beyond the boundaries of nowadays' sociology of electoral behavior. Finally we will try to test our hypothesis with the data at our disposal. If our research is successful we will improve our theoretical explanations on why people vote the way they do.

1.3 A comparative macrosociological analysis of electoral behavior

Now that we have made clear the importance for sociological research of establishing, in the first place, which are the social facts that we want to explain before trying to develop any theoretical explanation of them, we are going to describe our phenomenon, i.e., voting behavior in liberal democracies. Our purpose is to develop a thorough description of electoral behavior, which will uncover those empirical regularities which, thereafter, we will try to explain through the application of one or various existing sociological theories or, if necessary, through the application of newly developed theory with which to interpret our data.

The aim of our work is to provide a correct understanding of electoral behavior in liberal democracies. It remains clear that our work is, thus, not concerned with the explanation of any *national* or *regional* electoral behavior, being this British, American, Spanish, European, etc. The design of this research is inspired, thus, in comparative macrosociology, as our ultimate goal is to unveil the general laws determining people's electoral behavior, without being specifically concerned,

hence, with the detailed explanation of the results of a given particular election. Together with Goldthorpe (2000b), we think that the explanation of national differences relies on the particular combination of social variables that takes place within the administrative limits of the nation, and not on any immeasurable *essence*, only to be grasped with the poetic lens instead of the sociological ones²¹.

Since we do not have yet complete global databases registering cross-national electoral information²², it is necessary to select the frame from which we will take our variables. We have decided to base our study on data from Spain, due mainly to two reasons. In the first place it enables us to develop a detailed analysis of two relevant variables in the explanation of electoral behavior: social class (Evans & De Graaf, 2013; Evans, 1999) and national identity (Bieber & Wolff, 2005; Brown, 2005), together with other common variables generally spread throughout the globe, such as leadership or ideology²³. While these two latter variables are present virtually in every modern democracy –together with party identification, economic preferences, etc.– that is not the case of national identity, making Spain a good framework for addressing comprehensively our much general research question, *i.e.*, why people vote the way they do. Spain is also a good case to measure the impact of social class on electoral behavior, as it is quite an unequal

²¹ Primordialist theories on the origin of nations, based on Herder's idea of *volksgeist* (Dover, 1952), once widely spread, are now generally discredited (Özkirimli, 2010). *Vid., e.g.*, Siegfried (1950).

²² Attempts, however, have been made in this line; see Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf (1999). The work of the ACE Project is very remarkable on this aspect (ACE, 2014). Its electoral database, however, does not enable yet the conduction of wide behavioral research, as the number of variables included is still very limited.

²³ According to Torcal & Chhibber (1995: 7) leadership and ideology are, together with national identity, the main variables to explain electoral behavior in Spain.

society in terms of income distribution, *vide infra*. Although the relevance of social class as an explanatory variable of electoral behavior has been questioned –mainly during the 1990s (Clark, Lipset, & Rempel, 1993; Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 1992)– it has more recently been reassessed, with promising results suggesting a more complex class voting pattern than originally expected (Evans, 1999; Evans & De Graaf, 2013). In addition, we have to say that the work of the CIS –Spanish Center of Sociological Research– since its foundation in 1963 –initially as ‘Institute of Public Opinion’– provides us high quality comparative quantitative data, what strengthens the methodological dimension of our research. We will now comment briefly the pertinence of Spain as a case where to study the relationship between electoral behavior and the two aforementioned variables, national identity and social class, in order to justify the selection of Spain as the framework of our research. The other big cleavage delimiting what Brooks *et alii* have defined as “recent debates” in the study of electoral behavior is the religious one (Brooks, Manza, & Bolzendahl, 2003), and it is also present in Spanish politics with the enough strength to allow its assessment and analysis (Cordero, 2014; Orriols, 2013). As we stated above, the rest of the general variables assumed by current theory as relevant for the analysis of electoral behavior, are of a general kind and, hence, we can count with their presence within the limits of the Spanish case –*vid.* Bartels (2010) or Antunes (2010) for a good synthesis of these variables–.

1.3.1 Some brief commentaries on the economic unevenness and the national question in Spain

In this section we are going to analyze the uneven nature of Spain regarding these two fundamental variables: economic and cultural variations. The idea behind this analysis is to see if the observation of electoral trends in Spain will enable us to

draw some conclusions regarding two structural variables that undeniably have a strong effect on people's political behavior, attending to well-established theoretical works –we are referring to cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), that we will describe with more depth later on, in our chapter on theory–.


1.3.1.1 Economic unevenness

As Linz and Moreno stated in a classic text, “the multinational, multicultural and *asymmetric* federal state makes Spain quite unique in Western Europe” (Linz & Montero, 2001: 152). This means that within Spain we have enough variation to be able to examine different relevant topics that are general in the modern study of electoral behavior, such as class structure and nationalism. Indeed, within Spain we can analyze the cases of Catalonia and of the Basque Country that, together with Galicia, conform the so-called *historical nationalities*, a term present in the Spanish Constitution and in the different Statutes of Autonomy of those three Autonomous Communities (Requejo, 2001; Moreno, 2002; Aja, 2001; Aja, 1999: 53-54). The usage of data from Spain will also give us analytical advantages in relation with the measurement of class voting, as it offers enough variability to enable such an analysis. At the end of Franco's dictatorship, Professor Juan J. Linz already described Spain as a “slightly and unevenly developed” country (Linz, 1967: 41-46). This “unevenness” diagnosed by Linz in the 60s was to be an enduring feature of Spanish society, as we can deduce from the data presented in Table I. This table shows the Gini coefficient for each of the current 34 members of the OECD, calculated as the arithmetic mean of the available data since the 1974 to

2011²⁴. Here Spain occupies the third from last position of the third quartile, what indicates that Spain is amongst the OECD countries with the higher levels of inequality, rendering Spain as a country with enough internal variability in terms of income distribution to conform a good study case of class voting. In order to understand our data we are going to explain during the next sub-section how the Gini coefficient is calculated.

²⁴ Not all countries have the same data, oscillating from the case of Canada, with 35 points in the time series to that of Switzerland, with just one point. In the Annexes we have presented the full data (Table IA).

Table I. Gini index at disposable income, post taxes and transfers for the OECD countries. Mean values from the available data over the period 1974-2011



Source: Elaborated by the author from data of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2014), see Table IA in the Annexes.

The Lorenz Curve and the Gini coefficient

In 1912 the Italian sociologist Corrado Gini published a book (Gini, 1912) where he developed thirteen different formulations of an index to measure statistical variability. What is today known as the *Gini coefficient* is an index based on those first developments by Corrado Gini, but improved and refined by generations of statisticians (Ceriani and Verme, 2012); it is often used as a measure for income inequality by organisms such as the OECD or the United Nations (OECD, 2014; UNDP, 2014).

The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve, that 'plots the percentage of total income earned by various portions of the population when the population is ordered by the size of their incomes' (Gastwirth, 1971, p. 1037). According to this standard definition of the Lorenz curve, it is possible to expose it with two equations (Kendall & Stuart, 1969, p. 48); given that x is the salary of one of the members of the population being studied, then $F(x)$ refers to the proportion of that population receiving salaries equal to or less than x , so

$$p = F(x) = \int_0^x f(t)dt,$$

whereupon

$$L(p) = \phi(x) = \frac{1}{\mu} \int_0^x tf(t)dt$$


Thereby, given the following distribution representing a fictional country called Lorenzland with a population of ten individuals shown in Table II, we will obtain a Lorenz curve as represented in Figure 1.

Table II. Income distribution among the population of *Lorenzland*

Population				
Individual	Income (x)	F(x) (Cumulative percentage)	Income (Percentage)	Income (Cumulative percentage)
1	2,000 €	10,00 %	0,48 %	0,48 %
2	5,000 €	20,00 %	1,20 %	1,69 %
3	8,000 €	30,00 %	1,93 %	3,61 %
4	10,000 €	40,00 %	2,41 %	6,02 %
5	20,000 €	50,00 %	4,82 %	10,84 %
6	30,000 €	60,00 %	7,23 %	18,07 %
7	40,000 €	70,00 %	9,64 %	27,71 %
8	80,000 €	80,00 %	19,28 %	46,99 %
9	100,000 €	90,00 %	24,10 %	71,08 %
10	120,000 €	100,00 %	28,92 %	100,00 %
Total	415,000 €			

Thus, the “line of equality” -where $y = x$ - would represent a perfect income distribution, involving that everybody in our fictional country, Lorenzland, would earn exactly the same salary. As this is not the case, since individual number 10 earns 120,000 € whereas individual number 1 earns only 2,000€, we have a Lorenz curve notably deviated from the line of equality. According to the Lorenz curve in Figure 1 we can say that more or less the 50% of the population of Lorenzland earns less than 10% of the wealth that the country has; we can also say


that the richest 20% of the population in Lorenzland accumulates more than 50% of the country's wealth. Lorenzland would certainly be an unequal society.



The Gini coefficient is commented by Jenkins as one of the most commonly used indexes to measure inequality, comparing it with the Theil index, arguing that: “The Theil index is less “bottom-sensitive” than all members of the Atkinson family, while the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to transfers in the most densely populated part of the distribution (around the mode)” (Jenkins, 1991: 7). It is also commented in Atkinson as a highly used index to measure inequality: “The measures most commonly used in empirical work include the following: (a) the variance, V^2 ; (b) the coefficient of variation, V/μ ; (c) the relative mean deviation, $\int_0^{\bar{y}} |y/\mu - 1|f(y)dy$; (d) the Gini coefficient, $1/2\mu \int_0^{\bar{y}} [yF(y) - \mu\phi(y)] f(y) dy$; the standard deviation of logarithms, $\int_0^{\bar{y}} [\log y/\mu]^2 f(y)dy$.” (Atkinson, 1970, p. 252). The Gini index is perhaps more clearly explained in Ayala, *et al.* (1996, p. 428), as:

$$G = [1/(2n^2Y_m)] \sum_i n \sum_j n \text{abs}(y_i - y_j)$$

In this equation, y represents the income associated to every individual of a country's population, represented by i , thereby y_i relates to the income (y) of an individual (i), being $i = 1 \dots n$. Thus, Y_m represents the average income of the population, usually represented as \bar{y} . It is a way for representing the division of area A –the space between the Lorenz curve and the line of equality– by area B –the space under the Lorenz curve– plus area A . Thus the Gini index could also be represented graphically as $A/(A + B)$, in Figure 2. As the total area of our figure equals 1 (given that we will normalize its sides to the unit), then $A + B$ will equal, at most, 0.5 and this is the reason why the Gini index can be also represented simply as $2 \times A$ –the Gini coefficient will give as a number between 0 and 1, meaning 0 perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality–.



In our fictional distribution for Lorenzland (exposed above, in Table 2), $\sum_i n \sum_j n \text{abs}(y_i - y_j)$ equals 4,374,000 (see Table II in the Annexes). The total population, represented by n , equals 10 in our fictional case and the mean salary equals 41,500€ (415,000/10 people). Therefore, the Gini coefficient for Lorenzland is 0.527, as seen in the following applied equation:

$$G = \left[\frac{1}{2 \times 10^2 \times 41,500} \right] \times 4,374,000 = 0.527$$

1.3.1.2 The national question

Much has been written on the effect played by national identity on Spanish electoral behavior (Serrano, 2013; Hernández, 1994; Montabes & Fernández-Llébrez, 1994; Llera, 1994; Pallarés & Font, 1994; Pallarés, 2000). As we will dedicate a full chapter to the analysis of this complex relationship, it is our only intention now to provide some empirical evidences of the important role that national identity plays in the electoral behavior in Spain. In order to do this, we will show the relevance that the so-called ‘peripheral’ national identities (*vid., e.g.,* Pérez-Agote, 2008) play in those Autonomous Communities with relevant presence of nationalist political parties. This will only be a first approximation to the complex study of the bond that links nationalism and voting behavior, as we will dedicate a whole in-depth chapter to it, deploying multivariate statistical techniques in order to fully unveil this bond.

There are two remarkable cases of wide support to nationalist political parties in Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country. We take as a starting point 1980, once the restoration of democracy was completed, the Spanish constitution of 1978 was in full force and the processes of administrative devolution were being implemented. In the thirty-four years between 1980 and 2014, the Catalan

government was directed by the nationalist party *Convergència i Unió* during twenty-seven years, that is all the legislatures with two exceptions: the 7th (2003-2006) and the 8th (2006-2010) legislatures; the Catalan government during this period was a tripartite between three left-wing Catalanist forces –*Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) and *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds* (ICV)- being one of them, ERC, pro-independence. In the case of the Basque Country, its government since 1980 was always in the hands of the Basque Nationalist Party, *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV), with only one exception: the 9th legislature between 2009 and 2012, when a pact between the *Partido Socialista de Euskadi* (PSE), the *Popular Party* (PP) and *Unión, Progreso y Democracia* (UPyD), enabled the PSE to govern during that time –being this possible due to the illegalization of a wide pro-independence left-wing sector–.

Taking as a reference the ‘Autonomic Barometers’, elaborated by the *Spanish Centre for Sociological Research* (CIS) we can say that there are notable deviations regarding the national identification of respondents in the aforementioned two Autonomous Communities. The Autonomic Barometers are surveys based on statewide representative samples, enabling statistical representation for each of the seventeenth Autonomous Communities in which the Spanish State is divided. Up to the present day the CIS has elaborated three Autonomic Barometers. The first one of them was conducted in 2005, the second one in 2010, and the last one in 2012. In order to measure these differences on national identity we have devised an *index of peripheral nationalism*:

$$I_{pnat} = 100 * pn/sn$$

being pn the number of people ascribing themselves to peripheral national identity and sn the number of people identifying themselves with a state-wide national identity. The so-called *Moreno Question*²⁵ enables us to quantify these feelings of national belonging, as it offers five possible categories to answer the question ‘Do you see yourself as...’:

1/ [sub-state identity] only.

2/ More [sub-state identity] than [state-wide identity].

3/ Equally [sub-state identity] and [state-wide identity].

4/ More [state-wide identity] than [sub-state identity].

5/ [state-wide identity] only.

In order to better quantify the index of peripheral nationalism, we have equated pn to “[sub-state identity] only” and sn to “[state-wide identity] only”. As the statistical sample of the three Autonomic Barometers applies only to Spaniards who are 18 year old or older, we have to limit the conclusions of our index to that full age group. The last methodological commentary concerning the elaboration of the index of peripheral nationalism refers to the fact that, obviously, the information provided by the CIS’ surveys is given in percentages that we have converted into an actual number of citizens ascribed to sub-state and state-wide identities; for that purpose, we have taken into account the official population figures published by the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE) for each one of

²⁵ We will engage critically with the available measures of national identity, particularly the “Moreno Question”, in our chapter devoted to the relationship between national identity and electoral behavior. The index of nationalism, however, offers a straightforward intuitive measure of the strength that peripheral nationalisms have in a given society.

the years when the surveys were conducted. Hence, for July the 1st 2012, the INE reports that there were 38,403,105 Spaniards 18 years old or older; for July, 1st 2010, 38,284,909 Spaniards 18 year old or older were counted and, finally, 35,999,010 18 year old or older Spaniards were registered in July, 1st 2005 (INE, 2014). We can now calculate the index of peripheral nationalism from the data provided by the Autonomic Barometers, registering Table III the result of this operation.

Table III. Index of peripheral nationalism for Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country

	2005	2010	2012
Spain (Total)	48.54	41.44	58.25
Catalonia	185.71	165.85	384.21
Basque Country	433.93	551.16	734.38

Source: Elaborated by the author with data from CIS *Autonomic Barometers* I, II and III (studies no. 2,610, 2,829 and 2,956, respectively). Population figures are taken from the official INE reports (INE, 2014).

Thus, we see that in 2012 there was a ratio in Spain of 58.25 peripheral nationalists to 100 statewide nationalists. This same ratio was, in Catalonia, of 384.21 peripheral nationalists to 100 statewide nationalists and, in the Basque Country, rose to 734.38 peripheral nationalists to 100 statewide nationalists in Spain for that year.

Of course, this simple information does not provide any accurate measurement on the impact of national identity on people's electoral behavior, but it certainly offers some intuitive information showing that something is probably happening in that direction. As we have already said, we will examine such relationship later on, in a

chapter that discusses specifically this linkage, but we have positively exposed that Spain is a good case study to learn about the association between nationalism and voting behavior, being this modest objective our only one for now.

2 Spatial analysis of the electoral behavior in Spain

Once we have justified the selection of Spain as a case study for our research, as it gathers enough internal variability in some key explanatory variables of electoral behavior, it is time to start to find out those empirical regularities that will be explained by theory later on. During this section we are going to present a descriptive analysis of Spanish electoral behavior. We have elaborated a data file with the electoral behavior in the Spanish general elections since democracy was restored after Franco dictatorship; this means that we will be working with data from the eleven general elections initiated in 1977:

- June, the 15th 1977
- March, the 1st 1979
- October, the 28th 1982
- June, the 22nd 1986
- October, the 29th 1989
- June, the 6th 1993
- March, the 3rd 1996
- March, the 12th 2000
- March, the 14th 2004
- March, the 9th 2008
- November, the 20th 2011

2.1 Aggregation of parties and coalitions and its location in the political space

In order to build this file we have taken our data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior (Ministry of Interior of Spain, 2013). The file contains the results of Spanish general elections for the democratic period since the restoration of democracy after the fall of Franco's regime, *i.e.*, since the general elections of 1977 to the general elections of 2011. Each case of our file corresponds to each one of the municipalities of Spain²⁶. In parallel with the debugging of this electoral file, we have created six different categories to summarize the vote for the different

²⁶ According to the official data of the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations for March 2014, in Spain there are 8,126 municipalities (MinisterioHacienda, 2014). During the last 37 years there have been many changes involving the merging and divisions of some of the Spanish municipalities. We have debugged our data in order to enable comparison throughout the year, producing a file with 8,119 municipalities. This was a long process, as each elections' voting percentages must be calculated in relation with the existing municipalities of that time. In order to enable comparison we needed to melt municipalities that were not separated until recently in the files of the first general elections. There are, as well, some municipalities where no votes were casted in the first elections of 1977; in these cases we have substituted the "0" of the data file for "no information". Thereby, we are merging the data of old, now extinguished, municipalities into new municipalities, according to the process of municipal restructuring developed in Spain during the last 37 years; this merging will enable comparison of electoral data across elections. All these necessary changes are fully explained in the Annexes with greater detail (see Tables IIIa, IIIb, IIIc, III d, IIIe). We have to say, however, that this file was readapted to the general classification of the municipalities offered by the National Institute of Statistics of Spain (INE) and, where appropriate, by the National Geographic Institute of Spain (IGN), with the objective of representing spatially our electoral data. Due to the fact that this last operation would be too drastic if we integrated those records corresponding to the oldest general elections, we have decided to work, concerning the spatial analysis, with a reduced electoral data file which comprises the five last general elections, from 1996 to 2011, both included.

electoral options apart from the two main ones, *i.e.*, apart from the *Partido Popular* (PP) and the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE)²⁷. These categories are:

1. Other right-wing parties
2. Other left-wing parties
3. Nationalist (non-Spanish national) right-wing parties
4. Nationalist (non-Spanish national) left-wing parties
5. Green parties
6. Others

This classification has been done according to the different CIS' Time Series on ideological location of political parties²⁸. In the questions from which these Time Series are built, respondents are asked to locate different political parties in a scale from 1 to 10, being 1 "extreme left" and 10 "extreme right"²⁹. We have combined these ideological series –measuring left/right ideology– with their nationalism counterpart; according to González (2004, p. 119) these are the two axis around which the Spanish party system was established, *i.e.*, the left/right axis and the axis associated to the so-called peripheral nationalisms that, according to Giner & Moreno (1990) –see also Linz and Montero (2001, pp. 180-193)– have produced a

²⁷ *Partido Popular*, in English "Popular Party", known as *Alianza Popular* (*Popular Alliance*) until 1989, is the main right-wing party in Spain (Verge, 2007, pp. 56-62). The *Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, in English *Spanish Socialist Workers' Party*, is the main left-wing party in Spain (Verge, 2007, pp. 48-55).

²⁸ The "Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas", *Centre for Sociological Research* (CIS) is a Spanish official institute for sociological research, dependant on the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency.

²⁹ The sample is representative of Spain's total, state-wide, population for the parties with presence in every Autonomous Community (AC). In those political parties with a limited presence to an specific AC, the sample is representative of that AC.


centre/periphery contradiction, in line with the classic model enunciated by Lipset & Rokkan as a “conflict between *the central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically and religious *subject population* in the provinces and peripheries” (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 14; emphasis in the original). If, as suggested by Billig (1993; 1995), we were to treat nationalism as an ideology, we should measure not only the degree of “peripheral” nationalisms in Spain, but also the statewide Spanish nationalism –in line with the recent work of Spanish scholars, such as Muñoz Mendoza (2012)–. The Time Series at the CIS, however, give us only a measure of the degree of peripheral –Basque, Catalan, Galician...– nationalism of the different political parties; there is no Time Series measuring the degree of Spanish nationalism, neither a scale from 1 to 10 in which 1 where a given peripheral nationalism and 10 Spanish nationalism. The result is that CIS’ Time Series are only available for the Autonomous Communities (ACs) of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia; given that this is the only information at our disposal, we have calculated the arithmetic mean combining these three ACs for those political parties with statewide presence, such as the PP, the PSOE, or IU³⁰. Figure 3 presents the distribution in the political space of all the political parties of which the CIS has a Time Series for both of the aforementioned

³⁰ Formally, in Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country, we do not have the same political parties, but autonomous branches. For example, the PSOE is not present as such in those three ACs, being the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC) –Party of the Catalan Socialists– in Catalonia, the *Partido Socialista de Euskadi* (PSE) –Socialist Party of the Basque Country, presented in coalition with Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Left) since 1993– in the Basque Country, and the *Partido dos Socialistas de Galicia-Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSdeG-PSOE) –Party of the Socialists of Galicia-Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party– with a Galician national internal structure (PSdeG-PSOE, 2014), in Galicia.

axis³¹; we have merged the data of the *Popular Alliance* (AP) and the *Popular Party* (PP), as the former was the historical antecedent of the latter –“AP” became “PP” in 1989–, following the mainstream methodology in Spanish political science –see, *e.g.*, Orriols (2013)–.

³¹ In order to produce a Time Series, the CIS must have, at least, five points of the same question.

Figure 3. Ideological location of the main Spanish political parties included in CIS' time series for both axes



Source: Elaborated by the author. Data from the CIS' Time Series on ideological location of political parties (see Table IV of the Annexes).

In the case of those political parties or coalitions for which we do not have time series for both ideological axis –left/right axis and nationalist axis– we have proceeded as follows when it comes to integrate them in one of our six analytical categories. In the first place we used the time series available in one of the two commented axis, for the location on that axis. Secondly, we used particular locations, not constitutive of time series, from several CIS' studies (barometers, electoral studies, etc.). In the case of lacking any reliable statistical indicator for the location of a party or coalition in one of the two cited ideological axes, we followed a more 'objectivist' strategy, by making use of the content analysis of the different party manifestos³², or through the analysis of the archive, of press and other media that have made explicit reference to the ideological position with which the different parties or coalitions present themselves publicly –and not with regard to the interpretations or classifications that subjectively could have made any other particular media–. In order to facilitate reading and following the principle of simplicity, we decided not to plot each and every one of our classifying processes, as the procedure is similar to the one shown on Figure 3, because regardless of the sources used, the result has always been the location of each party or coalition in a political space defined by the two axes shaping that plot.

2.2 The territorialization of the vote in Spain

Once we have disclosed the methodology in which we base our analysis, we are going to present the results obtained. A first spatial analysis of the voting behavior of the Spanish population refers to the spatial distribution of the vote. The most widespread statistic synthesizing this information is Moran's *I*, which measures

³² We have consulted, with regard to this point, the database 'Manifiesto Project' (2014), funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation).

the spatial autocorrelation of a variable, so that a perfect dispersion of a variable X in space would correspond to an $I = -1$, whereas a total concentration in space of that same variable will make up an $I = +1$. Thus, in the absence of any spatial autocorrelation, in the sense of a total dispersion or concentration of the X variable, Moran's I will equal value 0; LISA indicators are derived from this statistic³³.

³³ While the initial article by Moran (1950) defines the basis of the statistic that bears his name, the Moran's I statistic, as we know it and use it today, was not developed until twenty years had passed since his early work of 1950, as Li, Calder and Cressie (2007, p. 359) have pointed out. This statistic was first defined by Moran as

$$I \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_{ij} Z_i Z_j}{\sum_{i=1}^n Z_i^2}$$

for any independent variable $n\{X_i: i = 1, \dots, n\}$ in spatial locations $\delta\{s_i: i = 1, \dots, n\}$, taking δ_{ij} as a measure for adjacency, being $\delta_{ij} = 1$ if the i th and j th positions are adjacent and $\delta_{ij} = 0$ in the case that they are not. In order to eliminate the cumulative effects on large datasets, showing only the absolute changes in the values of the variable in question, and assuming a constant mean in the observations, it is defined $Z_i = X_i - \bar{X}$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$. From this initial work, Cliff & Ord (1981) developed a statistic capable of measuring the spatial dependence from the residues of a linear regression model, emulating the popular Durbin-Watson test; this statistic, called Moran's I , was defined as

$$I \equiv \frac{Z'WZ}{Z'Z}$$

where W represents the spatial neighbourhood matrix –*vid.* Li, Calder & Cressie (2007, p. 359ff)–. For an assumption of inhomogeneity in the sample –applicable to those more frequent cases in which there is no global spatial correlation– the LISA indicators have been developed, acronym for “Local Indicators of Spatial Association”, enabling the calculation of a global Moran's I for each local spatial unity I_i , so

$$I \equiv \sum_i \frac{I_i}{N}$$

where the global Moran's I is calculated taking into account the measure of local autocorrelation I_i , being m_2 constant for every locations,

2.2.1 The territorialization for the left/right axis

In order to determine the spatial patterns in the voting behavior of the Spanish citizenry in relation to the already commented left/right axis, we have introduced a novelty in our methodology. Following the argument given by Linz and Montero when commenting

“(…) This chapter will focus on Spanish party *systems* rather than *a* party system: the multinational, multicultural and *asymmetric* federal state makes Spain quite unique in Western Europe”. (Linz & Montero, 2001, p. 152; emphasis in the original)

we have decided to add the already mentioned categories ‘PSOE’, ‘other leftist political parties’, and ‘peripheral nationalist leftist parties’, doing the same for the right-wing parties, putting together the categories ‘PP’, ‘other right-wing parties’, and ‘peripheral nationalist right-wing parties’. Otherwise, every general spatial analysis for the entire State that seeks to measure variations on the left/right scale would be distorted by the evident spatial concentration presented by either left wing or right-wing peripheral nationalist parties. We need to clarify, too, that our analysis were performed taking into account the vote for electoral lists with reference to the electoral census and not to valid vote, because our intention is to determine the spatial variations in voting behavior of the citizenry and not the voting variations to political parties or coalitions. While working with electoral results and not with survey data provides the advantage of eliminating the


$$I_i = (z_i/m_2) \sum_j w_{ij}z_j$$

of every spatial unity included in the analysis, the entirety of which is represented by N (Anselin, 1995, p. 99).

statistical error that characterizes every survey, it also shows the difficulty of not being able to link abstention to a given direction of the left/right axis. We present below the analysis corresponding to the 'left' of the left/right axis.


Figure 4 consists of two axes, with its values standardized so that the units correspond to standard deviations calculated from the variance of the variable 'left-wing vote' (LV). While the x axis consists of the values presented by the municipalities according to their distance or proximity with regard to the arithmetic mean calculated for the variable 'LV', the y axis accounts for the simple average of those same values in the neighboring municipalities (spatial lag).

Figure 4. Moran's scatter plot for the variable 'left-wing vote' (LV)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Figure 5. Box plot for the variable 'left-wing vote' (LV)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

We note that Moran's I presents a positive value of 0.532938, pointing to the existence of a spatial concentration pattern for those municipalities presenting either high or low relative values of voting for leftist political parties or coalitions. Thus, the cases included in Quadrant I of Figure 4 represent those municipalities characterized by a high level of left-wing voting which are surrounded by municipalities presenting the same trend, corresponding to the cases exceeding the median value in the box plot that is presented in Figure 5. Quadrant II cases correspond to municipalities with low support for leftist candidates surrounded by other municipalities with high support for that option, while Quadrant III cases represent municipalities with low support to left-wing parties or coalitions surrounded by municipalities presenting an identical trend.

In order to ensure the validity of these results, and given that the size of our data file is large enough, as it includes every Spanish municipality, we have increased the randomization of the data to 999 permutations for the calculation of Moran's I ; the calculation of this statistic was therefore conducted generating a reference distribution of itself from 999 random permutations. In a second step we calculated a pseudo significance level, used to evaluate the statistical significance of the distribution. Wanting to be strict about the validity of our results, we have implemented a strict cut value ($p = 0,01$), turning very difficult the replication of our results under the null hypothesis, for which there would be no relationship at all between the two phenomena included in our analysis, i.e., the formation of spatial clusters defined by the level of vote to the left of a municipality X and its neighbor municipalities $S(x)$. Thus, the probability that these spatial clusters were reproduced identically in the same way exposed in Figure 4 rises to 99% of the times that we repeat our analysis, inviting to reject the null hypothesis. Finally, it is

worth saying that in the creation of the file of spatial weighting, used to calculate the neighbourhood matrix needed to perform the calculation of Moran's I , we used a 'rook' criterion of contiguity, which in some cases allowed left aside those neighbours which do not have total shared boundaries. We are presenting, thus, a conservative methodology, which ensures the statistical robustness of the results of our analysis. This methodology will be replicated for the rest of the analysis presented in this chapter, so we will not reiterate its details.

Finally, Figure 6 shows, over the Spanish municipal map, the different spatial clusters based on the vote for the left, whose calculation was introduced in Figure 4. We can now see the location in space of these clusters and it seems clear that there is a clear pattern that affects their territorial distribution. There is a large spatial cluster which occupies most of the southern half of the country (municipalities presenting high rates of left-wing voting surrounded by others with the same trend). This cluster initiates in the North in the province of Cáceres (municipalities of Jerte, Cabezuela del Valle, Cerezo and Casar de Palomero), extends South through the Autonomous Community (AC) of Extremadura (with the notable exception of its two provincial capitals, Cáceres and Badajoz which, being contiguous, make up a high-low cluster) and occupies almost entirely the AC of Andalusia (with few exceptions, being important the low-high clusters that make up the municipalities of La Palma del Condado and Sanlúcar de Guadiana in the province of Huelva, the municipality of Carataunas in the province of Granada, and the municipalities of Beires, Paterna del Río and Santa Cruz de Marchena, in the province of Almería). This large cluster of the South is broken, to a large extent, by the AC of the Region of Murcia, although this AC does not present a well-defined pattern of spatial voting. Apart from this great southern cluster, no major clusters

of municipalities with a high vote for the left neighbouring with municipalities presenting the same pattern are registered, although we find some exceptions. Thus, we see several 'high-high' clusters around the mining towns of Mieres, Laviana and Morcín in the AC of Asturias, as in Páramo del Sil, in the Bierzo region, province of León. To the East, we see the "high-high" clusters of Alcalá de Ebro, Cariñena, Luceni, Sástago and Cosuenda, all of them belonging to the province of Zaragoza. Also the municipalities of El Masroig and Falset, both in Tarragona, and Salas Altas, in Huesca complete the "high-high" clusters of left voting in the northern half of the peninsula. Finally, it is worth to signal the "high-high" concentrations observed in the provinces of Castellón (Almedíjar, Azuébar and Chóvar), Valencia (Camporrobles and Sagunto), Cuenca (Belmonte), Madrid (Villarejo de Salvanes) and Toledo (Villamuelas).

It is also noteworthy the presence, in Figure 6, of several spatial clusters of municipalities with a small percentage of electoral support for left-wing candidates. These groups have a greater spatial dispersion than those, already mentioned, with a high electoral support for the left. We note, however, some characteristics that define these groups, starting with its most northerly location. With the exception of the "low-low" cluster, more central, located between the provinces of Salamanca (municipalities of Valverde de Valdecasa, El Tejado, Sorihuela, Horcajo de Montemayor, Gallegos de Solmirón, Escorial de la Sierra, Colmenar de Montemayor), Ávila³⁴, Segovia and Guadalajara, the rest of the


³⁴ We put here the reference to those Ávila municipalities which are part of this cluster, as they are high in number and will, therefore, difficult the reading if they were included in the main text. We have to indicate that we will only mention those municipalities belonging to the South of the province, as the rest does not alter the nature of the northern

clusters are located to the North of the peninsula (provinces of Álava, Barcelona, Burgos, Girona, León, Lleida, Navarra, Ourense, Palencia, Cantabria, Soria, Teruel, Valladolid, Vizcaya, Zamora and Zaragoza). We finally refer to groups with low support on the left present in the Canary Islands, particularly in the provinces of Santa Cruz de Tenerife (cities of El Paso and El Rosario) and Las Palmas (municipalities of Agüimes, San Bartolomé de Tirajana, Santa Brígida, Tinajo, Valsequillo de Gran Canaria and Vega de San Mateo).

clusters with low support on the left. These are: Santiago del Tormes, San Juan de Gredos, Villatoro, Villanueva del Campillo, Villafranca de la Sierra, Vadillo de la Sierra, Umbrías, Santiago del Collado, Santa María de los Caballeros, Santa María del Berrocal, San Martín de la Vega del Alberche, San Lorenzo de Tormes, San Juan del Molinillo, Puerto Castilla, Piedrahíta, Navatejares, Navatalgordo, Navarredondilla, Navaquesera, Navalperal de Tormes, Navalacruz, Navaescorial, Navadijos, Nava del Barco, Navacepedilla de Corneja, Narrillos del Álamo, El Mirón, Mesegar de Corneja, Malpartida de Corneja, Los Llanos del Tormes, Hoyos del Espino, Hoyorredondo, Hoyocasero, La Horcajada, Cepeda la Mora, Casas del Puerto, Bonilla de la Sierra, Becedillas, Becedas, El Barco de Ávila and La Aldehuela.

Figure 6. LISA cluster map for the variable 'voting for left-wing parties or coalitions' (LV)

(Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)




Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior (See Figure 1A in the Annexes for the significance map).

We will now proceed to present the same spatial analysis for the variable ‘voting for right-wing parties or coalitions’ (RV), again calculated over the electoral census. Since the methodology that we will follow here is identical to that used with the previous variable, ‘voting for leftist parties and coalitions’, we will avoid delving back into its details. Thus, Figure 7 shows the distribution of the variable RV; here we observe that the Moran’s *I* statistic for this variable is slightly higher than that calculated for left-wing voting, what indicates a trend towards the spatial concentration of right-wing voting. Again, those municipalities included in Quadrant I of the scatter plot are the same ones that exceed the median value in the box plot shown in Figure 8.

Figure 9 shows the presence of a large cluster of municipalities with a high proportion of voting for right-wing options in the centre-North area of the peninsula, occupying a space that finds its North-Eastern boundary in the province of Álava (municipalities of Kripan, Bilar, Laguardia, Lantziego and Lekora) and goes through Ávila, Burgos, Cuenca, Guadalajara, León, La Rioja, Madrid, Palencia, Salamanca, Cantabria, Segovia, Soria, Teruel, Valladolid and Zamora. To the East, the cluster finds its boundaries in the province of Castellón, and to the Southeast in the province of Murcia. Concentrations of municipalities with low electoral support on the right are presented in three groups; one on the Northeast of the peninsula, another Northwest –without reaching Galicia– and the last one located in the South. The first one includes the provinces of Álava (municipality of Aramayona), Barcelona, Guipuzkoa, Huesca, Zaragoza and Navarra. The second one includes some municipalities of Northwestern León (mainly the Bierzo) and Asturias, while the third one occupies almost the entirety of the AC of Andalusia and some municipalities of Extremadura.


We can, thus, conclude that there are two main spatial clusters that polarize Spanish electoral behavior in the left-right axis. There is one right-wing cluster in the centre-North of the peninsula, and one left-wing cluster in the South of the country.

Figure 7. Moran's scatter plot for the variable 'right-wing vote' (RV)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.


Figure 8. Box plot for variable 'right-wing vote' (RV)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Figure 9. LISA cluster map for the variable 'voting for right-wing parties or coalitions' (RV)

(Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)




Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior (See Figure 2A in the Annexes for the significance map)

2.2.2 The territorialization for the peripheral nationalist axis

The vote for peripheral nationalist political options presents much higher levels of spatial concentration than those already discussed for the left/right axis. Thus, Moran's I calculated for this variable reaches a level close to 1, which would mean perfect spatial concentration (Figures 10 and 11). As we have applied the same methodology as for the left/right axis, we are not explaining it in detail again in this section.


In this case, we observe two clear spatial clusters characterized by a well-defined voting pattern to peripheral nationalist political options. These correspond neatly to the AC of Catalonia and the Basque Country. There is, moreover, a large cluster consisting of municipalities with a notable low support for peripheral nationalist options which reaches the rest of the country, with some remarkable exceptions; these exceptions coincide with the ACs of Galicia, Andalusia, Asturias, Aragón, Valencia, part of Navarre (another part of this AC joins the great Basque cluster), the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. The Northeastern region of Castile and León should be included as well. For all these areas, spatial clusters are not statistically significant, without a clear homogeneous pattern of voting for or against peripheral nationalist political options.

Figure 10. Moran's scatter plot for the variable 'peripheral nationalist vote' (NAC)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.


Figure 11. Box plot for variable 'right-wing vote' (RV)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Figure 12. LISA cluster map for the variable 'voting for peripheral nationalist parties or coalitions (NAC)

(Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)




Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior (See Figure 3A in the Annexes for the significance map).

2.2.3 The territorialization of the abstention

Finally, we present the analysis of the territorialization of abstention for the Spanish case, using the same technical parameters than in previous analysis. But before we start explaining the results of this analysis, it is necessary to say that the measurement of the territorialization of the abstention in Spain is rather complex, given the implications of the legislation currently in force. Thus, the “Ley Orgánica 6/2002”, of 27 June 2002, also known as the law of political parties (Spain, 2002), which produced an exacerbation of the active abstention in the Basque Country, as it made illegal some left-wing pro-independence parties due to their refusal to condemn ETA’s terrorism. The methodological alternatives, since we only have spatial data from the 1996 general election, are two: either representing the percentages of abstention only for the general elections of 1996 and 2000, or representing the percentages of abstention for the period 1996-2011 excluding the Basque Country. After considering the possibility of presenting our analysis for the general elections of 1996 and 2000, we finally decided to exclude the Basque Country and Navarre, because we saw that even representing only those two elections, the Basque Country and Navarre continued to concentrate almost exclusively the largest percentages of abstention. The complex electoral experience of the pro-independence left Basque political parties during the 1990s, unmatched in other areas of the country, made this happen. If we had proceeded otherwise it would have been impossible to observe the trend set by abstention, due to the distortion introduced by active abstention, meaning the kind of abstention which is actively exercised by an electorate that is not allowed to vote for the political options of its choice –in the case of Spain, this means voting for the Basque left-wing pro-independence parties–.


Now that we have explained our methodological strategy to measure abstention, we can analyze our results. As we can see in Figures 13 and 14, the abstention is the variable presenting the less levels of concentration in its distribution, with a value of 0.405168 for the Moran's *I* statistic. Figure 15 presents the different spatial clusters for the abstention that, although quite dispersed, show a North-South cleavage, besides some remarkable concentrations in the Canary Islands.

Figure 13. Moran's scatter plot for the variable 'abstention' (ABS)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.


Figure 14. Box plot for variable 'abstention' (ABS)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Figure 15. LISA cluster map for the variable 'abstention' (ABS)

(Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior (See Figure 4A in the Annexes for the significance map).

2.3 Habitat analysis of the electoral behavior in Spain

Taking into account the results produced in previous research on the relationship between territory and society (García & Otero, 2012; García, 2013), we have classified the municipalities that make up the Spanish territory in four different types of habitat: cities, peripheries, small urban areas (SUA) and rural. In a second step we have disaggregated the rural habitat into three categories: manualized rural, agrarian rural, and deactivated rural. These divisions have been made in accordance with the inclusion criteria illustrated in the Annexes (see Table VA and Table VIA in the Annexes).

In the following pages we are going to show the results of the analysis on the relation between habitat and electoral behavior. Thus, Table IV shows the arithmetic means and standard deviations (σ) for the variables 'left-wing voting' (LV) and 'right-wing voting' (RV), both calculated over the Spanish electoral census. We have measured these variables taking as cases the list of Spanish municipalities; we take into consideration the results registered by the Spanish Ministry of Interior for the eleven general elections celebrated after in Spain after Franco's death (1977-2011).

Table IV. Vote in Spanish general elections and habitat							
	Total	Manualized rural	Agrarian rural	Deactivated rural	Small urban areas	Peripheries	Cities
	Media (σ)	Media (σ)	Media (σ)	Media (σ)	Media (σ)	Media (σ)	Media (σ)
Left-wing voting	32.08 (13.68)	34.21 (12.63)	26.59 (14.25)	29.71 (12.55)	37.80 (10.94)	37.74 (10.78)	34.71 (6.97)
Right-wing voting	42.41 (14.29)	41.31 (13.61)	47.42 (16.09)	44.00 (14.06)	35.93 (10.87)	37.28 (12.76)	37.02 (8.04)

Source: Elaborated by the author with the electoral results registered and published by the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

As we see, there are some relevant differences, summarized in table V. Rural habitats have the highest tendency to vote for candidates of the right, while urban habitats are characterized by high support for the left. Although we are still in the initial descriptive section of our work, without having referred yet to theory, we could advance that this trend would confirm the findings shown by research on class voting, which situates unskilled manual workers as the class with greater tendency to vote leftist options and farmers as the class with less tendency to do so (Nieuwbeerta & de Graaf, 1999, p. 35). However, this pattern of class voting does not satisfy entirely the explanation of the trends detected in our analysis. Thus, if we were to attribute the results of our description of voting patterns in the different habitats of Spain only to class voting, then we should have recorded the presence of spatial clusters of right-wing voting municipalities that coincide with those municipalities in the rural habitat, and this has not been the case (*vid.* Figure 9). We must therefore provide an alternative or complementary explanation to account for our results.

Table V. Deviations of each habitat from the arithmetic mean of the Spanish total					
Support for the left			Support for the right		
Type of habitat	(σ)	Deviation from the mean	Type of habitat	(σ)	Deviation from the mean
Small urban areas	10.94	+5.72%	Agrarian rural	16.09	+5.01%
Peripheries	10.78	+5.66%	Deactivated rural	14.06	+1.59%
Cities	6.97	+2.63%	Manualized rural	13.61	-1.1%
Manualized rural	12.63	+2.13%	Peripheries	12.76	-5.13%
Deactivated rural	12.55	-2.37%	Cities	8.04	-5.39%
Agrarian rural	14.25	-5.49%	Small urban areas	10.87	-6.48%

Source: Elaborated by the author from the electoral results published by the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the habitats elaborated from the data of the Spanish Institute of Statistics.

Thus we have decided to analyze again the relation between vote and habitat taking into account the results obtained in our exploratory analysis of the spatial clusters of Spanish municipalities. In this sense, Table VI illustrates the same information that is shown on Table V, with the peculiarity that its percentages have been calculated only for those municipalities included in the ‘high-high’ cluster of each one of the variables (left-wing voting and right-wing voting)¹.

Table VI. Deviations of each habitat relative to the average of the Spanish total for those municipalities within ‘high-high’ spatial clusters					
Support for the left			Support for the right		
Type of habitat	(σ)	Deviation from the mean	Type of habitat	(σ)	Deviation from the mean
Agrarian rural	2.65	+0.92	Agrarian rural	3.18	+1.62
Manualized rural	2.74	+0.6	Deactivated rural	2.62	-0.19
Deactivated rural	2.29	-0.58	Peripheries	2.35	-0.9
Small urban areas	2.36	-0.67	Manualized rural	2.22	-1.42
Peripheries	2.21	-1.07	Cities	1.18	-2.15
Cities	1.17	-4.26	Small urban areas	3.25	-2.22

Source: Elaborated by the author from the electoral results published by the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the habitats elaborated from the data of the Spanish Institute of Statistics.

