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Transparency and local government corruption: what does lack of transparency hide?
dc.contributor.author | Jiménez González, Juan Luis | |
dc.contributor.author | Albalate, Daniel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-07-09T12:15:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-07-09T12:15:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Jiménez, J. L., & Albalate, D. (2018). Transparency and local government corruption: what does lack of transparency hide?. European Journal of Government and Economics, 7(2), 106-122. https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2018.7.2.4509 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 2254-7088 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2183/23461 | |
dc.description.abstract | [Abstract] This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Universidade da Coruña, Servizo de Publicacións | es_ES |
dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.17979/ejge.2018.7.2.4509 | es_ES |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 España | es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.subject | Political corruption | es_ES |
dc.subject | Transparency | es_ES |
dc.subject | Local government | es_ES |
dc.title | Transparency and local government corruption: what does lack of transparency hide? | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.rights.access | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
UDC.journalTitle | European Journal of Government and Economics | es_ES |
UDC.volume | 7 | es_ES |
UDC.issue | 2 | es_ES |
UDC.startPage | 106 | es_ES |
UDC.endPage | 122 | es_ES |