Bank Mergers in Spatially Differentiated Markets
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Bank Mergers in Spatially Differentiated MarketsAutor(es)
Fecha
2009Cita bibliográfica
Novo-Peteiro, José A., 2009. Bank mergers in spatially differentiated markets, Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 90-96., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2008.01.003.
Resumen
[Abstract] This paper studies the incentives of banks to merge when competing in differentiated markets. Localized competition effects and spatial competition variables can play a key role in defining the patterns of consolidation in this sector. We consider a model where banks compete in distinct spaces of depositor's characteristics. Regional merger is the outcome of the merger game if the spatial scope of demand is low and/or accessibility of services is not costly outside the home region. Otherwise, cross-regional merger is the outcome of the game. The results are consistent with the recent evolution of banking systems in many developed countries.
Palabras clave
Bank mergers
Banking competition
Market definition
Banking competition
Market definition
Versión del editor
Derechos
Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN
0148-6195