We see that if we analyze those municipalities included in a ‘high-high’ spatial cluster, the general trend presented in Table V is reversed in the case of support for the left, while it remains the same, though softened, in the case of support for the right. Thus, rural habitats –and particularly the agrarian rural– are presented as the most likely to vote for left-wing options in the spatial clustering of municipalities with high voter

¹ We are using here the same database that was used in the previous spatial analysis, i.e., the one which compiles the electoral results of the general elections from 1996 to 2011, both included (*vid. footnote 2*).

support for this political option. Similarly, rural habitats –again we find the prominence of the agrarian rural– have the highest support for right-wing options within the spatial cluster of municipalities with high support rates for this political option. These results would also provide an explanation of the high standard deviations shown in Table V, as the filter by spatial cluster reduces significantly this measure, indicative of a trend toward internal homogeneity accompanying the filtering by spatial clusters. We see, for instance, how the standard deviation of agrarian rural goes from a value of 14.25 to another one of 2.65 in the case of left wing voting, and from a value of 6.09 to another one of 3.18 in the case of right wing voting.

We will now see what happens with the support for peripheral nationalist political options (Table VII). Given the inexistence of this option in most of the Spanish territory, we will restrict our analysis to those municipalities that are part of the spatial cluster with a high support for peripheral nationalist candidates.

Table VII. Deviations of each habitat relative to the average of the Spanish total for those municipalities within ‘high-high’ spatial clusters		
Support for peripheral nationalist options		
Type of habitat	Standard deviation	Deviation from the arithmetic mean
Manualized rural	4.80	+1.62
Agrarian rural	4.91	+0.99
Deactivated rural	4.42	+0.55
Small urban areas	4.34	-2.85
Peripheries	4.88	-2.99
Cities	2.04	-7.07

Source: Elaborated by the author from the electoral results published by the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the habitats elaborated from the data of the Spanish Institute of Statistics.

We see that rural municipalities are the ones presenting a ratio of support for peripheral nationalist options above average, while the remaining types of habitat present lower or much lower percentages, as it is the case of cities.

Finally, the measures for the abstention are presented in Tables VIII and IX. The first one is calculated with respect to the average of the Spanish total, while the second one measures the deviations for the municipalities presenting high abstention rates. In this case, the pattern of reversal is not as obvious as it is in the previous cases, presenting a clear predominance of the abstention among the small urban areas, followed by the agrarian rural habitat. Deactivated rural reverses the trend when we limit the analysis to those clusters with high abstention rates, although it shows a variation of 1.03 points. Cities clearly reversed the trend, as the peripheries and the deactivated rural did. It is important to note, however, that the abstention presents the greatest standard deviations among the variables that we have analyzed, indicating that this is a more complex pattern, whose logic has not been completely unraveled.

Table VIII and Table IX. Deviations of each habitat for the abstention					
Table VIII. Over the Spanish total			Table IX. Over 'high-high' spatial clusters		
Type of habitat	(σ)	Deviation from the mean	Type of habitat	(σ)	Deviation from the mean
Cities	4,87	+5,06	Small urban areas	6,84	+1,97
Small urban areas	6,28	+2,31	Agrarian rural	6,59	+1,04
Peripheries	6,77	+2,27	Deactivated rural	7,54	+0,86
Agrarian rural	8,18	+0,35	Cities	6,56	-0,21
Manualized rural	6,72	-0,97	Peripheries	5,18	-0,75
Deactivated rural	7,47	-0,17	Manualized rural	4,58	-2,00

Source: Elaborated by the author from the electoral results published by the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the habitats elaborated from the data of the Spanish Institute of Statistics.

2.4 Conclusions

The main contribution of this descriptive chapter is the provision of empirical evidence that belie simple associations regarding the relation between habitats and voting behavior. While the initial analysis of the spatial clusters shows a trend consistent with the theory generated by studies of class voting in the sense of a positive correlation between agrarian social classes and conservative voting (Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf, 1999), further descriptive analysis which takes into account spatial concentrations of voting reveals that this association does not hold. Thus, it is precisely among rural habitats where we find a bigger predisposition to vote for left-wing options among all those municipalities within a spatial cluster defined by a high vote for left-wing options. Similarly, although it might seem paradoxical, rural habitats are also more prone to vote for right-wing options among those municipalities forming spatial clusters defined by a high vote for this political option. Therefore, one of the conclusions of our work is that rural habitats are always the places presenting higher electoral support for the hegemonic political options in a given territory, as an identical trend is registered for the support to peripheral nationalist options. The trend is, however, less clear for the more complex case of abstention. We believe that this empirical finding needs further research efforts to offer a satisfactory explanation, and so we will try to provide it within the next chapters. Our data provide, however, a contribution to the scientific debate on the relationship between type of habitat and voting behavior; thus, in a study that took the AC of Andalusia as its context, Ortega *et al.* (2011, pp. 79-85) showed the presence of a significant causal relation, for which smaller habitats goes hand in hand with a

higher proportion of electoral participation. While this trend seems clear for the Andalusian case, our analysis reveal that the association between variables claimed by this study is not generalizable, in line with previous work which, at the state level, have dealt with this same issue (*vid., e.g.,* Dahl & Tufte, 1973). Our results contradict, however, one of the main conclusions of that classic study by Dahl and Tufte, because although these authors explain that there is a correlation whereby larger habitats go together with greater political heterogeneity, our data indicate rather the contrary – the measure of the standard deviations of rural habitats is higher than it is for the urban ones for every case taken into account (general behavior and spatial clusters with high support for left-wing options, for right-wing options, for peripheral nationalist options, and clusters presenting high abstention rates)–. This is a relevant finding, because that relationship had been only partially questioned (*vid. Anckar, 1999*). We can also say that our analysis nuance some national trends set on the case of abstention. In this sense Justel (1995) claimed to have detected a pattern of relationship between economic activity and the different types of abstention: “There is a certain indication that the tertiary activity is associated with higher levels of abstention” (Justel, 1995, p. 113); that statement does not seem to find empirical support in our analysis, as Table IX shows that the most tertiarized habitats, i.e., cities and peripheries, are below the average of abstention, reversing the trend shown in Table VIII, with percentages calculated over the Spanish total. This information shows the importance of establishing a segmentation of the analysis among spatial clusters, which often reverses the information offered by an aggregated national trend.

Finally, we will conclude that it is not appropriate from a sociological point of view to speak of a Spanish kind of habitats, as the data show high in-group variation for each one of these habitats. As we noted above, we need greater research developments in order to unravel the differential logics characterizing each one of these in-group divergences. What is now clear is the scientific futility of talking about the Spanish rural or about the Spanish urban, as if these were homogenous habitats. Quite often, sociological studies based on aggregate data are criticised alluding to the problem posed by the ecological fallacy –to associate mistakenly a certain group tendency to each one of the cases making up that group– and yet, the analysis presented in this chapter illustrate that if we make proper use of spatial statistics we can break this type of logical fallacy. Thus, we have seen that the aggregate calculation of the different habitat categories for the Spanish total may lead to fall in the so-called Simpson’s Paradox (Blyth, 1972), according to which a well-defined group trend may disappear or even be reversed if we aggregate such groups into a higher category lacking an appropriate empirical foundation. So, as a general conclusion, our data demonstrate (1) that it is inappropriate to speak about rural or urban Spanish habitats as homogeneous categories defined, in the political level, by similar electoral patterns, as it is evident that we have to talk about different urban and rural habitats with divergent, even opposing, electoral trends, and (2) that greater research efforts are necessary to account for these differences and contradictions. During the next chapters we will implement these research efforts.

II. Explaining the phenomenon

3 On the shoulders of giants

In this section we are going to summarize the three general theories of electoral behavior:

- The school of Columbia
- The school of Michigan
- The school of Rochester

We refer to them as *general* theories because each one of them presents a differentiated set of propositions to explain why people vote the way they do. These propositions are different in essence, and have underpinnings, respectively on sociology, social psychology and behavioral economics. These are grand theories, because they have successfully set up a program of research that extends to present day. Thus, we are still registering advances for every three of them, with a continuous flow of scientific publications on specific journals¹. The field of electoral behavior is undoubtedly situated at the highest degree of technical refinement in modern social science, with a level of development that is probably only matched by the field of social mobility. Moreover, there are not so many areas of research with such an interdisciplinary character, what is related to the fact that the three main schools of research that originated its modern study are rooted in three differentiated areas of social science. These three schools are not *general theories* in the critical sense established by Goldthorpe, referring to those perspectives focused on theory for the sake of theory, with no direct link to empirical research. All these three grand

¹ Examples of these international journals are *Electoral Studies*, *Research in Political Sociology*, *Political Behavior*, or *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*.

theories have been built up as a response to empirical research, and its current extensions are usually at the forefront of technical refinement within social science. We can anticipate, however, that neither of the three has provided a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon. This may be due to two possibilities:

1. The theoretical underpinning of one of the three schools is correct, while the other two are wrong. If the correct theory has not yet provided a satisfactory explanation of electoral behavior is because it has not been properly developed.
2. The theoretical underpinnings of all three schools are wrong.

Of course, much debate has been produced among the proponents of the three schools. They argue with each other trying to defend the strength of their preferred theory and they are continuously trying to improve its heuristic power¹. But before stating our view of the problem, let us examine with greater detail what these three theories are claiming.

3.1 Three traditions in the study of electoral behaviour

Few questions in the history of social thought have received the attention that thinkers of all epochs have paid to the problem posed by voting behaviour. *Why people vote the way they do* is indeed a profound issue that we find complexly theorized in the works of the ancient Greeks –*vid.* (Barber, 1986; Farrar, 1988)²–. We

¹ It is worth saying that outside the schools of Columbia, Michigan and Rochester there have been other theoretical attempts to explain electoral behavior. Thus, for instance, in an article published in 2007, Ethington and McDaniel defended an ecological approach (Ethington and McDaniel, 2007). In the article they complaint about the fact that behaviorism rule over electoral behavior research, leaving aside possible contributions from human ecology.

² To cite but a few direct classical Greek sources on this matter, it is relevant to talk about Plato's dissertation on the foundations of people's political judgment, presented in his well-

can state without fear of being wrong that this attention was constantly maintained throughout the epochal developments of social and social scientific thought³. For the sake of clarity, we will now focus our attention on the developments experienced by the *voting behaviour* question on its most evolved versions of the 20th and 21st centuries. The theoretical advances belonging to this contemporary period of modern social sciences are usually classified within a triad of traditions on this subject matter, commonly referred to as:

1. The sociological school of Columbia.
2. The psychosocial school of Michigan.
3. The economic school of Rochester.

These three traditions, which synthesize the whole scope of social science itself – alluding to the *homo sociologicus*, *homo psychologicus* and *homo economicus*, respectively⁴– have been establishing a scientific dialogue that enriched our

known *Protagoras* dialogue, where Socrates argued that it is not possible to teach the virtuousness needed in order to establish a good political judgment, and the sophist Protagoras, whose work was to teach Athenians how to develop their political skills, argued that this is indeed both possible and desirable (Plato, 2012[4th c. BC]). It is mandatory to cite, as well, Aristotle's *Politics* (Aristotle, 2009 [350 B.C.]), as in this work it is developed the link between virtuousness and good citizenry and, particularly, the association between good government and social equality, i.e., better governments are to be found within those cities where the middle class (*sic.*) overhangs both the rich and the poor (Aristotle, 2009 [350 B.C.], Book IV-Ch. XI).

³ *Vid.* Del Águila (1998) for the ancient Greek period, Rivero (1998) for the Republican tradition, García (1998) for the Liberal one, Vallespín (1998) for the radical democracy perspective, and De Gabriel (1998) for the point of view of the elite theorists.

⁴ These terms synthesize three different anthropological paradigms, the first one meaning that human behaviour is mainly caused by human roles and socialisation (Dahrendorf, 2010), the second one stressing the importance of cognitive processes on human behaviour (Jager et

comprehension of the complex process that defines our research question, leading us to a better understanding of why people vote the way they do. In fact, we can say that each of these academic traditions has constituted a social scientific *model*. According to Lave and March's definition, a model:

"(...) is a simplified picture of a part of the real world. It has some of the characteristics of the real world, but not all of them. It is a set of interrelated guesses about the world. Like all pictures, a model is simpler than the phenomena it is supposed to represent or explain (...) Since a model has only some of the characteristics of reality, it is natural to have several different models of the same thing, each of which considers a different aspect" (Lave and March, 1993[1975]: 3)

This definition of a model is certainly appropriate to define the nature and relationship between the aforementioned theoretical traditions on the analysis of voting behaviour. The dialogue maintained between those three models took sometimes the form of academic confrontation but it is also true that in many other occasions it pinpointed the principles of a future agreement on the topic of voting behaviour.

In this chapter we will examine the main characteristics of each of the three aforementioned models, usually referred to as the basis for modern analysis of voting behaviour and electoral politics (Bartels, 2010). By the end of the section we will also take a look at the perspective developed from political geography, which can be seen as an extension of the Columbia model.

al., 2000) and the third one presupposing an instinct in human beings according to which human behaviour would respond to a self-interest rationale (Persky, 1995).

3.1.1 The Columbia model

It all seems to have started in 1944 when a group of social scientists led by Paul Felix Lazarsfeld⁵ published a seminal work entitled *The People's Choice: how the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968 [1944]), laying the foundations of this model. The theory was later developed in two other major works entitled *Voting: a study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954) and *Personal Influence: the part played by people in the flow of mass communications* (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955)⁶. The seminal work included on their first work from 1944 was a product of the work

⁵ Paul F. Lazarsfeld (Vienna 1901- New York 1976), mathematician, later psychologist and, finally, sociologist, had a huge impact on the development of quantitative social research. He was the 1962 President of the *American Sociological Association*. Born in Vienna into a middle-class Jewish family, he was a committed and active socialist during his youth (Sills, 1987, pp. 258-259). In 1933 he got a grant from the *Rockefeller Foundation* that brought him to the United States, where he finally decided to stay, partly due to the increasingly dangerous political situation in Europe, especially for a person with his political background –most members of Lazarsfeld's family were imprisoned at the time, and Lazarsfeld's job position in Vienna was suppressed (Cole, 2004, p. 313)–. The astonishing increase of electoral support in the German Federal elections for the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s –6.5% of the votes in 1924, 43.9% in 1933– (Eberhard, 2005 [1984], pp. 224-225) as well as the defeat of the Vienna's July Revolt of 1927 stimulated Lazarsfeld's interests in people's political behaviour to the point that he stated:

“A fighting revolution requires economics (Marx); a victorious revolution requires engineers (Russia); a defeated revolution calls for psychology (Vienna)” (quoted in Sills, 1987, p. 256).

⁶ We must note here the precedent defined by the quantitative research carried out by George Gallup during the 1940s (Gallup, 1972), influential within the Scandinavian world (Valen and Aardal, 1994), as well as the work by sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd, in search for a *middletown* that, within the USA, could statistically match the political opinion of the whole nation (Lynd and Lynd, 1929). Inspired by this notion of statistical matching between a peculiar small part of the electorate –not a random sample– and the electorate as a whole, was worked out the median voter theorem, firstly developed by Hotelling (1929).

developed at the *Bureau of Applied Social Research*, founded and directed by Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia University, in New York. It presents an empirically contrasted model of voting behaviour mainly based upon variables related to social structure. It is worth saying that this idea of voting as an expression of one's social position, laconically summarized in the famous quotation "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1968 [1944], p. 69), was not among the initial hypothesis that Lazarsfeld and his colleagues had firstly in mind. These scholars, Lazarsfeld in particular, were highly shocked by the electoral rising of Nazism and Fascism in Europe, as well as by the fact that so many people pledged allegiance to the far right political and military agenda run by the governments emerged from that movements. Both the extraordinary prominence that the Nazis gave to propaganda⁷ as well as the unprecedented catastrophic consequences caused by the implementation of their political program, made scholars like Lazarsfeld see in political propaganda an extremely powerful weapon for controlling people's minds. Lazarsfeld's work started as a consequence of the impossibility, due to political reasons, of going back to Vienna after his two years fellowship in America, funded by the *Rockefeller Foundation* (1933-1935). He was then director of the *Office of Radio Research*, a newly created institution dedicated to the study of the impact of mass communication on citizens that in 1944 became part of the Columbia University,

⁷ *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda*, in English 'Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda', was the expressive name chosen for the office directed by Joseph Goebbels during the Third Reich, whose extremely sophisticated work would change the way in which political propaganda was to be developed since then. The relevance given to propaganda by Nazi leaders is historically unquestionable, as we see in Goebbels' words, uttered in 1934:

"Propaganda is an inalienable and vital function of the modern state" (cited in Taylor, 1983, p. 29).

being renamed as the *Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research* (BASR). Lazarsfeld directed the BASR between 1938 and 1949 (Garfinkel, 1987, p. 5; Knight & Marsh, 2002). He was trained as a mathematician at the *Universität Wien*, and introduced to the social sciences due strictly to political reasons, being his main motivation to provide an understanding of the failed revolution of 1927 Vienna (Lazarsfeld, 1972). Later on he would become one of the major figures in 20th century social science, with a highly recognized work based on strong empirical basis (Sills, 1987).

The Columbia school is an approach very much focused on dynamics of social conflict. Its internal logic is based on the idea that each social group –such as social classes, ethnic and national communities, etc.– has its own common interests, making that group members will cast their votes in accordance with their group interests. Thus, it was possible for Lazarsfeld and his colleagues to define an “Index of Political Predisposition” (IPP) for the Erie County vote in the USA presidential election of 1940, including three factors: socio-economic level, religion and residence (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968 [1944])⁸. The IPP was a landmark on the history of political research; its internal rationale was to be later developed by other scholars, notably by the American Seymour Martin Lipset and by the Norwegian Stein Rokkan. These two social scientists introduced the notion of *cleavage*, relating to those social divisions that will eventually produce political *alignments* between group members and political parties (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). In this highly influential work, Lipset and Rokkan argued that cleavages should be understood as the by-product of two interrelated processes: the development of the industrial revolution

⁸ The IPP was later applied by the BASR team to a nation-wide sample in the 1944 presidential elections, with fairly good, confirmatory, results, as explained in the preface of the second edition of *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1949).

and the establishing of modern nation-states. The result of these two processes was the division of society in different groups with different, often opposed, interests giving birth to four basic cleavages:

- Owner v. worker;
- Church v. State;
- Urban v. rural;
- Centre v. periphery.

This *cleavage* approach was thereafter constantly developed by generations of social scientists to the present day, when it has acquired a remarkable level of methodological sophistication –see, e.g., Evans and de Graaf (2013)–. Finally, this sociological model of electoral research makes also an emphasis on the role played by *social networks* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and Mcphee, 1954). Thus, people’s social environment and connections would either reinforce or soften their political predispositions. This line of research based on social network was also very much developed until the present day –see, specially, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995)–.

3.1.2 The Michigan model

The socio-structural model of the *Columbia School* had a great impact on the academic field, originating a debate that soon introduced serious critiques. Perhaps the strongest of these critiques was summarized in the celebrated book *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) written by a group of researchers at the University of Michigan. This seminal work started a new approach on the study of electoral behaviour, known as the *Michigan School*. The approach was based on a social psychological model built up from the analysis of a set of political polls carried out by the *Survey Research Centre*, at the University of Michigan. These polls were conducted during the USA presidential elections of 1948, 1952 and 1956.

Like the Columbia School, the Michigan model understood voting behaviour as a matter of alignments between the electorate and the different political parties. However, the theories differed greatly on the description of the nature of that bond. This link was, for Campbell and his colleagues, defined by the idea of *socialization*, as explained by authors like Hyman (1959) or Strodbeck (1958), and not by the location of individuals within social structure. The idea was that in the course of their lives individuals develop affinities to some parties and antipathies to others. Therefore, *party identification* was considered as the main explanatory variable of voting behaviour and, in its turn, it was considered a product of political socialization, starting from early childhood. One of the strengths of the Michigan approach is that it provides an explanation for the presence of strong partisanship feelings among people with no significant political knowledge⁹. Within the Michigan model voters resemble football supporters rather than rational individuals. These assumptions on the identification between the electorate and political parties, however, have also been submitted to criticism. Some authors have questioned the origins of partisanship as an expression of political socialization; thus, it is now generally seen as the outcome of other processes apart from socialization, like changes in policy preferences (Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002). There is as well an on-going debate questioning the model's proposal of partisanship as a steadily sustained bond, with empirical arguments showing its corrosion (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976). The Michigan model was initially devised with the American party system in mind and its suitability for the multiparty European case has been put into question (Budge, Crewe and Farlie, 1976). Nevertheless, the influence of the model and the amount

⁹ Results from the Survey Research Centre has shown that a large part of the electorate did not manage basic political concepts such as "liberal" and were characterized by their ignorance of important political issues (Campbell et al., 1960).

research it is still producing today are evidences of the huge influence that it has on the scientific study of electoral behaviour. Perhaps the work by González and Bouza (2009), focused on agenda-setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), represents the best example to understand Spanish electoral behavior through the Michigan approach. We consider agenda-setting theory as a particular branch of the Michigan school, given that it is focused on the influence of the media agenda on the public agenda. This is why we are not going into the details of the theory, since each one of the three schools have undoubtedly many branches, although they share a common emphasis regarding decision-making rationale.

3.1.3 The Rochester model

We will now consider the work developed from the tradition of economics and of Rational Choice Theory. This tradition constitutes today one of the most productive areas of research within the social sciences as a whole, being particularly active on the field of electoral behaviour (Dowding, 2005; Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan, 2007). The model has been initially identified with the works by William H. Riker, chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Rochester between 1962 and 1977 (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). The model relies heavily on game theory and rational action theory, presupposing that there is a will for the maximization of utility behind people's voting decisions. One very important work for the establishment of this model was the book by Anthony Downs *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Downs, 1957). Like for the Columbia model, this theory is based on the individual's *objective* social position, what differentiates it from the Michigan School, which is focused on people's *subjective* social location. The Rochester model is an economic one that sees voters as individuals seeking to maximize the utility of their vote, as a way for the maximization of their personal interests.

This utilitarian model understands that people order their voting preferences hierarchically; thus, the different options at their disposal are rationally compared before casting their votes. Underlying this rationalization of the vote, there is a utility function that compares the expected results of each possible vote. Simply put, according to Downs, voters are self-located on a left/right scale of political ideology. As they are able as well to locate the different political parties in such a scale, they will then take their electoral decision in terms of proximity or, using rational choice jargon, in terms of utility maximization. This decision is also framed by presuppositions on the chances of each party to win the elections, giving way to a calculus of voting that has been defined as “strategic” or “tactical” (Cox, 1997; Fisher, 2001). Criticism to this model came both from its specific application to the analysis of electoral behaviour (Blais, 2000) as well as from a general opposition to rational choice theory (Green and Shapiro, 1994).

3.1.4 The Ecological model

Finally we will take into account the specific contributions from political geography, also referred to as the ecological approach. If we want to trace back the roots of the analysis on the relation between territory and voting behaviour, we should consider, in the first place, André Siegfried’s pioneer studies on political sociology, where he established a formal correlation between place and vote (Siegfried, 2010 [1913]). This relation was based on the idea that granitic soils produced a kind of social structure conducive to right-wing voting, while those composed mainly of limestone would promote a social structure conducive to a predominance of the leftist vote. Siegfried’s analysis, however, can be considered as an antecedent of the Columbia School, for different soil compositions will promote different agricultural models, conforming different kinds of social structures that will produce, in turn, an effect on electoral

behaviour. Hence, it was social structure, and not territory in itself, the independent variable determining people's voting patterns in Siegfried's model.

This indirect relation between territory and vote was to be further theorised forty years later. In an intellectual environment dominated by Modernization theorists, who argued, following Weber (Weber, 2013 [1905]), that poor societies' cultural values were at the core of an explanation for their economic and political underdevelopment (Lerner, 1958; Pye & Verba, 1963), it was argued that good economic performance is a prerequisite for a stable democracy (Lipset, 1959). Modernization would transform societies, through nation-building processes, in a way that their old political cleavages –such as those based on clan or regional membership– were to be substituted by new modern nation-wide ones, among which social class would hold a central role, leading authors to define elections as “the expression of the democratic class struggle” (Lipset, 1960, Ch. VII-VIII). It can be stated, then, that authors within this tradition described a homogeneous trend accompanying the process of modernization, by which local differences would lose relevance, as these were going to be surpassed by new modern nation-wide cleavages; if territorial variations were to be found in people's voting patterns, these should be attributed not to any kind of spatial effect, but to differences in the social composition of the national territory.

Modernization theory, however, was harshly criticized during the 1970s and 80s, even 60s, by Dependency and World-System theorists (Chase-Dunn, 1989; Chirot, 1977; Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974). This critique of Modernization theory spread to its application to democracy and voting behaviour, as exposed by Lipset and his colleagues during the 60s, to the point that in the 1980s arose a new locally-oriented political sociology focused on the importance of spatial political divergences within

societies (Agnew, 1984; 1987; Johnston, 1986; Johnston, Pattie, & Allsop, 1988; Johnston & Pattie, 1989; Savage, 1987). Drawing on Giddens' theory of structuration (Giddens, 1977; 1979; 1981; 1984), theorists like Agnew wanted to demonstrate "the geographical rootedness of political life" (Agnew, 1987, p. 1), leading them to a profound critique of Lipset's homogenization thesis, that treated the local variations of societies as evanescent features that will eventually be banished within a process of progressively national uniformity. This was a critique of the habit of social scientists who usually match societies with the national communities they belong to, and it was supported not only from a theoretical standpoint, but also by empirical evidence; as Agnew puts it: "It is quite remarkable how much empirical sociology has suggested the importance of place without its authors making the connection" (Agnew, 1987, p. 12).

Ecological theorists also warned of the vivacity of local space as a political determinant, even in neatly modern societies like Great Britain or the USA, for place is seen as a source of collective identity that should, consequently, produce differences in voting patterns. We can state that, at this stage, space was already treated as an independent variable from social structure, and thus differentiated from the effect of unequal territorial distribution of social classes, or any other social structural variables. It remained attached, however, to processes of political socialization, resembling the Michigan model.

Thus, the spatial effect, now formally referred to as the "neighbourhood effect", firstly theorized by Cox (1969) and significantly developed by Miller (1978), can be summarized as the idea that everyday contact with fellow neighbours will produce a tendency towards the homogenization of political behaviour within local communities; in Miller's words: "People who talk together, vote together" (Miller,

1978, p. 65). Strong empirical evidence of this argument has been provided (Pattie and Johnston, 2000). Neighbourhood effect has also been empirically proved using the British General Election of 1997, which presented clear patterns of voting variations not related to class, but to differences among constituencies' life standards (MacAllister, *et al.*, 2001). Consequently, the debate is now focused on the logic and nature of these tendencies. One possible explanation is the idea, already mentioned, that social structural variables are not homogeneously distributed in the territory. This idea remembers us the indirect effect analyzed by Siegfried at the beginning of the 20th century and would eventually end up in a sophistication of the cleavage approach. This line of research has demonstrated to be highly productive, and in recent years we have witnessed a resurgence of class voting theorizing, in what is a sophistication of early class voting theory¹⁰ (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Evans, 1999; Manza, Hout, & Brooks, 1999; Manza & Brooks, 1999; Evans & de Graaf, 2013).

On the other hand we have explanations for the neighbourhood effect focused on the role played by local political cultures (MacIntyre, 1980) and on the idea that it is not social structure that varies, but economic realities that differ from one region to another (Heath, *et al.*, 1991). On an intermediary level, Savage *et al.* have proposed the alternative interpretation of seeing social class as still politically relevant, but arguing that its expression and mobilization is nowadays symbolically attached to local scenarios (Savage, Warde and Ward, 2003). It can be argued, however, that this approach is nationally biased, since it owes very much to the social reality of the United Kingdom, characterised by the erosion of nation-wide working-class

¹⁰ We are referring to the work of Robert Alford, who developed the so-called *Alford Index*, which is calculated by "(...) subtracting the percentage of persons in non-manual occupations voting for Left parties from the percentage of persons in manual occupations voting for Left parties" (Alford, 1963, pp. 79-80).

organisations as a consequence of Thatcherism during the 1980s (Savage, Warde, & Ward, 2003, pp. 190-191).

3.2 Some commentaries on the models

In this section we are going to introduce what we see as improvements to these models. Without abandoning the internal logics of these models we think we are able to improve their methodological rigor. As we are basing our analysis on data from Spain, we should pay special attention to the two main political cleavages that, according to experts, divide the Spanish society: social class and national identity; Juan Jesús González put it this way:

‘In the Spanish case, the party system of the transition was configured in accordance with two axes: the traditional opposition between left and right and the opposition between nationwide Spanish forces and ethno-cultural peripheral nationalisms (the opposition center-periphery; Giner and Moreno, 1990)’

3.2.1 Some methodological comments on the measurement of class voting in Spain

If we think about Siegfried’s pioneering analysis on the relationship between income group and vote (Siegfried, 2010 [1913]), then we can conclude that *class voting*, as it is now called, appears as one of the earliest voting phenomena to be studied by social scientists interested in the analysis of electoral behavior. We can even trace back this interest in the relationship between class and vote until the very origins of sociology itself, in the form of Engels’ statement that the working class would vote for socialist parties if suffrage were to be recognized as a workers’ right (Engels, 1895). This interest on class voting was to be a constant maintained through the history of electoral sociology. Lipset’s classical studies viewed class voting as an expression of class interests (Lipset et al., 1954), a standpoint that,

although submitted to strong criticism (Franklin, 1985; Clark and Lipset, 2001), has also been establishing notable counterarguments (González, 1993; 1996; 2001). Thus, as Polavieja commented: ‘One of the strongest regularities observed in electoral behavior is that support for left-wing parties is higher among the working class than the petty bourgeoisie and the so-called service class (Heath and Weakliem, 1994: 243)’ (Polavieja, 2001: 1). New groundbreaking research was developed in mid-20th century by American social scientists; Angus Campbell, a representative author of the psycho-social school of Michigan, argued that political attitudes and partisan identification were the key variables to explain electoral behavior, although both were themselves influenced by the voter’s social position (Campbell *et al.*, 1960).

The huge amount of research on class voting can be explained due to the centrality of social classes in the sociological tradition, not only, of course, in Marxism¹¹, but for Weberians (Breen, 2005) and Durkheimians (Grusky and Galescu, 2005) as well. Given its importance and relevance for the study of electoral behavior, there have been different proposals for the measurement of class voting. Perhaps the so-called

¹¹ The analysis of the relationship between democratic voting and social class has been present in Marxism since its very origins. Marx himself agreed that the revolution could be carried out by democratic means, given a requirement of enough class consciousness:

‘But universal suffrage is the equivalent of political power for the working class of England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population, where, in a long though underground civil war, it has gained a clear consciousness of its position as a class and where even the rural districts know no longer any peasants, but only landlords, industrial capitalists (farmers) and hired labourers. The carrying of universal suffrage in England would, therefore be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honoured with that name on the continent. Its inevitable result, here is the *political supremacy of the working class.*’ (cited in Hallas, 1983: 20).

Alford Index represents the best known and more influential of these attempts; developed by Robert Alford it is presented as “the percentage of persons in manual occupations voting for Left parties minus the percentage of persons in nonmanual occupations voting for Left parties” (Alford, 1963; pp. 79-80). The Alford Index, calculated through time, shows that there has been a general waning trend regarding the levels of class voting in virtually every Western society (Clark, Lipset and Rempel, 1993). Different sociological explanations of this empirically registered loss of influence have been signaled (Parkin, 1968; Cohen, 1982; Dalton, *et al.*, 1984; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Halle and Romo, 1991; Piven, 1992). However, explanations of *trendless class voting fluctuation*, supported by advanced statistical techniques, have emerged as a counter-critique of class voting decline theories (Heath, *et al.*, 1985; Evans, *et al.*, 1991; Manza, *et al.*, 1995).

Our point here is that theories for or against class voting are mainly worked out from data corresponding to advanced capitalist societies –mainly the USA– in an example of what postcolonial theorizing has called geopolitics knowledge (Mignolo, 2001). The problem is that these societies have experienced, during the last decades, a well-known growth of its services sector, at the expense of the industrial one, giving way to what has been known as post-industrial societies (Bell, 1973). It is true, however, that within the framework of big Western nation-states, there are still wide regions and areas whose economic structure is not utterly embedded in the market sphere. Such is the case of the Galician economic structure, which features a strong presence of non-market economic activity, what renders the Galician case as a particularly good case study for what can be an analysis of class voting in pre-capitalist societies (Beiras, 1995). Analyzing this version of class voting will shed light on our comprehension of the electoral behavior in large Western non-market embedded areas as well as in those countries with recent

democratic history that are still defined by strongly pre-capitalist economic structures¹².

3.2.1.1 Still European pre-capitalist societies?


It is not the purpose of this work to ground its argumentation on a narrow definition of what a pre-capitalist society is, as established in its original Marxist theorization (Marx, 1964[1857-58]). On the contrary we base our work on a looser definition of pre-capitalist societies, as those societies characterized for having economic activities which are not embedded in the capitalist market sphere, but rather oriented to self-consumption. As French anthropologist Claude Meillassoux put it, pre-capitalist societies are those societies with economic activities oriented towards reproduction instead of production (Meillassoux, 1972). Thus defined, it is obvious that there are still wide areas within advanced Western economies that can be categorized as pre-capitalist. Of course we are not arguing that the entire Galician economic structure is nowadays pre-capitalist, but we can affirm that this is so for a considerable segment of it. This segment has been declared in decay and its disappearance in a near future has been predicted (Beiras, 2008), but it is still present in today's Galician economy. We use the case of Galicia as a mere example of what must be a general phenomenon not only within the limits of the EU, but also within virtually every nation-state in the Western world and, of course, outside of it.

¹² I want to thank the critique by some colleague anthropologists following the presentation of a draft version of this work at the 5th Summer Seminar on Sociological and Political Research, at Harvard University, September 2012. Their critique saw an evolutionist bias on the notion of pre-capitalist society. Thus, we want to state that by its use we are referring to those societies, such as Galicia, which are embedded in fully capitalist economies, although still keeping relevant features of the economic structure previous to capitalism. We are not saying, therefore, that every society necessarily needs to go through different stages of economic development, including capitalism, as if this were a law of historic development, like in Marx's work.

Thus, we have developed an “agricultural index”, to measure the level of the agrarian sector in Galicia’s economy. This *agricultural index* can be expressed with this formula:


$$\text{Agricultural Index} = \frac{\text{Number of active farms}}{\text{Total population}} \times 100$$

We have calculated the agricultural index not just for Galicia, but also for each one of the seventeenth Spanish Autonomous Communities, as well as for the two Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla (see figure 16), and we see Galicia as occupying the seventh place of all the nineteen autonomous communities and cities.



Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the ‘Agricultural Census 2009’, of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE).

Figure 17 illustrates the proportion of farms depending solely on familiar labor, with no extra wage-earner employees. This familiar type of primary exploitation is typical of pre-capitalist economies and we see that Galicia ranks second, only after Asturias, which has a lower Agricultural Index, as we have seen in figure 16.



Source: Prepared by the author based on data from the ‘Agricultural Census 2009’, of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE).

This high proportion of familiar-exploited farms, producing and consuming primary goods outside the sphere of the capitalist market, derives from the late redemption of the medieval system of “foros”, which took place in 1926. This system established that the peasant working the land was not its owner, but its usufructuary, having to pay some stipulated tributes to a rentier conservative class that block any


possibility of capitalist development (Beramendi, 2007). After the redemption of the “foros” many peasants became owners of small portions of land, but due to different factors there was no immediate capitalist exploitation of these lands within the market system, but rather a sustained pre-capitalist mode of production that extends until the present day¹³.

Thus, small landowners outside the circulation of capitalist economy, are registered on the Spanish National Classification of Occupations or *Clasificación Nacional de Ocupaciones* (CNO) used by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research in its post-electoral studies for Galicia. There has been three approved CNO in Spain, but only two of them were used in these electoral studies: CNO-94 and CNO-79. CNO-94 was used in the last post-electoral study of the CIS, no. 2796. CNO-79 was implemented for the studies no. 2611, 2434, 2263 and 2070, all of them being post-electoral studies developed between years 1993 and 2005. There are two post-electoral studies, no. 1497 and 1292, related to the 1985 and 1981 Galician autonomous elections, which does not make use of any of the CNO classifications.

CNO-94 has one category containing Galician non-capitalist landowners, defined as “Self-employed skilled workers on farms”, no. 601. In CNO-79 this same category

¹³ Beiras has argued that this relative ‘underdevelopment’ was caused by a situation of internal colonialism, by which the three greater economies of the State –Castilian, Basque and Catalan– used the State power to perpetuate a system of dependency regarding other minor economies, like the Galician one (Beiras, 1972: 57-60). It is well known that Beiras built this approach inspired by the work of the economists at the ‘Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’, one of the five Regional Commissions of the United Nations. The whole approach owes much to the works by Robèrt Lafont (1967). This colonial/dependent approach opened up a school in Galician economics –*vid. e.g.*, (López-Suevos, 1977; 1979), also Vence (2011)–.


receives the code 611. In the post-electoral study 1,497, corresponding the 1985 Galician autonomous elections, the category is 04. Finally, in the study no. 1,292, corresponding the 1981 Galician elections, the number of this category is 03. In order to see the weight that these individuals have on Galician social structure we have elaborated figure 18. The low percentage registered in the study no. 1,292 could be the result of an error in the measurement of the occupational categories in that first post-electoral study. It must be said that this category of “Self-employed skilled workers on farms” has the highest frequencies among the overall occupations in every post-electoral study, making Galicia a society very much defined by pre-capitalist economic and social structures. We observe that, although the category is clearly diminishing over time, it still represents a considerable proportion of the occupied Galician population.




Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.

3.2.1.2 Pre-capitalist electoral profile

In this section we present the electoral profile of Galician pre-capitalist “Self-employed skilled workers on farms” occupation. As we have seen social class has an impact on electoral behavior that can be larger or smaller, in the form of *class voting*. As commented above, the Alford Index enables us to measure the levels of class voting for every democratic election. Figure 19 illustrates the evolution of the Alford Index for Galician elections, while Figure 20 shows the same trend for the general elections of Spain.




Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.




Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.

Differences between Galician and Spanish cases are self-evident. The evolution of the Alford Index in the Spanish case is congruent with the general declining trends in class voting described elsewhere (Clark *et al.*, 1993). The Galician case, however, diverges in two ways. In the first place, it shows a clear growing trend since the 2001 elections while, in the second place, it presents mainly negative levels, with the exception of the 1985 and 1993 elections. This means that left-wing parties in Galicia usually receive more votes from nonmanual than from manual workers. But, what is the role of pre-capitalists in this trend? Figure 21 shows the evolution of the Alford Index for the Galician case with and without pre-capitalists workers. It remains clear that pre-capitalist social actors are not voting through a working-class logic voting, as it could be thought due to their condition of manual workers, but we do not have any empirical evidence that they are operating according to nonmanual worker's rationalities, under the logic of the Columbia model.


Ideological self-identification in the left-right axis has been considered as one of the major explanatory factors of the Spanish electoral behavior (Torcal and Medina, 2002). Thus, we have described the subjective identification on the left-right axis for this Galician pre-capitalist electorate, while comparing it with the overall Galician electorate; figure 22 illustrates this difference. It is clear that pre-capitalist electorate is situated to the right of the general electorate, maintaining differences of around one point to its right. This evidence could lead to an explanation in terms of ideological voting of the right-voting trend shown by pre-capitalist electorate. However we need to check the other big ideological axis operating in Galician politics: the Galician nationalist axis. As we see in figure 23, there are no noticeable differences between pre-capitalist and general electorates regarding the Galician nationalism axis.



Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.



Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.



Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research.

3.2.1.3 Discussion

In this section we have defined a particular segment of the Galician electorate that cannot be understood either in terms of *working-class* or in terms of *service class* or *bourgeoisie*. We argued that this fragment of the electorate is properly a pre-capitalist one, for it is made up by workers that are not integrated within the capitalist spheres of production or of capital circulation. They are outside any recognizable form of capitalist market economy, while still integrated within logics of self-consumption or, using Meillasoux conceptual framework (Meillasoux, 1972), still on the sphere of reproduction, not production. We have seen that this pre-capitalist class has a strong presence in Galician social and economic structure, though its relative weight is progressively decreasing with time. This pre-capitalist fraction of the electorate does not seem to have any kind of working-class voting behavior under the Columbia approach, for its inclusion in our analysis involves an ever lower Alford Index, as measured in data from CIS' Galician post-electoral studies. Finally we have also seen that this pre-capitalist sector of society tends to identify itself as more right wing than the average Galician electorate, and as Galician nationalist as the overall electorate.

Thus we may think, with the evidence presented hitherto, that this differentiated pre-capitalist electorate, far from acting from a working-class voting perspective, is situated near of the upper classes' voting behavior. Although our evidence is not conclusive, it allows us to open new research questions that, once resolved, could lead us to a better understanding of pre-capitalist electorates and, therefore, of class voting. In order to solve this apparent contradiction we can argue that pre-capitalist social sectors, although away from the capitalist market, are landowners. This private property ownership works as an element of

capitalism within their non-capitalist general framework, in a way similar to that described by Wright when talking about the New Middle Class as a contradictory class position (Wright, 1985). If this were to be true, then it follows that pre-capitalist electoral behavior will turn closer to either working-class or to upper-classes political behavior depending on the context that surrounds each election¹⁴. This hypothesis, however, does not match the data, for there is a strong trend pointing to a continuity of electoral results in rural municipalities (*vid. supra*).

On the other hand, however, it has been correctly pointed out that pre-capitalist social sectors do not present any logic of capital accumulation, neither any other class logic within the wage-labor schema¹⁵. It is possible to argue that their voting behavior is not the product of a class rationale in the terms postulated by the Columbia approach. We see, nevertheless, that this pre-capitalist class is steadily located on the right side of the ideological axis and that they have been largely supporting the political right. *This could be explained in terms of a class alignment with the political party identified with the local political-economic elite, no matter its ideological location, what would produce remarkable ecological*

¹⁴ We are adapting here the argument by Callinicos and Harman regarding the dual position of new middle classes in advanced capitalist economies (Callinicos and Harman, 1987). This argument is also implicit in Marx's writings, as he considered the peasantry as a potential ally of the proletariat.

¹⁵ The first hypothesis, focused on the importance of private ownership, was suggested by Galician social scientist, professor Xavier Vence, in the course of a conference organized at the Universidade da Coruña in 2010. The counterargument, based on the pre-capitalist condition of this form of property, was provided by Galician social scientist, professor Xosé Manuel Beiras, in the course of a conversation at his own house in February 2011, specifically conducted for the purpose of this thesis. I want to thank both for their useful insights, and especially professor Beiras for his kind hospitality.

variations on both political values and voting behavior. This hypothesis is directly related to well-documented patterns of clientelism, largely described by ethnographers –*vid.* Jablonski (2009) for an analysis of the Galician case; *vid.* Silva (1998) for an analysis of northwest Portugal–. This version of class voting, however, does not match the assumptions of the Columbia model, based on class alignments between the lower classes and the political left and the higher classes and the political right.

