Dignidad: un concepto jurídico inoportuno

Abstract

[Resumen] El autor mantiene que la importancia atribuida por los juristas y los iusfilósofos al concepto de dignidad tras su proclamación en constituciones e instrumentos internacionales post- Segunda Guerra Mundial, no está justificada desde el punto de vista jurídico. Ante todo, la dignidad, entendida en su sentido ético-filosófico, ha sido tutelada con anterioridad a 1945. En segundo lugar, este concepto produce efectos negativos en la esfera de derechos: por una parte, el concepto dignidad no aumenta la esfera de derechos constitucionales y del principio de igualdad, por lo que es inútil. Por otra parte, si se configura la dignidad como límite a los derechos, especialmente el derecho a la libertad, puede conllevar peligrosas consecuencias.

[Abstract] The author argues that it is hard to justify from the legal point of view the importance attributed by legal scholars and philosophers of law to the concept of dignity, following its proclamation in Constitutions and international acts after the Second World War. First, dignity as conceived in an ethical-philosophical sense, was protected even before 1945. Second, dignity must be conceived in relation to rights. In this connection it is possible to observe two contrasting negative effects. On the one hand, the concept of dignity, that continues to be rather vague and uncertain, does not extend the scope of constitutional rights and equality and for this reason it does not appear to be useful in legal terms. On the other hand, if the concept of dignity is adopted as a way of limiting rights, especially freedom, it can have dangerous implications for such rights.