The data that we have already presented for the spatial analysis of Spain is in line with our different class-voting hypothesis, which postulates an alignment between the lower classes and the parties related to the local economic and political elites. Let us remember one of the conclusions of the spatial analysis that we have presented above:


‘Therefore, one of the conclusions of our work is that rural habitats are always the places presenting higher electoral support for the hegemonic political options in a given territory, as an identical trend is registered for the support to peripheral nationalist options.’ (*vid. supra*)

This well may be an obvious remark when comparing, e.g., Galician and Andalusian rural municipalities, as it could be argued that these differences are actually the effect of the higher Galician rates of private property ownership among the lower classes. But even if we analyze only the Galician case, we find a significant amount of deactivated rural municipalities strongly supporting left-wing options¹⁶. This empirical fact forces us to reconsider the

¹⁶ The Galician Nationalist Blog (BNG), which has an aggregated mean of 2.87 points on the left/right axis (*vid. supra*, figure 3, p. 75) governs the following deactivated rural councils:

traditional assumptions of class voting. We will develop this argument in the following chapter, in which we will present a model of class voting which is different from the traditional Columbia approach.

Figure 24. Galician municipalities classified by habitat



Source: Elaborated by the author (*vid.* Tables VA and VIA of the Annexes).

Pobra do Brollón, in the province of Lugo; Castrelo de Miño and A Mezquita, in the province of Ourense; San Sadurniño and Santiso, both in the province of A Coruña.

The Party of the Galician Socialists (PSdeG), with an aggregated mean of 4.19 on the left/right axis, holds the office of the following deactivated rural councils:

Camariñas, in the province of A Coruña. Silleda and Fornelos de Montes, in Pontevedra. Entrimo, Calvos de Randín, Castrelo do Val, Cortegada, Carballeda de Avia, Maside, Amoeiro, Parada de Sil, Castro Caldelas and Petín, in Ourense. Ribas de Sil, Pedrafita do Cebreiro, Samos, Becerreá, Cervantes, Navia de Suarna, Negueira de Muñiz and Castroverde, in Lugo.

3.2.2 Some methodological comments on the measurement of the nationalist cleavage in Spain

This section tries to improve our understanding of the relation between national identity and electoral behavior. The study of this relationship has a long record in the recent history of social sciences, for it has been systematically analyzed since the early 1970s –*vid., e.g.,* Eisenstadt and Rokkan (1973)– only a decade after the publication of the last one of the three major works that gave way to the modern scientific analysis of electoral behavior¹⁷. The relationship between national identity and electoral behavior has been also put under the lens of cleavage theory. In his foundational work, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan considered nationalism as one of the four *critical lines of cleavage* making up a given society's political/voting structure, referring to it as: “the conflict between *the central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 14).

But the link between these two broad variables is certainly not a straightforward one, as previous research has shown –see, e.g., Bond (2000)– and, we will argue, its complexities have not yet been utterly revealed. In order to achieve this aim we are going to use primarily data from Spain, although a comparative perspective will be also sustained. We consider that drawing upon data from Spain will enhance our analysis due to two reasons and, probably a third. The first reason is

¹⁷ We refer to the publication of the influential book *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960), which inaugurated the so called *Michigan School*, thus completing the triad of the modern traditions on the study of electoral behavior, being the other two the *Columbia School* and the *Rochester School*. All these three traditions have been previously described in sufficient depth.

that the Spanish case offers us an especially adequate framework for comparison among regions, as the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS)¹⁸ has been producing empirical data since its founding in 1963, enabling comparative analysis throughout methodologically homogeneous quantitative data sets. The second reason is that Spain offers a diverse political scenario, containing an established nation-state as well as different alternative nationalities and regions¹⁹. The third reason can be seen as a paradox, for the work on our research question has been unevenly developed during the last forty years. Thus, we find many examples of academic research occupied with the study of sub-State nationalisms in Spain, whereas it was not until recent times when we have seen the emergence of systematic social scientific accounts of Spanish nationalism as a self-contained ideology, both from mainly empirical standpoints –*vid., e.g.,* Muñoz Mendoza (2012)–, as well as from a more theoretical perspective –*vid., e.g.,* Taibo (2007)–. As Muñoz puts it: “(...) while the emergence, development, reproduction, discourse, social bases, repertoires of action and implications of alternative nationalisms have been thoroughly analyzed, the other side of the game –Spanish nationalism– has been, for long, largely neglected by the empirical literature, or simply treated as a residual category” (Muñoz Mendoza, 2008: xi). This trend is also commented

¹⁸ The Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Founded in 1963 as the *Instituto de la Opinión Pública* (Public Opinion Institute), it changed its name and structure in 1977. Today it is run under the Ministry for the Presidency and, to date, it has developed more than 2,000 surveys and some qualitative studies.

¹⁹ This assertion is endorsed by the second article of the Spanish Constitution of 1978: “The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them” (Spain, 1978: 28315).

in Taibo (2007, p. 9): “If someone, otherwise, miss in these pages a critical consideration of the discourses uttered by those nationalisms of the periphery, it will be good to remember that the object of this book is, rather, Spanish nationalism and that, while there are not too many considerations over this one among us, they are common, however, those interested in the former”. We have to acknowledge, in this regard, the impact of the influential work by Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (1995), for the development of these new lines of research.

Our work will be also very much grounded upon Billig’s theory of nationalism, which understands it mainly as a widespread ideology, opposing those views that see it as a psychological attribute of minority groups: “(...) The modern person considers the possession of a national identity to be as natural as having an arm or leg. However, this naturalness is itself something to be investigated, for it indicates the ideological nature of nationalism as an everyday phenomenon. It is one of the functions of ideology that historical and socially contingent features of the social world are experienced as ‘natural’ (...)” (Billig, 1993: 40). Thus, considering nationalism as an ideology entails that it should have active connections with the political realm and, so, we find many examples of scientific literature examining these connections between nationalism and political attitudes, relating topics such as immigration (Díez Medrano and Koenig, 2005), gender ideologies (Racioppi and O’Sullivan, 2000), language ideologies (Heller, 2011), etc. As any ideology, nationalism is constructed through the individual’s primary and secondary socialization (Dekker, Malova and Hoogendoorn, 2003), establishing a set of political and pre-political values which, eventually, will affect electoral behavior (Feldman, 2003). However, the way in which this connection takes place remains a black box in many aspects, although substantial advances in research have

provided us some explanations of its mechanisms. In its early stages, research on the relationship between national identity and electoral behavior established outright patterns, such as those derived from Gellner's well-known standpoint on nationalism, seeing it as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983: 1); there was a close link between national identity and electoral behavior implicit to this vision by which every nationalist living in a stateless nation should vote for secessionist political parties. However, empirical research has shown that this is by no means what is happening and that, consequently, we should adopt more flexible conceptions of nationalism (Bond, 2000: 33).

3.2.2.1 Preliminary considerations

There are probably few social phenomena as reluctant to be fixed within the scope of the rigorousness provided by social scientific thought as national identity. Its confinement to the realm of the *doxa*, in its twofold Platonian significance of *pistis* and *eikasia* (Plato, 2012[4th c. BC]), is perhaps better understood when we compare its scientific development during the last one hundred years of modern social science with another old, politically loaded, concept like social class. Thus, if we take a look at two of the most widely respected recent compilations on the state-of-the-art regarding social class and national identity, Wright (2005) and Özkirimli (2010), respectively, we can easily see that both from a theoretical and from a methodological point of view, social class has received a stricter treatment than national identity did. This relative underdevelopment on the scientific treatment of national identity, largely commented by several authors (*vid., e.g.,* Rigger, 2000; McCrone, 1998a; Billig, 1995: 51-55; Smith, 1983), cannot be attributed to a lack of time, interest or relevance of the social issues underpinned

by national identity. To justify these arguments, we could remember Ernest Renan's famous conference *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* given at the Sorbonne in 1882 (Renan, 1997[1882]). The immense amount of texts dedicated to the 'national question' came from both the Marxist and the Liberal traditions –see Haupt, *et al.* (1974) for a summary of the former, and Haugaard (2006) for a summary of the latter–. It attracted the interest of some of the most brilliant scholars of the last decades, like Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1991) or Benedict Anderson (1991). Moreover it has an undeniable social interest, as it played an important role on many of the most destructive conflicts that humanity has suffered in its long history (Hall and Malešević, 2013). It is perhaps in this exceptional relevance –as Billig (1995: 22-3) pointed out– that we are to find the reason why national identity was so impervious to the scientific realm of Platonian episteme. Nevertheless, this relative methodological underdevelopment must be qualified; there have been some relevant technical achievements that enabled us to better analyze the questions aroused by national identity. In this sense, the so-called Moreno Question (MQ) (Moreno, 1986)²⁰ is undeniably one of them, as it provides a robust methodological tool for the measurement and comparison of people's national identity feelings. This article aims to draw upon the path opened by the MQ, in order to further strengthen the methodological tools at our disposal, which are, as Goldthorpe (2000) insistently states, at the core of any scientific advancement. This task seems particularly urgent today, when national identity

²⁰ It has been explained (Moreno, 2006: 3) that was actually Juan Linz who firstly introduced this question, applying it to the Spanish case (Linz, 1973). This methodology was also applied thereafter by Gunther *et al.* (1986: 317). Finally, Moreno applied it to Scotland (1986; 1988).

has become a source of issues defining the impact area of political communication (Bouza, 2004) not only in Europe (Friend, 2012), but worldwide (Ichijo, 2013).

3.2.2.2 Objectives

In his classic work on the general sociology of Scotland, David McCrone has commented on the difficulties that scholarship has traditionally had in order to define what a nation is, stating that “(...) there seems little value in pursuing an ‘objective’ set of criteria, and measuring Scotland against them” (McCrone, 1992: 198). He instead has stressed the importance played by *consciousness* on nation-building processes, even claiming that “in many respects, the ‘nation’ is an aspiration rather than a historical fact” (McCrone, 1992: 198). Drawing upon this social-constructionist vision of nation-building processes it can be argued that nationalism should be better understood as an ideological continuum rather than a five set categorical system, such as the one offered by the MQ. This constructionist view is of course the general background and starting point of every qualitative approach to national identity, neatly highlighted in Wodak’s *et al.* classical study of Austrian national identity: “We understand the concept of identity on which we base our study to be context-dependent and dynamic” (Wodak, *et al.*, 2009 [1999], p. 3). It has been pointed out that there is usually a *dual identity* underlying people’s national identification (Moreno and Arriba, 1996), but this fact, in our opinion, does not neglect the idea of an identitarian *continuum* in those areas characterised by its subjection to two or more national projects claiming the same territory; on the contrary, it presupposes the introduction of two or more identitarian *continua*, depending on the number of national projects at stake in a given territory.

It is widely agreed, then, in social scientific literature, that nations are constructed through nation-building processes, *imagined* in the well-known expression by Benedict Anderson (1991). A definition that explains this point with greater detail, is the one given by Manuel Castells, who see nations as “cultural communities built up in people’s minds and collective memory by the fact of sharing history and political projects” (Castells, 2003: 82). This *constructivist approach*, however, is sometimes taken too far, as in Ernest Gellner’s assertion: “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner, 1964: 169). To consider nations as mere “inventions” has been thoroughly criticized, and so Anderson states that “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’”, concluding that “In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (Anderson, 1991: 6). A similar reasoning is pointed out by David McCrone when he states that “the nation is imagined rather than imaginary” (McCrone, 2001a: 49).

It has been said (Wimmer, 2008: 971) that it was social anthropologist Fredrik Barth the first scholar who broke with Johann Gottfried Herder’s essentialist perspective according to which nations are a natural expression of a deeper force, the *volksgeist*, often equated by Herder to language, as part of a general schema that postulates an identification between nature and human history, being both concepts subjected to similar general laws (Herder, 2013 [1744-1803]). In his classical ethnographic comparative study, Barth states that “The cultural contents of ethnic dichotomies would seem analytically to be of two orders: (i) overt signals

or signs –the diacritical features that people look for and exhibit to show identity, often such features as dress, language, house-form, or general style of life, and (ii) basic value orientations: the standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged” (Barth, 1969: 14). Thus, Barth reversed the logic underlying Herder’s assumptions, as cultural expressions, in the form of language or even manners, are used by groups in order to build up their own identities, and not the other way round. This theoretical standpoint has become commonly assumed in the vast field of nationalism studies which, although traditionally characterised by little communication in both disciplinary²¹ and national²² terms, it is starting to show now signs of integration (Brubaker, 2009: 21-27). One of the few analytical approaches which has been traditionally widely accepted²³ in the field is Miroslav Hroch’s schema for explaining stateless nations’ national awakening (Maxwell, 2010: 865); again, Hroch emphathizes the relevance of nations as constructed categories:

²¹ “There was relatively little cross-fertilization between work in sociology, anthropology, political science, and history, and still less between these and other disciplines such as archaeology, linguistics, economics, and disciplines in the humanities” (Brubaker, 2009: 22).

²² Loïc Wacquant put it this way: “The Summer 1996 issue of *Dissent* on “Embattled Minorities Around the Globe: Rights, Hopes, Threats” offers a good illustration of this imperialistic imposition operating under the guise of crossnational argumentation. It projects onto the whole humanity U.S. liberal common sense (and U.S. liberal guilt or good conscience) along with the category of “minority,” (sic.) which presupposes precisely what is being contested in social reality: that “culturally” or “ethnically” defined subgroups within a given nation-state are or should be entitled to some measure of civic and political recognition” (Wacquant, 1997: 232).

²³ Michael Billig has developed a critique of Hroch’s schema (Billig, 1995, p. 43), but it relates only to the idea, implicit in Hroch’s model, that nationalism finishes with the establishment of a new nation-state.

“(…) The ‘nation’ is not, of course, an eternal category, but was the product of a long and complicated process of historical development in Europe. For our purposes, let us define it at the outset as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness” (Hroch, 1993: 4).

This ‘collective consciousness’ referred by Hroch can be active or latent, as it should be seen as a process that “(…) could be interrupted, just as it could also be resumed after a long hiatus” (Hroch, 1993, p. 5). This process of (re)construction has been studied by many authors; Eric Hobsbawm has highlighted the role played by national traditions, frequently the outcome of elite-led strategies, in order to activate nation-building process (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), while others has been focused on the everyday nature of these national construction processes. Among the latter, Michael Billig’s theorization of nationalist (re)production (Billig, 1995) has played a very important role, giving way to what became a sustained theoretical standpoint –*vid. e.g.*, Cram (2001) and Penrose (2011)–. Billig resorts to Anderson’s conception of imagined communities in order to define the nation as “imagined as a unique entity in terms of time and of space” (Billig 1995, p.70), hence, the uniqueness in terms of time would be embodied in the national histories, while the uniqueness in terms of space, in the construction of a national “homeland” (Billig 1995, pp. 74-78). Nevertheless, from Billig’s point of view, a nation has to be imagined during its formation, but this imagination does not need to be employed continuously for its reproduction, which will be rather developed on a daily basis through processes of inhabitation, constituting Billig’s *banal* nationalism which, in his own words “is introduced to cover the ideological habits

which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (Billig 1995, p.6). These processes of reproduction occur between the moments of special patriotic meaning, or *flag-waving situations*, like “St. Andrews Day” or the “Burns Night” in Scotland or the “Day of the Country” or the “Day of Martyr Galicia”, in Galicia (McCrone and McPherson, 2009).

Billig’s analysis is based on Bourdieu’s theory of *habitus* (Billig 1995: 42). Bourdieu developed his concept of *habitus* as part of his general theory of genetic structuralism or “constructivist structuralism” (Bourdieu, 1989: 14) created in order to overcome the big debate between structure and agency, by giving back to agents the power to control their lives, power that, from Bourdieu’s point of view, had been banished in the works of structuralists such as Althusser (1965) or Lévi-Strauss (1958). Bourdieu, consequently, defined *habitus* as a socially generated system of predispositions to guide “thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions” (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]: 55). The habitus is constituted as an expression of an individual’s position within social structure or, using class analysis terminology, it is an expression of people’s class location (Weininger, 2005: 86), although it is not exactly the same for everybody within a particular social class, for it constitutes only a pre-reflexive guide, not an absolute determinant of action (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 136). Therefore, for Billig, who understands nationalism as an ideology, there must be some social mechanisms, related to people’s social position –being national of a given nation-state- which are capable of constituting a general guidance of predispositions enabling identification with a given national community and which are constantly, unconsciously, expressed. Examples of these “national habitus” can be found in sports, when people gets excited with the triumphs of their national teams or sad in defeat, as well as in

everyday life; a man or a woman, travelling abroad, will probably feel some emotional response when exposed to identity triggers, such as watching their national food in a menu of a restaurant or hearing people speaking their national language in the streets of a foreign city. In fact, there are many examples of nation-building processes boosted in distant diasporas –*vid.* Núñez Seixas (2001) for a study of Galician emigrants in Argentina, one of the largest Galician emigration destinations– illustrating these processes.

So the scope of study of banal nationalism pays attention to the (re)construction of nationalism within *established nations*, making a difference with those theories that understands nationalism as the condition of “others” –*vid.*, *e.g.*, Janowitz (1983) and Snyder (1976)– or even with those works based on the study of nationalism in moments of national pride, such as international sports competition –*vid.*, *e.g.*, van Hilvoorde, Elling and Stokvis (2010), and Abell *et al.* (2007)– leaving aside the question of how national identity is maintained between those special moments. In this sense, Billig explains that nations are inhabited through processes of routine formation, or inhabitation; these processes make reference to those elements which daily, almost continuously, are affecting people in an unconscious way, such as flags in public buildings, drawings in notes and coins alluding to glorious national history/persons/events, journalists’ *deixis* by which the nation becomes the universe of information, unless the contrary is informed etc. *Deixis* is a concept in linguistics that makes reference to the contextual nature of language. According to Rauh, “(...) deictic expressions are those expressions of a language which in some way (...) are dependent upon or related to the situation of the encoder (...) The term used here (derived from gr. *deiktikos* “apt for pointing with the finger”) also hints at this respect, namely at the function of deictic

expressions to *point at* their referents” (Rauh, 1983: 10). Thus, by *deixis* we refer to those elements in language that need, in order to be fully understood, of extra-linguistic indicators. Michael Billig widened the scope of the term to explain how national identity is reconstructed through language by authorized speakers²⁴, who assume their particular nation as the background of the information and, thus, (re)produce it (when, for instance, a TV news presenter says that “the government of the nation is working on this problem”, assuming which nation is that).

Let us get back now to the analysis of the MQ. We can affirm that, by using the MQ to measure national identity we are losing detail. It will be impossible, for instance, to register those differences among individuals regarding the process of embodying –in their discourse and ideology- a given national identity. The MQ is a relatively simple categorization of what in essence is a qualitatively rich phenomenon. On the other hand, however, it is also true that the MQ offers the possibility of obtaining quantitative measures of national identity, with higher detail than a dichotomous question, as Bond points out: “(...) Although it undoubtedly has its limitations –*vid.* McCrone (1998: 7); Brown, McCrone and Paterson (1998: 209)– it also has the virtues of consistency and continuity” (Bond, 2000: 16).

3.2.2.3 Analytical implications and hypothesis

We have seen, so far, that there is a substantial degree of agreement among scholars in dealing with nations not as static objective realities but, rather on the

²⁴ Authorized speakers are those speakers who “have such an authority that can speak to say nothing. Their discourse is effective: it is believed, obeyed, respected” (De Lemos, 1993: 85). They are the bearers of a symbolic *skeptron*, the stick held by public speakers in ancient Greece, in an example by Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1982: 124). This figure is often identified in modern societies with newscasters.

contrary, as on-going intersubjective processes. Nations are therefore constructed at some point and, once they become accepted as useful realities by a majority of their population, they need to be constantly reconstructed, through discourse (Wodak et al., 2009 [1999]), cultural practices (McCrone, Morris and Kiely, 1995), the media (Eder et al., 2002), branding image²⁵ (Dinnie, 2008), and many other everyday mechanisms (Billig, 1995, pp. 93-127). So nations are modern social constructions built around some particular diacritics (Barth, 1969) which preexisted to them, and which are articulated around an on-going national project (Armstrong, 1982). It is well-known that language plays a strong central role as a diacritic for sub-state national projects in Spain –see Shabad & Gunther (1982) for the Catalan and Basque cases and Beswick (2007) or Beramendi (2007), for analysis on Galicia– but there is of course a difference between national languages and prenational forms of talk. This difference between a national, standardized languages and prenational forms of talk was densely commented by Billig (1995: 13-36), linking it to his idea of a “syntax of hegemony” (Billig, 1995: 87), a phenomenon related to the process by which a part of the cultural/linguistic

²⁵ Branding image as a part of national reconstruction has achieved a prominent position in Spain, as it is one of the main strategies developed at the Foreign Ministry. See, e.g., the news published by Spanish national newspaper ABC, in May 2013: “Marca España, Margallo’s ‘flagship’” (Mora, 2013). See also the news published in *El País*, in September 2013: “Margallo launches in Paris the “Marca España” with a message of “excellence”” (EFE, 2013). The Foreign Ministry in Spain also launched a specific webpage on this www.marcaespana.es where it states: “Marca España is a state policy whose efficacy will be proven in the long term. The guarantee of the continuity of the Marca España project stems and develops from consensus that transcends political changes. Its objective is to improve the image of our country both domestically and beyond our borders for the common good.” (MarcaEspaña, 2013). See, for an academic perspective on the topic, Noya (2004).

mosaic that had the territory included within the limits of a future nation, will become dominant in order to construct a genuine national identity; in this sense we can observe a metonymic process by which a part claims to represent the whole. This concept is applied by Billig in order to analyze the construction of languages, insofar the process by which a given dialect²⁶ becomes the “official” language of a particular nation, is inextricably linked to power; in Billig’s words: “The middle class of metropolitan areas typically will make their meanings stick as the official language, relegating other patterns within the national boundaries to ‘dialects’, a term which almost invariably carries a pejorative meaning” (Billig 1995: 32). This process of linguistic hegemony is also central to Gellner’s theory (1983), which was a prolific starting point for subsequent works focused on the problems posted by linguistic substitution in terms of human rights (*vid.*, e.g., Eriksen, 1992).

This differentiation between pre-national diacritics and standardized national forms is not, of course, bounded only to language, and expands to whatever ethnic attributes usually understood as the objective foundations determining the existence of nations, constitutive of national *differential facts*. In McCrone’s opinion, those elements which are chosen in order to proclaim the *differential fact* of a given nation, are not independent from the socio-political situation; in fact it is people who select what *differential facts* has to be proclaimed as identifiers of

²⁶ The term *dialect* has been problematized a number of times, as it usually involves not only a descriptive scientific definition on the variation of languages, but also differences regarding the status of each of these varieties –see Haugen (1966) for an in-depth dissertation on the different implications of the term dialect-. This is why we want to clarify that our use of the term in our text refers to its most descriptive non-normative way.

nationality. In other words, “being able to show that there is ethnic homogeneity in a given territory –or, rather, that people living there believe themselves to be homogeneous– is the outcome of political and social processes, not their explanation, their cause” (McCrone D. , 2001b, p. 23; Stavenhagen, 1996)-. Therefore, when nations bitare in an early stage of construction, when they are not established, it is easy to find conflicts among national elites regarding these processes of standardization; the well-studied Galician bitter orthographic conflict constitutes a good example of such conflicts (Herrero, 2011). This differentiation between well-established national languages and pre-national forms of talk can be easily found in qualitative research; De Nieves (2008, pp. 39-42) has shown it for the Galician case, through the realization of semi-structured in-depth interviews. Galician nation-building process is relatively underdeveloped when compared to those processes in Catalonia or the Basque Country (Martinez-Herrera, 2002) and we argue that this fact has relevant analytical implications in a context like Galicia, where 90% of the population declares to be able to speak Galician at the turn of the 21st century (Maiz and Losada, 2000: 65). We have seen, however, qualitative evidences showing that Galician is usually seen as a pre-national way of talk rather than a modern national language, establishing an interpretative pattern that changes when talking about the language used by Galician nationalists, seen as a proper modern language (De Nieves, 2008: 40). It has been registered, showing the other side of the coin, processes of protest against standardized Galician language, carried out by native speakers defending their own particular ways of talking, usually characterized by clear lexical Spanish language interferences (Alvarez-Caccamo, 1993; O'Rourke & Ramallo, 2013).

This, of course, is congruent with theories on nationalism highlighting the difference between pre-national diacritics and national standardized forms. For that reason, we think that this empirically documented process related to Galician language engages as well with other kinds of ethnic diacritics and to Galician identity itself. If this were to be the case, the MQ cannot be interpreted as a reliable indicator of national identity for the Galician case, as Galician identity can be understood by large parts of its population as pre-national. It is true that the MQ does not label territorial identities as “national” or otherwise, but then we have to accept that the measurement of national identity through the MQ will present problems in those contexts where different types of identities –national and pre-national– are contained within the same label; in the case of Galicia, for instance, we will have some people stating that they feel mainly Galicians in a pre-national way, while other people will state that they are mainly Galicians in a national way. It will be the same label, but with completely different meanings²⁷.

²⁷ Typically we can imagine a Galician speaker from a rural area, with no particular sympathy towards Galician nationalism and an electoral behavior that consistently relies on Spanish nationalistic parties, stating that he/she feels mainly Galician (due to his/her ethnic attributes, we may deduce). On the other hand we could find an Spanish speaker from one of the biggest Galician cities, without any link with Galician traditional culture, but with a strong nationalist ideology, stating that he/she feels mainly Galician (due to his/her political or ideological attributes). These are two completely different ways of considering oneself “mainly Galician”, put together by the MQ within the same category; however, in political or ideological terms these two terms are clearly different. As nationalism, we have already stated, belongs to the realm of ideologies, the MQ does not seem very useful to measure nationalism in this kind of contexts. In other words we can summarize this problem by saying that ethnic and ideological realities do not necessarily have to present any statistical correlation; Galician ethnicity can be integrated within any national project –Galician or Spanish– while ideology can be developed with any given

Again, Michael Billig has commented this difference between pre-national and national feelings of identity, explaining that Mediaeval times would be characterised by an idea of the *terra* as a sense of belonging tied up to limited, relatively small, territories “like valleys, uplands or lowlands” (Billig 1995, p. 74) and not to wider national communities spreading beyond direct human perception, *imagined* in terms of Anderson (1991). As a consequence we have to acknowledge that we do not know what kind of identity –national or prenational– is actually measuring the MQ, and we instead should recognize that what is probably happening is that these two kinds of identities are being recorded within the same categories; this mixing in the type of identities subsumed in the same categories of the MQ does not make any difference to people’s self-identification, but we should be aware of it when we use the MQ as an indicator of national feelings. The point has been developed by Beramendi who, on the Spanish case, concluded:

“In other words, the development of a sub-state national identity induces two opposing phenomena: the growth of a concordant regional identity in unnationalized parts of the community, and a reaction reaffirming the national-state identity in other portions as well as among the population outside this community. *In terms of identities, the region in question is divided, as it were, into three persuasions: two are built around **the same specific ethnicity but in different***

ethnicity. It is worth saying that during Franco’s dictatorship there was an effort for integrating the different cultures of Spain as regional variations enriching Spanish cultural identity, in an attempt to detach ethnicity from sub-state processes of nation building (Mira, 2009).

degrees (a national sub-state versus a simple regional identity), and the third is centred on the national-state identity” (Beramendi, 1999: 95; my emphasis).

There is no possible analytical way of discerning the first two identities referred by Beramendi taking only into account the five categories that make up the MQ and, particularly, the two categories priming the sub-national identity; in a society like Galicia, defined for having two on-going national projects, one poorly developed Galician national project and one strong established state-wide nation project, such as the Spanish one, the MQ becomes a sort of bucket were different kinds of identities coexist, being impossible for the analyst to distinguish them. We could have some people identifying themselves as Galicians in a regional, not national, way, as they can understand that their cultural diacritics –being Galician speakers, playing/listening to Galician traditional music, etc.- are regional expressions of Spanishness. On the other hand we could have some people with all the cultural diacritics associated to the Spanish national project –being Spanish speakers with no connections to traditional Galician culture- identifying themselves as Galicians only, in a pure expression of Galician nationalist ideology. Our hypothesis then is that the MQ is only measuring national identity correctly in those cases where we find two highly developed national projects; this would be the case of Catalonia, the Basque Country or Scotland. Moreover, although in these cases the relation between the MQ and people’s national identities is clearer, there is always some degree of uncertainty regarding those identities priming the sub-national category, introducing a doubt on the nature of such assertions. However, in those cases where we find one strong state-related national project and one underdeveloped sub-state national project, the MQ’s would become fuzzy, mixing national and pre-national identities within those categories priming the sub-state identity; this

would be the case of Galicia and, probably, of some other cases within Spain, like Andalusia or Asturias, which present even weaker national projects fighting against the state-wide Spanish national project. We will try to provide empirical support for this hypothesis in the next section.

3.2.2.4 Descriptive analysis

Let us start our analysis by considering data from the CIS' study 'Autonomic Barometer (III)', no. 2,956. This study consisted in the realization of a survey with 11,290 interviews within Spain, with a sample that enables specific analysis for each one of the seventeen Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs)²⁸. The fieldwork took place between 13 September and 9 October 2012 and it is accessible online (CIS, 2012)²⁹. Figure 25 presents a scatter plot, showing the relationship between two variables: feeling of attachment with the Spanish identity (*Y* axis) and feeling of attachment with the AC identity (*X* axis)³⁰. Here we have two main groups of ACs, one group *A*, containing those ACs of the upper part of the figure and another group *B*, in the lowest part. We have then identified two subsets of ACs within each of the aforementioned big groups. The first subset *A.1* (Castile-La Mancha, Valencia, Castile and León and

²⁸ See figure IIIAa, IIIAb, IIIAc, IIIAd, and IIIAe in the Annexes.

²⁹ There is no data available for including in our analysis the Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia –absence of a question in its questionnaire that allows us to measure the multiple levels of Murcians' identity–. Murcia, however, is traditionally an AC with a weak sense of AC identity; the MQ for this AC in CIS' 2,956 study shown nobody answering 'Only Murcian, not Spanish' and a 6.3 per cent of people answering 'More Murcian than Spanish'.

³⁰ The wording of this question was: 'Everyone feels attached, to some extent, with the land where we live, but there are some areas to which we feel more attached than others. To what extent do you feel identified with the village or city where you live? Use a 0 to 10 scale to answer, where 0 means that you do not feel 'any identification' and 10 that you feel 'very identified'. This question –absent in the questionnaire for Murcia- included identification with Spain and the AC, as well.

Madrid) features high Spanish identifications (8 to 9 over 10) and relatively low AC's identification (7 to 7.5 over 10)³¹. The second subset *A.2* consists of ACs with high Spanish identifications (8 to 9 over 10) as well as high AC's identification (9 to 9 over 10) –Asturias, Extremadura, Aragon, Andalusia, Cantabria and La Rioja-. The second group of ACs present low feelings of Spanishness (means under 8 over 10). We have subdivided this *B* set into two subsets *B.1* and *B.2*; the first one contains relatively low expressions of Spanishness (7 to 8 over 10) and high identifications with the AC (8 to 9.03 over 10), including the Canary Islands, Galicia and the Balearic Islands. Finally, subset *B.2* is characterized for having low expressions of Spanish identity (5 to 7 over 10) and high expressions of identification with the AC (8 to 8.5 over 10); this subset includes Navarre, the Basque Country and Catalonia³². Adapting to our data the existing literature, particularly Herranz de Rafael (1996), we will define group *A.1* as composed by strong state-wide nationalist ACs, groups *A.2* and *B.1* by weakly nationalized ACs and group *B.2* by strong state-wide nationalist ACs. We hypothesize that the nature of this cleavage, as a division between strongly nationalized ACs *versus* weakly nationalized ACs, involves the existence of two different kinds of national conflict in Spain. ACs within subsets *A.1* and *B.2* in figure 1 will be characterized by having a belligerent structure of actors reproducing nationalism³³, whereas ACs within subsets


³¹ This data is based on mean values for each AC.

³² We have to note the peculiarity regarding the case of Navarre, as this AC has been traditionally claimed as part of the Basque Country by Basque nationalists –see, e.g., Perez-Agote (1989) or Conversi (1997: xvi). For a historical perspective during the Second Spanish Republic, see Chueca-Intxusta (1999)–. There were two Basque nationalist coalitions concurring in the Spanish 2011 general election within Navarre, *Amaiur* and *Geroa Bai*; they obtained 91,623 votes in the AC of Navarre, concentrating 28.25 per cent of the vote for political parties within this AC (MinisterioInterior, 2013).

³³ See, Eder *et al.* (2002) for a dramatist perspective on national identity reconstruction, formed by a basic matrix of three structural positions: *ego*, *alter*, and *other*.

A.2 and B.1 will have a rather lower profile regarding their set of actors reproducing national identity.

Figure 25. Collective identity feelings in each Spanish Autonomous Community



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from CIS' study 2,956.

In order to test this last hypothesis, pointing out differences on the degree of conflict associated to each group of ACs we will develop a qualitative content analysis of the press. If this hypothesis proves to be right, then the appropriateness of our proposed division for Spanish ACs will gain consistence, enabling subsequent analysis to test our main hypothesis, already explained, according to which the MQ only provides good measures of national identity in those contexts where we find highly developed national projects –ACs within subset B.2– but not in those places with either one national project –ACs within subset A.1– or presenting low intensity alternative sub-national projects – ACs within subsets A.2 and B.1–.

3.2.2.5 Some clarifications on the notion of dual identity

It can be argued that the idea of a *dual identity*, particularly developed by Luis Moreno on the Catalan case (Moreno, 1986; Moreno, 1988a; Moreno, 1988b; Moreno and Arriba, 1996) and assumed later by Spanish researchers to explain other cases within post-1978 Spain –*vid.* Coller and Castelló (1999), on the case of Valencia– contradicts our approach, more focused on the idea of conflict between different national identities within Spain. The *dual identity* approach is at the core of the design of the MQ, as Moreno himself explains in his article on the origins of the ‘Moreno question’:

“The concept of dual identity or compound nationality concerns the way in which citizens identify themselves in sub-state minority nations or regions. It incorporates in variable proportions the ethnoterritorial (regional) identity and the state (national) identity. As a result of this, citizens share their institutional loyalties at both levels of political legitimacy without any apparent fracture between them” (Moreno, 2006: 2).

The centrality of the notion of a ‘dual identity’ in the formation of the MQ as a methodological approach to measure national identity leads us to clarify our interpretation of how identities are intertwined in the Spanish state, which has been defined as a paradigm of multinational political organization (Linz, 1989). Our view of the problem is focused on the idea of an unequal relation between the State-wide Spanish national identity and the different sub-State national identities; this unequal relation takes often the form of a hierarchy, in which a dominant national project conforms a dominant national identity with the ability to integrate the ethnoterritorial variations to itself, usually as regional identities, resembling

the distinction applied in linguistics when regional dialects are to be defined against national languages, as Billig puts it:

“The idea of a dialect had little use before nation-states started establishing official ways of speaking and writing. Differences between languages and dialect, then, become hotly contested political issues, as well as concerns for the discipline of linguistics (...) More is at stake in drawing the boundary of a language than linguistics. The battle for hegemony, which accompanies the creation of states, is reflected in the power to define language (...)” (Billig, 1995, p. 32)

This power-related distinction between languages and dialects has been pointed out by Gil (2006), on the Galician case. But, perhaps, it is on the notion of *hegemony* that we can best circumscribe the problems posed by the idea of a dual identity. Again, Michael Billig wrote that “(...) within the history of nationalism, one part of the imagined national whole has always sought to present itself as the universal voice of the whole (...) in attempting to construct a national, cultural unity, one part –one aspect of the cultural and linguistic mosaic- will become the dominant, metonymic representation of the whole (...) other ways of being national will be repressed, forgotten or relegated to the status of dialect” (Billig, 1995: 87). Such metonymic process by which a part of the national mosaic is discursively constructed as representing the entire nation, involves above all the set of a power relation by which the centre rules symbolically over the peripheries, identifying nationalistic discourses with Bakhtin’s idea that utterances involve centrifugal and centripetal aspects at the same time (Bakhtin, 1981 [1930s]). We can state, therefore, that there is a differential quantity of status associated to the collective cultural representations existing within the boundaries of a given nation-state,

enabling Pierre Bourdieu's well known processes of capital conversions (Bourdieu, 1986), in this case from social and economic capital into cultural capital, as "the middle class of the metropolitan areas typically will make their meanings stick as the official language, relegating other patterns within the national boundaries to 'dialects', a term which almost invariably carries a pejorative meaning" (Billig, 1995: 32). Also, Anthony Smith, in his ethno-symbolist approach to nationhood, argues that many modern nation-states were formed around a dominant pre-modern ethnic community integrating, peacefully or by arms, another *ethnies*, as he calls those pre-modern communities (Smith, 1991: 39).

It is easy now to express that the idea of a *dual identity* as expressing the self-identity of the inhabitants of stateless nations within wider nation-states is not as explanatory as it should be, for there is much left unexplained in terms of power relations entangled within the social articulation of the two identities composing the duality or even within the articulations of various identities composing "multiple identities", a term also used by Moreno when he explains the identity complex of modern societies (Moreno, 2004). It is necessary to say that this critique is probably more accurate when applied to the case of Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia than when it is used in order to measure identity feelings in Scotland, and this is so due to a simple reason regarding the wording of the so-called Moreno question. Thus, when deployed in Scotland, the question usually poses a distinction between Scottish and British identities, whereas in Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia that distinction is made between Catalan/Basque/Galician and Spanish identities.

As we know that nations are constructed through discursive (Wodak *et al.*, 2009 [1999]) and other symbolic unconscious processes (Billig, 1995), then we can better talk about nations in terms of processes or projects, rather than established perpetual things. Consequently we will call the State-wide national process operating in the Spanish state as the *Spanish national project* (SNPr), whereas the different sub-State national processes will be identified as the *Catalan national project* (CNPr), the *Basque national project* (BNPr), the *Galician national project* (GNPr), etc. Our point refers to the idea that the SNPr maintains a discursive and symbolic *war* with the other national projects present within the boundaries of the Spanish state. As we know that every national project claims a given territoriality as *their* national territory (Penrose, 2002), and a given *people*³⁴ within that territory as *their* nationals (Anderson, 1991)³⁵, it follows that two or more different genuine national projects cannot coexist within the same territorial boundaries without the presence of conflict. The dramatic situation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict gives us a daily reminder of this social fact, as it does history – we can take as an example the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, very much based on territorial disagreements among Pol Pot’s Cambodia and Vietnam, that eventually gave way to the Third Indochina War –see Hood (1992) and Young (1991)–. This incompatibility between the core assumptions of the SNPr and the rest of the

³⁴ See Bourdieu (1990) for a critical reflection on the relationship between power and the social construction of *the people* precisely by the elites who deploy this construction to reassert their social primacy over “the people” to which or for which they talk.

³⁵ The cultural anthropologist Jaqueline Urla, who made extensive fieldwork in the Basque Country, has highlighted the role played by modern statistics in the social construction of national identities (Urla, 1993).

national projects within Spain produces a dynamic creating two correlated processes:

1. The SNPr tries to integrate within it the diverse set of ethnicities present within the territory *imagined* (Anderson, 1991) as Spanish national. As the diacritics conforming Spain as a nation were mainly taken from Castile³⁶, Billig's first syntax of hegemony (Billig, 1995: 87) was built around the cultural symbols of this region –language is a good example of this, as the Spanish national language is commonly identified with Castilian³⁷-. Consequently, the more the ethnic diacritics of the peripheral areas of Spain differ from the Castilian standard, the higher the efforts of the SNPr in order to integrate them within it. This process of integration necessarily

³⁶ In terms of Spanish political scientist, Carlos Taibo: “[...] in the exercise of determination of the national character some stereotypes are imposed on others: it seems unnecessary to remember that the *Spanish* national character is often confused with the *Castilian*, to the point that the latter frequently becomes simply the former” (Taibo, 2008: 85; italics in the original).

³⁷ This discursive construction of the Spanish syntax of hegemony around the language of Castile can be found in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Article 3 of this Constitution deals with language in Spain and is entitled “Castilian and the rest Spanish languages”. We can say that this legal formulation is constructing through discourse a hierarchical system that identifies a primary Spanish language –Castilian– and a secondary category formed by “the rest” of the languages within the Spanish state. This practice is consistently developed on a daily basis by the Spanish authorities. We can take as an example the “Instituto Cervantes”, which is “the public institution created in Spain in 1991 for the promotion and teaching of the Spanish language and of the co-official languages and for the diffusion of the Spanish and the Spanish American culture” (InstitutoCervantes, 2014). As we see in its own definition, the discursive construction of the Spanish syntax of hegemony around Castilian language appears to be self-evident, as Castilian is implicitly identified as *the* Spanish language, relegating what the Constitution calls “the rest of the Spanish languages” to the condition of merely *co-official* languages.

regionalizes non-Castilian diacritics –in the sense of recognizing them, but to the price of being imbued with a lower status than the Castilian standard- as the syntax of hegemony of one national project can be only identified with one of the parts conforming the cultural mosaic of the nation³⁸. The characterization of the non-Castilian languages of Spain as “dialects” of the Spanish language during Francoism was a good example of this, and we can find as well historical antecedents of this kind of Spanish glotopolitics in the times of the colonization of the *New World* (Mannheim, 1992). For a recent perspective on the topic, see the work of Galician sociolinguist García Negro (García Negro, 2000; 1993; 1991). Also Álvarez Cáccamo (2005) for a critical analysis of present linguistic legislation and, for a general historical perspective of the 20th century, see Freitas (2008).

2. The second process is produced by the dynamic generated by the different sub-state nationalisms within Spain, as the CNPr, the BNPr or the GNPr, to cite the main three sub-state national projects within the Spanish state. This dynamic works in the opposite direction than the aforementioned process regarding the SNPr; thereby, these sub-state national projects want to nationalize their diacritics, against the regionalization defined by the SNPr. In this sense, the sub-state nationalisms in Spain can be seen as a reaction against the regionalization process developed by the SNPr; from a wider perspective, these movements can be seen in line with those

³⁸ In Billig’s words: “Also, in attempting to construct a national, cultural unity, one part – one aspect of the cultural and linguistic mosaic- will become the dominant, metonymic representation of the whole. [...] other ways of being national will be repressed, forgotten or relegated to the status of dialect” (Billig, 1995: 87).

anthropological perspectives claiming for a necessity of enhancing cultural diversity within the modern nation-states (Lisón, 1982).

Of course, this dialectic affects identity, and it is clear that the diagnosis of how the different identities are intertwined within the Spanish state plays a fundamental role within the national conflict. Social scientists who adhere the process of nation building promoted by sub-state national projects tend to problematize the relation between the different identities, indicating that the current form of Spanish identity undermines somehow the sub-state identities. In Galicia we find examples of this trend in virtually all the disciplines within social sciences, from cultural anthropology (Gondar, 1993: 232-244), to economics (Beiras, 2013; 2008; 1979; López Suevos, 1979), to linguistics (Gil, 1986; 2009), to general political essay (Subiela, 2013; of course, Castelao, 1996 [1944]). Nationalism has been characterized as conflictive, in the sense that it is defined as a tool for either domination of subaltern cultures or, on the other hand, for resistance against that domination (Feinberg, 1997); as Varshney puts it:

“In the nationalism of exclusion, a dominant group within a society –domestic or foreign- seeks to impose its own values on the various other groups within that society or seeks to exclude, sometimes violently, other ethnic groups from the portals of power. Typically, this takes the form of enforcing language, religion, or culture via control of the state, or excluding groups from power on the basis of ethnic characteristics only. In the nationalism of resistance, a dominated group opposes such a move and seeks to preserve its cultural identity and resist the hegemony and power of the dominant group” (Varshney, 2003: 86).

We can easily exemplify this differentiation by bringing up some extreme examples of these two types of nationalism; thus, we will easily agree that Nazi's supremacist nationalism, as in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (1925) has little to do with the resistance nationalism of the anti-colonialism movements, inspired by the writings of thinkers like Franz Fanon (1961).

We find a similar argumentation in Pérez-Agote, when he argues that nationalism involves "a fight for the absolute objectivation of every social identity, i.e. one of them through the conversion in social evidence of the politically objectified identity, and the other through the political objectivation of the community neglected by the State" (Pérez-Agote, 1984: 23).. In this line writes Cabrera, on the Galician case:

"Galician nationalism emerges as a response to the global "nationalistic" policy (economic, cultural and political) of the State in which it is historically integrated (...) This involves the logical impossibility for two national identities to coexist in the same cultural and geographical space, but it does not prevent a complementary conceptualization of that wider community (the State, Spain, etc.), avoiding any contradiction, both collectively and individually" (Cabrera, 1992: 183).

This duality has always been present in the Marxist tradition which, especially since Lenin (Lenin, 1965 [1920]) –although we already find sketches of this approach in Marx's writings on Ireland (Marx and Engels, 1972)–, claims for the analytical necessity of distinguishing between pro-revolutionary and pro-reactionary nationalist movements (Haupt, Löwy, & Weill, 1974; Callinicos, 1999; Löwy, 1976). The criterion by which a given nationalist movement is to be classified within one of the aforementioned categories, however, was its

contribution to a general process of revolution focused on the emancipation of the working class. This is why we find so many debates and different standpoints in relation with the national question within Marxism, as nationalistic fights were almost invariably judged as a means to the end of a revolution to be led by the working-class³⁹.

3.2.2.6 Qualitative analysis of the press

Before introducing further quantitative analysis on the analysis of these groups, we will show some qualitative evidence in support of our hypothesis. We are going to refer to the media, particularly the press, as this is an actor playing a central role in the reproduction of national identity. Despite some skepticism on this relation (Schlesinger, 1991a; 1991b; 1993), social scientists have boosted this area of research with remarkable success. See, for a general overview, Deutsch (1966), Anderson (1991), Tomlinson (1991), Billig (1995: 93-127), Eder, *et al.* (2002), Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring (2010), and Mihelj (2011). For specific case studies see, e.g., Brookes (1999), Britain, Law (2001) and MacInnes (1992), Scotland, Idoiaga and Ramirez (2002), the Basque Country, or Yumul and Özkirimli (2000), Turkey.

³⁹ Significantly enough, we find that Marxism has produced new discourses on the role of nationalism when Marxism itself moved from a philosophical universe orbiting around the notion of labor towards another one mainly focused on the idea language and, thus, of interaction, as Habermas' work illustrates:

"Of international importance are, too, the autonomy movements, fighting for regional, linguistic and cultural autonomy and, sometimes, fighting too for the autonomy of confession (...) I will try to show, briefly, that such conflicts can be understood as resistance trends towards the colonization of the lifeworld" (Habermas, 2010 [1981]: 930-931). See also Habermas (1988).

As Teun Van Dijk states in his classical manual of news analysis, “linking news texts with societal macrostructures in general (...) requires a theoretical strategy that proceeds stepwise through different levels” (Van Dijk, 1988: 19). Thus, our theoretical approach is based on three traditions: the first one is based on the interdisciplinary studies that links news and nationalism, already commented, the second one will be focused on the grammar structure of news texts and, finally, we will be drawing upon a theoretical tradition within political science, related to the analysis of political campaigns and strategies, that we are going to widen in order to apprehend the role of the media in the development of Spanish national conflict. Seeing nationalism as a political cleavage in Spanish politics, affecting differentially to our three types of ACs (strong sub-state nationalistic ACs, weakly nationalized ACs and strong state-wide nationalistic ACs), involves that we should find a difference in the news coverage of identity politics, if we are to see “news communication participants (journalists, media users) as social actors and group members [who] are the social representatives closest to news reports, because of their productive and interpreting activities in the news communication context” (Van Dijk, 1988: 19).

By using a common methodology in Political Science, we are going to classify the messages analyzed in three different categories: negative, neutral and positive, so we can, thereafter, produce a comparative framework for analysis of the news coverage on Spanish identity politics. Thus, according to Skaperdas and Grofman (1995), a negative campaign is defined as one that “attacks the other candidate personally, the issues for which the other candidate stands, or the party of the other candidate” (Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995: 49) or, in other words, negative campaigning is a political strategy mainly focused on “criticizing the opponent”

(Lau and Pomper, 2001: 81). We will, hence, identify the news headlines as negative when they are focused on criticizing the opponent –either Catalan or Spanish national projects-; consequently we will identify the opposite messages as positive and, when there is no evidence or either *negative* or *positive* messages, we are going to classify them as *neutral*.

3.2.2.6.1 Strong statewide nationalistic ACs

According to our hypothesis, ACs included in subsets A.1 and B.2 are characterized by a strong national conflict between state-wide Spanish nationalism and sub-state national projects. ACs within subset A.1 are Castile–La Mancha, Valencia, Castile and León and Madrid. ACs within subset B.2 are Catalonia, Navarre and the Basque Country. In this section we are going to deal with those ACs that better fits the category *strong state-wide nationalistic ACs*, and thus those ACs within subset A.1. According to the study 2,829, “Barómetro autonómico (II)”, conducted by the CIS between January and March, 2010 (CIS, 2010), these are the most read newspapers for the ACs within subsets A.1⁴⁰ (we are only considering those newspapers which are read by at least 5% of the respondents):

-Castile- La Mancha: El País (31.7%), El Mundo (17.5%), ABC (9.5%), La Razón (5.3%).

-Valencia: El País (19.3%), Levante (18.6%), Información de Alicante (17.7%), El Mundo (11.5%), Las Provincias (11.2%).

⁴⁰ The wording of the question, only formulated to those aged 18 or more who admit reading the newspaper, is: “And what newspaper do you prefer to follow political information?”.

-Castile and León: El Norte de Castilla (21.6%), El País (14.3%), El Mundo (11.2%), Diario de Burgos (8.6%), La Opinión, el Correo de Zamora (7.3%), Diario de León (6.8%).

-Madrid: El País (38.0%), El Mundo (19.3%), ABC (8.8%), La Razón (6.4%), 20 Minutos (6.2%).

We have consulted the front pages of these newspapers for two symbolic dates, exemplifying those flag-waving situations commented by Billig as moments of special patriotic meaning. The first one is September, the 11th, national day of Catalonia, while the second day will be October, 12th, national day of Spain⁴¹. We have chosen the national day of Catalonia because the national question in Spain is very much focused on Catalonia, since the Catalan elections held on November, 25th, 2012, which were anticipated by the Catalan government, and presented by CiU –the coalition in government at that time–, as a monographic election around independence, explicitly defended by *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya*, one of the two political parties making up the governing coalition –some leaders of the other party, *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*, have shown some reluctance to independence, however (Piñol, 2012)–. We have analyzed the headlines regarding these two symbolic days in four front pages for each newspaper, the day after each celebration: September the 12th, and October the 13th, 2013; we have also taken into account the year 2012 in order to widen our data.

⁴¹ The first day, also “Diada Nacional de Catalunya”, commemorates the fall of Barcelona, defeated by the Bourbon Spanish troops during the War of the Spanish Succession, on 11 September 1714. The second day is the “Fiesta Nacional de España”, also “Dia de la Hispanidad”, Spain’s national day, commemorating Columbus discovery of America, on October, 12th, 1492.

Regarding the “National Day of Catalonia” we have obtained the following results. There are eight different subjects in the front-page headlines of 12 October 2012 and 2013:

1. Independence
2. Catalonia
3. CiU
4. Diada
5. Spanish Government
6. Pro-independence movement
7. Artur Mas
8. Barcelona

The first one, “independence”, is referred to in a neutral way three times, as a “historical display of force”. This neutrality, however, is questioned by an obvious deixis at work, making clear that it is not “our” independence, but the independence of “others” and thus reproducing the conflict between two differentiated national projects. The rest of the time, independence is referred in a negative way: twice as a “game out of Mas’ hands”⁴² and, therefore, as a kind of political strategy emanated from the Catalan elites –the president of the Catalan government, in this case-, which is getting out of control; this view is implicitly neglecting the rival vision of “independence” as a result of a pro-independence popular movement. Independence is also referred to as “brag” and as “defiance”. These two expressions, apart from their obvious negative connotation, introduce

⁴² Artur Mas is currently –September 2013– the president of the *Generalitat*, the Catalan autonomous government.

again a kind of homeland deixis (Billig, 1995: 105-109) –for a general discussion on deixis practices see Jarvella and Klein (1982)–. This homeland deixis contributes to the social construction of two communities: one that defies and another one that is defied, or bragged, by the former.

The second subject is Catalonia. This is referred as “chained”, an obvious negative reference. The logic of this headline is based on the fact that the pro-independence movement organized a human chain on the “National Day of Catalonia”, thus reversing the democratic, peaceful, connotations pursued by the organizers of that initiative.

The third subject is CiU, the governing party in Catalonia. It is said that CiU “stirs the powder keg”; here the negative connotation is again obvious, although this time it has military, armed conflict, connotations.

The fourth subject is the “Diada”, a popular Catalan word for the “National Day of Catalonia”. The “diada” is referred to as a defiance, again a negative term and, again, we see how it is reproduced a deixis by which two communities are constructed in discourse, for at least two subjects are needed if one of them is defying.

The fifth subject is the “Spanish Government”, which is referred to as “inhibited”, carrying an implicit accusation of softness towards the Catalan pro-independence events.

The sixth subject is the “pro-independence movement”, although this time is an implied subject. The headline says only “They will not divide us”, and thus we find a clear reproduction of a deixis claiming the existing of a “them” –Catalan pro-

independence population-, and of an “us” –Spaniards-, as well as an implicit declaration of Spanish nationalism, alluding to the national integrity of Spain’s territory, which would include Catalonia. The message is also negative, as it presupposes a threat upon Spanish territorial integrity, carried out by the Catalan pro-independence movement.

The seventh subject is Artur Mas, the president of the Catalan government. Two headlines say that Mas “demands another tax treatment”, in what could be interpreted as a neutral assertion. The eighth and ninth subjects –Barcelona and the pro-independence chain- are also referred to in a neutral way –“collapsed by pro-independence demonstrators”, the former, object of “massive support”, the latter-.

In summary, we can say that the majority of messages are negative, sometimes characterized by strong belligerent connotations and only in a few cases the subjects are referred to in a neutral way.

Regarding the other national day, the “National Day of Spain”, we have done the following analysis. There are only four different subjects:

1. The Spanish monarchy (the King and the Prince)
2. The pro-independence movement
3. Artur Mas
4. Unionist demonstration in Catalonia

Regarding the monarchy, all the headlines treat it in a positive way, depicting it as an institution that is concerned with the Catalan pro-independence movement, seen as a “problem”. The king of Spain is the subject of four different headlines, all

of them stating that “the king addresses Rajoy –Spanish Prime Minister–, to discuss Catalonia”, in the context of a military parade. The prince of Spain is also a subject in three headlines, which make quotation of a prince’s speech, stating that “Catalonia is not a problem” and that the Spanish national day is a day to “celebrate what unite us”; this last statement is quoted twice, and it is an example of a deixis alluding a Spanish national “us” while stating that Catalonia is a part of that national “us”, in which we unite. The monarchy is thus presented as a key actor for tackling with the Catalan question in a context where the Government is being criticized by its alleged “inhibition” or lack of action on the matter (see above the analysis for the “Catalan National Day”).

The pro-independence movement is referred in a very negative way, stating in one front page headline that it is “bleeding“ the main political parties of Spain, the PP and the PSOE, and of Catalonia, CiU, alluding to the electoral effects that this issue is playing in both Spanish and Catalan politics.

Artur Mas, the president of the Catalan government, is also referred in a very negative way. A headline states that “Mas announces in the “Fiesta Nacional” (Spanish National Day) that he will try to destroy Spain”.

Finally, we find many references to a unionist demonstration that took place in Catalonia. It is referred neutrally, as a demonstration “against independence”, “pro-Spanish constitution” or “massive pro-unionist demonstration”. It is also referred to in a positive way, stating that the Catalans demonstrating are “Spaniards from the heart”, remembering Janowitz’s (1983) differentiation between patriotism and nationalism, the former involving feelings of love, and the latter of hate. Also Bar-Tal (1993) dichotomy between patriotism –which would be

related to good feelings of integration within the country– and nationalism –which would involve bad feelings of chauvinism and hate–⁴³. Finally we can say that these unionist Catalans demonstrators are victimized in a couple of times, stating that the “cry of the silent minority” “demand protection against separatism”.

Table X below summarizes our qualitative analysis for the ACs within sub-set A.1 and thus, constitutive of our analytical category “strong state-wide nationalistic ACs”. It shows an inversion of the nature of the messages, depending on which context these are published; the messages are mainly negative when talking about the “Catalan National Day” and mainly positive when talking about the “Spanish National Day”. We see, moreover, how a discursive construction of national identity is fundamentally carried out within news published on the “Catalan National Day”, in what could be understood as an attempt of neutralize the discursive construction of the Catalan national project. Neutral messages constitute, in both cases, a minority of news publications.

Table X. Classification of the headlines published in the front page of the main newspapers in those ACs within A.1 sub-set				
	Negative messages	Positive messages	Neutral messages	Homeland deixis
Front page headlines published the day after the “Catalan National Day”, September 12 th , 2012 and 2013	9 (60.0%)	0 (0%)	6 (40.0%)	7
Front page headlines published the day after the “Spanish National Day”, October 13 th , 2012 and 2013	2 (14.3%)	9 (64.3%)	3 (21.4%)	1

⁴³ These differentiations have been criticized by Billig, as mere rhetoric with no solid empirical basis (Billig, 1995: 55-59).

3.2.2.6.2 Strong sub-state nationalistic ACs

In this section we are going to reproduce our qualitative analysis of the most read newspapers for each AC, this time applied to those ACs which we call “strong sub-state nationalistic ACs”. These are those ACs included in subset B.2, i.e. Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarre –although we have already seen that the strong sub-state nationalism at stake in Navarre is actually Basque–. Again, we draw upon data available in the study 2,829 “Barómetro autonómico (II)”, at the CIS, to check which are the most read newspapers in the aforementioned ACs –and again we are taken into account those newspapers read by at least 5% of the respondents–.

-Catalonia: El Periódico de Catalunya (27.0%), La Vanguardia (24.7%), El País (9.4%), El Punt (5.7%).

-The Basque Country: El Correo (42.8%), El Diario Vasco (25.6%), Gara (6.9%), Deia (6.9%).

-Navarre: Diario de Navarra (56.9%), Diario de Noticias (25.1%).

The first thing that calls our attention is the almost complete absence of state-wide Spanish newspapers –there is the exception of El País, which holds a 9.4% of readers in Catalonia–. This is already telling us about a detachment of the Spanish national project, as its media is barely present within these three ACs. Let us now examine the front-page headlines for the days after our two flag-waving situation.

These are the five subjects present in the issues published after the Catalan National Day, 12 October 2012 and 2013:

-Diada

-The Catalan people

-Pro-independence movement

-Catalonia

-The Catalan Pathway⁴⁴

The first one, the Diada is referred to as “historical”, once, and “multitudinous”, twice. It is also said to be a “celebration”. These are all positive views of the *Diada*, a popular expression for the National Day of Catalonia, for they depict it as a success in both historical and social terms. Finally it is also called “the Diada of the independence”, which could be interpreted as a neutral expression, although it could also be argued that this comment is discursively constructing the possibility of the independence in the future, while identifying this Diada as its starting point, highlighting its historical relevance.

The Catalan people is often used to stress the roundness of the mobilization and, hence, discursively constructing a narrative by which the Catalan people is identified as the agent producing the mobilization. This is a clear contrast with the discourse found in the press published in those ACs within sub-set A.1, where the agents are situated outside the “Catalan people”. Underneath these differences is the national conflict, as on the one hand we have a discursive construction of a Catalan nationality –the people as the subject of sovereignty–, while on the other we find a discursive de-construction of that Catalan nationality –focusing on other subjects as agents of the mobilizations, without naming a Catalan people-. This conflict engages with the literature on the origins of nations, as a product of modernity where it is produced a shift in the subject sovereignty, as the *people*

⁴⁴ The Catalan Pathway was organized as a human chain crossing the entire Catalan territory during the “Catalan National Day” in 2013.

substituted *God's will* (Hobsbawm, 1991: 14). Thus, it is used the expression “hundreds of millions of Catalans take the streets with the ‘estelada’⁴⁵ as a symbol”, which we will interpret as an expression of the homeland deixis; this structure – large mobilization and “the Catalan people” as the subject of sovereignty- is repeated eight times. It also appears implied in the headline “Decided”, written over a large image of the demonstration.

Pro-independence movement is also cited many times in the headlines that we are reviewing. It is said that this movement “claim” to Mas for a 2014 referendum, thus reversing the logic of the headlines analyzed for ACs in sub-set A.1 –headlines in A.1 ACs argued that the mobilization was promoted by Mas, while the headlines for B.2 ACs argue that it is the pro-independence movement which is forcing the president to fight for the referendum-; again we see the discursive fight, between those trying to construct the nation and those trying to deconstruct it. We see that the media pattern already explained for the “Catalan people” is now reproduced for the “pro-independence” movement, as it is frequently referred to as historically determinant and subject of great support. We find eight examples of this pattern among the headlines.

Catalonia appears four times as a personalized subject, as in “Catalonia says enough”. This personalization of the nation equals it with the Catalan people, as the nation is the embodiment of its people. Catalonia appears also objectified, as in “Catalonia is not Spain”, one of the mottos uttered during the demonstrations.

Finally, the Catalan Pathway always appears as a positive reinforcement of the previous assertions. We have, for instance, a headline saying, “Hundreds of

⁴⁵ Catalan flag associated with the pro-independence movement.

thousands of people complete the 400 kms of the Catalan Pathway”. This positive reinforcement appears twice.

In relation with the “National Day of Spain”, we have registered eight subjects:

- José Ignacio Wert
- Mariano Rajoy
- Pro-union demonstrators
- Catalonia
- Spanish monarchy (King and Prince)
- The Basque people
- The Basque police
- Fascism/Violence

José Ignacio Wert is the Spanish Minister of Education, Culture and Sport. He holds a central position within the Spanish national conflict largely because a statement that he uttered in the Spanish Parliament: “Our interest is to Spanishize the Catalan children” (Vanguardia, 2012). The National Day of Spain took place in a few days after his polemic statement, thus attracting media attention. It is referred twice in a negative way, with newspapers often explaining that the Spanish King addressed the Spanish Prime Minister during the celebrations in order to talk about Wert’s statement. We find headlines such as “poor Wert” or “A royal slap on the ears: the king nags Rajoy due to the Minister of Education’s purpose of ‘Spanishize’ Catalan children”.

Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, appears as a neutral subject, with headlines focused on his conversation with the King regarding Wert's utterances. It is also treated twice as a passive subject, being pressured by the pro-independence movement.

Pro-union demonstrators are object of many critics, both explicit and implicit. It appears twice in a slightly negative way, as in "the anti-independence demonstration drew several thousands in Barcelona"; this could be a neutral headline, but the demonstration's goals are depicted in a negative way –"anti-independence" instead of "pro-union"–. Pro-union demonstrators are accused of having been violent in the past, stating that it was a success for them to demonstrate in a pacific way in 2013; headlines for the pro-union demonstration of 2012 also reproduce this accusation, as in "Tension in the "Fiesta Nacional", published on October, 13th, 2012. Two newspapers stated that the pro-union demonstration failure in attracting a large number of people, as we can see in "Modest pro-Spanish demonstration" or in "Pro-unionism deflates". One newspaper, however, referred to pro-union demonstrators in a positive way, qualifying the march as "multitudinous". Conversely to what happened with the Catalan people, treated as the subject responsible for the pro-independence demonstration, pro-union demonstrations are seen as being the product of the efforts of two political parties, the PP and Ciutadans, both pro-unionists: "The PP and Ciutadans celebrate 12-0 and gathered around thirty thousand people in Barcelona". The same mechanism of national de-construction through discourse is once more clearly deployed.

The Spanish monarchy appears in a similar way than it did in the newspapers published in A.1 ACs, as a key mediating institution. We find this positive message in four newspapers.

The Basque people and police are introduced in two Basque newspapers, stating that “17% of Basques supports that the new Government boost independence”. This shows an absolute disconnection with the Spanish national project, for the “Spanish National Day” is not even commented. The Basque police appears in one newspaper, being accused of collaborating in the clearance of a garden where “Spanish fascism will be exalted”.

Finally, fascist violence or simple violence is also referred three times, after the events that took place in Madrid during the Catalan National Day, 2013⁴⁶. One newspaper published that one of the aggressors was a participant in a pro-union demonstration: “One of the Blanquerna attackers attends the extremist demonstration, controlled by the Mossos”⁴⁷.

Table XI provides a summary of the results of our qualitative analysis for the ACs within sub-set B.2, that we labeled “strong sub-state nationalistic ACs”. We quickly recognize the inversion of negative and positive messages, regarding our previous analysis for those strong statewide nationalistic ACs. We think that these data supports our hypothesis on Spanish national conflict, which we expressed as a strong open conflict within strong nationalistic ACs. We have here more messages than we had for the strong state-wide nationalistic ACs, as expected, due to the fact

⁴⁶ During the Catalan National Day, several extreme-right individuals sabotaged an act of celebration of several Catalan institutions that was taking place in the Blanquerna Bookshop, in Madrid; twelve people were arrested (ElPais, 2013).

⁴⁷ *Mossos d’Esquadra* is the name of the Catalan autonomous police.

that it is the Catalan nationalism the one which introduced its claims on Spanish public agenda (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Behr and Iyengar, 1985), after the massive pro-independence demonstration on September, 11th, 2012. We take the proliferation of the homeland deixis as the expression in discourse of the political battle that is taking place among competing national projects.

Table XI. Classification of the headlines published in the front page of the main newspapers in those ACs within B.2 sub-set				
	Negative messages	Positive messages	Neutral messages	Homeland deixis
Front page headlines published the day after the “Catalan National Day”, September 12 th , 2012 and 2013	0 (0%)	24 (92.3%)	2 (7.7%)	9
Front page headlines published the day after the “Spanish National Day”, October 13 th , 2012 and 2013	9 (56.3%)	5 (31.3%)	2 (12.5%)	7

3.2.2.6.3 Weakly nationalized ACs

This section is dedicated to the media analysis of those ACs within subsets A.2 and B.1, which, we have argued, are characterized by being weakly nationalized in either Spanish or alternative sub-national projects. This feature should be reflected in the media, as a mild national conflict, in comparison with the one that is taking place within ACs in subsets A.1 and B.2. We are going to address, in the first place, the analysis for those ACs within subset A.1, and thus weakly nationalized in the Spanish national project. We are going to use the same methodology that we already used before, so we will avoid a detailed explanation of the procedure in this section.

Weakly state-wide nationalized ACs within subset A.2

The ACs within subset A.2, weakly nationalized in the Spanish national project, are the following:

-La Rioja

-Cantabria

-Andalusia

-Aragon

-Extremadura

-Asturias

According to CIS' study 2,829, Barómetro autonómico II, these are the most read newspapers for each of these ACs (more than 5% of readers):

-La Rioja: La Rioja (63.8%), El Pais (12.6%).

-Cantabria: El Diario Montanes (64.7%), Alerta (9.8%), El Mundo (7.2%), El Pais (5.5%).

-Andalusia: El Pais (19.8%), Diario Sur (11.4%), Ideal (9.4%), El Mundo (7.9%), ABC (7.9%), Diario de Cadiz (5.1%).

-Aragon: Heraldo de Aragon (60.1%), El Pais (10.0%), El Mundo (5.9%), Diario de Alto Aragon (6.9%).

-Extremadura: Hoy, Diario de Extremadura (64.8%), Periodico de Extremadura (11.5%), El Pais (9.3%).

-Asturias: La Nueva España (62.1%), La Voz de Aviles (22.9%), El Pais (6.7%).

The subjects for the front-page headlines within the day after the “Catalan National Day” in 2012 and 2013 were:

-Independence

-Catalan pro-independence movement

-Catalonia

-CiU

-The Spanish Government

Independence, the first one of the subjects alluded in these headlines, is neutrally referred as a “historical display of force”. As we have seen during the analysis of A.1 ACs, there is a kind of deixis involved in these headlines, discursively constructing independence as a matter of “others”. We have registered this discourse in the headlines of six different newspapers. We have also negative messages related to this subject, as a “game out of Mas’ hands”, found twice; as we commented above, this assertion involves a discursive construction of independence as emanated from Catalan political elites, going out of control. As we have seen, this vision of independence, neglects the rival discourse of “independence as the product of a popular movement”.

The Catalan pro-independence movement appears several times as a subject in our headlines. It is presented in a neutral way, as having displayed its force, six times. It is also presented in a negative way, identifying it with a “defiance” in four

different times, reproducing a Spanish deixis as well, as we have seen in the analysis of A.1 ACs.

Catalonia appears in a negative manner once, stating that it is “chained”. It is also presented once in a negative way, while reproducing a deixis reconstructing the Catalan national project, in “Catalonia uses a multitudinous pro-independence march to ask the State for more money”, and thus depicting “Catalonia” as an entity instrumentalizing the protests in a materialistic way.

The negative reference to CiU is the same as in the analysis for A.1 ACs, “CiU stirs the powder keg”, already commented.

Finally, the reference to the Spanish Government is also the same as in the previous analysis for A.1 ACs, as “inhibited”, in a negative way.

Let us analyze now the headlines of the day after the “Spanish National Day”. We have found the following subjects in the newspapers distributed in those ACs that we called weakly nationalized in the Spanish national project, subset A.2:

-The Spanish monarchy (the King and the Prince)

-The Catalan pro-independence movement

-Artur Mas

-The Catalan pro-union movement

The Spanish monarchy appears in the same way as in the ACs within subset A.1 and B.2. This positive reference as a key mediating institution is found in ten different newspapers. We have also found two neutral references to the Prince, in “The Prince presides, together with Letizia, his first military parade of the Fiesta

Nacional”, and in “Don Felipe stars in the reception with a message on behalf of the King”.

The Catalan pro-independence movement appears negatively once, in the same way described during the analysis of A.1 ACs, as “bleeding” the main Spanish and Catalan political parties.

Artur Mas, president of the Catalan Government, appears negatively once, in the same way described above, for A.1 ACs, in the headline “Mas announces in the “Fiesta Nacional” (Spanish National Day) that he will try to destroy Spain”.

Finally, the Catalan pro-union movement appears victimized in one headline, “A multitude of Catalans ask for protection against separatism”, as we have seen previously for A.1 ACs. It is also depicted in a neutral way twice, with headlines making reference to the pro-union demonstration that took place in Barcelona.

Table XII summarizes our analysis for the A.2 ACs. It shows a soft majority of neutral messages in the headlines published after the Catalan National Day, and a clear majority of positive messages after the Spanish National Day. These results would confirm our hypothesis, that identifies these ACs as weakly nationalized in the Spanish National Project, as we have found the same trend identified for the strongly nationalized ACs of group A.1, although in a softer, less accentuated, way.

Table XII. Classification of the headlines published in the front page of the main newspapers in those ACs within A.2 sub-set				
	Negative messages	Positive messages	Neutral messages	Homeland deixis
Front page headlines published the day after the “Catalan National Day”, September 12 th , 2012 and 2013	10 (45.5%)	0 (0.0%)	12 (54.5%)	10
Front page headlines published the day after the “Spanish National Day”, October 13 th , 2012 and 2013	2 (12.5%)	10 (62.5%)	4 (25.0%)	4

Weakly sub-state nationalized ACs within subset B.1

The last group of ACs that we are taking into account in our qualitative analysis of the media is subset B.1, including weakly nationalized in a sub-state national project. These are the ACs included in this group:

-Galicia

-The Canary Islands

-The Balearic Islands

The *Barómetro autonómico II*, CIS' study 2,829, identifies the following newspapers as the most read press within these three ACs:

-Galicia: *La Voz de Galicia* (42.7%), *Faro de Vigo* (15.7%), *El Progreso de Lugo* (11.6%), *El Pais* (9.3%).

-The Canary Islands: *La Provincia* (26.2%), *Canarias 7* (20.1%), *El Pais* (9.9%), *Diario de Avisos* (7.7%).

-The Balearic Islands: *Ultima Hora* (40.9%), *Diario de Mallorca* (32.2%), *El Pais* (7.6%), *El Mundo* (7.6%).

Four subjects are identified in the front page headlines of these newspapers:

-The Catalan pro-independence movement

-Catalonia

-Independence

-Barcelona

With regard to the first subject, the Catalan pro-independence movement, we have identified seven neutral references, as a “display of force”, similarly to the already commented trend in the rest of ACs. Some other headlines, two, added some positive nuances to these neutral references, depicting the mobilizations as a historical success.

Catalonia is cited once in a negative way, already commented “Catalonia in chains”.

It is also alluded negatively in another headline, accusing Catalonia of instrumentalizing the mobilizations in order “to demand more money from the State”.

Independence is referred to negatively, in a way already shown for previous analysis, as “a game out of Mas’ hands”.

Finally, Barcelona appears as a subject for the first time in the headline “Barcelona collapses with demands of fiscal agreement and independence”. This is a neutral structure, similar to those that uses Catalonia as a subject, but here we do not see any deixis reproducing Catalonia as a political subject.

The front page headlines published the day after the Spanish National Day, introduced the following subjects:

- The Spanish monarchy (King and Prince)

- Catalan pro-independence movement

- Artur Mas

- Military parade

- Catalan pro-union movement

Again, we detect the same discursive pattern in relation to the Spanish monarchy that we found in the rest of ACs. Three positive references were found depicting the monarchy as a key mediating institution to tackle with the national conflict, and two neutral references to the Prince’s activities.

We have also registered the already negative mention to the Catalan pro-independence movement, as “bleeding” the main Spanish and Catalan political parties.

Artur Mas appears again negatively in one headline, in the same way as explained before, as wanting to destroy Spain.

We have to mention one reference to the military parade, held in Madrid, as a subject. It also makes reference to the Prince of Spain, in a neutral way, stating that “The first military parade of the Fiesta Nacional presided by the Prince was shorter and austere”.

Finally, the Catalan pro-union movement is cited once, in the already mentioned victimizing discourse.

Table XIII summarizes the analysis for these three ACs. We see that there is a primacy of neutral messages for the Catalan National Day, whereas we have registered an equal proportion of negative, positive and neutral messages. We also see that the homeland deixis is not very active, neither for the Spanish nor for the Catalan cases.

Table XIII. Classification of the headlines published in the front page of the main newspapers in those ACs within B.1 sub-set				
	Negative messages	Positive messages	Neutral messages	Homeland deixis
Front page headlines published the day after the “Catalan National Day”, September 12 th , 2012 and 2013	3 (25.0%)	2 (16.7%)	7 (58.3%)	2
Front page headlines published the day after the “Spanish National Day”, October 13 th , 2012 and 2013	3 (33.3%)	3 (33.3%)	3 (33.3%)	2

3.2.2.6.4 Conclusions of the qualitative analysis of the press

In this section we have developed a qualitative analysis of the front-page headlines in the most read newspapers for the different groups of ACs that we have outlined. Four issues have been taken into account for each newspaper; in the first place we have seen the headlines published the day after the Catalan National Day, September 11th, for years 2012 and 2013. The other two issues are those published after the Spanish National Day, October 10th, for the same years 2012 and 2013. We have chosen these two dates because they are perfect examples of what Michael Billig defined as flag-waving situations. We have chosen the Catalan National Day, and not any other representing some other sub-state national project within Spain, because of the primacy that Catalan nationalism have got during the last two years, focusing the Spanish debate on the *national question* for that period. As we have seen, the big pro-independence demonstration celebrated in Barcelona in 2012 was largely responsible for this fact.

Our intention, as explained above, was to reinforce our main hypothesis with qualitative data. Thus, we argued that it is necessary to differentiate the Spanish ACs in three groups, if we want to understand correctly the implications of national identity for political and electoral behavior in Spain. We commented some of the analytical limitations of the MQ regarding this matter, stating that it is a good index or national identity for those places with highly developed national-projects, but that it is not when these projects are still in their early stages. Therefore we have implemented comparative analysis between the seventeenth Spanish ACs, as we have highly comparative quality data for a context comprising societies with different national projects, in different stages of development. After developing an

initial quantitative analysis, we have classified the Spanish ACs in two general groups, thereafter divided into four:

1. Strong nationalistic ACs
 - a. Sub-state nationalistic ACs (B.2)
 - b. State-wide nationalistic ACs (A.1)
2. Weakly nationalized ACs
 - a. Sub-state nationalistic ACs (B.1)
 - b. State-wide nationalistic ACs (A.2)

Our main hypothesis, then, was that the MQ should be a good indicator of national identity only for the ACs that are classified as “strong nationalistic ACs”. However, the MQ should not be producing a reliable index of national identity for those ACs under the label “weakly nationalized ACs”. This, was argued, is a consequence of the fact that the categories offered by the MQ are collecting data that mixes national and pre-national identities. If this were to be the case, we should refine our analytical tools in order to measure national identity and, in a second step, to determine its influence on political and electoral behavior. Thus, in order to test our hypothesis, we have designed a qualitative study of the newspapers published in each one of the aforementioned groups, classifying the Spanish ACs. If our hypothesis is true, then we should find substantial differences in the way that the national conflict is developed in Spain, adopting different general forms in the two main types of ACs. The conflict should be more opened and aggressive in the ACs belonging to subsets A.1 and B.2, while it should be milder, more blurred, in those ACs within subsets A.2 and B.1. As we have seen, our qualitative study of the press

-summarized in table XIV- confirmed this hypothesis, showing the expected differences for each of the postulated types of ACs.

We do not take for granted, nevertheless, that our hypothesis is correct and in the next pages we are going to develop quantitative analysis in order to test our hypothesis. However, we already have empirical evidence supporting our thesis.

Table XIV. Main type of messages published in the media for each group of ACs				
	A.1	A.2	B.1	B.2
Catalan National Day	Negative (60%)	Neutral (54.5%)	Neutral (58.3%)	Positive (92.3%)
Spanish National Day	Positive (64.3%)	Positive (62.5%)	Positive-Neutral-Negative (33.3%)	Negative (56.3%)

3.2.2.6 Quantitative testing

In this section we are going to provide further quantitative evidence in order to test our hypothesis. We have shown, until now, theoretical and empirical evidence in order to demonstrate that the MQ should be a good indicator of national identity for strongly nationalized areas, whereas this should not be the case for those weakly nationalized areas. We are presenting now some empirical evidence supporting this statement, based again on data from CIS' study 2,956, "*Barómetro Autonómico III*", already commented. One of the questions asked in the questionnaire of the study refers directly to the political status of Spain:

Q.18 What does Spain mean for you? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

- a. My country.
- b. A nation that I am a member.

- c. The State of which I am a citizen.
- d. A State made up of several nationalities and regions.
- e. An alien State of which my country is not a part.
- f. (DO NOT READ) None of the above.
- g. Do not know.
- h. Do not answer.

Options “a” and “b”, are expressions of Spanish nationalism, as we can say that people answering these options consider Spain as a nation and, most importantly, as *their* nation. Options “d” and “e”, however, do not explicitly consider Spain as a nation, but simply as a State; moreover, people choosing options “d” or “e” consider that the Spanish State is made up from different sub-state nations. Option “c” is a neutral one, for it only describes the reality of Spain being a State within international law. We can, thus, treat the categories of Q18 as a continuum, going from 1 –strong Spanish nationalism- to 5 –strong sub-state nationalism-. We will consider other response categories for Q18 as missing values. As Q18 is included in the questionnaire for every AC, we think that it is a good option to test our hypothesis, i.e., the MQ is a good indicator of national identity within those territories which are strongly nationalized, but not when applied to those weakly nationalized regions.

Now we can formulate our hypothesis in a way that it can be tested quantitatively, as follows. In the first place we are going to describe the general hypothesis behind

the logic of the argument that sees the MQ as a good indicator of national identity: As an individual moves from category 1 to category 5 in the MQ⁴⁸, the probability for that individual to get a high value in Q18 increases. We can test this hypothesis using a Logistic Regression (LR) where the dependent variable will be Q18, as an indicator of an individual's national loyalties. To transform our dependent variable into a binary variable, and as our hypothesis is oriented towards the highest values for this variable, we will dichotomize the responses to Q18 into two groups, equating to '1' those 'd' or 'e' responses –absence of Spanish nationalism–.

Tables XV and XVI present the results for LR models with control variables. The MQ is statistically significant in every AC of subset B.2, but this is not the case for the rest of the subsets. Moreover, the pseudo R-squared is particularly high for the models of subset B.2. These results are positively aligned with our research hypothesis, as they indicate considerable correlation between both variables within subset B.2, whereas this correlation is clearly diminished within other groups, as we move from B.2 to A.1. Figure 26 illustrates the predicted probabilities of presenting absence of Spanish nationalism depending on the response given to the MQ for each of the four groups in which we have classified Spanish ACs; this figure clearly shows how probabilities decrease as we move from group B.2 to group A.1.

⁴⁸ Category 1: Only Spanish, not X.

Category 2: More Spanish than X.

Category 3: Equally Spanish than X.


Category 4: More X than Spanish.

Category 5: Only X, not Spanish.

Table XV. Binary logit estimates on the Absence Vs. Presence of Spanish National Identification (B.2 to A.2). Data from the Autonomic Barometer III, 2012 (CIS' study 2,956)								
	B.2			B.1			A.2	
	Basque Country	Catalonia	Navarre	Balearic Islands	Galicia	Canary Islands	La Rioja	Cantabria
MQ (1-5)	2.11 (0.31)**	1.75 (0.13)**	1.88 (0.39)**	1.59 (0.29)**	0.85 (0.28)*	0.27 (0.42)	0.07 (0.51)	0.23 (0.33)
Ideology (1-10)	0.04 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.05)**	-1.12 (0.23)**	-0.38 (0.11)**	-0.39 (0.10)**	-0.25 (0.15)^	-0.19 (0.18)	-0.50 (0.17)**
Sex (Ref: Woman)	1.63 (0.46)**	0.19 (0.20)	0.18 (0.55)	0.03 (0.48)	0.001 (0.37)	-0.04 (0.58)	2.03 (1.08)^	0.61 (0.56)
Social class (Ref: Professionals)								
Self-employed	-1.43 (1.02)	-0.27 (0.44)	1.02 (1.12)	1.03 (0.77)	1.08 (0.64)^	-18.44 (16314)	-18.73 (10813)	2.19 (0.99)*
Routine non- manual	-0.57 (0.60)	0.12 (0.28)	2.22 (0.86)*	-0.04 (0.56)	-0.17 (0.48)	1.50 (0.68)*	-0.93 (1.17)	0.26 (0.80)
Working class	-0.51 (0.64)	-0.10 (0.28)	1.53 (0.71)*	-3.18 (1.23)**	-1.60 (0.77)*	-0.11 (0.83)	0.33 (0.84)	0.47 (0.70)
Age (Ref: 18-34)								
35-49	0.30 (0.58)	-0.31 (0.26)	0.94 (0.75)	0.73 (0.60)	0.14 (0.47)	-0.83 (0.78)	0.56 (0.89)	0.06 (0.73)
50-64	-0.71 (0.60)	-0.03 (0.28)	0.68 (0.70)	0.12 (0.62)	-0.62 (0.50)	0.62 (0.67)	-1.07 (1.22)	0.40 (0.73)
65+	-1.90 (0.73)**	-0.75 (0.31)*	-0.59 (0.91)	-1.12 (0.82)	-0.99 (0.63)	-18.16 (6944)	-0.90 (1.30)	-0.87 (1.22)
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke)	0.63	0.54	0.76	0.57	0.27	0.19	0.18	0.18

Table XVI. Binary logit estimates on the Absence Vs. Presence of Spanish National Identification (A.2 to A.1). Data from the Autonomic Barometer III, 2012 (CIS' study 2,956)

	A.2				A.1			
	Extrem.	Aragon	Asturias	Andalusia	Madrid	Castile- La Manch.	Castile and León	Valencia
MQ (1-5)	0.93 (0.64)	0.99 (0.46)*	-0.51 (0.50)	0.54 (0.26)*	0.29 (0.26)	0.16 (0.50)	0.15 (0.34)	1.38 (0.27)**
Ideology (1-10)	-0.58 (0.22)**	-0.27 (0.15)^	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.26 (0.12)*	-0.34 (0.20)^	0.00 (0.15)	-0.54 (0.10)**
Sex (Ref: Woman)	-0.11 (0.77)	0.98 (0.60)	0.78 (0.90)	0.41 (0.33)	0.62 (0.47)	0.94 (0.86)	0.57 (0.55)	0.70 (0.40)^
Social class (Ref: Professionals)								
Self-employed	-18.12 (10373)	-0.20 (1.03)	-16.97 (10472)	-18.17 (7207)	-0.02 (1.12)	-17.09 (8935)	0.55 (0.94)	-0.91 (0.87)
Routine non- manual	-0.89 (1.18)	0.13 (0.72)	1.62 (1.08)	0.86 (0.39)*	-0.12 (0.57)	1.51 (0.86)^	0.93 (0.62)	0.28 (0.51)
Working class	-0.81 (1.18)	-0.58 (0.70)	1.82 (0.97)^	-0.24 (0.51)	-0.38 (0.68)	-17.20 (5164)	-0.69 (0.85)	0.25 (0.50)
Age (Ref: 18-34)								
35-49	1.26 (1.22)	0.55 (0.64)	-0.83 (0.94)	-0.20 (0.39)	0.18 (0.61)	-0.99 (1.21)	-0.59 (0.67)	-0.84 (0.47)
50-64	1.91 (1.25)	-0.50 (0.81)	-1.92 (1.20)	-0.21 (0.44)	0.50 (0.61)	0.49 (0.88)	-0.04 (0.62)	-0.18 (0.49)
65+	0.57 (1.47)	-1.41 (1.06)	-17.67 (4614)	-1.09 (0.65)^	-0.63 (0.88)	-17.30 (4725)	-17.83 (3079)	-1.41 (0.84)^
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke)	0.23	0.20	0.28	0.06	0.07	0.24	0.12	0.39



3.2.2.8 Discussion

The scientific study of national identity is among the most urgent tasks to be considered by current sociology. Events taking place during 2014, like the Scottish referendum, the Catalan consultation or the Ukrainian internal conflicts show that sub-state national identity is playing a fundamental role on setting up the political agenda. Statewide national identity holds a prominent role as well, as it is underlying many processes of the current European crisis, as Habermas recently pointed out (Habermas, 2012). The work presented in this article wants to make a contribution for an improvement on the scientific study of national identity, and so we have proved that the most usual measure of national identity feelings through surveys, the so-called Moreno question, needs to be qualified. Using data from Spain we have developed both qualitative and quantitative techniques in order to test if the MQ provides a right measure of national identity in every social context.

After classifying Spanish Autonomous Communities into four categories in accordance to the identity feelings displayed by their citizens, we have seen that the MQ mirrors well national identity feelings in just one of these four groups, i.e., those ACs in which we find two concurrent highly evolved national projects. However, it is not working as an indicator of national identity in those other cases of societies where we find only one national project or even more than one, providing that there is one dominant project while the others remain underdeveloped. We have developed a critique of the dual identity theory, which is the epistemological foundation of the MQ. Our critique is based on the fact that in those societies in which there is a clear primacy of a state-wide national project, sub-state identity (or identities) is either totally or partially –if it were to be the case that some sub-state national project were to be developed– subsumed within the dominant state-wide national project, in the form of its regional expressions; this will produce what we may call a *dialectalization* of identity, through its regionalization. This regionalization process, based on the creation of symbolic dependencies –affecting those ethnic diacritics (Barth, 1969) through which national or pre-national sub-state identities are socially constructed– initiates a dialectical process. In such a process the regionalization would be the thesis, while the antithesis is embodied in diverse social movements that can, to some degree, be identified under the label of pro-independence. In fact we could easily cite many examples of these kind of movements in those places where there is sufficient cultural diversity to make the situation too charged of symbolic violence for the aforementioned dialectical process not to start. These would include the defense and promotion of language, natural and historical heritage, music, literature, etc.

If, as Billig insistently states, we should treat nationalism as an ideology (Billig, 1993) maybe we could start by measuring it as such, making use of a similar scale to the one that we usually employ in order to measure the left-right ideology⁴⁹, representing one of the extremes the complete identification with the state-wide national project, and the other the complete identification with the sub-state national project. Alternatively, researchers can develop indicators by combining at least two variables in order to actually measure national identity in those contexts in which the efficacy of the MQ proves to be limited.

4. Towards a new theoretical model of electoral behavior

During this chapter we are going to evaluate the validity claims of the theoretical models proposed by the three main schools studying electoral behavior: Columbia, Michigan, and Rochester. Based on our previous analysis and work we will determine if the theory provided by these models is enough to argue that social science has understood why people vote the way they do. If this were not the case, then it will be necessary to either improve the models or to propose a new one.

In the previous chapter we have explained the logic of the three main theories to explain why people vote the way they do. Thanks to these three theories we are able to explain some of the variations on people's electoral behavior. Thus, in a recent work on class voting, Spanish political scientist Lluís Orriols stated:

'During the 1982-9 period the predicted probability of voting for the left among the working class was about 0.27 higher than professionals. Yet this gap has been

⁴⁹ The wording of this question in CIS' studies is: 'Usually, when talking about politics, the expressions left and right are used. If 1 was extreme left and 10 extreme right, which one would be your positioning?'

substantially reduced during recent years and it was approximately 0.08 in the 2008 general election' (Orriols, 2013: 381).

The assumption underlying this model is that of the Alford index, i.e., class voting is the alignment between workers and left-wing parties and between the bourgeoisie and right-wing parties. This class voting rationale was at the core of the Columbia approach and, of course, defines the whole idea of political cleavage, as introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). However, Orriols showed that the strength of this alignment is weak. Shall we conclude that the link between social class and electoral behavior has decreased over time? This was, in fact, the line followed by many researchers, and their arguments were summarized by González (González, 1996: 46) in these five points:

1. The impact of post-industrialization
2. The weakening of class solidarity
3. The rise of the new social movements
4. The embourgeoisement of the working class
5. The rise of post-materialist values

Other researchers, however, have been arguing over the past decades that class is still relevant to explain people's electoral behavior. These authors argued that either there was a trendless fluctuation (Manza, Hout and Brooks, 1999), or a reconfiguration of the cleavages in modern societies, which are more complex than they used to be (González, 1996: 73).

While the debate on the strength of the cleavages is still going on (Evans and de Graaf, 2013), it is true to say that the other two theories have seen an increasing

flow of research. In particular, rational choice has experienced a boost in research during the last decades (Blais, 2000). But perhaps the main problem of rational choice applied to electoral behavior is that the expected utility of an individual's vote is so small that the effort of bother to cast the vote cannot be worthy. This was sarcastically pointed out by Uhlaner, who wrote: 'Unfortunately for the theory, people do vote' (Uhlaner, 1989: 390). New research based on expanded assumptions of rational choice, like bounded rationality or imperfect information, has certainly increased the strength of these models (Santana, 2014), but it is still lacks explanatory power to fit the variations in the data.

In this chapter we are going to introduce a new theory to explain why people vote the way they do, as we think that the explanatory power of all the three models is certainly not fitting the data, even after their sophistication, as we have seen. In order to do so, we are going to argue that the three main theories of electoral behavior are actually expressions of the same theory of human action. Once we establish this point, we are going to propose a theory of electoral behavior based on another theory of human action.

4.1 Three theoretical models of electoral behavior?

Until now we were discussing the explanatory power of the three main theoretical approaches to understand electoral behavior: the models of Columbia, Michigan and Rochester. These three models are usually seen as expressions of, respectively, Sociology, Social Psychology and Economics. This is so because the causes defining people's electoral behavior for each model are, respectively, social structure, socialization, and utility maximization. The logic of the Columbia model relies on the idea of a person who thinks something like this:

'I am a worker and my life would be better off if the party in office defends
workers'⁵⁰

Therefore, we have an individual rationally trying to maximize the utility of his/her vote. The Columbia model is thus relying strongly on methodological individualism and, ultimately, postulating a rational choice model in which the utility is defined to a large extent by some position within the social structure.

The logic of the Michigan model relies heavily on the notion of partisanship. The idea is that each individual, throughout his/her life, goes through different experiences that define his affinity for a given political party. Thus, the logic of the Michigan model could be expressed like this:

'I vote for this party because I like it more'

Of course the reasons behind the sympathies that people have to parties relate to their socialization process. Again, we have individuals trying to maximize the utility of their votes when this utility is very much defined by their personal experiences. The model postulates an internal satisfaction for individuals when their preferred party wins, as if they were football supporters. Party identification, additionally, takes a long time to be established and it is very difficult to change (Green and Palmquist, 1990). Thus, each individual has a particular party preference that, in turn, will determine his/her vote.

Finally, the logic of the Rochester model introduces decision-making models originated in market economics. In this sense, a voter would be like a consumer trying to maximize his/her personal utility through the act of voting/purchasing.

⁵⁰ The same logic would be applied to the rest of the possible social cleavages.

Consequently, political parties would be like firms trying to increase their benefits, now in terms of voting support. Elections are seen like a market ruled by supply and demand laws, where 'parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies' (Downs, 1957: 28). Ideology, in this model, is seen like a shortcut enabling a faster adjustment of supply (party) and demand (voter), according to the rules of the market; as Downs expressed it: '(...) With this short-cut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues' (Downs, 1957: 98). Therefore, the underlying logic of the Rochester model could be summarize like this:

'It is more useful for me to vote for party A rather than for party B'

The model is based on the *homo economicus*, presupposing that complex utility equations are developed unconsciously by individuals in order to find the best results for themselves. In this model, people are very much like computers who tend to act more or less mechanically to take the highest benefit from their actions; human interaction can, thus, be modeled and predicted as the option which better maximizes the utility of its participants. This theory of human action produced an array of literature on game theory, particularly boosted thanks to the discovery by John Nash of an equilibrium for those games that apparently could not be solved with the pattern of mutual utility maximization, based on a purposed randomization of player's strategies (Nash, 1950). Rational choice theory, and game theory in particular, can be captivating for social scientists running away from a kind of work that is closer to opinion than to science. It introduces the possibility of modeling human interactions through an extensive use of

mathematical procedures, offering the possibility of building up *hard* science⁵¹. However, and although the expectations of the theory were very high (Goldthorpe, 1998), it does not explain many aspects of human behavior, as Green and Shapiro's influential work states (Green and Shapiro, 1994). This well may be because it is still not fully developed, as many of its proponents argue, or simply because it departs from a wrong understanding of human interaction. This latter argument is our own.

It could be argued that all these three approaches share the same basic assumption on human behavior. The three models depart from an idea of a subject that rationally chooses between different options. The point in which they differ is just on which are the basic variables motivating this decision: structural variables, personal affinities or cost/benefits evaluations on a market-like situation. As the three models rely on the same general theory of human behavior –rational action– it is perfectly possible to combine them, and thus Anduiza and Bosch (2004) have done so. This combined model basically says that the electoral behavior of each individual is the aggregated result of the three groups of variables. For the aggregated model, structural variables are in the base of the decision-making process, in the form of cleavages; then these structural locations enable a different political socialization process and, finally, the amount of variability to be explained is attributed to costs/benefits rationales. Consequently the three main models

⁵¹ Its impact on sociology and political science is huge. It seems that nowadays game theory and Rational Action Theory (RAT) are the hegemonic theoretical standpoint in the social sciences, with a big amount of papers published and research projects developed. This centrality has also provoked strong actions against it, notable the so-called *Perestroika* movement, which argued that RAT was impoverishing social and political research (Monroe, 2005).

defining the study of electoral behavior in modern social sciences are just variations of the same general theory, which is just rational action. And in fact, all three models can be modeled using rational choice equations for the maximization of utility, if some concessions are made concerning the relevance of each set of variables for an individual's utility function.

We have to mention here Raymond Boudon's work on classifying the different meta-theories on people's behavior (Boudon, 2006). Basically, according to Boudon every theory in the social sciences can be included in one of the three types that he proposes. *Type I* is identified with Rational Choice Theory (RCT), and relies on utilitarian psychology, *Type II* with socialization theories based on causalist psychology, and *Type III* with those theories postulating that the actions of individuals are explained by their subjective meanings, in accordance with rational psychology (Boudon, 2006: 151-152). According to Boudon's classification, we can quickly identify the Rochester school with Type I, the Michigan school with Type II, and the Columbia school with Type III. We argue, however, that Boudon's classification is not fair, as it is clearly benefiting RCT, who he explicitly defends. Let us see why.

Boudon departs from the epistemological assumption of methodological individualism. As he puts it:

'So, a general rule of any scientific investigation in any science is that, in order to explain a macroscopic phenomenon, the analyst should try to identify the ultimate elementary causes responsible for the observed macroscopic phenomenon. As far as the social sciences are concerned, Weber and Schumpeter have given this general rule a name: "methodological individualism", since the elementary causes

of any social phenomenon are obviously human individual actions' (Boudon, 2006: 150).

So, if individuals are the basic unity for explaining human action, then RCT is necessary the best theory to explain people's actions. This is a tautology. In Newton's physics the 'ultimate elementary cause' to explain the orbits of planets around the Sun was a mysterious invisible force called *gravity*, not the internal atomic structure of elements. Neither is it in Einstein's general relativity, which states that a curvature in space-time caused by the mass of celestial bodies is the 'ultimate elementary cause' explaining the orbits of planets around the Sun that, otherwise, would follow straight trajectories. So, why individuals should be the 'ultimate elementary cause' to explain human behavior? We think that situating 'in-dividuals' as this ultimate cause is tricky and arbitrary, and that it is a statement deeply rooted on liberal philosophy. As Bourdieu commented, on neoliberalism:

'On behalf of this scientific program of knowledge, transformed into a program for political action, it has been accomplished an immense *political work* (...) which aims to create the conditions for the design and functioning of the "theory"; a *program of methodic destructions of the collective*' (Bourdieu, 1998; emphasis in the original).

It is well known that the notion of a 'society' made up of 'individuals' was socially constructed; in other words, it is just one cultural schema among many enabling human understanding of their everyday life, but it is certainly not an immanent

reality⁵². As Callinicos (1999) explains, we can trace back the establishment in Western political thought of the notion of a 'society' made up of 'individuals' to Descartes' philosophy of the cogito (Descartes, 2000 [1637]), later on annihilated by Freud's theory of the unconscious (Freud, 1899), that *divided* what seemed to be *in-dividual*. Therefore, it seems rather aprioristic to situate the individual as the 'ultimate elementary cause' of human action. To do so is arbitrary and, as Bourdieu explained, heavily politically loaded. And, apart from that, it is scientifically inaccurate, as theories are there to (firstly) account for the variations registered in the data and (secondly) to provide a possible truth when they are successful in their predictions; therefore, it is not scientific to try to depart from what seems to be true –methodological individualism– and then proceed to develop theories that explain empirical trends. But the greatest methodological problem relates to the fact that all three models are examples of subjectivism. Thus, they all understand vote as an expression of people's inner symbolic representations, either related to their structural location, life experiences or utility maximization. They do not take into account, however, the structural component of human action and, as we shall see later on, it is impossible to understand correctly human behavior without taking into account the two components that define it, i.e., subjectivism and structuralism. Later on we will discuss with some detail the social theory of

⁵² To cite but an example, Buddhism relies on the idea of 'anatta', that means precisely 'not-self'. Thus, each person is, in Buddhism, the embodiment of different processes, making everything in the universe part of a single individual reality, including people. In Buddhism the *individual*, thus, is not identified with a *person*, but each person is seen as part of an *individual* reality made up of all the things in the universe, interconnected through different processes (Buswell, 2003).

Pierre Bourdieu, as it presents a framework where these two components are integrated.

Furthermore, even if we agree that individuals are really in-dividuals, obviating Freud's work, we could still ask if it is necessary to find the 'ultimate elementary cause' in the irreducible last unit of our subject of study. Certainly this is not the case in physics; nobody in their right mind opposed Newton's universal gravity arguing that it is stupid to presupposed the existence of such an invisible force like gravity, and that it was needed to 'open the black-box' –to use RCT jargon– to get to the point of the atomic structure of elements. And, even then, why atoms should be the ultimate cause? Do not we should better find this *ultimate cause* within atomic nuclei? But, sadly enough, it happens that it was not until 1911 when Ernest Rutherford discovered that atoms have a nucleus. It was not until 1932 that Dimitry Ivanenko proposed his proton-neutron model of atomic nuclei and, nowadays, quantum mechanics have largely discredited Ivanenko's model while still trying to describe a definite model. In the meantime, humans were able to reach the moon thanks to a Newtonian model published more than 300 years ago, when it was impossible to imagine any appropriate notion regarding atomic nuclei. However, these are the kind of arguments used against 'socialization' theories in sociology, and in favor of a methodological individualism based on the belief that individuals are the ultimate cause of social processes⁵³.

⁵³ We do not want to insist much longer on this point. But, apart from the problem postulated by Freud's theories to this view, which is big enough to disregard it, we should comment recent advancements in neuroscience. In fact, there is a whole new area of research on neuropolitics, that considers the 'ultimate cause' to be found in neural networks, not in individuals. At the University of Edinburgh, Professor Laura Cram, to

4.2 A new theory of electoral behavior

Thus, once we have argued that all three theories of electoral behavior are versions of a subjectivist meta-theory, we are going to develop a new theoretical model outside the realms of RAT. And we are going to do so simply *because RAT does not match the data*. It does not provide a correct explanation of the data, nor it is able to make accurate predictions on people's electoral behavior, as we have seen. Furthermore, the Columbia approach is too rigid to explain electoral change and the Michigan one too soft to explain consistent trends.

Our new theory is based on the idea that resources are unequally distributed among people and, in that sense, fits the tradition of materialism. It departs from Marx's materialist version of Hegel's dialectics, later on enriched by Bourdieu's theory of capital conversion. We can synthesize the evolution of this theory so far by using a simple metaphor: Marx discovered that human action responds to the logics of a construction set and described the aspect of some of its pieces; Bourdieu opened the box, described the nature of the pieces, classified them in three basic groups, and discovered that the different pieces can be interchangeable to some degree. It is our intention to continue with this fruitful line of research.

whom I want to thank her hospitality while I was a Visiting Researcher there, leads one of the leading projects in the area since 2013. See also the work by neurologist Antonio Damasio (1995), largely applied in sociology recently by Manuel Castells (2009). Furthermore, it has been rightly indicated that every sub-system of reality is ruled by its particular set of rules, with some degree of independence to one another (Romero, 2013).

4.2.1 From alienation to habitus

The three classical theories of electoral behavior are based on the idea of an *alignment* between the individuals and a given political party. This may be an alignment based on structural location (Columbia), personal affinities (Michigan) or costs/benefits calculations (Rochester). We will argue, however, that the alignment is not between voters and parties, but between voters and electoral habitus. But, let us first explain the reasoning that led us to this conclusion.

According to Santiago (2015), there are two different sociological traditions that have theorized the notion of 'social structure'. One of them, initiated with Durkheim's differentiation between mechanic and organic solidarities (Durkheim, 1996[1893]), would be focused on institutional and cultural processes and on the ideas of socialization and role/status framework. The other one sees social structure as the expression of class structure, finding its peak on Bourdieu's theory of practice, summarized in the famous equation presented in *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 2012[1979]: 101):

$$[(\text{habitus}) (\text{capital})] + \text{field} = \text{practice}$$

It is on this latter materialist tradition that we want to build our work. Alongside the centrality of the unequal distribution of goods among people, the materialist tradition –at least in its versions by Marx and Bourdieu⁵⁴– shares a common view

⁵⁴ In fact, the so-called Analytical Marxism (AM), do not share the same view of power than Marx and Bourdieu, as works by analytical Marxists rely heavily on rational choice theory and methodological individualism. The main authors of this current are Gerald Cohen (1989), John Roemer (1982) and Jon Elster (1985), including as well Adam Przeworski (1986) and Erik Olin Wright (1985). The divorce between AM and Marx's writings was highlighted by Hunt:

of power. Thus both Marx's theory of alienation and Bourdieu's theory of practice share the same idea of power. Probably the first exposition of the idea of power underlying the theories of these two authors is to be found on Plato's allegory of the cave (Plato, 2012[4th c. BC]: VII). Simply put, it understands that power is something with the capacity of determining people's will and desires. Steven Lukes have called this conception of power as three-dimensional, in his celebrated essay on the subject matter (Lukes, 2005). Thus, during the 1960s and 70s there was 'an ongoing debate within American political science' (Lukes 2005: 60) around the idea of power, in which pluralist ideas of power had a great influence, notably Robert Dahl's famous essay, *Who Governs?* (Dahl, 1961). Lukes entered that debate in 1974, with the first edition of his book, putting forward a theory of power based on a broad conception of it. Lukes' work understood that all the standpoints in that debate might be summarized into three categories or views of power. He called the first one, which was represented by the pluralists, *one-dimensional* view of power. The second one, identified with the different works by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, was the *two-dimensional* view of power (*vid.* Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Finally, Lukes proposes a *three-dimensional* view of power.

'If this uninteresting Marxist feature of exploitation is Marxism's most defensible feature, then Marxism would definitely seem to be, as the AM school suggests, intellectually bankrupt. The argument that Marxism is intellectually worthless is certainly nothing new; indeed this criticism has been made innumerable times over the last 125 years. For these critics to assert, however, that they constitute a "new school" of Marxism is fundamentally dishonest (...) To my knowledge, no member of the AM school has explained in what sense they are Marxists. Until I am aware of such an explanation and, indeed, find it convincing, I shall consider them to be a part of the long tradition of anti-Marxism—and a particularly virulent part'. (Hunt, 1992: 105).

Thus, *one-dimensional* view of power is committed to the study of behaviour, specifically, decision-making on key-issues affected by an observable conflict of interests. *Two-dimensional* view of power is focused, in addition to the typical features the *one-dimensional* view, on the mobilization of bias; their central thrust is based on the existence of non-decisions that reduce the scope of decision-making. The *three-dimensional* view of power is, however, focused on four aspects:

- Decision-making and control over political agenda;
- Issues and potential issues;
- Subjective and real interests;
- Observable and latent conflict⁵⁵.

Moreover, Lukes points out that behind each conception of power, there are political interests at stake. Consequently we may find liberalism entangled with the *one-dimensional* view of power, which legitimizes political decisions based on the belief that people can change politicians through franchise. Behind the *two-dimensional* view of power we can discern a reformist ideology. It is implicit to this standpoint the idea that people's interests do not have the same relevance, although these interests can be enlightened through political ways. Finally, in the *three-dimensional* view of power, we find a radical conception of power relations. According to this view people's wants and desires can be actually a product of the system, being that the system could be working against people's interests.

⁵⁵ Latent conflict will arise when there is a contradiction between the interests of the rulers and the interests of the population excluded by the rulers. This latter population might not have a clear conscious of their real interests.

Only one year after the first edition of *Power: A Radical View* (Lukes 2005 [1974]), the Pandora's box was opened in the power debate with the publication of Michel Foucault's *Surveiller et punir* (Foucault, 1975), boosting up a long postmodern line of thought that only now seems to lose influence. Foucault's theory introduced the possibility of a four-dimensional view of power, according to which even its resistance is determined by power. But not only Foucault's theory challenged Lukes' *three-dimensional* view of power. In the history of social thought we can find different standpoints regarding power, which are different, complementary or even contradictory, from the one of Lukes. Therefore, we will examine Weber's well-known classification of the different forms of authority into charismatic, traditional and rational-legal (Weber, 1989[1910-1914]). We will also take into account the works by Western Marxists György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci; particularly the concept of *hegemony* by Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971[1926-1937]) and the concept of *false consciousness* by Lukács (Lukács, 1968[1922]). Finally we will also comment briefly Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis* (Habermas, 1997[1973]), due to its relevance for an understanding of political power.

Lukes has commented Weber's work in these terms: "For Weber domination was legitimate, that is, recognized as legitimate by those subject to it (he had no interest in illegitimate power)" (Lukes 2005, p.112). In fact, Weber himself wrote "the existence of domination turns only on the actual presence of one person successfully issuing orders to others' (Weber, 1989[1910-1914]: 53). Weber, thereby, was interested in the forms by which political power is legitimated and maintained. Developing a methodology based on the construction of *ideal types* he concluded that there are three types by which these legitimation and maintenance of political power is possible: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. The

problem, according to Lukes, is that Weber's idea of power does not account for those relationships of power as an imposition, acting against the interests of the dominated.

The work by Western Marxists Antonio Gramsci and György Lukács is interesting because their theories answer one the fundamental question of domination. As Lukes put it: "When (...) does (...) shaping and imposition constitute domination?" (Lukes 2005: 144). For the aim of this work, we will focus on Gramsci's concept of *hegemony* that, basically, is seen as a force that works to maintain society in a *negotiated consent*. Thus, for Gramsci, the position of hegemony typical of the ruling class is maintained through a process of constant negotiation. As expressed by Perry Anderson, Gramsci's *hegemony* meant "the ideological subordination of the working class by the bourgeoisie, which enables it to rule by consent" (Anderson, 1976: 26). This is why the role of the intellectuals is so important for Gramsci in order to make the revolution, because they can break this ideological subordination. According to this definition of hegemony, Gramsci concludes that those who are subordinated have two different contradictory consciousnesses; one that is "imposed", inherited from the past, and another which is related to "commonsense", i.e. that defines their real interests. In the context of liberal democracies, the first one of these types of consciousness would enable the agreed domination of the working class by the capitalists, while the latter would break this consent, liberating the working class.

Lukács' standpoint is more radical, as it departs from the idea that the *real* interests of people are determined by their location within the process of production; in his own words: 'the appropriate and rational reactions imputed to a

particular typical position in the process of production' (Lukács, 1968[1922]: 229). Consequently, if there is an appropriate and rational reaction associated with class, then it must be possible the existence of an inappropriate reaction, that Lukács called 'false consciousness'. According to Lukács, the appropriate class consciousness is not at all given, but rather must be achieved, conquered, by the working class, following a process of intellectual struggle to understand the totality of the historical process, defined by dialectical materialism, that eventually gave way to the capitalist mode of production that dominates it. This idea of false consciousness was also present in Engels, as we can see in this fragment of the letter he sent to German publicist Franz Mehring:

'Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or seeming motive forces. Because it is a process of thought he derives its form as well as its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material, which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote source independent of thought; indeed this is a matter of course to him, because, as all action is *mediated* by thought, it appears to him to be ultimately *based* upon thought.' (Engels, 2004[1893]: 14).

From Lukes' point of view, the problem with this kind of answers is twofold. Firstly people do not have only one sort of interests, they usually have interests of different kind. Moreover people's identity is not reduced only to social class, they have much more identities than class, giving way to other interests. Secondly, Lukes identifies a problem typical of Marxist social theory, i.e. "the claim to have

some sort of privileged access, external to the actors, to a “true” account of what is “real” and of what are “appropriate” and “rational” responses to subordination” (Lukes 2005: 135). Lukes goes on to state, regarding Marxist-Structuralist standpoint:

“(…) the self-assurance and often dogmatism with which Marxist thinkers, sectarians and party secretaries across the decades have been ready to attribute “real interests” and “false consciousness” to others” (Lukes 2005, p.145-146).

We think, however, that this critique is not attributable to the whole Marxist tradition –*vid. e.g.* Jameson (1991)–. This false-consciousness approach is not even directly attributable to the original writings by Marx. Thus, the whole idea of alienation by Marx, can be classified within three-dimensional view, as we shall explain later. According to the differentiation by Spinoza between power as *potentia* and power as *potestas* –*vid.* Negri (1999)– we can argue that both Marx’s alienation and Lukes’ three-dimensional view of power are focused on the idea of power as *potestas*, i.e., as domination. This version of power can determine people’s wants and desires in a way that may be contrary to their objective interests, whichever these may be. This is related to Habermas’ work (1997[1973]), arguing that there are contradictions between some of the sub-systems (economic, administrative…) that operate within advanced capitalist societies (Habermas 1997[1973]: 34). Thus, for instance, usually people find it difficult to combine the high expectations created by welfare politics with an everyday reality very much defined by dispossession and impoverishment. According to Habermas, such a contradiction involves a crisis of legitimation that increases electoral abstention, to which the State would respond by an increasing

of its authority through the expansion of the territories of law. The result is a colonization of the life-world by the system, using Habermas' terminology, to be offset by social movements that defend autonomous spheres of action. But whereas Habermas sees a possibility of defense embodied in the social movements, Foucault does not. As we have already commented, Foucault's ideas of power proposed a fourth-dimensional view (Lukes 2005: 88). The aim of Foucault was to create a microphysics of power, making reference to the moment when power penetrates people's bodies (Foucault, 1975). This idea of microphysics of power was developed by comparison with Bentham's insights on the panopticon, a new prison system where the prisoners interiorized a constant state of being watched. In this sense power appears to be everywhere, to the point that the subject is constituted through his/her subjection to power. The assumption, however, brought accusations of determinism, as in Foucault's view there is very little space for agency. The debate very much got entangled in the broader debate on action/structure, what, for Lukes, dissolved the ultra-radicalism of Foucault's view of power (Lukes 2005: 88-99). This vanishing of the subject in Foucault's thought, which even denies the possibility of effective resistance –as it must be determined by power as well– constitutes what Callinicos has called the apories of post-structuralism: rationality, resistance, and the subject (Callinicos, 1991: 128).

So, our theory departs from Marx's alienation. Alienation is the English translation for the German *Entfremdung*, meaning *distancing*. Thus, alienation in Marx is simply a distancing from *Gattungswesen*, German for species-being. Consequently, alienation is just a process by which people disconnect from their true human nature, being its cause their living in a non-egalitarian mode of production. Every non-egalitarian mode of production involves the premise that some people will

occupy a location within the economic structure that is defined by its subjection to the economic interests of some other people who occupy a different structural position defined by its duty of extracting the most out of the first group of people. Although this is so for slavery and feudalism, for instance, Marx applied it mainly to capitalist relations. Thus, in capitalism, the bourgeoisie owns the means of production and employs workers through wage in order to increase the surplus value through the application of work to source materials. In such a relationship, the meaning of the working class is basically to increase the surplus value by obeying the mandates of the bourgeoisie. This dynamic is necessary for the working class to achieve basic living conditions and it is also necessary for the bourgeoisie to gain competitiveness against its competitors; therefore it cannot be changed without changing the system. The argument by Marx is that, as the very basic material conditions of the working class depend on its satisfactory endeavors in accordance with the rules of the bourgeoisie, then its whole consciousness of the world and of themselves become altered. Workers start seeing their lives through the lens of the bourgeoisie, as this will give them more chances to ensure decent living conditions; eventually their very human nature is substituted by its economic role of workers, and this last condition will determine their will, their likes, their character, etc. The alienation of workers affects four different aspects of their life. There is an alienation of the worker from the work they produce, as the way in which it is produced and designed depends on the bourgeoisie. There is an alienation as well from working itself; the worker is but a piece within a long chain of production of the final product, making it impossible to get the satisfaction associated with the development of a product in accordance to his/her own perspective. There is an alienation of the worker from his/her human nature; as

the psychological well being of humans depends on their ability to develop meaningful activities, then workers cannot achieve that as they only develop partial tasks as mandated by the bourgeoisie, without a sense of totality. Finally there is an alienation of workers from their fellow workers; thus, as capitalism introduces the field of the so-called labor market, where workers compete with each other in order to get the highest possible salary, they end up internalizing such competition. According to Marx, human beings, however, are designed to build projects together in order to achieve higher common standards in their well being, and so alienation builds a wall between workers and between workers and their human nature (*vid.* Marx, 1974[1844]; Marx and Engels, 1998[1846]).

Hence Marx argued that the dynamics generated by the capitalist mode of production divided the population into two main classes of people. The ones who owned the means of production and the capacity to organize the way that the production process is managed, and the ones who only had their labor-power to sell in the labor market, in exchange of a salary. Therefore, according to Marx, this artificial, socially constructed, relation in the level of the production process, have consequences on the self-image of the individuals involved in such a process. The main effect is that of an *estrangement* of individuals from their human condition as it would be outside of this particular type of class relations. The role that individuals play as workers or capitalists colonizes their whole self and identity. Thus, we can conclude that Marx understood that the structural location occupied by people within the socioeconomic system ⁵⁶ introduces limitations or

⁵⁶ It is important to highlight the term 'socioeconomic', as in Marx's work it is nonsense to divorce economy from society. The economic infrastructure produces a distinctive social structure that determines the *relations* between people. Social class, in Marx, is not an

constrictions that would orient individual practices. We argue that Pierre Bourdieu, with a body of work produced mainly during the 1970s, has developed this argument by Marx outside of the Hegelian conception of identity and self-identity that we can find behind Marx's early theorizing on alienation. Thus, before entering Bourdieu's model, we will expose what we consider as the main limitation behind Marx's theory of alienation.

Marx was basically a Hegelian who put dialectics down to earth. His general approach to history as an expression of conflictive class relations as well as his understanding of identity and self-image is essentially a materialist expression of the Hegelian idealist framework (Hegel, 1998[1807]). Nancy Fraser, the celebrated American critical theorist, has developed a critique of Hegelian identity schema; for her, this Hegelian model is based on the dialogical construction of identity 'through a process of mutual recognition' (Fraser, 2000: 109), giving way to analytical approaches that embrace the notion of self-hatred (*vid. e.g.* Taylor, 1992). Thus, the process of creation and solving of injustices on the sphere of recognition from the standpoint of the identity model can be summarized as follows –*vid.* (Fraser, 1995; 2000)–:

Generation of injustices within the sphere of recognition (Hegelian model):

1. One part of my identity is despised.
2. I am wrong.
3. I do not like myself.

attribute of individuals, but a relation between structural groups that acts as a framework in which individuals take part and express their bounded praxis, or action.

Generation of justice within the sphere of recognition (Hegelian model):

4. Symbolic reconstruction of the part of me which is despised.

5. I am not wrong.

6. I like myself.

According to Fraser, however, the application of the identity model to solve injustices within the sphere of recognition presents serious problems⁵⁷. Namely regarding *displacement* and *reification*. By displacement, Fraser means that the fights for recognition can eclipse those for redistribution; by reification, she means that the fights for recognition can reify the defended group identities, what may derive in intolerance against the 'others', instead of respectful interaction (Fraser, 2000: 108). Thus Fraser concludes that social movements should be changing their focus from an *identity model* to a *status model* (Fraser, 2000: 113). The status model does no longer include any notion on true/false identities and its correlate of self-hatred; on the contrary, it interprets the absence of cultural recognition, not as the result of conflictive identities, but as a pattern of social subordination. Therefore, the reparation of this social subordination will come hand in hand with measures oriented to load the despised diacritics with status. However, a more radical view, closer to Foucault's four-dimensional power, would propose the suppression of the difference; hence, for instance, regarding gender, the solution would not be given by the empowerment of women, but by the suppression of gender differences –vid. (Fraser, 1997; Butler, 1990)–.

⁵⁷ This identity model has been largely applied in several contexts, from gender politics –vid. Fraser (1995)– to language policy –vid. Álvarez Cáccamo (2003) and De Nieves (2011) for analysis of the Galician case–.

It was Pierre Bourdieu who most notably took over the task initiated by Marx's theory of alienation, building it up outside the initial tradition based on the Hegelian identity model. Furthermore, Bourdieu's endeavors achieved a more fundamental task by de-economizing Marx's framework of exploitation. As Habermas explained, Marx's whole approach was built upon the idea that work was the fundamental human feature; it is well known that Habermas carried out a re-elaboration of the Marxist approach upon the idea that language was instead the fundamental human feature (Habermas, 2010 [1981]). It may be said, however, that Bourdieu's approach integrates both linguistic and working human capacities into an integrated framework for analysis thanks to the expansion of the notion of capital. Capital, in Bourdieu's work, does no longer belong solely to the economic realm. Thus, Bourdieu's definition of capital broadens the initial Marxist economic approach, but is certainly rooted on it:

'Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its 'incorporated', embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, *i.e.*, exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor. It is a *vis insita*, a force inscribed in objective or subjective structures, but it is also a *lex insita*, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world.' (Bourdieu, 1986: 241).

Hence, for Bourdieu there is no intrinsic limitation of capital to its monetary form. This would be a particular form among many. Which are these forms? Although Bourdieu himself has sometimes talked about 'linguistic capital' (Bourdieu, 2002: 146), this is nothing but a form of the broad cultural capital. Thereby, for Bourdieu all forms of capital can be classified in three general types: economic capital,

cultural capital and social capital. Bourdieu usually adds symbolic capital as well, but only as an expression of the power or energy implicit to the three main types of capital, power as *potentia*. Thus, for instance: '(...) to function as symbolic capital, i.e., to be unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence' (Bourdieu, 1986: 246). Therefore, symbolic capital is a form of capital *perceived* as legitimate and objective competence through which symbolic violence is implemented. Thus, for instance, an aristocratic child from 18th century Paris could have shown his/her artistic expertise on neoclassicism to a peasant with no cultural capital inherited; the result would be the re-construction of the class domination of the latter by the former under the disguised, pernicious form of legitimate knowledge, when in reality what was at stake is nothing more than a difference on the level of capital accumulation between the two social classes of which the cited individuals are members. To continue with the example, the result would have been an extraction of surplus value in terms of cultural capital of the latter by the former, in the case that the latter would have considered neoclassicism as a form of high human artistic expression. That is, if the peasant recognizes the legitimation of the cultural field in accordance with the laws imposed by the logic of capital accumulation fixed by the aristocracy, then the apparent higher knowledge of the aristocrat would have functioned as symbolic violence, ended up with the symbolic extraction of symbolic capital in its cultural form. The dominant classes have the power to set the rules of the market and, once the rules are fixed, they also have a privileged access to the social objects that are capitalized by the market they have made. For Bourdieu, society could be seen as a poker game in which some of the players team up each other to cheat on the rest of

the participants to get their money; furthermore, as the cheated players do not see the trick, think that winners actually deserve to win.

In order to clarify Bourdieu's standpoint we will first define the main notions of it, and after that we will exemplify the theory with the particular example of the linguistic market. Bourdieu's general framework was defined by himself as *constructivist structuralism* or *structuralist constructivism*, pointing to the transgression of the boundary between structure and agency underlying his thought (Bourdieu, 1989: 14). Bourdieu's schema is based on classical social theory, not only from Marx, but also from Weber, due to the relevance that symbolism, particularly the notion of *status*, has acquired in his work; we find strong reminiscences of Veblen's theory of the leisure class (Veblen, 1994[1899]), and particularly in the role played by the *conspicuous consumption* with which the leisure class wanted to differentiate themselves from the industrial class (Veblen, 1994[1899]: 41-59) –*vid.* Alvarez Sousa (1996: 169) for its association with Bourdieu's framework–. However, as Alvarez Sousa has pointed out:

'Regarding the theory of social classes by P. Bourdieu, it departs from the Classics, although it does not follow them strictly, redirecting them to a new theory through a set of different ruptures. We want to make clear that these ruptures are not necessarily denials, but rather reformulations made by taking the positive aspects from each author, instead of the negative ones.' (Alvarez Sousa, 1996: 167).

Bourdieu's structuralism is not identified with its typical definitions by Lévi-Strauss in anthropology (Lévi-Strauss, 1958), or by Saussure in linguistics (Saussure, 1974[1916]). In his own words:

‘By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exist, within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.), objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 14).

Regarding constructivism, Bourdieu’s approach is not related to its influential Actor-Network Theory version, as in the work by Latour (2005). In his own words:

‘By constructivism, I mean that there is a twofold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought, and action which are constitutive of what I call habitus, and on the other hand of social structures, and particularly of what I call fields and of groups, notably those we ordinarily call social classes’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 14).

As Bourdieu explains, there are two main traditions in the social sciences; the objectivist one, epitomized by Durkheim’s famous quotation ‘consider social facts as things’ (Durkheim, 1982[1895]: 60), and the subjectivist one, which according to Bourdieu ‘can reduce the social world to the representations that agents have of it, the task of social science consisting then in producing an “account of the accounts” produced by social subjects’ (Bourdieu 1989: 15). This involves two different conceptions of the social scientist, either as a demiurge or as a mere interpreter. The first conception is usually associated to positivism, while the latter, boosted by post-structuralism is shared nowadays by many scholars, and it is very well summarized in this fragment by Monica Heller, reporting a case in which the police asked for help to a linguist lecturing at the university:

‘The place to find a language expert, of course (of course?), is a university. Hence my friend’s call to me: she knew she was being constructed as a holder of objective truths, while she understands herself as a producer of situated knowledge—an interpreter, not a transmitter.’ (Heller, 2011: 4).

There is an utter opposition between objectivism and subjectivism. The first current sees human behavior as an expression of forces which are unknown to agents, who rationalize their behavior by building what Durkheim called ‘prenotions’ and Marx ‘ideologies’; the role of the social scientist, thus, is to unveil the real hidden forces which are really determining human behavior (Bourdieu, 1989: 15). On the other hand, subjectivism states that human behavior obeys to subjective symbolic representation; social agents build up their own social constructs, representations of their world, and act accordingly. Thus, the role of the social scientist would be to fully understand these social constructs in order to understand and explain people’s behavior. This way of theorizing is epitomized by Schutz’s work, who understood that the role of social scientists is making ‘constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors in the social scene’ (Schutz, 1962: 59, cited in Bourdieu, 1989: 15). While objectivism sees people as puppets, subjectivism sees them as generators of symbolic worlds that guide their behavior. This has implications for every kind of human behavior or conduct. For instance, regarding electoral behavior, an objectivist would claim that people’s vote is an expression of an unconscious underlying force driving people to choose one particular party or electoral option, while people, in order to justify their behavior, elaborate some pseudo-rational discourse explaining this action. For a subjectivist, people’s electoral behavior is


nothing but the expression of people's images and constructions of the different parties and political options at their disposal.

The work by Pierre Bourdieu is important for different things, but probably its greatest merit was to overcome the cleavage between objectivism and subjectivism. As Bourdieu explains: 'If I have somewhat belabored this opposition –one of the most harmful of these “paired concepts” which, as Reinhard Bendix and Bennett Berger (1959) have shown, pervade the social sciences– it is because the most steadfast (and, in my eyes, the most important) intention guiding my work has been to overcome it' (Bourdieu, 1989: 15). Bourdieu's theory of human action understands it as a vector with two components, a structural component, which we may call x , and a subjective component, which we may call y . Therefore, if human action is a vector with two components, it can only be partially understood or predicted by knowing only the value of either x or y . According to Bourdieu, thus, human action can be formalized like this:

$$r = x_i + y_j$$

Consequently, structuralism introduces the predictive flaws summarized in figure 27; if we only have the value for one of the components, x , in this case, then we will only be able to predict human action as a vector ranging from the minimum to the maximum possible value that subjective view can take. Imagine that each value, from 0 to 10, on the x axis of figure 27 corresponds to a definite structural position –for instance, to class positions in the Goldthorpe schema–. If we only have the information for this axis without taking into account the values of the other component, i.e., of subjective view, our prediction of behavior will range from 0 to 10 on the y axis for each of the social classes. For instance, Marx's structuralist

prediction of revolution ignored the values of the y axis; revolution is a possible vector (r) only achievable for some of the structural locations (x_z), but if we do not take into account subjective view (y_j), then we cannot be able to predict when, under which circumstances that vector is going to happen, as we lack one of the components of the vector that represents human praxis. Marx was right in pointing that revolution is a vector only possible by individuals located on a limited range of structural positions, but unless we know the way in which subjective view is related to structure, we cannot be able to predict revolution, or any other social praxis.




We will try to clarify the point a little further, by using the simplest Marxist model of revolution. In figure 28 we have a vector, r , which is the sum of two components, x_1 and y_1 . This vector r represents the human practice of revolution. The subjectivist component y has two possible values: consent, represented by value '0' and dissent, represented by value '1'. The structuralist component x has two possible values as well: the bourgeoisie, represented by value '0', and the working

class, represented by value '1'. Thus, in order to obtain the vector r it is necessary that social agents present '1' values for both axes. In other words, it is necessary that the agents belong to a structural location defined as working class *and* that they hold a subjective worldview of dissent. Both subjective view and structural location must be combined in this unique way to produce revolution, so $r = x_1 + y_1$. Marx's structuralism interpreted that the values on the y axis are completely determined by the values on the x axis, meaning that members of the working class would tend to develop a subjective view based on dissent. Bourdieu's habitus clarified this point, as there is no determination of y by x , but an interrelation between the two, in the sense that the structural location influence the subjective view and, at the same time, the subjective view reinforce structural location. This interplay between structure and agency is summed up in the idea of habitus; the habitus is a social mechanism within the minds of individuals constantly encouraging them to act within a limited range of options. It is the subjective expression of the structural location of individuals, acting like a force that orients practice within a range of options. If Marx would have thought in terms of habitus, then it will *compel* agents in each structural location to act in a *unique* manner, instead of *orienting* practice within a *range* of options. As expressed by Loïc Wacquant:

'Habitus is an old philosophical notion originating in the thought of Aristotle and of the medieval Scholastic that was retrieved and reworked after the 1960s by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to forge a dispositional theory of action suited to reintroducing the inventive capacity of agents within structuralist anthropology, without that falling back into the Cartesian intellectualism that skews subjectivist

approaches to social conduct from behaviorism to symbolic interactionism to rational choice theory' (Wacquant, 2006: 317).



We will afford the reader the graphical representation of human behavior according to subjectivism, as it resembles the structuralist one but with predictions ranging from the minimum to the maximum structural value. According to Bourdieu, both deviations lack a necessary component of the vector that human action is.

Therefore, if human action is a vector with two components (x_i, y_j) , every theory only taking into account one of these two components is incomplete. However, both objectivism and subjectivism made relevant contributions to sociology, as they provided an understanding on the generation and functioning of each of the two components. Bourdieu's work was focused on the link between these two realities, which is the *habitus*. Thus the habitus can be understood as logically designed mechanism by which the structural and the subjectivist components are linked.

Habitus refers to people's internal set of predispositions for action, structurally determined. In his own words, habitus refers to 'the mental structures through which they (agents) apprehend the social world, are essentially the product of the internalization of the structures of that world. As perceptive dispositions tend to be adjusted to position, agents, even the most disadvantaged ones, tend to perceive the world as natural and to accept it much more readily than one might imagine especially when you look at the situations of the dominated through the social eyes of a dominant' (Bourdieu, 1989: 18). Thus, the habitus is the lens through which the agents carry out the decision-making processes that constitute human action. This process can be reduced to its basic binary expression and must be possible to explain in detail through neuroscience –*vid.*, e.g., (Sollberger, Rankin and Miller, 2010)–. As we have discussed earlier, neuroscience is gaining prominence within the social sciences and it is our belief that it will define one of the two main branches of sociology in the near future. The other branch, related to the structuralist component of human action, is the one that we want to expand in this thesis.

We can briefly summarize Bourdieu's argument by stating that structure determines habitus, i.e., forces, and habitus urges agents to act within a set of possible practices. Each structural location is associated to a particular range of practices in a way that is not deterministic, being the strength of the link directly proportional to the approximation of structural locations to ideal types. According to Bourdieu, human action is like rowing a boat in the night with the help of a lighthouse that is different for each structural position. When an individual is not clearly located in a precise structural location, then he/she will have more than one lighthouse, leading to confusion and suffering. As Bourdieu put it:

‘Contradictory positions, suitable to exert on its occupants structural ‘double coercions’, are often torn habitus, leading to contradiction and division against themselves, generating suffering’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 210)

But habitus is not a construction that operates in an empty space –in fact this is particularly what defines the subjectivist deviation–. Habitus is socially situated, and intrinsically related to social space. It underlies every social interaction and individual decision, being its direct link to social structure. Symmetrically, social structure manifests itself in social interaction through habitus, in Bourdieu’s words: ‘The dispositions acquired in the position occupied imply an adjustment to this position’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 17). This (subjectively) embodied (structural) social distances ‘are at the basis of all forms of cooptation, friendships, love affairs, marriages, associations, and so on’ (*idem.*). Here we see the linkage between subjectivism and structuralism, which are just two components of the vector that social action is. We may exemplify this with the so-called ‘young rebel’ attitude, as this is a human praxis to be found within the range of desirable practices determined by habitus to only those young people located in a similar semi-advantaged structural location; on that very range, however, we may find the possibility to develop a conformist praxis, although the force to adopt this latter conduct will be stronger for agents occupying a less advantaged structural location⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that agents who are advantaged enough have what may be described as *carte blanche* to denounce injustices they do not need to solve to be advantaged. On the other hand, disadvantaged groups tend to reject combative attitudes in an effort to show that they do not need the redistribution of the social field that in fact provokes their disadvantage position. The attitude benefits the

Thus, the objective social space in which the habitus is developed is the *field*, which Bourdieu defined as a 'battlefield' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 101) where resources are disputed and distributed. Unlike economic accounts of resources, of which Marxism is a perfect example, Bourdieu opened it up to other real forms of resources that are actually disputed in social fields. All the different resources, material and symbolic, that are present in society can be classified into three broad categories: cultural, social and economic. Bourdieu calls 'symbolic' the force or strength that these resources get when deployed in the social field. Álvarez Cáccamo has rightly pointed out that this classification refers to the value or use related to social objects, and that it is only within a capitalist system that these value turns into actual forms of capital:

'The immaterial dimension of language is subsumed by the same principles that determine the commodification of any resource and transform what initially is a social free good (Marx, 1996[1867]) into product and commodity with exchangeable value, which sets the value of the individuals themselves' (Álvarez Cáccamo, 2011: 11-12).

However, as Bourdieu's theory is based upon capitalist societies and our analytical efforts also refer to this kind of societies, we will consider them as forms of capital. Thus: economic capital, social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. As Bourdieu puts it:

former, by restating their advantaged social position, reinforced by an image of 'compromise' and 'disinterestedness', whereas benefits as well the latter who, although reproducing their disadvantaged social position, display an image of 'dignity' that situates them as fully integrated within the dominant field, instead of despise to one of the many undervalued social sub-fields, what would reduce their chances of upward social mobility.

‘These objective relations are the relations between positions occupied within the distribution of the resources which are or may become active, effective, like aces in a game of cards, in the competition for the appropriation of scarce goods of which this social universe is the site. According to my empirical investigations, these fundamental powers are economic capital (in its different forms), cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital, which is the form that the various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate (Bourdieu 1986). Thus agents are distributed in the overall social space, in the first dimension, according to the overall volume of capital they possess and, in the second dimension, according to the structure of their capital, that is, the relative weight of the different species of capital, economic and cultural, in the total volume of their assets.’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 17).

The notion of social field relates to the idea that social interaction is structured in fields with differential distributions of capital:

‘The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws of functioning of the field most favorable to capital and its reproduction.’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 246)

Thus, each form of capital, i.e., of accumulated labor, can be transformed into another form of capital by paying a conversion tax that varies in accordance with the structure of the field. In the academic field, for instance, cultural capital in the form of published papers on prestigious journals –*i.e.* in journals with a high volume of cultural capital associated– can be exchange for economic capital, as it enables the access to scarce tenured positions at universities, and for social capital

–as it increases the chances of the researcher to get invited to talk as a key speaker in prestigious seminars or congresses, where he/she will connect him/herself with other prestigious researchers–. The rate of conversion depends on the structure of capitals in a particular field on a particular time; similarly, in a typical industrial economy the field makes it easier to get profit from industrial activities, whereas in a financial economy profit will be easier to get through speculative activities on the stock market. Thus, there are fields where cultural capital holds the highest rate of conversion, meaning that agents are able to access the resources distributed in the field mainly through cultural capital, like academic credentials. However, even in these fields with primacy of cultural capital, the other forms will help to get the resources at stake –for instance, in the academic field, dominated by cultural capital, economic and social capitals can help to gain access to titles with a high volume of cultural capital associated–. However, the higher returns to capital are obtained by deploying the type of capital that dominates a particular field. In other words, if an agent wants to optimize his/her capital resources, then he/she should use them accordingly; if she/he has a high volume of cultural/social/economic capital, then she/he should compete for resources on the fields that benefit cultural/social/economic capital. This means that the structural location of agents have two components: the total volume of capital that they have and the structure of this volume, i.e., the proportion of cultural, social or economic capital in which his/her total volume of capital is divided –*vid.* (Weininger, 2005)–. Thereby, the extraction of capital gains cannot be only reduced to its economic form, exemplified by the concept of surplus value in Marx. We will exemplify this for the case of language.

4.2.1.1 Putting Bourdieu's schema to work: The case of language

Within the classic tradition of structuralist linguistics, the main role attributed to language is the communicative one (Saussure, 1974[1916]). However, from the perspective of Pierre Bourdieu, it is in the social realm where language articulates its classificatory function (Bourdieu, 1982). It is in the linguistic market, that constitutes the field where language is implemented, that a given degree of linguistic competence gets its differential value. Linguistic competence relates to the higher or lower expertise of individuals in a given language. Notwithstanding, due to the existence of linguistic gains within the linguistic market, Bourdieu considers more appropriate to refer to this linguistic competence as linguistic *capital*, which is a subtype of cultural capital. The higher this capital, the higher the authority associated to the speech act, and the higher the authority, the lower the relevance of the uttered message when it comes to the degree of attention paid by the receivers. The paradigmatic case of the highest linguistic authority is a mass where, independently of the message conveyed, the assistants will hear the priest in the same way (Bourdieu, 2002: 146). Bourdieu defines this kind of situations, where speech is delivered without communicating a thing, as linguistic *rappor de forces* (balance of power). These situations are not only related to the authority of the speaker, but also the fact of 'having so clearly on its side the institutions, the laws of the market and the totality of the social space, that it is possible to speak without saying anything, just speak' (Bourdieu, 2002: 146).

To define the concept of linguistic market, Bourdieu starts from another concept, the 'kairos', which was used in the lessons of rhetoric by Classical Sophists referring to the idea of hitting the mark. Thus, it is not only related to choose those words which are grammatically correct for discourse, but these must also be

acceptable from a social point of view. Therefore, the idea of 'kairos' relates not only to formal correction, but also to what is socially appropriate. Thus, for instance, if someone is uttering a very formal discourse when informality is required, then this speaker is certainly delivering an inappropriate, bothering, speech. Hence, to speak appropriately, the notion of 'kairos', is the basic mechanism thanks to which the linguistic market evaluates linguistic expressions. In social fields 'there is a struggle of agents and institutions, with different forces and in accordance to the different constitutive rules of this field, to get the specific gains at stake' (Bourdieu, 2002: 157). Thus, the State, the church or any political party are examples of fields in constant struggle for the benefits at stake. The role of the capital relates to the power exercised over the field, so that the field itself will favor those competitors with the highest volumes of capital –in the case of the linguistic market, the field benefits the participants with the highest volume of linguistic capital– in order to enable the access to the surplus value derived from each interaction. To continue with the example of the linguistic field, Bourdieu explains that 'to talk about linguistic capital means that there are linguistic gains: whenever someone who was born in the seventh district –this is the case of the current French political appointees– opens the mouth, receives a linguistic gain, which is by no means fictitious or illusory (...) The very nature of their language (that can be analyzed phonetically, and so on) indicates that he/she is authorized to speak, no matter what he/she says' (Bourdieu 2002: 146). Finally the habitus refers to 'social structures "interiorized" and "incarnated"' (Bourdieu, 1984: 468), meaning that agents acquire their habitus in relation to their location within social structure and, particularly, in relation to their social class. The linguistic habitus, therefore, is related to the different ways of speaking that have the members of a

speech community depending on the location in social structure of that community. Everyone of the habitus present in the linguistic market are linked to a specific volume of linguistic capital which, in turn, will be used in the field in order to obtain the surplus value produced by the interactions within the field. Consequently, the expression of the linguistic habitus in the linguistic market, or field, will result in the linguistic practice, or discourse. This materialist view of discourse understands that the value (prestige, authority) of the products (the different forms of linguistic expression of the agents) is negotiated in the linguistic market. The linguistic market is, as the economic market, affected by monopolies, holdings and the whole set of known strategies enabling capital accumulation, avoiding an equal negotiation of the price for a new product that could enter the market. Those participants in the interactions who have the highest volumes of linguistic capital will be advantaged in the interactions in terms of prestige and authority, facilitating the acquisition of the surplus values derived from the transaction. Thus, there are forces at stake that modify the value that the market gives to every product, in terms of associated capital to each of the forms of speaking of every participant of the interaction. The linguistic capital is distributed in accordance to the way in which the products –the speech acts– approximate the pre-established criteria by the underlying forces of the market, which provide a frame for the interaction. Finally, it is necessary for the market forces to operate that the market is unified, meaning that ‘the majority of the speakers are subject to the same rule determining the prices of the linguistic productions’ (Bourdieu, 2002: 149). Using the example of the Bearn language, in Southeast France, this means that ‘the last of the Bearn peasant (...) is objectively measured by the rule of the standard Paris French’ (Bourdieu, 2002: 149-150). Bourdieu identifies the

unification of the linguistic market with the linguistic relations of domination. These relations of domination do not respond strictly to the logic of economic domination, but to a specific logic that derives from the rules of the field, both in the way that these are applied, and in the nature of the surplus value gained. This is how 'cultural domination' (Bourdieu, 2002: 150) is constituted.

4.2.2 Expanding Bourdieu: towards a law of capital attraction


We have seen so far that the theory of practice by Pierre Bourdieu combines the objectivist and subjectivist view of human action into a single theoretical framework. This framework has two cornerstones: *field* and *habitus*. *Habitus* functions as an internal mechanism of agents for the orientation of practice. It is our view that this relates to Darwin's theory of natural selection (Darwin, 1964[1859]). According to several authors, the success in evolution of the human race relates to 'its superior capacity to process symbols' (Castells, 1996: 92); this capacity enabled humans to constitute groups by the usage of highly complex symbolic references, giving them an extraordinary capacity to adapt to different geographical contexts, climates and circumstances. Consequently, it is evolutionary that the individuals constituting human groups internalize a common understanding of the world, making decision-making easier, faster and more efficient than it would be if every individual constantly calculate his/her utility maximization for every single action to be taken, as RAT postulates. Bourdieu called *habitus* this common lens or framework for understanding the world, involving that the application of *habitus* on the social situations that it contemplates produces human practice. Of course the *habitus* is constituted in a particular set of social interactions, and it provides a correct orientation to practice only within these situations; when humans are taken out of the contexts where the

habitus is operative, they use analogy to orient their behavior. Thus, every peasant who is a new immigrant in a big city finds him/herself 'lost' and therefore tend to make up communities with their fellow countrymen, trying to establish a similar partial social context where their habitus are fully operational in order to mitigate the distress caused by the fact of being out-of-context. Bourdieu called this effect *hysteresis* or Don Quixote effect (Bourdieu, 1979: 122), which is certainly related to Durkheim's *anomy*, as this describes the same situation of dissolution of social norms; however, Durkheim, as a good structuralist, misinterpreted the pattern, understanding it as an effect of society over individuals, lacking the subjective part of the equation present in Bourdieu's hysteresis (Durkheim, 1996[1893]; 2012[1897]).

Capitalist societies are defined by an unequal access to resources. Individuals have differentiated access to economic, cultural and social resources. The theory of social classes by Bourdieu deducts that each social class is defined by its differential access to resources, classified in these three main groups. The logic of exploitation that we find in Marxist class analysis is also present in Bourdieu's, who expanded it beyond the economic exploitation. Thus, if capital is accumulated labor, this also applies to cultural capital, which is accumulated labor since early childhood, where children from the upper classes are instructed in what is called high-culture –visiting museums, theatres and other cultural institutions, inculcation of literary habits, etc.–, building up their taste from their social class. Of course when this children enter the education system, which will evaluate their expertise on the same culture they have been working at home, they have an advantage over their working-class classmates, who were instructed not in high-culture, but in popular culture, that is absent of curricula. The accumulated work

that defined an investment in cultural capital pays off not only in the education system, but also in everyday interaction through body language, acts of speech, etc. And, as in the case of economic exploitation, the surplus value is taken from the working-class, because no one can speak correctly without someone who speaks incorrectly. The same applies to social capital, in the form of relations since early childhood, which are dependent on the social clubs and places that parents visit, enabling the establishments of life-long friendships which are nothing but the expression of accumulated work in social capital, hiding capital behind an image of innocent friendship. This disguising mechanism applies to all forms of capital: cultural capital is hidden behind 'intelligence', social capital behind 'niceness' and economic capital behind 'effort'.

Figure 29. Bourdieu's Class Structure



Source: Elaborated by the author from information in Weinger (2005: 130).

There is a correspondence between every point in this three-dimensional space (x_1, x_2, x_3) and a particular habitus. In this sense, habitus can be seen as an adaptive mechanism to one's structural location within a social space where resources are unequally distributed. Thus, in order to adapt to a life with access to X resources, it is better for individuals to understand the world through a lens made up from a structural position that enables access to this same X resources. It follows that in a society where resources are equally distributed the different habitus, then, would tend to converge, and that individuals in contradictory class locations or in the process of upward or downward social mobility, i.e., with no clear class location, will hold different habitus; if habitus is like a lighthouse and practice is a sailor rowing in the night, then individuals in these kind of situations will have several lighthouses to follow, introducing confusion and distress.

We see that Bourdieu's theory of practice has two interrelated components: subjective (habitus) and objective (fields). Thereby we think that this point opens up two different lines of research, one for the objective component and the other one for the subjective component. The subjective component is identified with group habitus integrated in the mind of individuals. Therefore we can develop research regarding the neurological process by which this process of habitus integration is made. The rapid advance of neuroscience currently enables this line of research; we have already commented some research projects on neuropolitics measuring the segregation of hormones in agents' brains when talking about their identity feelings or their political values (Olivieri, 2013). The research question regarding the subjective component of human practice would be 'how habitus are integrated in people's minds?' The other line of research relates to the objective part of the equation, and will eventually provide an answer to the relations

between fields and between fields and habitus. Bourdieu himself has outlined this by stating that human practice (synthesis) is always the result of the dialectic between habitus (thesis) and field (antithesis). In the following pages we will try to expand and formalize this hint a little further.

4.2.2.1 Far Beyond Bourdieu: Formalization and Expansion of the Theory of Practice

Bourdieu wrote:

‘The major contribution of what must rightly be called the structuralist revolution consists in having applied to the social world the relational mode of thinking which is that of modern mathematics and physics, and which identifies the real not with substances but with relations (Bourdieu, 1968). The “social reality” which Durkheim spoke of is an ensemble of invisible relations, those very relations which constitute a space of positions external to each other and defined by their proximity to, neighborhood with, or distance from each other, and also by their relative position, above or below or yet in between, in the middle. Sociology, in its objectivist moment, is a social topology, an analysis situs as they called this new branch of mathematics in Leibniz’s time, an analysis of relative positions and of the objective relations between these positions’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 15-16).

If we want to understand, or to *open the black box*, using RAT jargon, we should first formalize the relations between objective structures that, together with its subjective integration and reinterpretation, constitute human practice. We will start formalizing the model of human practice by Bourdieu, in its objective component, eventually leading us to its expansion.

Let us depart from the simplest notion of the human world, i.e., the world as humans see it. We have already stated that Darwin’s evolution points out towards

the fact that the human differential adaptation, as a species, is culture (Tomasello, 1999). The superior capacity to process symbols (Castells, 1996) of the *Homo sapiens sapiens* gave humans the capacity to build up complex social relations through the usage of symbols, enabling infinite⁵⁹ variations in the cultural patterns and thus increasing the adaptive capacity of humans to the most different environments. *Habitus*, thus, is the expression of this adaptive capacity, concretized in particular social environments; the *habitus* are developed in accordance with the differential capacity by social groups to get resources that are, of course, symbolic. To say that resources are symbolic does not oppose the material nature of some resources, such as money, but it states, quite redundantly, that everything in the human world is taken into account symbolically. This is so because humans are symbolic animals attributing symbolic values to everything within their world; this, in turn, makes classification easier, and classification is another defining human feature, as it introduces an order into what would be otherwise a symbolic nebula –*vid.* Barth (1969)–. As capitalism is a socioeconomic system based on the premise that the resources available to individuals depends


⁵⁹ Perhaps it is too risky to state that there are infinite possibilities for cultural variation. Following Chomsky's Universal Grammar (UG) –the theory stating that the human brain, as a product of evolution, presents a limited set of rules for the construction of languages, meaning that UG underlies every possible languages and, therefore, that there are *impossible* languages, i.e., those languages outside the rules of UG (Chomsky, 2006)– we can think that there is an underlying common brain structure from which cultures are designed, and that therefore there are impossible cultures. This is the hypothesis of psychological nativism –*vid.*, e.g., Pinker (2002)– arguing that evolution has shaped human brain in the sense that cultures are not developed from *tabula rasa*, but from underlying structures. In any case, accepting the nativist argument, we can still think that the number of cultural variations enabled by the human brain is high enough to guarantee successful adaptation to virtually every kind of natural and social environment on the planet.

on the amount of capital individuals have, then it follows that everything within capitalism can be measured in terms of capital⁶⁰. From now on we are going to refer to agents and objects as *social objects*, as people are nothing more than social bodies symbolically loaded, as everything else. Thus, following Bourdieu, we can say that within capitalism social objects are defined by the volume and composition of capital attached to them. Therefore the nature of social objects can be formalized as occupying a single position in a three-dimensional space where the x_1 axis measures the quantity of economic capital associated to them, the x_2 axis measures the quantity of cultural capital associated to them, and the x_3 axis measures the quantity of social capital associated to them. Figure 30 illustrates a spatial representation of social objects.

⁶⁰ Note that we say 'within capitalism'; there are still non-capitalist societies within Western democracies, in the form of pre-capitalist peasant communities or of post-capitalist 'integral cooperatives' –*vid.* Evans (2015)–. In this non-capitalist societies –in the hypothetic case that they did not have any connection with capitalism– the classificatory symbolism of objects and subjects would not be developed in terms of capital, but instead in terms of 'value' (Álvarez Cáccamo, 2011a). This trend of capital 'colonization' of the human world was famously pinpointed by Marx as the commodity fetishism, *Warenfetischismus*:

'As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things' (Marx, 1990[1867]: 165).

Figure 30. Spatial representation of social bodies



Source: Elaborated by the author⁶¹.

As we have already discussed symbolic capital here refers to the amount or volume of each one of the three types of capital that is recognized in a given field. This relates to the idea of unified market, also discussed above, that refers to the common exchange rate of each three capitals and to the differential attribution of capital to social objects in a given field. Thus, for instance, in the academic field cultural capital holds the lowest exchange rate, dominating the other two types. In a political party, on the other hand, it usually is social capital that dominates the other two, with specific requirements in terms of social capital to become a

⁶¹ The idea of representing Bourdieu's general schema on capital in a pyramidal structure was taken from Álvarez Cáccamo (2015a), although this author uses the term 'value' instead of 'capital' –*vid.* Álvarez Cáccamo (2011b; 2015b)–.

member, for instance. Finally, economic capital is dominant on the stock exchange market. For each one of all these three examples the other two forms of capital are also relevant, but their exchange rate is higher than that of the dominant one, i.e., it would be necessary to invest a relatively high volume of non-dominant capital to get a relatively small volume of the dominant capital. For instance, when a field is clearly dominated by a particular kind of capital, like the academic field, in which tenured positions –charged with economic and social capital, but mainly with cultural capital– are given in exchange of cultural capital, it is formally not allowed the investment of the other two forms of capital –and if this happens, then it will be punishable by law, which is the institutionalization of capital exchange rates⁶²-. Of course social democratic policies alters the rules of the market, obscuring the actual exchange rate for every type of capital in each field; for instance, public education affords a high volume of economic capital that in free market should be invested in order to obtain cultural capital in the form of academic credentials. We can easily see this effect in those private academic institutions issuing credentials with very high quantity of cultural capital associated, which will eventually be exchanged for social and economic capitals, and that require exorbitant amounts of economic and social capitals⁶³ -*vid.* Karabel (2005) and Brint and Karabel (1991)-.

A given habitus, then, is nothing more than an association between social objects in order to better perform in a given field. The habitus of each social class is designed

⁶² Someone could argue that illegal capital conversion is still happening, but note that, if this were to be the case, then it would be necessary to invest a huge amount of economic capital or of social capital. Thereby, the law on the conversion of capital in accordance to each field is not altered. This law was fully explained by Bourdieu (1986).

⁶³ As Khan puts it: 'Harvard's "middle income" is the richest 5 percent of our nation' (Khan, 2011: 6).

to optimize the fit between a set of social objects –agents– with access to differential set of social objects –money, arts, furniture, sports...–. Class domination is an on-going process by which the upper classes capitalize a given set of social objects that are later inaccessible for the lower classes; an obvious example of this is money. Money value does no longer rely on the material with which it is made, but only in its symbolic value; the dominant classes charge money with a precise volume economic capital and then restrict the access of the lower classes to this resource. The lower classes can either participate in this hegemonic market –as almost every social field rely on money as an expression of economic capital– with the condition that they are going to have low volume of economic capital or, on the contrary, go out of this hegemonic field and start exchanging alternative currencies. The risk, of course, is that the symbolic attribution of economic value to this currency only applies within the limits of the sub-market in which the alternative currency operates. In other words, alternative currencies are symbolically deprived of economic capital within the hegemonic system, as defined by the dominant classes. Another example relates to sports (Bourdieu, 1978). Sports are social objects, like money, loaded with *value* or, in the case of sports within capitalist societies, loaded with capital. The logic of class domination typical of capitalist societies is similar than for the case of money or, indeed, for any other social object. Let us take football as an example. There is evidence that there were ancient practices similar to modern football, where a bunch of people played with something similar to a ball divided into two teams to score points to the other team. These peasant varieties of playing football are usually referred to as ‘mob football’ (Marples, 1954). It was not until the 19th century when codes of football were developed, in English elite schools. Different

rival private schools formalized football in different ways, eventually giving way to modern official varieties –the Cambridge Rules gave way to modern European football, whereas Rules by other schools initiated rugby (Marples, 1954)–. What does the history of football tell us about how society works? First of all it is interesting to note that different norms, initially elaborated by rival elite schools, prevail; the rivalry of elite schools is a way for summarizing the competition between different institutions for the same economic, cultural and social resources. The fact that the different laws prevailed indicates that every of this elite schools dominated markets with a similar volume of capital; this control of similar resources enabled that the differential capitalization of practices. Secondly, it is interesting that these rules formalized previous ‘mob’ football. This opposition between *form* and *substance* is a constant in the processes of capitalization. The dominant classes elaborate norms based on shaping what was previously unshaped. Thus, in the case of the Cambridge Rules, they state that it is forbidden to touch the ball with the hands, thereby creating a standard to which compare every act of playing football. If somebody touches the ball with his/her hands, then he/she is playing wrong. The norm is capitalized because it is an expression of an social object –elite school– with high volume of capital. Therefore, to play football in accordance with the capitalized rules introduces the player into the market of the ruler –the institution– giving him/her the opportunity to acquire social capital that then could be exchange for economic or cultural capital. This capital is extracted from the popular classes, who by playing mob football are completely out of the hegemonic standard in the market. This is of course the same process defining linguistic standardization, or any other social practice –eating, riding, partying, working, etc.–. The dominant classes established a new standard through

the formalization of previously unshaped practices; this new standard is loaded with the capital of the class that created it. Therefore, the dominated classes, who need to succeed in capitalist societies⁶⁴, try to assume the *forms* enacted by the dominant classes, which are capitalized and therefore give access to the hegemonic market where these practices has some capital. The problem of course is that the formalization of practices is dynamic, ensuring that the dominated classes never achieve the degree of proficiency in these formalized practices shaped by the dominant classes; this explains successfully linguistic substitution, among other major social changes.

Finally we will add the concept of sub-field or sub-market to Bourdieu's general schema, for we think it increases the explanatory power. As far as we know, Bourdieu did not mentioned the idea of sub-fields in the way that we want to point out, but only while referring to different relations between hegemonic fields –for instance, the different semi-autonomous sub-fields of cultural production, as opposed to the single field of the Kabyle–. But now we want to pinpoint the following idea: whenever the dominated classes have very low amounts of capital within the hegemonic markets, they create alternative markets with their own distributions of capital among social objects and practices. Every agent could operate simultaneously in different fields, and accumulate high amounts of capital within one field or sub-field while ate the same time very low volume of capital within another field or sub-field. This process explains the existence and

⁶⁴ It could be argued that the dominated classes freely choose to participate within capitalistic markets. It can be counter-argued that this is no longer an option, as capitalism is the dominant system, after it has accumulated most part of the accessible resources –*vid.* Beiras (2008a; 2008b)–.

maintenance of the so-called sub-cultures, usually understood from the lens of socialization. But the theory of social practices as an expression of a given habitus within a given field proportionate a structural location to subjective processes at the core of socialization theories. This solves the explanatory flaw of socialization theories, which never explained why similar personal experiences indeed many times produced such differences in social practices. This idea drove us to propose a theory of capital attraction in order to formalize the theory of social practices. At the core of this idea is the fact that social objects –including agents– attract each other in direct proportion to their volume/composition of capital and in inverse proportion to their social distance. In other words, when two social objects, for instance an agent and a social practice, present the same position in social space (vid. figure 30) and are accessible to each other –they operate in the same field– then they will attract each other. The force of this attraction is directly proportional to the volume of capital and inversely proportional to the distance between them. For instance, different cultures –i.e. different fields– can charge with the same volume of capital some ways of eating –body disposition, etc.– attracting agents with an equal volume of capital; however, it is the case that an 18th century French agent will never develop the practice of eating in the same way that contemporary Chinese aristocrats. This effect played by social distance has been mitigated by globalization, which introduced a tendency towards the unification of fields and markets⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ Again, we see the fruitful expansion towards other forms of capital, apart from the economic one, of Bourdieu's schema. Classical Marxists had theorized this unification of the fields only in its economic form (Chattopadhyay, 2002; Lenin, 2010[1916]).

Therefore we argue that this underlying logic of human practice can be mathematically formalized. This will clarify it, as well as it will enable its operationalization.

4.2.2.1.2 Gauss' Theorem

Mathematical representations of phenomena are not the reality behind these phenomena, but a symbolic representation of it. The advantage over any other good metaphor is that mathematical representations are the most accurate way to describe phenomena. The use of mathematics forces the analyst to provide exact descriptions and interpretations of phenomena, preventing the inclusion of black boxes within theories. Black boxes are part of the arguments that make up theories that are not clearly defined or explained. For instance theories based on the notion of socialization usually receive the accusation of relying on a black box when it comes to explain the process that causes the internalization of attitudes by individuals.

Mathematics allows us to formalize a theoretical model with the highest level of accuracy, enabling its testing and comparison with other rival models. So far we have developed an extension of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, postulating a gravitational theory of capital, or a law of capital attraction. In other words, we are stating that there is a law, whose rationale we have already discussed in the previous pages, which provokes an attraction among social bodies, causing the alignment between subjects and practices, between practices, between practices and objects and between objects and subjects. In order to simplify and clarify this analysis, we have defined all these objects as simply *social bodies* with a definite position in social space. This position can be expressed as an Euclidean vector with three components (x, y, z) , each of them accounting, respectively, for the volume of

economic, cultural, and social capital associated to each social body. Thus, social bodies can be seen as geometric objects with *magnitude* and *direction*; their capital volume defines its magnitude, and their direction is defined as a line between the origin O , in a three-dimensional space and the position (x, y, z) that they occupy in such a space. Symbolic capital is not a component of the vector, as this regards only to the amount of recognized capital within a given field. Thus, any social body –an agent, a practice, an object, etc. that is recognized in a given social field– can be expressed as:

$$\vec{B} \equiv (B_x, B_y, B_z)$$

Being B_x, B_y, B_z the components of the vector \vec{B} , referring respectively to the amount of economic, cultural and social capital with which the body is charged in a given social field. We can standardize the volume of capital on a scale from 0 to 10. In order to exist socially within a given social field, capital must be *symbolic* capital, meaning that we should be able to measure the volume/composition of capital for every social body within that given field⁶⁶.

⁶⁶ Taking the example of an academic journal, the citation index would be an index of the volume of capital associated to the journal within the academic field. We could breakdown the composition of its capital using different methods. One could be to conduct a survey among capitalized agents within the field –professors with expertise on the area of the journal– asking them to answer questions that are proxies of the three types of capital. For instance:

- To what degree, in a scale from 0 to 10, do you think that having published in this journal improves your...
 - Networking with other colleagues? (Proxy to social capital)
 - Chances of salary increase? (Proxy to economic capital)
 - Academic recognition by other colleagues? (Proxy to cultural capital)

Figure 31. Representation of a social body in a vector space




Figure 31 represents a social body as a vector in a given field. The social body is a vector in the social space OB -from origin, O , to the point B - with a magnitude and a direction; its magnitude refers to the total volume of capital (B_x, B_y, B_z) -in the example $(3, 2, 5)$ - and the direction is defined by the line from origin, O , to point B .

We have argued that there is a force attracting social bodies that is greater the greater the similarity between the volume and the composition of their capital – their position in the three-dimensional social space– and is weaker the greater the social distance between them. We postulate that this force between pairs of social bodies is equal and opposite to each other, independently of their individual social masses –i.e. their capital volume– directly proportional to their total capital volume/composition, and inversely proportional of the social distance between them. We do not need to develop *ex novo* the mathematics regarding the dynamics between attracting bodies as postulated by our

theory, as these have been already modeled. The most fundamental of these models is the Gauss' theorem (Gauss, 1813)⁶⁷.

In the Gauss' theorem the symbol $\vec{\nabla}$ represents a special vector where the components are derivatives with respect to x , to y , and to z . Thus:

$$\vec{\nabla} \equiv \left(\frac{\partial}{\partial x}, \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, \frac{\partial}{\partial z} \right)$$

Therefore, $\vec{\nabla}$ works as a differential operation of something, enabling the calculation of a vector from scalars –real numbers in linear algebra–. For example, $\vec{\nabla}$ can act on a scalar φ , which is a function of position, i.e. $\varphi(x, y, z)$, in order to create a vector:

$$\vec{\nabla} \varphi \equiv \left(\frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial x}, \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial y}, \frac{\partial \varphi}{\partial z} \right)$$

But $\vec{\nabla}$ can act on a vector field as well. This is possible by treating $\vec{\nabla}$ as if it were a vector:

$$\vec{\nabla} \cdot \vec{V} \equiv \left(\frac{\partial V_x}{\partial x}, \frac{\partial V_y}{\partial y}, \frac{\partial V_z}{\partial z} \right)$$


Every set of bodies represented on a virtual space, and thus holding a definite position, conforms a *field*. Therefore social fields can be modeled with the same mathematics used for general fields (magnetic, gravitational, etc.). A gravitational

⁶⁷ We will base this section on the explanations by Professor Leonard Susskind, physicist at Stanford University (Susskind, 2009).

field –and social fields are certainly gravitational fields– is defined by different masses in space. Figure 32 represents a force field, regardless the nature of its bodies –these may be particles, planets, objects, or social bodies–. In order to define the gravitational field we introduce a test mass; thus, moving the test mass through the gravitational field and liberating it in different points we will see how fast, and in what direction, the test mass moves. This operation gives us the two components of the acceleration vector –direction and magnitude– of the test mass (A). The acceleration vector can be defined as:

$$\vec{A} \equiv (A_x A_y A_z)$$

Figure 32. Representation of a field of acceleration (force field)



Consequently we can define a vector from the test mass to the i th mass as R_{-i}^{\rightarrow} , indicating that the gravitational force of the test mass is pointing towards the i th mass, which is creating the gravitational field, along the vector \vec{R}_i . In such a field of

acceleration, every mass ($i, j... n$) makes a contribution to the general force, as expressed in:

$$\vec{A}(x) = \sum_i \frac{G m_i}{R_i^3} \vec{R}_i$$

This is the equation of the gravitational field, where the acceleration depends on position, as indicated by (x) . G is the gravitational constant, as calculated by Newton, and equals $6.673 \times 10^{-11} \text{ N} \cdot (\text{m}/\text{kg})^2$. Thus, the acceleration exerted by the i th mass to the test mass is directly proportional to the mass of particle i multiplied by G , and is inversely proportional to the distance between the two masses. Moreover the direction of the acceleration of the test mass goes along the vector that links it to the i th mass, forcing us to add one more R to the denominator, as this is the distance between the two masses. Therefore the overall acceleration is the sum of all the vectors linking the test particle to the total particles within the gravitational field. This gravitational field can be summarized as the divergence of A :

$$\vec{\nabla} \cdot \vec{A}$$

Thus, if we only had a gravitational field made up of one single mass, then all the gravitational force of the field would be directed towards one single point. We refer to this effect as the divergence of the acceleration field. To build up the equation for this particular case, it was necessary to invent the concept of 'mass density', which refers to the amount of mass per unit volume, and is known as ρ . It is therefore a field in itself, a density field, and can be expressed as:

$$\rho = \frac{\Delta m}{\Delta v}$$

The relation between the density field (ρ) and the gravitational field, is expressed as a field equation:

$$\vec{\nabla} \cdot \vec{A} = -4\pi\rho G$$

Where the gravitational constant G is proportionate to the amount of mass (ρ); the minus sign relates to the fact that in a field with one single mass, the force converges into that point, and convergence is negative divergence ($-\nabla$). This equation is known as Gauss' law, and was formulated by Gauss in 1835 and accounts for the acceleration in a gravitational field that contains only one particle.

Gauss' theorem establishes that in a given field, which has a divergence, we can integrate the divergence over the volume inside the region. For instance if we had a spherical field, we can break up the space of it into three-dimensional little cubes in order to integrate the divergence within each of the cubes while multiplying it by the volume of each cube; finally, we will be able to add up all the divergences calculated for every cube making up the sphere so we have the overall divergence.

Thus:

$$\nabla \cdot A = \sum_{i,j...n} \int \nabla \cdot A_{i,j...n} \times (d_x, d_y, d_z)$$

The field A of each of the cubes has a component perpendicular to its surface (A_{\perp}) and Gauss's theorem states that the integral of the whole divergence of A is equal to the integral over the boundary (σ); therefore:

$$\int \nabla \cdot A (dx, dy, dz) = \int d\sigma A_{\perp}$$

Accordingly, it is possible to know the gravitational field of a sphere by surrounding it with another sphere. As Gauss' law states that the divergence of a field A equals $-4\pi\rho G$, then:

$$\int \nabla \cdot A (dx, dy, dz) = -4\pi G \int \rho d^3x$$

As $-4\pi G$ is just a constant we can put it outside the integral, which still contains the volume; therefore, by integrating the volume, we will have the mass of the field. Thus:

$$\int \nabla \cdot A (dx, dy, dz) = -4\pi GM.$$

Therefore $-4\pi GM$ must equal the perpendicular component of the gravitational field. Given that the mass distribution of a sphere is isotropic, its gravitational field must be isotropic as well, i.e., the gravitational component of the spherical field will be the same at every point of the surface of the sphere, simplifying the calculation as: $A_{\perp} \int d\sigma$. As the integral of $d\sigma$ is the area of the sphere, then:

$$-4\pi GM = A_{\perp} 4\pi R^2, \text{ or: } -GM = A_{\perp} R^2$$

Consequently, the gravitational field of a mass (A_{\perp}) can be defined as:

$$A_{\perp} = -MG/R^2$$

Thus, Gauss' calculation matches exactly Newton's universal gravitation. Therefore, what we really have here is a mathematical expression of a field of attraction between bodies that can be applied as well to fields made up of social bodies.

4.2.3 Why people vote the way we do?

After this long theoretical and methodological trip we have finally arrived to a point from which we are able to provide an adequate answer to our research question. Due to the fact that existing theories on electoral behavior do not match the data, we have elaborated a new theoretical framework from an expansion of the theory of practice, initially developed notably by Bourdieu (1987). We have further developed Bourdieu's approach, given it mathematical formalization as well as expanding it through the notion of sub-fields. Regarding the former, we have developed a mathematical formalization for Bourdieu's general theory; thus, it is possible to see it under the lens of attraction between social bodies in a vector space defined by the quantities of economic, cultural and social capital that are attached to them in a given social field. In this sense, social fields are understandable under the logic of general field theories, such as Newton's gravitation field or Gauss' theorem. These two theories provided mathematical expressions of attraction between bodies, called gravitation by Newton and negative divergence by Gauss. We have seen that this general law of attraction between bodies in a given field suits Bourdieu's theory of practice and help to its operationalization and formalization. Thus, every social body in a given social space holds a specific, measurable, quantity of economic, cultural and social capital; the attraction between social bodies is in direct proportion to the total volume of aggregated capital –called by Bourdieu 'symbolic' capital, i.e., the volume

of capital effectively recognized in a given field– and inversely proportional to the distance between bodies. The first part of this general law explains practice, for example linguistic practices; thus, in a multilingual field where one language accumulates more economic, cultural and social capital, a process of linguistic substitution is foreseeable as part of a general strategy towards upward social mobility, although some sort of difference between linguistic varieties will always remain as long as there are class differences, since ‘there is a clear relation between the accessibility to codes by the community, its knowledge, proficiency and use, and the forms of social stratification’ (Álvarez-Cáccamo, 1987: 132). In fact, the case of Galician linguistic change matches perfectly the theory of practice, since Galicians massively adopted the Spanish language only after internal immigration from rural areas and into the Galician cities, where the distribution of *capital* among languages –Spanish held the highest volume of economic, cultural and social capital– was different to the distribution of *value* in the rural villages – where Galician enabled social cohesion, through its associated social, cultural and economic use-value–⁶⁸. Ethnographers have noted that until the 1980s there was a social taboo in rural Galicia avoiding parents to speak Spanish to their children, as it was seen as presumptuous; however, coinciding in time with the massive introduction of TV and of the Spanish education system, this taboo came to an end,

⁶⁸ Of course, we follow here Marx’s classical distinction between use-value and exchange-value:

“The commodity itself appears as unity of two aspects. It is use value, i.e. object of the satisfaction of any system whatever of human needs. This is its material side, which the most disparate epochs of production may have in common, and whose examination therefore lies beyond political economy. Use value falls within the realm of political economy *as soon as it becomes modified by the modern relations of production, or as it, in turn, intervenes to modify them.*” (Marx, 1993[1858]: 851, emphasis in the original).

accelerating linguistic substitution. The introduction of these two socialization agents in the social field of rural Galicia had altered the location of the social object 'Spanish language' in the social space, as well as it altered, or even introduced, the object 'Galician language' (Álvarez-Cáccamo, 1991). But the very field was altered itself, since these two agents also introduced a new structure of social space with new forms of upward and downward social mobility, which progressively substituted the different forms of the so-called traditional society –*vid.*, e.g., Fernández de Rota (1987) for an analysis of social mobility in terms of weak and strong houses, typical of that society–. Rural Galicia became then part of Spanish capitalism, where social mobility was higher than in the traditional system and it went hand in hand with the acquisition of capital, in its cultural, social and economic forms; in parallel, Spanish was culturally capitalized through the education system. In this sense, national languages are no more than particular linguistic varieties capitalized by the States to, circularly, increase the symbolic capital of the State that initially capitalized them –*vid.*, e.g., Billig (1995)–. Thus, a typical pattern from the 1950s onwards was that rural marriages immigrated into the city looking for upward mobility; in order to accomplish this objective, they transformed the use-value of their lands into economic capital –they sold them in exchange of money–, transformed the use-value of their language into cultural capital –they abandoned Galician in exchange of the cultural capital associated to Spanish–, and transform the use-value of their social relations into social capital – as soon as they arrived to the city they transform economic and cultural capital into social capital, becoming members of one of the different urban social clubs; the more aggregated economic and cultural capital they had, the higher the social club they became members of. This of course, involved an abandonment of the

network of social relations they previously had in the rural, defined as a complex combination of individualism and solidarity (Gondar, 1993)-.

We have conducted six interviews to inhabitants of the Galician city of Corunna. Two of them had immigrated to the city during the past ten years, another two were sons of parents who arrived the city during the 1970s, and another two were sons and grandsons of inhabitants of Corunna. One of the respondents of the second group is the son of immigrants from a rural area of Lugo, 100 kilometers away from Corunna. The man, already in his 50s is not fluent in Galician, although his parents were both Galician-speakers –although they tried to avoid speaking Galician in front of the respondent– explained how their parents oriented aggressively his social relations. His parents had good productive lands to sell back in the rural and thus could immigrate to Corunna with a relative high volume of economic capital; this volume enable them not to live in one of the peripheral neighborhoods, with lower house prices, where many rural immigrants lived. They wanted to live near the city center in order to enroll his son in one of the middle-class schools of the city; he remembered how his parents went into economic difficulties, but never stopped being members of a famous middle-class social club of the city, as well as he remembered his mother’s obsession with the quality of his child’s shoes. He finally got a middle-class job and his current relationships, many of them were initiated when he was a child, are either second generation or third generation immigrants like him, and all of them share the same class location. He is still a member of his parents’ social club and is a very good player at padel, a middle/upper class sport. He enrolled his children into an upper-class social club of Corunna and one of them is a very good player of tennis, an upper-classes sport (*vid.* Bourdieu 2012[1979]). Neither his wife, nor his friends can speak fluent

Galician, but his children can speak the standard variety of the language taught in the education system, although they have never really used it outside school.

Paradoxically the respondents showing the highest sympathies for Galician language are those belonging to the group of Corunna-born grandparents. In the context of political controversy on the law that regulates the teaching of Galician in the education system, these respondents were happy with the idea of having bilingual children. No members of their family ever spoke Galician, at least that they remember, and thus the fear of cultural de-capitalization was not present. The Galician spoken by their children is of course the standard variety, which accumulates some sort of cultural capital in some particular fields, like the literary field. Thus, the social distance from the de-capitalized forms of Galician and from the class who spoke it is so huge that they can allow themselves to appropriate the capital associated to its standard variety, while this was not possible to second-generation immigrants. Moreover, the volume of social capital of this Corunna-born grandparents group was notably higher, with friends directly involved in the cultural world, like artist, art dealers, etc. a field where Galician language has associated capital, in its three forms –*vid.*, e.g., Álvarez-Cáccamo (1997; 2003) and, particularly, Álvarez-Cáccamo (2011c):

‘The overlaps between the networks of these fields are clear, even clearer in our society due to the anomalous character of language capitalization: sociolinguists who are writers and politicians, teachers who write, editors who are teachers and political figures, etc. etc. This cultural capital of Galician circulates around, but is sparsely convertible into the broader market circuit that determines social and economic locations and that “natural” “mobility” in class societies’–.

Therefore the sympathy for Galician among urban upper classes is intimately related to their higher social capital, without which Galician cultural capital cannot be implemented, and thus never achieving the state of symbolic capital. On the other hand, the ghost of decapitalization is still very present among second-generation immigrants, who present the fiercest attacks on Galician language. Consequently this constitutes a perfect example of the law of capital attraction: *directly proportional to its mass, inversely proportional to its distance.*

Habitus, in this case linguistic habitus, can be seen clearly as a force causing an acceleration between social bodies that is equal and opposite to each other. This acceleration equals the product of the masses of the two bodies divided by the distance between these bodies. *This general force does not determine human practice, but rather orients it as an attraction between social objects;* although unlikely, it is possible to break this force, in the same way that it is possible to swim against the flow when you can do it otherwise. Therefore, habitus bounds rational choice, by framing it. We argue, then, that rational choice equations of utility maximization should be widened in order to integrate the general attraction caused by habitus; the result of this integration would be the most accurate predictor of human practice. The bigger the masses of social bodies and the lower the distance between them, the smaller the weight of rational calculation, and viceversa. This explains why rational choice can effectively predict simple types of behavior, like in the prisoner's dilemma (Chess, 1988) or even in football penalty kicking (Palacios-Huerta, 2003), while it presents important prediction flaws on complex ones, like voting behavior (Feddersen, 2004). By formalizing the strength of the habitus we will then have an accurate approximation to human practices, and this is the contribution this work wants to make. This could be developed by

formalizing the strength of the habitus from '1' (no force at all) to '0' (maximum strength); then we will simply need to multiply the appropriate equation of utility maximization times this coefficient. But first, we have to formalize the effect of habitus.

We have said that the strength of habitus is the social version of a force field. This enables us to draw the vector equation:

$$\vec{A}(x) = \sum_i \frac{S_i}{R_i^3} \vec{R}_i$$

Where:

$$S_i = \| S \| = \sqrt{S_1^2 + S_2^2 + S_3^2}$$

Meaning $\| S \|$ the Euclidean length or magnitude of the vector \vec{S} , symbolic capital, which is composed by the economic capital component, S_1 , the cultural capital component, S_2 , and the social capital component, S_3 .

And:

$$R_i = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i - q_i)^2}$$

Meaning the overall distance within the three-dimensional Euclidean space that defines any social field.

Thus, the force of a given social field X can be equally expressed as:

$$A(x) = \sum_i \frac{\sqrt{S_1^2 + S_2^2 + S_3^2}}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i - q_i)^2}}$$

We have stated that social objects are located within a vector space with three components, equal to the three-dimensional representation of their symbolic capital derived from economic, cultural, and social forms. Thus, the force of vector \vec{A} between two or more social bodies in a particular social field X , equals the volume of the symbolic capital (S) –the sum of the economic (E), cultural (C), and social (s) capital effectively recognized in that given social field X – for each of the social bodies present in the field (i), divided by the Euclidean distance of the overall symbolic capital (S) present in that field X (S_x). In the vector form of the equation, the final \vec{R}_i indicates that the acceleration happens in the direction indicated by this vector (*vid.* fig. 32). Therefore we have to divide the equation by this very distance, in order to avoid the loss of equilibrium, and that is why the denominator is cubed and not just squared. As we have seen, we could express the same equation in its simpler, non-vector, form in which the denominator would be just squared.

Consequently, the force of attraction between two social bodies is equal and opposite of each other, no matter the differences in the volume of capital between them. The bigger the capital volume of a social object, the bigger its force of attraction towards other social objects. This is why social distance plays such an important role to the maintenance of class divisions that Bourdieu called simply *distinction*. Social distance plays here a determinant role by guaranteeing that social bodies do not converge around one single set of highly capitalized social

objects. This is why the substitution of Galician by Spanish took so long since the first introduction of Spanish as an administrative language mainly during the 17th century and cannot be understood in terms of the dyad imperialism/resistance, as in Rodríguez (1976). The social fields present in rural Galicia were not integrated into the social fields where Spanish is at a reasonable social distance until the 1970s, thanks to the massive introduction of Spanish TV and the education system. It is true that before that time some institutions used Spanish, notably the Church and the local political elites, but these were socially very distant. The 1970s combined the introduction of the universal education system, in Spanish, the introduction of TV, in Spanish, and the possibility of social mobility in the cities, also in Spanish. This enabled the transformation of use-values into exchange-values in order to access a capitalist market where an individual's location depends on the volume of overall capital that he/she has, and where everything is commodified, including language, as Marx anticipated –commodity fetishism– and later ethnographic research confirmed (Heller, 2011). The main factor breaking the taboo on the generational transmission of Spanish was, in fact, the reduction of the social distance with Spanish within the urban sub-fields where the first-generation immigrants went to live in⁶⁹. Here we see the relevance of sub-field, for as the overall urban inequality was in fact much higher than the rural one, it was not within sub-fields. We argue that when inequality is too high, and thus the

⁶⁹ In other words, in the new urban sub-fields it was possible to get a job as, for example, babysitter or bellhop, if individuals showed enough capital, also cultural capital in its linguistic variation. This social mobility from peasantry towards working-class occupations was not present in the social fields present in 'traditional' rural Galicia, and thus linguistic capitalization was seen as presumptuous. In the new context, however, it was not presumptuous, but necessary.

Euclidean distance of overall symbolic capital is also high, the cultural adaption of humans drives them to operate within sub-fields; if this was not the case, the lack of respect and status associated with decapitalization would be incompatible with happiness and human fulfillment. Therefore, sub-fields are always dependent of the general dominant fields, but they are allowed to some degree of autonomy within them. The so-called urban cultures are a clear example of sub-fields, where the distribution of capital among social objects is altered with respect to the dominant fields, enabling the pseudo-capitalization of its participants. This theory fully explains the phenomenon of sub-cultures, even the violent ones, whereas rational choice theory does not. Socialization theories does not explain it neither, as it could never provide a convincing answer to the twins paradox –the empirical fact that two people with very similar process of socialization usually differ greatly in their practices. As Leong *et al.* put it: '(...) the twin paradox: the existence of pronounced differences in identical twins who have shared both heredity and environment' (Leong *et al.*, 2012: 118)–. More importantly the notion of sub-fields solves the biggest problem of the Michigan approach on electoral behavior theory: explaining voting change.

It is usually state that the Columbia approach, focused on social cleavages, provide good explanation for vote stability, but not for change. If vote is the product of an alignment between structural positions and political parties, how is it that people change their vote without changing their structural position? But, moreover, how is it possible that individuals maintain their vote even when they change their structural position? On the other hand, regarding the Michigan approach, focused on the socialization that builds up party identification, the theory says that voting is the product of an alignment between individual sympathies built during long

periods of political socialization and the parties that attract these sympathies. How are, then, electoral changes possible during an individual's life? These paradoxes are solved by the theory of practice that, as we have seen, breaks the objective/subjective cleavage. Thus, the practice of an individual is always the combination of his/her habitus and the field where he develops his/her life. As we have explained, individuals are social objects with some degree of symbolic capital attached, therefore occupying a position in the vector space that defines the social field. Political parties are too social objects equally defined in such space. Consequently, electoral preferences are the result of the association between these two social bodies, calculated in accordance with our general law.

Subfields are integrated within the general field, but maintain a certain degree of autonomy, what facilitates a differential distribution of capital within the general framework. This explains, for instance, the appearance of urban dialects or jargon which, spoken by the working class, gives cultural capital in its linguistic form to those agents who show expertise in the jargon. This is possible due to the fact that the general rules of capital transmission are also respected within sub-fields, since linguistic expertise in a given dialect has also attached a quantity of social capital – in the form of necessary contacts with other agents capitalized within the sub-field– and of economic capital –increases the probabilities of having participated in the economic exchanges typical of the sub-field–. However, all subfields are finally subject to the rules of the dominant field, meaning that the capital attached to social objects within subfields is not symbolic capital within dominant fields; thus, capitalized social objects within subfields are punished in dominant fields, where they lose all its symbolic capital. This phenomenon underlies what has been called the demonization of the working class (Jones, 2011), which is nothing but the

decapitalization in the dominant field of the social objects capitalized within urban subfields. This symbolic dualism affects every social object included within economic, social, or cultural capital, like linguistic variation, clothing, body language, music, etc. Eduardo Galeano captured the logic of this social law in his poem *Los nadies* (The Nobodies), from his book *El libro de los abrazos* (The Book of Embraces):

‘Sueñan las pulgas con comprarse un perro y sueñan los nadies con salir de pobres,
que algún mágico día llueva de pronto la buena suerte, que llueva a cántaros la
buena suerte; pero la buena suerte no llueve ayer, ni hoy, ni mañana, ni nunca, ni
en lloviznita cae del cielo la buena suerte, por mucho que los nadies la llamen y
aunque les pique la mano izquierda, o se levanten con el pie derecho, o empiecen el
año cambiando de escoba.

Los nadies: los hijos de nadie, los dueños de nada.

Los nadies: los ningunos, los ninguneados, corriendo la liebre, muriendo la vida,
jodidos, rejodidos:

Que no son, aunque sean.

Que no hablan idiomas, sino dialectos.

Que no profesan religiones, sino supersticiones.

Que no hacen arte, sino artesanía.

Que no practican cultura, sino folklore.

Que no son seres humanos, sino recursos humanos.

Que no tienen cara, sino brazos.

Que no tienen nombre, sino número.

Que no figuran en la historia universal, sino en la crónica roja de la prensa local.

Los nadies, que cuestan menos que la bala que los mata.’ (Galeano, 2000: 59)⁷⁰.

The reason why dominant fields invest resources in the decapitalization of subfields is because these threaten to change their own distribution of capital, thus breaking the bonds between social objects that maintain the field together. Consequently, one given field can only be dismantled or dominated when confronting another field or combined fields with higher overall attraction force, competing for the different distribution of the same resources. Thus, as long as there is inequality, there will be dominant fields and subfields in conflict between each other. Marx identified such dynamic and theorized it by bringing back to

⁷⁰ ‘Fleas dream of buying themselves a dog, and nobodies dream of escaping poverty: that one magical day good luck will suddenly rain down on them—will rain down in buckets. But good luck doesn’t rain down yesterday, today, tomorrow, or ever. Good luck doesn’t even fall in a fine drizzle, no matter how hard the nobodies summon it, even if their left hand is tickling, or if they begin the new day with their right foot, or start the new year with a change of brooms.

The nobodies: nobody’s children, owners of nothing. The nobodies: the no ones, the nobodied, running like rabbits, dying through life, screwed every which way.

Who are not, but could be.

Who don’t speak languages, but dialects.

Who don’t have religions, but superstitions.

Who don’t create art, but handicrafts.

Who don’t have culture, but folklore.

Who are not human beings, but human resources.

Who do not have faces, but arms.

Who do not have names, but numbers.

Who do not appear in the history of the world, but in the police blotter of the local paper.

The nobodies, who are not worth the bullet that kills them.’.

earth Hegel's idealist dialectics, now filled up with social actors who he called the bourgeoisie –social agents taking the benefits in the dominant fields– and the proletariat –being exploited in the dominant fields, and eventually taking the benefits of newly constituted dominated subfields–; although this captures the intrinsic tension of capitalist inequality, revolution –i.e., the overcome of outnumbered dominant fields by subfields– is not a necessary outcome of the process, because in order to occur two conditions must be met: In the first place the subfields need to be constituted –what Bourdieu referred to as the need of the working-class to be constituted as such, as if it does not constitute a proper political subfield, it is no more than the exploited mass of agents within the dominant fields–. Secondly, working-class subfields must coordinate among them in order to overcome outnumbered dominant fields –Lenin's famous anti-structuralist quote, 'without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement' (Lenin, 1973[1902]: 11)–.

Accordingly, if social fields are force fields that hold together due to an attraction between social objects in accordance with a general law dictating that this attraction is directly proportionate to the volume of capital of the objects and inversely proportionate to the distance between them, then we can apply it to every social practice, including the social practice of voting. Thus, voting is a practice that expresses the linkage between social objects with a similar capital structure within a given social field. Consequently we must differentiate voting practices in the dominant fields and in the dominated subfields. Let us begin with the former.

Dominant fields are characterized by having the highest attraction forces, due to the fact that the social objects that constitute them have the highest volumes of capital within society, which we understood as a complex of fields and subfields distributing a limited number of common resources. During this work we have described what we have called the law of capital attraction, but previously Bourdieu has described the law of capital conversion (Bourdieu, 1986), that we have already considered. One of the side effects of the fact that capital forms are mutually convertible is that conversion rates vary in accordance with the primacy of the type of capital that dominates each field. This causes the division of the fields into three subfields, both dominant and dominated; in every society, i.e., in every physical space where symbolic resources are structured within a global social field, this global field is divided into six. There are two main divisions, which are then breakup into three. There is one dominant field, constituted by the social objects with the highest volumes of attached capital, distributing the bulk of the existing symbolic resources. This dominant field is made up by social objects with differential volumes of economic, cultural and social capital, that summarize the different types that symbolic capital can adopt. Since the different forms of capital are mutually convertible, there must be a process of partial autonomization, in order to protect their exchange rates. Consequently, the dominant field is divided into three dominant fields: one characterized by the primacy of the economic capital, another one defined by the primacy of cultural capital, and a third one displaying the preeminence of social capital. Typical social objects included within each one of these dominant fields include:

- Economic capital primacy: Money, successful businesses, large companies, industrialists, successful businessmen, expensive commodities (cars, houses, clothes...).
- Cultural capital primacy: Both objectivized and incorporated forms of cultural capital. Regarding the former: large private libraries, collector's items, rarities, special editions, classical music... Regarding the latter: expertise on linguistic standards, table manners, scholarly knowledge, university professors...
- Social capital primacy: Memberships of elite social clubs, aristocratic titles, powerful families, exclusive parties, friendships in the government and in other institutional bodies...

Social agents embodied with enough volume of capital to access some of the resources distributed in one of these three dominant fields constitute the dominant classes. When any given social object has an irregular distribution of capital –meaning that it has attached significant greater amounts of one of the three types of capital– then it tends to revalue this particular form of capital, in order to prevent its exchange rate to depreciate. This can be seen in the typical discourses of agents within each one of the fields; for instance, successful businessmen tend to devalue scholar or erudite knowledge, arguing that it does not match the necessities of the market and that it is thereby useless. On the other hand university professors tend to despise private entrepreneurship, arguing that the market does not necessarily address social necessities. Finally, aristocrats tend to despise both cultural and economic capitalized agents, typically contemptuously referred to as *nouveau riche*. Of course these critiques are never completely unfold

neither externally nor internally, since it is not possible to be a member of a dominant field without counting, to some degree, with all three forms of capital. Although we do not have data to contrast this empirical trend with the aristocracy, we can do it with the social agents integrated in the dominant fields with economic and cultural capital primacy. Table XVII illustrates the ideological self-identification of managers and cultural professionals in three recent studies by the Spanish Center of Sociological Research, consistently matching the expected empirical trends predicted by the theory (two highest scores highlighted for each professional category)⁷¹.

Table XVII. Ideological Identification and Occupation in Spain						
	January 2015		October 2014		July 2014	
	Directors and Managers	Technical/Scientific Intellectual Professionals	Directors and Managers	Technical/Scientific Intellectual Professionals	Directors and Managers	Technical/Scientific Intellectual Professionals
Conservative	12.8	10.4	19.0	10.4	21.2	10.1
Christian Democrat	8.3	7.2	4.8	5.5	9.1	5.3
Liberal	15.6	11.2	14.3	11.7	13.6	11.5
Progressist	11.0	15.2	10.7	17.2	9.1	14.5
Social Democrat	7.3	11.7	10.7	9.4	10.6	13.4
Socialist	7.3	10.9	10.7	12.0	4.5	8.9
Communist	3.7	3.7	0.0	3.2	1.5	1.7
Nationalist	9.2	4.3	4.8	5.5	1.5	2.8

⁷¹ We have selected these three studies because the wording of the question asked was exactly the same in every of them: 'How would you define yourself in politics, according to the following classification?'

Feminist	0.9	0.5	1.2	1.3	1.5	2.5
Green	4.6	6.4	1.2	5.5	3.0	6.4
Other answer	2.8	2.9	0.0	3.2	4.5	2.0
Apolitical	1.8	2.4	4.8	3.6	10.6	4.5
DN/DA	14.7	13.3	17.9	11.7	9.1	16.4

Source: CIS studies no. 3,050, 3,041, and 3,034.

Agents are capitalized social bodies within the field attracting and being attracted by other similarly capitalized social bodies within that field. Let us illustrate this with an example; imagine an agent *A*, who is a senior manager of a multinational company, and presents the following capital structure:

$$E(A) = 0.9$$

$$C(A) = 0.6$$

$$s(A) = 0.7$$

This capital structure is always relative to the general global field, which encompasses all three dominant fields, as well as all the dominated subfields. This means that within a given society there are limited economic, cultural, and social resources, and that our agent *A*, has access to almost every possible economic resource, to more than half of the cultural resources, and to 70% of the social resources. This capital structure situates agent *A* within the dominant field, taking particular advantage on the dominant field with economic primacy. Formally, *A* is a social body occupying a particular position within a vector space:

$$\vec{A} \equiv (0.9, 0.6, 0.7)$$

This is a specific position within the global field that encompasses every field and subfield within a given society. This global field is defined by relations of attraction between the social objects within them, which, in turn, occupy other specific positions within the global field. The attraction between A and other social objects within the field is in direct proportion to their mass and in inverse proportion to their distance. Therefore, A will be mostly attracted by the social objects with the highest volume of capital within its particular dominant field with economic primacy. It will also be attracted by every social object within the global field, specially by the ones with more capital volume, but this attraction will be reduced if these are far from A 's position; for instance, A would be attracted by a rare 17th century edition of Don Quixote, but not as attracted by a 2013 Lamborghini Gallardo. This differential attraction is the expression of the social law that we have outlined so far. We can estimate that the vector location of the Don Quixote edition would be:

$$\vec{Q} \equiv (0.4, 0.9, 0.6)$$

And that the vector location of the Lamborghini Gallardo would be:

$$\vec{L} \equiv (0.9, 0.4, 0.8)$$

Of course, these are estimations, but the real position of these social objects could be measured through a survey with a representative sample of the agents who are members of the global field. The wording of the questions leading to this characterization would relate to the expected monetary value of both items, to the prestige of the brand for the case of the car and the perceived cultural heritage of the book, and to the expected kind and quantity of social relations granted to their

owners by both objects. Anyway, agreeing our estimated attributions, we are able to calculate the strength of the attraction between the three social bodies A , Q , and L . In addition, we are able to calculate the overall strength that keeps together a fictional social field containing only these three items. Let us start with this latter calculation; our general formula, already commented, is:

$$A(x) = \sum_i \frac{\sqrt{S_1^2 + S_2^2 + S_3^2}}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n (p_i - q_i)^2}}$$

Thus:

$$A(x) = \frac{\sqrt{[(0.9 \times 0.4 \times 0.9)^2 + (0.6 \times 0.9 \times 0.4)^2 + (0.7 \times 0.6 \times 0.8)^2]}}{\sqrt{[(0.9 - 0.4)^2 + (0.6 - 0.9)^2 + (0.7 - 0.6)^2] + [(0.9 - 0.9)^2 + (0.6 - 0.4)^2 + (0.7 - 0.8)^2] + [(0.4 - 0.9)^2 + (0.9 - 0.4)^2 + (0.6 - 0.8)^2]}}$$

$$\therefore A(x) = 0.53$$

The overall force of this fictional field made up by the aforementioned three social bodies would equal 0.53. This is the quantifiable force that bounds together this particular set of social objects. Accordingly, we can argue that the field will hold together until some other field with higher overall convergent force compete for the same resources. The capital attached to each of the social objects making up the field is always relative to the actual resources at stake; for instance, cultural capital will be boosted in those societies with higher education institutions, such as universities, which in turn keep associations with economic and social capital. The higher these ties between forms of capital, the stronger the field and the higher the capital. This is the reason why some universities has more prestige than others, being ‘prestige’ an intuitive estimation of cultural capital which, in turn, defines –

and is defined by– the other two forms of capital. For instance, to follow with the example of the university, its cultural capital will be higher if its alumni comprise presidents, millionaires, etc. and if its budget is higher than the average.

Let us calculate now the strength of the links between social bodies in our proposed example. Since this is a fictional field with just three social objects, three are the possible bonds: the manager (A) with the car (L), the manager with the book (Q), and the book with the car. Since we have defined this force as equal and opposite, vice versa is always included. Let us start with the attraction between the manager and the car:

$$A(AL) = \sum_i \frac{\sqrt{S_1^2 + S_2^2 + S_3^2}}{(\overline{AL})}$$

$$A(AL) = \frac{\sqrt{(0.9 \times 0.9)^2 + (0.6 \times 0.4)^2 + (0.7 \times 0.8)^2}}{\sqrt{(0.9 - 0.9)^2 + (0.6 - 0.4)^2 + (0.7 - 0.8)^2}}$$

$$\therefore A(AL) = \frac{1.027}{0.224} = 4.59$$

We see that this is much higher than the overall attraction of the field, symptomatic of the conflict between capitals –if this were not the case, the overall attraction should be higher, taking into account the high volume of capital involved–. The attraction between the manager and the book is –we afford the detail of the calculations, now that these have been explained–:

$$A(AQ) = \frac{0.773}{0.592} = 1.31$$

As we see this is much lower than the *AL* attraction. Let us finish now with the calculation of the attraction between the car and the book. Again, we will excuse the detail of the calculations:

$$A(QL) = \frac{0.700}{0.735} = 0.952$$

We see that the attraction between the book and the car is the lowest within the objects of the field, illustrating the conflict between the different types of capital –it has the highest Euclidean distance–.

So this is our general model of social practice. It is a theory that provides accurate testable hypothesis on human practice, seen as an association between social objects within social fields of attraction. At the beginning of this work we argued that Spain is a good case study because its two main social cleavages –the national and the class one– are deep enough to test its effect on electoral behavior. But now we are able to declare that we have developed a *general* theory of human practice, which enables the analytical integration of every social cleavage, not just of these two. Thus, according to our general framework, the diacritics at the core of nationalist discourses (Barth, 1969) are nothing but social objects within autonomous or semi-autonomous fields. Languages, for instance, can be modeled as objects in the vector space just like the three social objects of our previous example; this is so because they too have a particular volume of symbolic capital attached, which can be broke up into specific volumes of economic, cultural, and social forms of capital. In this sense, national projects, i.e., nations are just

dominant (or dominated) fields fighting to maintain (or to achieve) hegemony within a particular territory. As they traditionally had the power to impose duties over commodities, they still maintain the power to impose duties over languages and other diacritics, i.e., capitalizing them. This capitalization of particular diacritics is of course linked to the conflict between fields, as it either maintain a capitalization of items that benefits the agents attached to them, or it defends an alternative capitalization that undermines the benefits, the symbolic and material surplus-values, that agents within dominant fields obtain from the established distribution. This is why banal nationalism, i.e., the one of the so-called established nations (Billig, 1995) is always conservative in the sense that it is defined to safeguard the benefits of the agents participating within the dominant fields –it could be progressive when it is opposed to the irruption of another dominant national fields that aim to occupy the space of the national dominant fields, for instance, through military invasion–. And this is why sub-state ethnic nationalism can be progressive in the sense that it aims to depose the dominant fields –which capitalize non-majoritarian diacritics within the territories where national conflict does exist– and substitute them with another fields that indeed capitalize those diacritics that are majority within its territory; the paradox, however, is that as soon as this change takes place, ethnic nationalism starts to be conservative, in the sense that it becomes banal nationalism. In a deeper sense, the safeguard of dominant fields –or the fight for some subfields to become dominant– that characterizes nationalism is always inevitably conservative in the sense that it does not necessarily question the existence of the unequal distribution of capital itself. At worst nationalism works for the maintenance of such unequal distributions, while at best it works for the establishment of a more equal

distribution. How can capital be equally distributed within societies, if this were to be possible, is a question that certainly exceeds the framework of this work⁷².

Now that we have traced our way down to this point we are finally able to answer the initial question of research. Voting is just one more social practice among many, and it can be formalized as an attraction between social agents and political parties, which are both social objects within a particular field or subfield. Therefore, in each social field, each electoral choice will have a particular volume/structure of symbolic capital attached. For example, among the dominant urban fields, one right-wing liberal political party *P* could have a high volume of economic capital attached, say 0.8 in our 0 to 1 normalized scale, a medium-low volume of cultural capital attached, say 0.4, and a medium-high volume social capital, say 0.6. Thus:

$$\vec{P} \equiv (0.8, 0.4, 0.6)$$

Maybe another conservative right-wing party, *C*, would be something like this, with a remarkable higher volume of social capital:

$$\vec{C} \equiv (0.7, 0.6, 0.9)$$

And a far-left communist party, *R*, would be formalized as a vector where cultural capital has particular prominence:

⁷² This is perhaps *the* question that defines critical theory since its very beginnings. It is at the core of Plato's *Republic*, and encompasses Marx's critique of Political Economy and all the works that came after it; recent efforts on this matter can be seen on Wright (2010) or in Holloway (2002), while a good summary of it during the Modern period is to be found in Löwy (1993). Perhaps symbolic capital cannot be equally distributed among all members of society as long as there is capital accumulation –vid. Zerzan (1994; 2005)–.

$$\vec{R} \equiv (0.2, 0.9, 0.4)$$

Etc. Of course, another electoral options –abstention, null vote, etc. – can be also equally modeled, although one particular model should be given for each type of the existing abstentions within each field –anarchist abstention, ‘angry/destructive’ abstention, etc.–. The logic of association between agents and electoral choices does not vary, therefore responding to the logics of social objects previously commented. For the case of very lowly capitalized social agents the association is between their very little actual capital, but the strength of the bond with highly capitalized social objects –including political parties– is equal and opposite, i.e., these agents are as attracted by political parties as political parties are attracted to these agents. In this sense, the bonds could be very powerful, if the capital associated to the political parties is very high. Let us see this with an actual example: rural Galicia. In rural Galicia, the *Popular Party* (PP) has a consistent and clear majority across elections since democracy was restored in Spain, after Franco’s dictatorship. Our hypothesis goes as follows: Galician rural areas are among the most impoverished areas of Spain, and these are mainly inhabited by elderly people. We have already commented that there was a general transition from traditional ways of living to capitalism that caused massive internal immigration towards Galician cities, mainly Corunna and Vigo. There were more chances of success in this internal immigration if the initial invested capital was high, meaning that the wealthy peasants could sell their lands in order to obtain enough economic capital to initiate the urban capitalist life with confidence. Of course, many of the wealthiest of these peasants did not need to emigrate, as the rural social fields reported them enough capital to stay. The effect was that rural

Galicia became more and more polarized during the 1980s and 1990s, with many of the wealthiest peasants becoming politicians. Poor peasants, on the contrary, did not have any substantial volume of capital. Hence, the question is: How can someone without capital manage to go through upward social mobility? The answer is, of course, that it depends on the field. It is the case that rural Galicia was far away from what we may call capitalization institutions, i.e., places distributing capital; for instance, universities, which distribute cultural capital. But someone far away from universities need economic capital to send their children away –or to go away him/herself– meaning that capitalization was neglected via cultural capital. The only form remaining, thus, was social capital. It happens that the party with more members in Galicia –and in Spain– is by far the PP. Therefore the strong link between rural Galicia and the PP can be explained as the result of the trend towards capitalization of decapitalized social agents, who use the only form of capital at their disposal. This relation of exchange of votes for favors, i.e., patronage, has been largely documented –*vid.* Jablonski (2009)– and has been detected by our own research. Thus, in the rural focus groups that we have developed, already discussed, this relation was constantly pointed out; in fact, one of the participants in the groups declared that in his region –South rural Galicia– there were intermediaries called ‘jornaleiros’, who continuously reported the local direction of the party on the political likes and attitudes of their neighbors. Thus, loyalty to the party and to the local leader, worked as a mechanism developed to obtain social capital by agents without any single form of capital. This loyalty is usually exchanged for favors –mainly little rural infrastructures–, needed when someone lacks economic capital, and, sometimes, for economic capital –via irregular job recruitment–. These practices are largely documented, not just by

ethnographic research, but also by journalists, and has been recognized and condemned by justice (Ascón, 2015). This logic also explains the similar process that takes place in Andalusia, being the *Spanish Socialist Workers Party* (PSOE) the beneficiary; this counter-intuitive conclusion derives from the fact that social capital is the key variable at the core of the dynamic –*vid. Ortega and Trujillo (2013) and Ortega et al. (2011) for a description of the Andalusian case–*.

In capitalized social fields, like cities, the association is simple and does not need any further theoretical clarification. In order to test our theory it would be necessary a state-wide representative survey designed to provide an exhaustive identification of (1) the different social fields and subfields present within the country, and (2) the capital volume/structure of each one of the social objects operating within each one of the fields or subfields. Since this would produce extremely long questionnaires and datasets, it would be necessary to conduct thematic research. For instance, in order to predict the outcome of a given elections, it is necessary to register the volume/structure of capital associated to every electoral option, as well as to the social agents with right to suffrage. Since the distribution of capital within fields is always relative to the social position of the objects that integrates them, no ‘objective’ research on the number of party members, economic goods associated to each party, etc. It will be enough with a good questionnaire that captures the capital volume/structure of each object for each field and subfield. For instance, in working-class urban young sub-fields, voting could be completely decapitalized, as the social object ‘political parties’ is too far, making the Euclidean distance too high to generate a sensitive link. In urban middle-classes with mainly cultural capital, the link would be maintained with those political options with higher attributed charges of cultural capital, etc.

Each person, however, has a particular capital volume/structure, and each political option has a particular capital volume/structure in each field/subfield. An ideal survey would register both the volume/structure of capital of social agents and of political options according to each social agent; this would lead to the formalization of the fields, and to its break-up in subfields. To design such a questionnaire is not easy task; a Bourdieu-like questionnaire has been recently developed in the UK by Mike Savage et al., provoking some harsh critiques by John Goldthorpe (2013). These flaws are, however, solvable. Further work to improve this methodology should be developed, as specific methodology is needed. Since the attribution of capital to social items is relative to the field structure, we need representative sampling of each field; this is clear, for instance, in relation with age, as Goldthorpe has pointed out (*vid. supra*). The volume of capital attached to higher education diplomas vary from generation to generation, depending on the distribution of academic credentials. Thus, for instance, an architect does not have the same volume of cultural capital in 1960s Spain than in 2010s Spain. Since fields are constituted in accordance with this type of market equilibrium we cannot, for instance, select the individuals with higher education credentials from a nationwide representative sample without falling into two possible errors: either increasing the sampling error substantially or misrepresenting the capital distribution of dominant social fields with cultural capital primacy. Specific surveys must be conducted within each social field that correctly measure the three general forms that capital can take.

5. Hypothesis derived from the model and testing

In this chapter we are going to test the theoretical model we have built up. This model was built upon two assumptions: the correct fit of the empirical regularities detected in our descriptive chapters and the improvement of the explanatory capacities of the currently dominant theories of electoral behavior. Thus, we have argued that the Columbia approach, based on alignments between people's belonging to one side of existing social cleavages, appears to be too rigid to fit the variations in the electoral behavior *within* social classes. This prediction flaw, largely described by the proponents of the Michigan approach, is also registered in our descriptive analysis, showing remarkable differences on the electoral behavior of agrarian classes, for instance. On the other hand, as we have indicated, the Michigan approach, based on socialization theories, is good to explain electoral change. For instance, it has produced fruitful lines of research focused on the relation between newspaper reading and changes in political preferences –we have already commented agenda-setting theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), which maintain its vigor today (Bouza, 2004)–. The theory, however, does not seem to provide an explanation of stable long-term trends related to social cleavages (Evans & De Graaf, 2013). Finally, as we have already commented, rational choice approaches struggle to make sense of the so-called not voting paradox; as Feddersen put it:

'At least since Down's (1957) seminal work *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, rational choice theorists have appreciated the "paradox of not voting". In a large election, the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small. If each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome, then even a small cost to vote –like a minor schedule conflict or

mildly bad weather– should dissuade anyone from voting. Yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines, daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote. Given the central place of voting within political economy, the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem’ (Feddersen, 2004: 99).

A new model based on Bourdieu’s theory of practice seemed appropriate to us in order to overcome these difficulties to fit the data. This is so because the underlying difference between Columbia and Michigan relates to the debate between objectivism and subjectivism, whose overcoming was the main declared purpose of Pierre Bourdieu, as he clearly states:

‘Speaking in the most general terms, social science, be it anthropology, sociology or history, oscillates between two seemingly incompatible points of view, two apparently irreconcilable perspectives: objectivism and subjectivism (...) If I have somewhat belabored this opposition –one of the most harmful of these “paired concepts” which, as Reinhard Bendix and Bennett Berger (1959) have shown, pervade the social sciences– it is because the most steadfast (and, in my eyes, the most important) intention guiding my work has been to overcome it’ (Bourdieu, 1989: 14-15).

Therefore we have elaborated a model of electoral behavior based on Bourdieu’s general theory. For this, we have formalized mathematically Bourdieu’s model, together with the formalization of the notion of sub-fields. The result is an equation that accounts for the structural foundations upon which practice takes place. In other words, this is a model of electoral behavior based on situated

practice theory of human action. The result, in each case, would be a measurable set of dispositions towards some of the different political options, meaning that each agent's practice operates within the constraints set up by his/her structural position. The model, thus, combines both Columbia and Michigan approaches, and at the same time postulates an integrative model with rational choice approaches described by the Rochester school. This would solve the paradox of not voting, by framing practice within each agent's location in the different social fields that define society. The formalization of our model allows us to check its validity through a clear set of hypothesis testing.

5.1 Description of the focus groups

Our hypotheses are also tested with the data registered in the six focus groups that we have conducted. These focus groups were developed in the Galician peripheral municipality of Ponteareas and each of them counted with six participants. Our intention was to detect the different political discourses elaborated by agents within different structural locations. Thus, we have developed two focus groups for each one of the following profiles:

- Residents in the rural habitat of the municipality.
- Residents in the urban habitat of the municipality.
- Commuters living in Ponteareas but working in the nearby much bigger city of Vigo –while Ponteareas counted 23,115 inhabitants on 1 January 2014, Vigo counted 294,997 in that date⁷³–.


The logic underlying this selection was double. Firstly, we wanted to isolate different sub-fields by collecting data from restricted habitats, where the amount

⁷³ According to official data of the National Institute of Statistics of Spain (www.ine.es).


of capital is limited enough to avoid the proliferation of dominant fields and subfields.

The development of qualitative research in this municipality seemed particularly good to us, due to the fact that it is a Galician medium-size municipality with enough internal habitat variability to test our hypothesis (*vid.* figure 33).


Figure. 33 Distribution of the population in Pontareas (2011)



Source: National Statistics Institute (INE), 2011 Census.



Furthermore, the population is distributed among the different habitats that make up the village. Figure 34 shows the distribution of the population among the administrative sections conforming the municipality.



We have established habitat as the common variable for our focus groups because this way we will be able to register the different political discourses within every social field, enabling us to test the different hypothesis of our model. Since the idea is to capture these discourses, we have developed two groups for each habitat category, in accordance with ideology. Thus, we have a more rightist and a more leftist group for each habitat category. In all six groups we sought gender parity, and this was achieved for every one of them, that maintain a proportion within the range 60/40 per cent regarding gender. We did not control variables such as education or occupation, in order to introduce variability within these key

variables, enabling us to test our hypothesis. The six focus groups were conducted between July and August 2014.

5.2 Analysis of the focus groups

The main hypothesis derived by our model could be summarized as follows:

There is no simple association between political cleavages and voting behavior. The association is rather between agents' structural location and political options that share a similar capital volume/structure. In other words, the association is between social objects with similar amounts of capital (capital volume) and type of capital (capital structure).

This hypothesis fits the data shown in our descriptive chapter that features a spatial analysis of voting behavior in the general elections of Spain (1977-2011). Thanks to these analyses we have demonstrated that similar structural locations are aligned with different, sometimes ideologically opposed, political options. This would explain, for instance, the sustained differential support to either the PP or the PSOE by deactivated rural municipalities in different ACs. This would explain as well internal variations within some ACs, usually considered as outliers. In accordance to our model these alignments depend on the capital structure within each social fields, and thereby it can solve the predictive flaws of the other three theories. Thus, according to the Columbia model, there should be alignments between social cleavages –namely classes and national identity– and particular political options; however this is not happening. The Michigan model, on the other hand, would propose alignments between variations in people's primary and secondary processes of socialization and political options; this prediction, however, does not fit the registered trends of steady alignments between classes

and political options –although the political options differ, questioning the Columbia approach–. The Rochester school provides a model that is different to each individual; the trends between cleavages and different political options could be seen as an illusion, result of the aggregation of individual equations of utility maximization. However, a rational choice model of voting behavior has not been theorized yet, as we have seen previously.

The data of our focus groups fits the hypothesis. This is very clear on the two rural focus groups. Although the structural location of its participants is very similar and is defined by an overall absence of capital⁷⁴, we have found the same discourses for justifying different voting behaviors, responding to the structure of the different subfields where they live in. Thus, one of the participants commented on FG2 while justifying her vote for the PSOE:

‘They are good people, good neighbors (...) You can always rely on them and ask for any help you may need and they listen. If they can help, they will... the thing is that you have to make yourself heard. Me, for instance, when they governed the Xunta [Note: Galician Autonomous Government] I went there and talk to X because

⁷⁴ The average age is 58 years for the rightwing-oriented rural group (FG1), while it is 56 years for the leftwing group (FG2). Regarding occupations, 50% of the participants in the rightwing group are retired, 33.3% occupied, and 16.7% unemployed with previous working experience. These proportions are, for the leftwing-oriented rural group, 33.3% retired, 50% occupied, and 16.7% unemployed. Regarding the type of occupations developed by the occupied members of each group and the past occupations of the retired workers, these are, for FG1, 60% self-employed with no workers hired (40% for FG2), 20% employee with permanent contract in the public sector (20% for FG2) and 20% employee with temporary contract (40% for FG2).

it was a shame to see the school like that, he... he understood and at the end they fix the building (...) I don't know if it was thanks to me, but they did it'⁷⁵

This participant is a woman, 52 years old, with primary studies and employee with temporary contract. Therefore her structural position is defined by a relative lack of economic and cultural capital –in average these are higher in the other groups– and thus her voting rationality is constraint by an attraction of her habitus towards the capital that she can mobilize best, i.e. social capital based on the knowledge of politicians who usually have family bonds with someone in the local community, well-known to this participant due to the nature of multiplex social networks in rural habitats; as Coleman put it:

‘It is possible to gain insight into some of the ways in which closure and appropriable social organization provide social capital by use of a distinction made by Max Gluckman (1967) between simplex and multiplex relations. In the latter, persons are linked in more than one context (neighbor, fellow worker, fellow parent, coreligionist, etc.), while in the former, persons are linked through only one of these relations. The central property of a multiplex relation is that it allows the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in others. Sometimes, the resource is merely information, as when two parents who see each other as neighbors exchange information about their teenagers’ activities; sometimes, it is the obligations that one person owes a second in relationship *X*, which the second

⁷⁵ Original:

‘Son boa xente, bons veciños (...) Siempre podes confiar neles e pedirilles calquera axuda que poidas necesitar e eles escoitan. Se poden axudarte, axudan... o que pasa é que ti teste que facer escoitar. Eu, por exemplo, cando estaban na Xunta, eu falín con X porque era una verghüenza ver a escola como a tiñan. E el... el entendeuno e ao final a que o arreglaron? (...) Eu non digo que fose por min, eh, pero fixérono’.

person can use to constrain the actions of the first in relationship *Y*. Often, it is resources in the form of other persons who have obligations in one context that can be called on to aid when one has problems in another context'. (Coleman, 1988: S109).

Significantly enough, the same voting rationale appears on FG1 uttered by a participant who votes for the PP; he is a man, 67 years old, retired, who worked as self-employed with no employees within the limits of the municipality, with primary studies:

'(...) but it is also true that they respond. Every politician is there for self-interest, you already know that... but every time the lights did not work, or the road was unpaved in *X* [name of the rural habitat where he lives], you can tell them and they send someone to fix it. And I know that in *Y* [another rural habitat nearby] it is not like that; they always have to wait until the elections (...)'⁷⁶

Thus, we see clearly how there is a link between structural location and voting rationale, in this case between reduced capital structure/volume and the political parties with the highest charge of social capital within each field. The model also holds for other structural locations, as we will see with examples taken from FG3 and FG4. The FG3 group is the rightwing-oriented focus group with participants from the urban habitat of the municipality, the city center. All of them lived there their whole lives, and the parents of four of the participants were also raised and

⁷⁶ Original:

'(...) pero tamén é certo que eles responden. Todos os políticos están aí por interés, xa o sabedes... pero cada vez que as luces non funcionaban, ou a carretera estaba sin asfaltar en *X*, podes dicirllo que alguén mandan para arreghlalo. E eu sei que en *Y* eso non é así; sempre teñen que esperar que veñan as eleccións'.

lived within the urban limits of the municipality. The capital volume/structure of the group clearly differs from the two rural ones. Thus, the average age of the groups are lower, 52 years old for the rightwing-oriented urban group (FG3) and 50 years for the leftwing one (FG4). Regarding occupations, the percentage of retired participants is 33.3% for both FG3 and FG4 –two of the six participants of each group–, 50% are occupied in FG3 (33.3% in FG4), and 16.7% of the FG3 participants are unemployed (same percentage for FG4). The occupations of the occupied and retired members of the groups present the following pattern: 20% of participants in FG3 are self-employed with workers hired, 40% are employee with permanent contracts and another 40% employee with temporary contracts. 25% of the participants in FG4 are employee with permanent contracts, whereas 75% are employee with temporary contracts. The overall economic capital of these two groups is the highest of the six focus groups. According to our hypothesis this fact should develop a voting rationality defined by an alignment with those parties judged as able to perform better economic policies. This rationality is clearly shown on FG3 by a participant who is a woman, 46 years old, manager of a local store with two employees:

‘What I don’t like of Rajoy [President of the Spanish Government] is that he is raising too much taxes, and it... it is crazy what we are paying now. I didn’t vote for that, but I hope that the economy gets better... this unemployment is horrible. Besides, who is going to pay for the pensions? But I know that it was necessary to stop spending money like before. With Zapatero, for example, the PlanE [economic plan of the previous Spanish Government, of the PSOE, based on public works contracts]... It was wasted money. Besides, I couldn’t believe that, but you know

that here all the workers were Portuguese... With the unemployment that we have!

That is wasting money'⁷⁷.

We see that there is a clear association between voting and economic performance, as the electoral discourse is clearly defined by economic policies. The same voting rationality, focused on the economy, is also found in the electoral discourse in FG4. In this group, a 40 year old man, employee with a permanent administrative contract in the public sector, argues that his vote to the BNG is due to the fact that:

'They are the ones who care about what is ours. Look the Basques or the Catalans...

but we keep voting for the PP. Feijóo [President of the Galician Government, member of the PP] wants to go to Madrid, to the government... It is not to be selfish to care about what is ours... we are among the poorest in Spain'⁷⁸.

Finally, we will comment the voting rationalities showed in groups FG5 and FG6. These, as we explained, are made up of commuters who have their residence in Pontearreas, but need to go daily to Vigo, where they work, 30 kilometers away. The structural location of the member of these groups is defined by primacy of

⁷⁷ Original:

'Lo que a mí no me gusta de Rajoy es que está subiendo mucho los impuestos, y es... es una locura lo que estamos pagando ahora. Yo no voté para eso, pero espero que por lo menos la economía mejore... este paro es horrible. Además, ¿quién va a pagar las pensiones? Pero también creo que había que dejar de gastar el dinero como antes. Con Zapatero, por ejemplo, el PlanE... Eso fue tirar el dinero. Además, no me lo podía creer, pero ya sabéis que aquí todos los obreros eran portugueses... ¡Con el paro que tenemos! Eso es tirar el dinero'.

⁷⁸ Original:

'Son los únicos que se preocupan por lo nuestro. Mira los vascos o los catalanes... pero nosotros seguimos votando al PP. Feijóo quiere ir a Madrid, al gobierno... No es ser egoísta preocuparse por lo nuestro... somos de los más pobres de España'.

cultural capital. Thus, in the rest of the groups the majority of participants have primary or secondary education, whereas in these groups of commuters, the proportion of participants with higher education credentials is higher (66.7% in both groups). The average age of groups FG5 and FG6 is the lowest, with 38 years for the former, and 36 for the latter. All the members of these two groups are currently occupied as employee with temporary contracts.

The cultural capital voting rationale predicted by the theory is clearly illustrated by the electoral discourse of this participant of FG5, voter of the PSOE. She is a woman, with a university degree in Biology, 37 years old, who works as a shopping assistant in a department store:

‘Here [in Pontearreas] what I see is that, many times, people is ignorant. I think that in order to vote you must inform yourself first... Look at X [nearby municipality], how they have an industrial estate and the social services are much better. But if people vote because they have a relative in the city council... then here we are... that it is shameful to see the streets like they are now. At least those of the PSOE, I don’t know, for what I read, I think they are prepared to implement a project. But the PP here... what ideas will they have?’⁷⁹

This rationale is even clearer in group FG6, where a man, 35 years old, with a university degree and who works as commercial for a cable company, said:

⁷⁹ Original:

‘Aquí lo que yo veo es que, muchas veces, la gente es ignorante. Creo que para poder votar primero tienes que informarte... Mira en X, cómo tienen un parque industrial y los servicios sociales son mucho mejores. Pero si la gente vota porque tienen a un familiar en el concello... pues así estamos... que es una vergüenza ver las calles como están ahora. Por lo menos los del PSOE, no sé, por lo que leo, yo creo que están preparados para llevar a cabo un proyecto. Pero el PP aquí... ¿qué ideas van a tener?’.

'Last time I voted, I vote for AGE [Galician leftwing nationalist political coalition]... and I voted them just because of Beiras. And that is the same reason why I always voted the BNG when they had Beiras as the candidate. I mean... he is Professor of Economics! You just had to hear him speaking in the Parliament... And then they put Quintana instead. I mean, who was that guy compared to Beiras? Beiras was an intellectual... and you see what happened to the BNG without him'⁸⁰.

All these discourses are just examples of expressions of the political habitus, as alignments between agents' structural locations and the structural location of parties, being both always context-dependent. This is why the social capital voting rationale registered on the rural groups is the same although the party benefited by it differs. In one of the rural areas, the PP has the greatest charges of social capital, whereas in the other, the party with the highest social capital is the PSOE. What these data show is that rationalities –which are expressions of the habitus– do not vary, although it may seem so if we only look at the results of the elections. This crucial appreciation can be seen more clearly in the following table (Table XVIII). To prepare this table we have identified all the expressions of the political habitus for each of the groups; then we classified each of these voting rationales in accordance to the prevailing type of capital involved in each rational. Therefore we define voting rationales as conscious rationalizations of the unconscious attraction between forms of capital that is the habitus.

⁸⁰ Original:

'La última vez que voté, voté por AGE... y les voté sólo por Beiras. Y esa es la misma razón por la que siempre voté al BNG mientras tenían a Beiras de candidato. Quiero decir... es catedrático de economía! Sólo tenías que oírlo hablar en el Parlamento... Y luego van y ponen a Quintana. Quiero decir, quién era ese tío comparado con Beiras? Beiras era un intelectual... y ya ves lo que le pasó al Bloque sin él'.

Table XVIII. Percentual presence of voting rationales for each focus group				
	Total number of voting rationales registered	Economic capital	Cultural capital	Social capital
FG1	7	28.6%	14.3%	57.1%
FG2	6	33.3%	16.7%	50%
FG3	10	60%	20%	20%
FG4	11	45.5%	27.3%	27.3%
FG5	9	55.5%	44.4%	0.0%
FG6	12	41.7%	58.3%	0.0%

Thus, Table XVIII shows the presence of the different voting rationales for each of the focus groups that we have developed. We see that the predictions of our theory meet the data registered very well. As FG1 and FG2 are the rural groups whose agents have primacy of social capital, FG3 and FG4 are the urban groups whose participants have primacy of economic capital and FG5 and FG6 are the groups of commuters with primacy of cultural capital. Of course, although the participants have primacy in one type of capital, they also have some volume of the other two broad types of capital, explaining the registered distributions.

This qualitative testing allowed us to make one fundamental scientific observation: the existence of voting rationalities. The existing of this rationalities, as we have said, are the conscious rationalizations of the unconscious strength of the habitus. We think that the relevance of this discovery is important because it improves previous measurements of the so-called class voting that, like the Alford Index, measure it as a linear relation between the working class and leftwing parties and

the bourgeoisie and rightwing parties. Our theoretical model proposes a more complex relation between class location and electoral behavior, confirmed by the existence of voting rationalities, which are alignments not between classes and particular political parties, but between classes and political discourses. The specific alignment, thus, depends on the structure of each field where the agents are included, that defines the volume and type of capital associated to each of the political options –also to the abstention or to null vote– meaning that the alignment would be with the option that matches each voting rationality.

Another relevant conclusion of our analysis is that postulates that ideological self-locations could be a *post facto*. If our theory is right, political alignments are expressions of the habitus, which, in turn, is an adaptive mechanism that a particular agent with a particular capital volume/structure develops in order to improve his/her performance in a particular field defined by a particular capital volume/structure. According to the theory, the habitus produces alignments between agents and political parties that may be well thenceforth rationalized in terms of ideological self-identification. Simply put, an agent would first align with a political party situated by the media, the social environment and even by itself either on the left or on the right of the political spectrum; as time passes and the agent consistently votes for this party, he/she himself/herself may finally identify as either leftist or rightist.

Another hypothesis from our theoretical standpoint is that the reproduction of social structure is an everyday phenomenon that takes place on a daily basis through conscious and unconscious mechanisms that can be traced back through

people's discourses. When it comes to electoral discourses this hypothesis can be operationalized as:

Social reproduction is also reconstructed through electoral discourses. This means that, regardless the structure of capital, there must be a fundamental difference between the electoral discourses of agents with high amounts of capital and the electoral discourses of agents with low amounts of capital.

The corpus of all our six focus groups is clearly aligned with this hypothesis. According to Bourdieu⁸¹, there is a general opposition between the habitus of the dominant and the habitus of the dominated classes. This central opposition relates to that between *form* and *function*, and it is at the core of the formation of the judgment of taste, that constitutes Bourdieu's most acclaimed research (Bourdieu, 2012[1979]). This opposition translates symbolically the material reality constituted by the fact that the working class needs to sell its human force or power and corporal abilities to earn a salary⁸², while the higher classes need precisely to show the absence of that need in order to socially construct their structural position. This produces differences regarding the appreciation of qualities such as, for instance, physical strength, substantial meals, or contact sports –on the side of the dominated classes– as opposed to physical charisma, haute cuisine, or refined sports –on the side of the dominant classes–⁸³. In other

⁸¹ This insight can be found throughout many of Bourdieu works. See, for instance, Bourdieu (2003).

⁸² This does not only refer to its physical power, as during the initial phases of capital accumulation (Arrighi, 1994), but also to its mental power, as it is the case during the advanced stages of capital accumulation (Berardi, 2004).

⁸³ These differences, together with many other showing the same trend, have been empirically contrasted largely (Bourdieu, 2012[1979]).

words, when social objects, like in the examples related to sexual practices, culinary practices, or sports practices have significant amounts of capital attached, then they stop being just utilitarian to enter the reign of formality. This general difference sets up the basis for the social construction of distinction between classes and finds its way through every social practice; of course through the practice of electoral politics as well. Practically, this means that in every pair of our three sets of focus groups –one for each type of capital– we should find a difference between those agents with high volumes of capital and those other agents with low volumes. And this precisely was the case for the six focus groups.

Regarding the first pair of focus groups, integrated by agents with primacy of social capital, the difference can be seen clearly in the discourses of participant *X* and participant *Y*. Participant *X* is a woman, 69 years old, from one of the rural areas of Ponteareas, who is now retired after a life of temporary works related to domestic service. She stated:

‘And many times you went to the meals organized by them and there was *P* of course... and you had to go! (...) And then there maybe he came over the tables (...) To say hello! You could always tell him something (laughs) (...) Of course! So the ones in charge of the party commission talked about who was going to come, and you could tell him about any problem you had...’⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Original:

‘E muitas veces ibas ás comidas que orghanizaban e claro que alí estaba *P* [major of the municipality]... e tiñas que ire! (...) E logho alí pois ao mellor viña polas mesas (...) A saludar! Siempre podías contarlle algo (risos) (...) Claro! Pois os da comisión de festas falaban de a quen iban traer, e tu tamén pois podías dicirle algún problema que tiñas...’

This is of course a justification of practices of clientelism, from the practical perspective of an agent with low volume of social capital attached. There is an implicit declaration of the need for this kind of social capital to improve her living conditions, in direct contrast with this other fragment uttered by Y. Y is a 52 years old man, owner of a small successful business of wood production. He stated:

‘At the end they are always the same, they are all for themselves. But it is important that they talk to the people. If they don’t, then it is when they get out of control. They must take into account what the neighbors tell them... If they don’t then it comes that they govern for themselves and then not even by chance’⁸⁵

Although this is also a justification of political clientelism –a synonym of the electoral appreciation of social capital– the discourse differs clearly from the previous example. Notably, the utterance never refers to oneself, but to ‘the neighbors’, or to ‘the people’. The speaker explains how politicians should implement good government, not because the speaker needs it, but because that is the best thing to do. There is an implicit claim of expertise on how politics work, and a clear distance between public affairs and one’s personal affairs. As a consequence we have here registered the electoral expression of the general difference between *form* and *function*, between the *abstract* and the *specific*, or between the detached *stylization of how things should be done* and the *raw claim of how I need things to be done* that justifies ideologically the practices of agents that constantly rebuild social structure. Underlying these similar pairs of

⁸⁵ Original:

‘Ao final son todos iguais, todos están ao seu. Pero é importante que falen coa xente. Se non falan coa xente é cando se desmandan. Teñen que ter en conta o que dicen os veciños... se non é cuando gobernan para eles e xa entón nin de casualidad’.

metadiscourses there is the core difference between the lack of material and symbolic resources by the dominated classes and the need to express the abundance of resources of the higher classes in order to differentiate themselves from the lower classes and, thus, socially construct their dominant position⁸⁶.

Examples of this differentiation were also found in the pair of focus groups with primacy of cultural capital (FG5 and FG6) and of economic capital (FG3 and FG4). One of the participants on FG3, 51 years old, owner of a local family business with employees, declared:

‘It is unacceptable that the government is raising taxes as it is currently doing. In order to create wealth, there must be investment first, and if you make the rich poorer that is bread for today and hunger for tomorrow’⁸⁷.

Again we have registered the same impersonal style than before, with no direct reference to one’s own needs. This can be interpreted as an implicit declaration by

⁸⁶ For an application of this difference to academic disciplines within the social sciences, where economics are linked to the higher classes whereas geography remains decapitalized, *vid.* Bourdieu (1980b). The argument follows the general ‘distinction’ framework, by which economics are associated with the study of general laws, abstract reasoning, grand theory, etc. whereas geography is occupied with the study of the particularities of specific areas, limited theory, etc. Of course this particular classification is contextual, and relates to the location and trajectories within social structure of the members –students and faculty– of each discipline in a particular moment of history. In the end, it responds to the particular structure of the academic field in a particular moment, which is in turn defined by capital accumulation through history and, therefore, establishes continuities to some extent.

⁸⁷ Original:

‘Lo que no puede ser es que el gobierno esté subiendo los impuestos como lo está haciendo. Para que haya riqueza tiene que haber inversión, y si haces a los ricos más pobres eso es pan para hoy y hambre para mañana’.

the speaker to express that he does not need any help from the State, indeed any help at all, in order to be successful; in other words, he is declaring that he is already successful while giving the rest advice on which one is the better economic policy to be developed by the government and how everybody should use their right to vote accordingly. It is an expression of an agent who is benefited by the market. It clearly opposes the electoral habitus registered in the discourse of this other participant, a woman, 47 years old with temporary contract:

‘It is not that I am happy if *X* wins, but I know that if *Y* wins I am going to have less days off’⁸⁸

Although this discourse is also focus on an economic voting rationale, we see remarkable differences with the previous one. Again, we see that there is a usage of the first person singular, while at the same time there is a declaration of self-interest behind electoral behavior.

Finally, we have detected the same opposition regarding cultural capital. Thus, one of the participants of FG5, a man, 35 years old, with post-graduate studies, and a temporary job, declared:

‘What I see is that it is needed to get out from certain mentalities, maybe a little outdated. I liked very much the Jazz festival that took place some months ago and I believe that this line should be followed. It is missed to value the heritage, for

⁸⁸ Original:

‘Yo tampoco es que me alegre si gana *X*, pero sé que si gana *Y* me van a quitar días libres.’

instance, without having to repeat always the same folklores. It is clear to me that this should be a priority for the city Council.⁸⁹

Once again, the same impersonal style is used to elaborate a discourse of ‘what should be done’ instead of what I need to be done. This appearance of disinterestedness is a way, we argue to (re)construct class domination through the practice of voting. Again, this discourse is in clear divergence from this utterance by a participant of FG6, a man 38 years old, with a three-years university degree in education:

‘I would like to have more cultural activities. I don’t know, guitar lessons, theater lessons... all these activities you cannot do here and that, to me, is a limitation’.⁹⁰

We see how the schema is repeated for all the three types of capital and consistently in the six focus groups we have conducted. The implications of a bourdieusian analysis of electoral behavior are, therefore, twofold. On the one hand it allows us to provide an answer to the question of why people vote the way we do, whereas, at the same time, it allows us to see electoral practices as yet another mechanism for the maintenance of class differences within social structure.

⁸⁹ Original:

‘Yo lo que veo es que aquí hacía falta salir un poco de ciertas mentalidades, a lo mejor un poco atrasadas. Me parece muy bien el festival de Jazz que se hizo hace unos meses y yo creo que habría que seguir en esa línea. Se echa de menos poner en valor el patrimonio, por ejemplo, sin tener que repetir siempre los mismos folklores. Está claro que para mí eso tendría que ser una prioridad para el Concello’.

⁹⁰ Original:

‘A mí me gustaría que hubiese más actividades culturales. No sé, clases de guitarra, de teatro... todo eso aquí no lo puedes hacer y eso, para mí, es una limitación’.

6. A brief conclusion

The major debate within sociology is, perhaps, the one between those who argue that there are some kind of hidden processes to be discovered underlying human practice, and those who argue that there are no such processes at all, meaning that the empirical regularities in social data are nothing but the aggregation of individual choices. This opposition gave way to a major division within the discipline between objectivists and subjectivists, or between structuralists and phenomenologists. This core opposition produced a differentiation affecting methodology; while the former usually make extensive use of theoretical discussion in order to provide frameworks that explain human behavior, the latter usually explain that behavior by aggregating individual motivations. We could cite Habermas theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984) as an example of the former and proponents of the so-called grounded theory (Glasser and Strauss 1967) as an example of the latter. As a consequence, the nature of human actions vary extremely; they are seen either as expressions of unconscious mechanisms that sociologists should uncover or, on the other hand, as expressions of freewill that sociologists should simply amalgamate and describe. However this whole opposition between objectivism and subjectivism in the social sciences has been denounced as a fallacy by many, and notably by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Therefore we have departed from Bourdieu's integrated theoretical approach in order to provide a new theory of electoral behavior that overcome some of the limitations presented by the currently dominant approaches, which remain fixed within the objectivist or subjectivist paradigms. The key concept in Bourdieu's work that enables the surpassing of the objectivist/subjectivist cleavage is *habitus*. Simply put, *habitus* can be seen as an internal adaptive

mechanism within each individual that orients his/her practice. Thus, there is no structural determination of human behavior, nor is it seen as an expression of aggregated acts of freewill. Structure orients practice, without determining it. Our work expands Bourdieu's general schema through the notion of subfields and formalizes it in order to enable its operationalization. The result is a description of electoral habitus that has been registered in the political discourses of the focus groups that we have developed.

The general methodology of our research departs from Goldthorpe critique and proposal of reintegration of research and theory in sociology. This critique argues that in order to produce scientific sociology we should always depart from the observation of empirical trends that constitute the basis of any explanatory endeavor through the construction of theory. Therefore, we have taken into account data from the Spanish general elections (1977-2011) in order to develop a spatial analysis of the electoral results that showed remarkable regional variations within the same types of habitat. Afterwards we have presented a general review of the scientific literature on electoral behavior, to realize that this theoretical framework does not explain the variations showed by the analysis of our data. The Columbia approach, based on the impact of social cleavages on electoral behavior proved to be too rigid, while the Michigan approach, based on the varieties of socialization theory, too soft; the first theory predicted similar voting patterns for people within similar structural positions, and our research shows that this is not the case, since there are solid regional divergences between groups of people with similar positions. Even after careful analysis on what we have called pre-capitalist effect on Galician class/nationalist voting behavior, the theory does not fit the data. On the other hand, the Michigan approach does not fit the data either, as

socialization based theories postulate the absence of the kind of structural variations registered in our analysis. Finally, the Rochester approach focused on rational choice theory, present its main weak point precisely when it comes to analyze electoral behavior. Consequently, we have developed a new theory explaining electoral behavior. Since the Columbia/Michigan approaches are expressions of the structuralist/subjectivist debate, we have drawn our theory on the general framework by Pierre Bourdieu, which broke that division by producing an integrated approach. Furthermore we have expanded the original Bourdieu schema with the conceptualization of subfields, and we have provided a mathematical formalization of the whole new model. This new theory is a new theory of social practice that can be used to explain and predict every human practice, not just electoral behavior. When it comes to the analysis of voting, our model does indeed fit the variations found in our analysis of the data. It opens the door to the future integration of our formalized model of practice with maximization of utility functions, typical of rational choice theory. As we have pointed out, the main achievement of our work is to present a formalization of the habitus and its effects on human practice. In other words this explains the effects of habitus on social agents. There is still one line of research to be developed in the future: the neurological underpinnings of the structural/subjective mechanism that is the habitus. Together with the formal integration with rational choice theory that would fill the gap between the range of possible practices offered by the habitus and actual practices, these would be the main future fields of research opened by our work. There is of course space for the future validation/testing of this new theory with appropriate data. We have argued that the correct measurement of it needs a new specific questionnaire and sampling, in accordance

with its peculiarities; these three lines of research constitute the future ways that our work can take in the future.

As concluding remarks we will highlight what we think are key points for the validation of our theory. We think that this expanded theory of practice can be tested and validated through representative survey samples. In order to do this we should proceed as follows. In the first place we would need to classify people by habitat, as habitats are divisions within unified fields. In parallel we need to classify people in accordance to these market unifiers. We have argued that nationalism plays a prominent role as market unifier; this is evident for the unification of economic markets, but has also pointed out that it affected the unification of cultural markets (Anderson, 1991). The attractive force that defines fields are only effective if the market is unified; for instance, to say that a linguistic field is unified, Bourdieu means 'that the majority of the speakers are subject to the same law of linguistic production costs' (Bourdieu, 2002: 149). When Bourdieu applied this theory to the study of the Bearn, a region in Southern France, he clarified it by stating that 'even the last one of the Bearn peasants (...) is objectively measured by the rule of standard Parisian French' (Bourdieu, 2002: 149-150). Therefore nationalism works as a market unifier of all three kinds of capital, enabling the extraction of material and symbolic gains within the economic, cultural and social spheres. It is necessary to classify people in accordance with the nationalist projects working within the fields they live in; of course there is a dominant major Spanish nationalist field, struggling for the unification of the Spanish territory in accordance to its rules; however, it is also true that in some parts of the territory, namely those with large ethnic diacritics decapitalized by Spanish nationalism, that have built their own national projects, i.e., their own field

unifiers. This situation guarantees national conflict in those areas where more than one national project is being developed, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, or Galicia. It is important, thus, to classify people by their Autonomous Community, if we are to measure the effects of the habitus in Spain. The institutionalization approach have argued that even in those places with no sub-state nationalist projects, such as Cantabria, or Madrid, the process of autonomic decentralization have contributed to the development of partial market unifiers. Therefore, it is useful to have a representative sample for each of the Autonomous Communities. The representation of the different habitats is also useful because the distribution of capital is relative to these habitats, meaning that a university credential could involve a high volume of cultural capital in some habitats, whereas it may involve a low volume in others. Once we have a representative sample of people for each habitat in every Autonomous Community, we can use a questionnaire that enables the classification of respondents in accordance with their volume/structure of capital. These can be done thanks to the inclusion of questions providing information on the amount of economic, cultural, and social capital each individual has. Additionally, we should use these respondents to classify each social object that we want to analyze, in this case political parties, in the same way; thus, we could ask respondents direct and indirect questions that give us a measure of the volume/structure of capital associated to each political party. Finally, if the sample is representative, we will be able to represent the dominant fields and the subfields operating under the umbrella of the different market unifiers. Finally, then, we will be able to calculate the convergence force of each field as well as the associations between agents and political options. Presumably, these associations will be sometimes strong, and sometimes weak. We have argued that a possible

way to end up the modeling of practice in those cases where the habitus is not very strong by making use of rational choice theory. An integrated paradigm of human practice is therefore postulated by this work. Finally, it is worthy to highlight another future methodological alliance opened by this work; this relates to the integration of Bourdieu's notion of social fields with the general theory on social networks (Requena, 2012). The idea of a situated practice, intrinsic to Bourdieu's work, could enrich social network analysis by modeling social bodies, agents and practices, taking into account their capital volume/structure, by making use of our proposed general equation of field attraction.

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ANNEXES

	Table IA. Gini index at disposable income, post taxes and transfers (1 of 2)																		
	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Australia																			
Austria																			
Belgium																			
Canada			0,304	0,288	0,293	0,289	0,289	0,287	0,292	0,299	0,296	0,293	0,292	0,289	0,284	0,283	0,287	0,294	0,292
Chile																			
Czech Republic																			0,232
Denmark												0,221	0,224	0,225	0,224	0,22	0,226	0,222	0,222
Estonia																			
Finland													0,209						
France																			
Germany												0,251					0,256		0,263
Greece													0,345						
Hungary																		0,273	0,282
Iceland																			
Ireland																			
Israel												0,326					0,329		
Italy											0,287							0,275	
Japan												0,304							
Korea																			
Luxembourg													0,247						
Mexico											0,452								
Netherlands												0,272					0,292		
New Zealand												0,271					0,318		
Norway													0,222						
Poland																			
Portugal																			
Slovak Republic																			
Slovenia																			
Spain																			
Sweden										0,198								0,209	
Switzerland																			
Turkey														0,434					
United Kingdom												0,309					0,355		
United States										0,336	0,337	0,34	0,339	0,34	0,344	0,348	0,349	0,346	0,352

Source: Elaborated by the author from data of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2014).

Table IA. Gini index at disposable income, post taxes and transfers (2 of 2)																				
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	MEAN
Australia			0,309					0,317				0,315				0,336		0,334		0,322
Austria												0,268	0,26	0,266	0,265	0,261	0,268	0,267		0,265
Belgium												0,27	0,269	0,264	0,269	0,259	0,262	0,262		0,265
Canada	0,286	0,287	0,289	0,298	0,302	0,309	0,309	0,318	0,317	0,318	0,316	0,322	0,317	0,318	0,319	0,321	0,32	0,32		0,301
Chile														0,509			0,508		0,501	0,506
Czech Republic				0,257						0,26		0,267	0,259	0,259	0,255	0,256	0,254	0,256		0,256
Denmark	0,223	0,216	0,215	0,216	0,224	0,224	0,228	0,227					0,232	0,239	0,246	0,242	0,238	0,252		0,228
Estonia												0,349	0,337	0,328	0,313	0,315	0,314	0,319		0,325
Finland			0,218					0,247				0,254				0,259	0,255	0,26		0,243
France				0,277	0,278	0,276	0,284	0,287	0,287	0,284	0,282	0,283	0,288	0,293	0,292	0,293	0,293	0,303		0,287
Germany	0,262	0,268	0,266	0,26	0,259	0,259	0,259	0,264	0,27	0,28	0,282	0,285	0,297	0,29	0,295	0,287	0,288	0,286		0,273
Greece		0,345					0,354					0,33	0,34	0,339	0,33	0,329	0,331	0,337		0,338
Hungary	0,299	0,299	0,294	0,294	0,281	0,284	0,294	0,293			0,303		0,291		0,272		0,272			0,288
Iceland												0,257	0,269	0,286	0,279	0,301	0,266	0,244		0,272
Ireland												0,314	0,315	0,314	0,299	0,293	0,331			0,311
Israel			0,338					0,347					0,378			0,371	0,373	0,376		0,355
Italy			0,326					0,321				0,33				0,315	0,312	0,319		0,311
Japan			0,323					0,337			0,321			0,329			0,336			0,325
Korea														0,306	0,312	0,314	0,314	0,31	0,311	0,311
Luxembourg				0,259					0,261			0,258	0,277	0,273	0,273	0,288	0,276	0,27		0,268
Mexico		0,519						0,507				0,474				0,475		0,466		0,482
Netherlands			0,297					0,292					0,284	0,28	0,295	0,286	0,283	0,288		0,287
New Zealand			0,335					0,339			0,335					0,33	0,317			0,321
Norway			0,243					0,261				0,276				0,25	0,245	0,249		0,249
Poland												0,349	0,326	0,314	0,314	0,305	0,304	0,305		0,317
Portugal												0,378	0,373	0,369	0,361	0,353	0,339	0,344		0,360
Slovak Republic												0,268	0,275	0,249	0,246	0,257	0,261	0,261		0,260
Slovenia												0,246	0,245	0,241	0,241	0,236	0,247	0,246		0,243
Spain												0,33	0,324	0,315	0,309	0,317	0,333	0,338		0,324
Sweden			0,211					0,243				0,234				0,259	0,269	0,269		0,237
Switzerland																	0,298			0,298
Turkey		0,49										0,43			0,409		0,411			0,435
United Kingdom		0,337					0,34	0,352	0,34	0,335	0,335	0,331	0,335	0,339	0,341	0,342	0,345	0,341		0,338
United States	0,369	0,366	0,361	0,363	0,364	0,357	0,354	0,357	0,36	0,376	0,374	0,36	0,38	0,384	0,376	0,378		0,38		0,359

Source: Elaborated by the author from data of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD, 2014).

Table IIA. Calculation of $\sum_i n \sum_j n \text{abs}(y_i - y_j)$ for the fictional distribution of Lorenzland											
	<i>i=</i>										
<i>j=</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<i>Horizontal sum of all the vertical sums</i>
1	0	3,000	6,000	8,000	18,000	28,000	38,000	78,000	98,000	118,000	
2	3,000	0	3,000	5,000	15,000	25,000	35,000	75,000	95,000	115,000	
3	6,000	3,000	0	2,000	12,000	22,000	32,000	72,000	92,000	112,000	
4	8,000	5,000	2,000	0	10,000	20,000	30,000	70,000	90,000	110,000	
5	18,000	15,000	12,000	10,000	0	10,000	20,000	60,000	80,000	100,000	
6	28,000	25,000	22,000	20,000	10,000	0	10,000	50,000	70,000	90,000	
7	38,000	35,000	32,000	30,000	20,000	10,000	0	40,000	60,000	80,000	
8	78,000	75,000	72,000	70,000	60,000	50,000	40,000	0	20,000	40,000	
9	98,000	95,000	92,000	90,000	80,000	70,000	60,000	20,000	0	20,000	
10	118,000	115,000	112,000	110,000	100,000	90,000	80,000	40,000	20,000	0	
Vertical sum	395,000	371,000	353,000	345,000	325,000	325,000	345,000	505,000	625,000	785,000	4,374,000

Table IIIAa. Merging of municipalities to enable comparison across elections. Origin correspond to the local administration of 1977; the merging occurred between 1977 and 1979, unless indicated

ORIGIN		DESTINY	
Official codes	Official names	Official codes	Official names
1012 1029	Barriobusto Labraza	1043	Oión
1015 1048	Bergüenda Salcedo	1902	Lantarón (created in 1978)
1045	Pipaón	1030	Lagrán
4025	Beníñar	4029	Berja (since 1984)
4040 4042	Doña María Ocaña Escúñar	4901	Las Tres Villas
5003	El Ajo	5073	Flores de Ávila
5028	Bernuy Salinero	5019	Ávila
5223 5248	Santa Lucía de la Sierra Tremedal	5236	Solana de Béjar (until 1979, when it became Solana de Ávila)

5250	Urraca Miguel	5019	Ávila
5268	La Zarzainto	5236	Solana de Ávila
8173	Pruit	8901	Rupit I Pruit (merged in 1977)
9004	Aforados de Moneo	9209	Medina de Pomar
9008	La Aguilera	9018	Aranda de Duero
9031	Avellanosa del Páramo	9902	Valle de Santibáñez
9049	Bentretea	9238	Oña
9053	Boada de Roa	9256	Pedrosa de Duero
9069	Cañizar de Argaño	9181	Isar
9081	Castil de Lences	9272	Poza de la Sal
9092	Castrovido	9330	Salas de los Infantes
9116	Cueva de Juarros	9177	Ibeas de Juarros
9126	Eterna	9048	Belorado
Garganchón	9145	9274	Pradoluengo
Guadilla de Villamar	9150	9373	Sotresgudo
Guzmán	9353	9256	Pedrosa de Duero
Hinojar del Rey	9158	9174	Huerta de Rey
Hoyuelos de la Sierra	9171	9330	Salas de los Infantes

Junta de Oteo	9186	9209	Medina de Pomar
Junta de Río de Losa	9187	9908	Valle de Losa
Junta de San Martín de Losa	9188	9908	Valle de Losa
Lences	9193	9272	Poza de la Sal
Palacios de Benaver	9245	9181	Isar
9260	Peñalba de Castrointo	9174	Huerta de Rey
9278	Puras de Villafranca	9048	Belorado
9284	Quintanalará	9314	Revilla del Campo
9285	Quintanaloranco	9048	Belorado
9286	Quintanamánvirgo	9256	Pedrosa de Duero
9290	Quintanarraya	9174	Huerta de Rey
9296	Quintanilla-Pedro Abarca	9172	Huérmedes
9333	Salgüero de Juarros	9177	Ibeas de Juarros
9336	Sandoval de la Reina	9247	Villadiego
9341	San Pedro Samuel	9259	Pedrosa de Río Urbel
9344	Santa Cruz de Juarros	9177	Ibeas de Juarros

9364	Sedano	9905	Valle de Sedano
9367	Solduengo	9043	Barrios de Bureba
9402	Valcavado de Roa	9321	Roa
9420	Las Vegas	9043	Barrios de Bureba
9436	Villahizán de Treviño	9247	Villadiego
9453	Villanueva de Río Ubierna	9906	Merindad de Río Ubierna
9474	Villorejo	9181	Isar
9475	Villorobe	9463	Villasur de Herreros
12019	Ballestar	12093	Puebla de Benifasar
12030	Bojar	12093	Puebla de Benifasar
12047	Corachar	12093	Puebla de Benifasar
12062	Fredes	12093	Puebla de Benifasar
16076	Colliga	16078	Cuenca
16201	Sotos	16909	Sotorribas
16252	Villanueva de los Escuderos	16078	Cuenca
16260	Villar del Maestre	16910	Villar y Velasco

17072	Fonteta	17902	Forallac
17131	Peratallada	17902	Forallac
17235	Vulpellach	17902	Forallac
18019	Ambroz	18911	Vegas del Genil
18026	Belicena	18911	Vegas del Genil
18156	Pinos del Valle	18159	El Pinar
18166	Purchil	18911	Vegas del Genil
19012	Alcorlo	19269	La Toba
19137	Hinojosa	19265	Tartanedo
19253	Secarro	19901	Semillas
19276	Torrecilla del Ducado	19256	Siene
19315	Villacadima	19065	Cantalojas
22038	Aso de Sobremonte	22059	Biescas
22138	Lanuza	22204	Sallent de Gállego
22219	Serraduy	22129	Isábena
24013	Salas de los Barrios	24115	Ponferrada
24048	Castrofuerte	24220	Villaornate
24072	Fresnedo	24064	Cubillos de Sil
24075	Galleguillos de Campo	24139	Sahagún
24085	Joara) into Sahagún	24139	

24111	Pedrosa del Rey	24130	Riaño
24128	Renedo de Valdetujar	24183	Valderrueda
24138	Saelices del Río	24051	Cea
24186	Valdeteja	24177	Valdelugueros
24195	La Vega de Almanza	24004	Almanza
24204	Villacé	24212	Villamañán
24220	Villaornate	24902	Villaornate y Castro
26116	Poyales	26058	Enciso
26156	Trevijano	24146	Soto en Cameros
27036	Neira de Jusa	27901	Baralla (changed its name at the end of the 70s)
34065	Cozuelos de Ojeda	34004	Aguilar de Campoo
34085	Herreruela de Castillería	34056	Cervera de Pisuerga
34111	Nestar	34004	Aguilar de Campoo
34128	Perazancas	34056	Cervera de Pisuerga
34226	Villanueva de Henares	34004	Aguilar de Campoo
37084	Carbajosa de Armuña	37093	Castellanos de Villiquera

37093	Castellanos de Villiquera	37130	Forfoleda
37220	Navarredonda de Salvatierra	37131	Frades de la Sierra
40011	Aldeanueva del Monte	40170	Riaza
40027	Becerril	40170	Riaza
40096	Grado del Pico	40024	Ayllón
40116	Madriguera	40170	Riaza
40133	Moraleja de Cuéllar	40149	Olombrada
40137	El Muyo	40170	Riaza
40147	El Negredo	40170	Riaza
40169	Riahuelas	40079	Fresno de Cantespino
40175	Saldaña de Ayllón	40024	Ayllón
40187	Santibáñez de Ayllón	40024	Ayllón
40209	Turrubuelo	40032	Boceguillas
40217	Valvieja	40024	Ayllón
40226	Villacorta	40170	Riaza
42138	Peñalcázar	42148	La Quiñonería
44202	Rudilla	44125	Huesa del Común
47072	Gomeznarro	47085	Medina del Campo

47107	Padilla de Duero	47114	Peñafiel
47136	Rodilana	47085	Medina del Campo
47202	Villaesper	47197	Villabragima
49074	Fornillos de Fermoselle	49264	Villar del Buey
49217	Tardobispo	49151	El Perdigón

Table IIIAd. Merging of municipalities to enable comparison across elections. Origin correspond to the local administration of 1982; the merging occurred between 1982 and 1986, unless indicated

ORIGIN		DESTINY	
Official codes	Official names	Official codes	Official names
1026	Iruña-Trespuentes	1901	Iruña Oka/Iruña de Oca
4025	Benínar	4029	Berja (since 1984)
5004	Alamedilla del Berrocal	5019	Ávila
5028	Bernuy Salinero	5019	Ávila
5050	Carpio Medianero	5903	Diego del Carpio
5146	Narillos de San Leonardo	5019	Ávila
5250	Urraca Miguel	5019	Ávila
5255	Vicolozano	5019	Ávila
9031	Avellanosa del Páramo	9902	Valle de Santibáñez
9158	Hinojar del Rey	9174	Huerta de Rey
9263	Pesquera de Ebro	9905	Valle de Sedano
9278	Puras de Villafranca	9048	Belorado
9364	Sedano	9905	Valle de Sedano
9475	Villorobe	9463	Villasur de Herreros
16260	Villar del Maestre	16910	Villar y Velasco
19012	Alcorlo	19269	La Toba
19276	Torrecilla del Ducado	19256	Sienes
22005	Aínsa	22907	Aínsa-Sobrarbe
24072	Fresnedo	24064	Cubillos de Sil
24111	Pedrosa del Rey	24130	Riaño
27036	Neira de Jusa	27901	Baralla (changed its name at the end of

			the 70s)
37084	Carbajosa de Armuña	37093	Castellanos de Villiquera
37093	Castellanos de Villiquera	37130	Forfoleda
49074	Fornillos de Fermoselle	49264	Villar del Buey

Table IIIAe. Merging of municipalities to enable comparison across elections. Origin correspond to the local administration of 1986; the merging occurred between 1986 and 1989, unless indicated*

ORIGIN		DESTINY	
Official codes	Official names	Official codes	Official names
9080	Castil de Carrias	9048	Belorado
9475	Villorobe	9463	Villasur de Herreros
13099	El Robledo	13901	El Robledo
19012	Alcorlo	19269	La Toba
19276	Torrecilla del Ducado	19256	Sienes
24072	Fresnedo	24064	Cubillos de Sil
24111	Pedrosa del Rey	24130	Riaño

· In the file associated with the general elections of 1989, only one merging was necessary. Thus, the municipality of Pedrosa del Rey (24111) was merged into the municipality of Riaño (24130). There is no need to merge municipalities in the elections thereafter, corresponding with years 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2011.

Table IVA. CIS' time series used to locate political parties and coalitions in the ideological space


Code	Title	Sample	Wording
A402010610	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: PSOE (National)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/National (with Ceuta and Melilla)	And in which box of that same scale would you locate each of the following parties?
A402010620	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: AP (National)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/National	As we have seen, when talking about politics we normally use the expressions left and right. On this card there are a number of boxes that go from left to right. In which box would you locate the following parties?
A402010630	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: PP (National)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/National (with Ceuta and Melilla)	And in which box of that same scale would you locate each of the following parties?
A402010640	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: IU (National)	Idem	Idem
A402010360	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: PNV (Basque Country)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Basque Country	Idem

A402010680	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: ERC (Only to those who answer in Catalonia- National)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/National	And, using that same scale, please tell me where would you locate each one of the following parties or political formations?
A402010850	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: CiU (Only to those who answer in Catalonia- National)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/National	Idem
A402011910	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: Cs- Ciutadans (Catalonia)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Catalonia	And in which box of that same scale would you locate each of the following parties or coalitions?
A402010420	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: BNG (Galicia)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Galicia	And in which box of that same scale would you locate each of the following parties?
A402010320	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: HB (Basque Country)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Basque Country	And using this same scale from 1 to 10, could you tell me where would you locate each of the political parties that I am going to mention you?
A402010310	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: EE (Basque Country)	Idem	As we have seen, when talking about politics we normally use the expressions left and right. On this card there are a number of boxes that go from left to right. In which box would you locate the following parties?

A402010300	Scale of ideological location (1-10) of political parties: EA (Basque Country)	Idem	And in which box of that same scale would you locate each of the following parties?
A202030290	Scale of nationalism (1-10) of political parties: PP (Basque Country)	Idem	And using that same scale of Basque nationalism, where would you locate each of the following parties?
A202030380	Scale of nationalism (1-10) of political parties: PP (Galicia)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Galicia	And using that same scale of Galician nationalism, where would you locate each of the following parties?
A202030440	Scale of nationalism (1-10) of political parties: PP (Catalonia)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Catalonia	And using that same scale of Catalan nationalism, where would you locate each of the following parties or coalitions?
A202030330	Scale of nationalism (1-10) of political parties: IU (Basque Country)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Basque Country	And using that same scale of Basque nationalism, where would you locate each of the following parties?
A202030550	Scale of nationalism (1-10) of Catalan political parties: ICV/ICV-EUiA (Catalonia)	Spanish population/both sexes/18 years old and older/Catalonia	And using that same scale of Catalan nationalism, where would you locate each of the following parties or coalitions?


Figure IA. LISA significance map for the variable 'voting for left-wing parties or coalitions' (LV)

(Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)




Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Figure IIA. LISA significance map for the variable ‘voting for right-wing parties or coalitions’ (RV) (Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.


Figure IIIA. LISA significance map for the variable ‘voting for peripheral nationalist parties or coalitions’ (NAC) (Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Figure IVA. LISA significance map for the variable 'abstention' (ABS)

(Randomization: 999 permutations. Significance filter: $p=0.01$)



Source: Elaborated by the author with data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior.

Table VA. Inclusion criteria in the different territorial habitats for the Spanish municipalities

HÁBITAT	INCLUSION CRITERIA
Cities	<p>It is considered as city every municipality that meets the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A total population of at least 15000 inhabitants in year 1910. - A total population of at least 30000 inhabitants in year 1930. - A total population of at least 30000 inhabitants in year 1981. - A total population of at least 35000 inhabitants in year 2001. <p>In the same way, it will be considered as cities every municipality being Provincial capital, although these do not meet the aforementioned criteria.</p>
Peripheries	<p>It will be considered as <i>peripheries</i> those municipalities included as part of a Big Urban Area in the Spanish Housing Atlas (2007). In this case Big Urban Areas are characterized by having at least one municipality of 50000 or more inhabitants and the rest of municipalities having 1000 or more inhabitants.</p>
Small urban area	<p>Small urban are classified by two criteria:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If they have 10,000 or less inhabitants in year 2001. 2. If they are classified as Small Urban Area Municipalities in the Spanish Housing Atlas.
Rural	<p>This category includes the rest of municipalities. It is divided into three groups: manualized rural, agrarian rural, and deactivated rural. The criteria for this sub-classification depends upon their social and labour structures, in accordance with an automatic classification criteria initiated with the following rule:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Every municipality taken into account must meet the requisite of not belonging to any of the urban categories. -Every data concerning their social and labour structure belongs to the Population Census 2001, carried out by the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE).
	<p>Manualized rural</p> <p>Municipalities meeting any of the three following conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least 30% of the occupied population being in manual or administrative labor. - At least 50% of the population being occupied. <p>At least 40% of the population being manual or administrative occupied population plus unemployed population.</p>
	<p>Agrarian rural</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Municipalities with more than 14% of their population occupied in agriculture. <p>Municipalities simultaneously classified in two categories including the Agrarian rural category will prevail in this latter one.</p>
	<p>Deactivated rural</p> <p>Municipalities meeting at least one of the next conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Municipalities having less than 400 inhabitants. - Percentage of population aged 65 or more years greater than 50%. - Percentage of population being occupied less than 30% <p>At least 60% of the population being inactive.</p>
	<p>Prevalence criteria in case of conflict and attribution of non-assigned municipalities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - When one municipality is classified in two or more rural categories it is established the following prevalence order: - Agrarian municipalities will prevail in the first place, Manualized in the second and Deactivated in the last place. - In the case that a municipality is not assigned to any category, this will be classified attending to the proximity of the centroids using a discriminant analysis technique. <p>A small number of municipalities, 11, remained outside the classificatory system (usually newly created municipalities that do not have enough information).</p>

Table VIA. Distribution of the main social structural variables among the different territorial habitats of Spain


			Rural			Small urban	Periphery	Cities
			Deactivated	Agrarian	Manualized			
Mass	Population mean	Year 1900	1,162	1,062	1,710	7,715	3,047	56,712
		Year 2010	515	676	1,986	18,394	21,860	25,7905
	Density	Density	13,7	14,1	73,0	316,1	1,301,8	2,161,5
Evolution	Balance (all)	Natural 2001-10	-157,809	-28,677	-54,424	159,880	707,856	263,666
		Migration 2001-10	15,222	-3632	743,177	934,373	2,332,945	751,982
	Growing	2001-10	-1.2	-1.2	1.3	2.1	3.6	1.0
Composition	Ages (average)	% <16	7.1	7.5	13.2	16.4	17.6	15.5
		% >65	37.4	33.9	22.2	16.4	13.8	17.0
	Studies (average)	No studies	43.9	37.1	29.5	30.5	21.2	19.5
		>Primary	38.7	40.8	53.3	55.7	64.8	67.2
	Labour structure	% Cadre	2.4	2.5	4.0	4.3	6.1	8.0
		% Administrative	3.7	3.7	6.2	6.9	9.7	10.1
		% Manual	14.5	12.6	24.0	24.8	25.8	20.3
Relationship with work	% Agricultural	7.9	19.4	5.5	4.6	1.9	1.1	
	% Retired	36.1	32.0	25.6	19.7	16.8	17.9	
	% Occupied	30.3	39.4	42.4	43.4	46.5	41.6	

Source: Elaborated by the author with data of the Spanish Population Censuses, Municipal Censuses, Residential Variation Statistics and Natural Population Movement from the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE).

Table VIIA. Distribution of the Spanish municipalities into the different habitats				
TYPE	Number of Municipalities		Population	
		%		%
Deactivated rural	3.017	37,2	1.555.051	3,31
Agrarian rural	935	11,5	632.912	1,35
Manualized rural	3.034	37,4	6.025.681	12,82
Small Urban	377	4,6	8.213.644	14,75
Periphery	679	8,4	6.934.689	31,57
City	66	0,8	14.843.093	36,20
Not applicable	11	0,1	17.021.758	0,02
TOTAL	8.119	100	47.021.031	100

Source: Elaborated by the author with data of the Spanish Population and Housing Census, 2011 (Spanish Institute of Statistics)

Figure VA. Spanish territory divided into the different territorial habitats



Source: Elaborated by the author with data of the Spanish Population and Housing Census, 2011 (Spanish Institute of Statistics).

Figure VIA. Autonomous Communities of Spain



Source: Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment.

